Enforcement of labour law in cross-border situations. A legal study of the EU's influence on the Dutch, German, and Swedish enforcement systems by Kullmann, M.
PDF hosted at the Radboud Repository of the Radboud University
Nijmegen
 
 
 
 
The following full text is a publisher's version.
 
 
For additional information about this publication click this link.
http://hdl.handle.net/2066/139739
 
 
 
Please be advised that this information was generated on 2018-07-07 and may be subject to
change.
ENFORCEMENT OF LABOUR LAW IN CROSS-BORDER SITUATIONS
SERIES LAW OF BUSINESS AND FINANCE
Editors
Sebastian Kortmann
Dennis Faber
Volume 14
ENFORCEMENT OF LABOUR LAW IN
CROSS-BORDER SITUATIONS
A Legal Study of the EU’s Influence on the Dutch,
German, and Swedish Enforcement Systems
PROEFSCHRIFT
TER VERKRIJGING VAN DE GRAAD VAN DOCTOR
AAN DE RADBOUD UNIVERSITEIT NIJMEGEN
OP GEZAG VAN DE RECTOR MAGNIFICUS
PROF. DR. TH.L.M. ENGELEN,
VOLGENS HET BESLUIT VAN HET COLLEGE VAN DECANEN
IN HET OPENBAAR TE VERDEDIGEN
OP WOENSDAG 15 APRIL 2015
OM 16.30 UUR PRECIES
DOOR
MIRIAM KULLMANN
GEBOREN OP 16 JULI 1983
TE EMMERICH (DUITSLAND)
WOLTERS KLUWER – DEVENTER – 2015
Promotor: Prof. mr. L.G. Verburg
Copromotor:
Prof. mr. M.S. Houwerzijl (Tilburg University)
Manuscriptcommissie:
Prof. mr. C.H. Sieburgh
Prof. mr. H.C.F.J.A. de Waele
Prof. mr. F.J.L. Pennings (Universiteit Utrecht)
ISBN 978 90 13 12865 9
ISBN 978 90 13 12866 6 (E-book)
NUR 825-502
Design: Cremers visuele communicatie, Nijmegen, The Netherlands
© 2015, Miriam Kullmann
Published by:
Wolters Kluwer Legal Publishers
P.O. Box 23, 7400 GA Deventer, The Netherlands
This publication is protected by international copyright law.
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval
system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopy-
ing, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the publisher.
PREFACE
The enforcement of labour law in cross-border situations increasingly
gains attention at EU and Member State level. It is therefore that this
book addresses an important question, namely in which ways and to what
extent do EU rules and case law exert influence on Member States’
methods to monitor and enforce labour law in transnational situations.
To measure the ways in which the EU exerts influences, a frame-
work has been provided. This framework consists of jurisprudential and
legislative requirements which Member State enforcement methods have
to respect. The jurisprudential requirements consist of a floor and ceiling.
The floor consists of the principles of equivalence and effectiveness,
serving as minimum standards the decentralised enforcement of labour
law at Member State level must take into account. These two principles
have been developed in the ECJ’s case law and have later on been included
in EU secondary legislation as well. Moreover, Member State enforcement
methods are limited by the ECJ’s case law on the cross-border posting of
workers, the latter being based on the freedom to provide services. As a
result, Member States have to find a balance between the floor and the
ceiling when enforcing the rights foreign workers derive from EU law.
Besides these jurisprudential requirements, enforcement methods must
respect EU law adopted with the aim of regulating enforcement at Member
State level.
With regard to the question on the extent of the EU’s influences, it has
been established that monitoring and enforcement of labour law differs – to a
certain extent – between the Member States that have been studied. Three
enforcement methods that exist at Member State level have been distinguis-
hed in this study: the judicial enforcement method, the industrial relations
enforcementmethod and the administrative enforcement method. Especially
the Swedish enforcement mechanism differs from the Dutch and German
methods in that it is based almost only on the industrial relations enforce-
ment method. Only to a minor extent public enforcement is set up. In
Germany and the Netherlands a mix of all three methods can be found.
Nevertheless, in Germany preference seems to be given to a mix of
V
administrative and industrial relations enforcement. In the Netherlands a
shift has taken place from pure judicial enforcement towards a combination
of judicial and administrative enforcement. Besides, the social partners have
set up their own instruments to ensure compliance with their collective
agreements.
This study provides an in-depth overview on how labour rights of
cross-border moving workers are monitored and enforced in Germany, the
Netherlands, and Sweden. It shows the main differences, as well as the
similarities, that exist between the enforcement methods in these countries.
Therefore, this book is not only relevant to academia, but it is also of
relevance to policy-makers at EU as well as at Member State level.
December 2014
Professor Sebastian Kortmann
Honorary Chairman of the Board of the Business and Law Research Centre
Professor Dennis Faber
Member of the Board of the Business and Law Research Centre
Preface
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Introduction
1.1.1 The enforcement of labour law at Member State level
Labour law traditions in the EU Member States vary greatly,1 as does the
way they are monitored and enforced. At domestic level, three enforce-
ment methods can be distinguished:2 judicial enforcement, industrial
relations enforcement, and administrative enforcement. Judicial enforce-
ment, a traditional method to seek compliance with the law, leaves judges
a great deal of room for the interpretation and application of labour law in
cases initiated by individual employees or their representatives. The
effectiveness of this method, however, is questionable. For many employ-
ees, actually suing his3 employer is a step too far, especially if the
employment relation is still intact. It is not hard to see that the hurdles
are even higher in cross-border situations. It would be precarious to place
too great a reliance on a (foreign) employee’s own initiative to initiate
proceedings against his own employer.
The EU’s Advocate General Alber emphasised in the Commission v
Italy case that it is in principle no longer difficult to pursue a legal claim in
another Member State, yet the costs of bringing a legal action abroad
might be disproportionately high, since such an action often does not
concern very large sums of money in the case of unpaid wages. Moreover,
it is more expensive to initiate proceedings abroad: a correspondence
lawyer must be engaged, and language barriers may exist, possibly
involving translation costs. The Advocate General adds that access to
trade union representation, at least in Italy, is not straightforward. More-
over, he concludes by stating that
1 Syrpis (2007) 3.
2 Malmberg et al. (2003) 59-65. The same distinction is drawn for the “creation of
labour law” with the difference that these three methods are referred to as
“strategies”.
3 Please note that reference to ‘he’, ‘his’ or ‘him’ encompasses both genders.
1
“in addition to the purely financial aspect, the difficulties, costs and language
barriers to be expected can operate psychologically to inhibit the worker in
question”.4
Within the industrial relations enforcement method, supervision and
enforcement of (collective) labour law is entrusted to trade unions (or to
works councils) together with the employers and/or their representatives
as their counterparts (together the social partners).5 Whether this method
effectively contributes to the guaranteeing of rights depends on the efforts
made by the social partners and the national system within which social
partners operate. If they do not undertake to represent (foreign) workers
and do not fight for these workers’ rights, the practical utility of trade
unions in monitoring and enforcing workers’ rights may be questioned.
Nevertheless, if trade unions adopt a proactive attitude, they definitely
contribute to guaranteeing the rights of workers.
Apart from the industrial relations method, (some form of) admin-
istrative enforcement is available in many Member States, whereby super-
vision and enforcement of the rules is a task for public authorities such as
labour inspectors, equality agencies, or other public bodies. For a state,
law-enforcing authorities are cost-intensive, in that they need sufficient
capacity to – proactively – monitor and enforce labour law.
Broadly speaking, these three methods can be found in all Member
States, albeit they may be used in different ways and combinations. If one
looks at each method separately, however, it becomes clear that these
methods must be understood as complementary mechanisms, only jointly
contributing to the effective enforcement of labour law.6
1.1.2 Challenges to Member State monitoring and enforcement methods
The 2004 and 2007 EU enlargements were not only challenging as regards
the number of new Member States; their impact on the EU’s overall
economic and social profile was also a challenge.7 The old EU-15 Member
States, whose labour markets are quite similar in terms of industrial
4 Case C-279/00 Commission v Italy ECLI:EU:C:2002:89, Opinion AG Alber,
paras 34-6.
5 In the context of the EU social dialogue, Dorssemont speaks about “contractual
governance by management and labour”. This is also true of national industrial
relations enforcement. Dorssemont (2006) 285.
6 Malmberg et al. (2003) 307.
7 Donaghey & Teague (2006) 653.
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structure8 and levels of economic development9 , feared that the EU
accessions would have an adverse impact on their economic and social
conditions.10 One major fear was – and probably still is – that
“the big differences in living standards between the EU-8 and the EU-15 […]
would disturb established economic and social conditions in the ‘old’ Member
States”.11
According to Eurostat, the hourly labour costs in the EU-27 Member States
in 2014 ranged from 3.7 EUR to 40.1 EUR.12 This corresponds to the
margin existing in relation to statutory minimum wages. At 174 EUR per
month, Romania has the lowest statutory minimum wage, while Luxem-
bourg, by contrast, has the highest statutory minimum wage in the EU at
1,921 EUR per month.13 These wage gaps may explain the “stronger
migration dynamics than previously seen within the EU”.14 Such large
differences may explain why transitional measures have been agreed,15
postponing the full application of the free movement of workers’ rights.
During the transitional period, in most Member States, except Sweden, for
instance, the new Union citizens were still required to have a work permit
in the host state. However, no restrictions were imposed in the context of
the freedom to provide services or the freedom of establishment (Arts 49
and 56 TFEU).
Worker mobility mostly occurs where the home state (or country of
origin) has working and employment conditions that are of a lower
standard than those applicable in the (temporary) host state.16 It is these
high-level employment conditions and the protection thereof by national
monitoring and enforcement methods that were frequently challenged
before the Court of Justice of the European Union (‘ECJ’). To secure their
8 Addnett (1995) 7.
9 Schmidt (2012) 11.
10 It seems that these fears still dominate the political debate. See for just one recent
example, FAZ, ‘Arbeitnehmerfreizügigkeit: Die Bulgaren und Rumänen kommen’
(27 October 2014).
11 Donaghey & Teague (2006) 653. Van Hoek and Houwerzijl point out that a huge
difference in wages may increase the risk that wage provisions are circumen-
vented. Van Hoek & Houwerzijl (2006) 433.
12 See <http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/index.php/Wages_
and_labour_costs#Labour_costs> accessed 28 October 2014.
13 Based on statistics of September 2014: <http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statis-
tics_explained/index.php/Minimum_wage_statistics> accessed 28 October 2014.
14 Dølvik & Visser (2009) 498.
15 Donaghey & Teague (2006) 653.
16 Davies (1997). See also Houwerzijl (2005) 9.
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competitive and thus advantageous position, both service providers and
the European Commission contest(ed) national enforcement instruments
used to enforce labour law in cross-border situations.17 Opposing interests
became clear: while there is reason to assume that the EU, including the
Member States that gained accession in 2004 and 2007, strongly supports
the guarantee of fundamental freedoms, which is at the core of European
integration, it seems that the ‘old’ Member States’ labour law systems
faced increasing EU intervention. In an EU with 28 Member States, there is
no one-size-fits-all method to ensure that the rights workers derive from
EU law are applied. The different interests at stake aggravate the monitor-
ing and enforcement of labour law at Member State level.
Moreover, Member States are faced with different free movement
rights which they have to protect at domestic level. Workers who cross the
border to work in another Member State enjoy certain rights. While Union
workers, based on the free movement of workers,18 are protected against
any discriminatory or restrictive host state measures or actions in relation
to employment conditions and access to employment,19 the scope of
protection afforded to posted workers is much narrower. Only a hard
core of employment conditions can be guaranteed to them, on the basis of
which the employer providing the service benefits from competitive
advantages and does not need to apply the entire labour law system of
the host state.20 Workers moving under the free movement of workers
regularly fall within the host state’s labour legislation.21 It has been
established that much of the migration flow takes place on a short-term
17 It should be noted that in the context of the posting of workers, competition also
exists with social security contributions and tax rules, both being excluded from
Directive 96/71/EC of 16 December 1996 concerning the posting of workers in the
framework of the provision of services [1996] OJ L18/1 (PWD). See for this remark
Ahlberg (2013) 323-4; Vas Nunes (2014).
18 In 2010, based on statistics supplied by Eurostat, it was established that 2.3 per cent
(ie 11.3 million persons) of the EU’s citizens actually invoke their right to free
movement of workers. Commission, ‘Reaffirming the free movement of workers:
rights and major developments’ (Communication) COM(2010) 373 final, 2.
19 This term is derived from Directive 2014/54/EU of 16 April 2014 on measures
facilitating the exercise of rights conferred on workers in the context of freedom of
movement for workers [2014] OJ L128/8 (‘Union Workers Enforcement Directive’).
20 Posted workers are only entitled to enjoy certain core employment conditions in
the temporary host state, as laid down in the PWD.
21 Barnard (2012) 215. Examples are the requirement to hold particular qualifications
(Case C-340/89 Vlassopoulou ECLI:EU:C:1991:193 on the freedom of establishment)
or licences (Case 292/86 Gullung ECLI:EU:C:1988:15 on the right of establishment
and the freedom to provide services).
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basis and in low-paid and unskilled jobs in the EU-15 Member States.22
Even though the legal regulations of these two forms of worker mobility
differ, the increased labour migration associated with the 2004/07 en-
largements have blurred the “boundaries between mobile labour, posted
workers, leased agency workers and self-employment”.23
Based on that, the workers’ socio-economic positions are comparable in
the sense that mobility of either group is largely temporary, which differs,
for instance, from frontier workers who live in one EUMember State while
working in another, or other Union workers who aim to stay in another
Member State on a long-term basis. It may even be that these workers –
unknowingly – switch between the free movement of workers and the
posting of workers. This particular new group of “resilient” migrant
workers is addressed in the present study.24
1.1.3 EU impact on enforcement of labour law at Member State level
It is important that labour law is monitored and enforced. In the Green
Paper on ‘Modernising labour law to meet the challenges of the 21st
century’, the European Commission emphasised that
“[e]nforcement mechanisms should be sufficient to ensure well functioning and
adaptable labour markets, to prevent infringements of labour law at national
level and to safeguard workers rights in the emerging European labour
market”.25
22 Dølvik & Visser (2009) 498. See also Lillie, Wagner & Berntsen (2014) 323, who state
that migrants dominate in lower-pay categories.
23 Dølvik & Visser (2009) 498.
24 Lillie and Berntsen use the term “hypermobile workers” specifically to address
those who work in the construction sector and who are “employed on short-term,
project-based contracts, with limited job security, and have no connection to the
society in which they work. They make migration decisions based on short-term
economic considerations, with little consideration given to integration into their
host societies”. Lillie & Berntsen (2014).
25 Commission, ‘Green Paper on Modernising labour law to meet the challenges of
the 21st century’ COM(2006) 708, 14, referring to Ilo (2005), para 65. See on the
necessity to enforce compliance with labour law, eg, the Report on the transitional
arrangements restricting the free movement of workers on EU labour markets
(2006/2036(INI)), 22 March 2006; and Commission, ‘Guidance on the posting of
workers in the framework of the provision of services’ (Communication) COM
(2006) 159 final.
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According to Bernard,
“[t]he EU might be a formidable law-making machine. It is not, however, a law-
enforcing one. […]”.26
Rights and obligations established at EU level in the area of labour law are
implemented, applied and enforced at Member State level through the
methods introduced above. Monitoring and enforcement of EU (labour)
law is decentralised. National (procedural) law is, in that respect, a
functional complement to EU law, as it provides the tools and instru-
ments, institutions and procedures to “help Community law work
effectively”.27
Decentralised monitoring and enforcement consistent with the three
methods described above seems to be problematic: in an EU with
28 Member States, the procedures and practices differ greatly. Principally,
by virtue of the principle of national procedural autonomy,28 Member
States are free to arrange their monitoring and enforcement system as they
think best in absence of EU harmonising measures. To ensure at least to a
certain extent, that EU law is uniformly applied, Member States’ monitor-
ing and enforcement mechanisms must respect the principles of equiva-
lence and effectiveness.29 This principle means that Member States must
enforce and punish infringements of EU law under conditions that are not
less favourable than those governing similar domestic actions (principle of
equivalence),30 and the exercise of rights conferred by EU law may not
be rendered impossible or excessively difficult by national (procedural)
law (principle of effectiveness).31
The principle of sincere cooperation (Art 4(3) TEU),32 which is the
basis for the two minimum requirements of equivalence and effective-
ness,33 obliges Member States to
26 Bernard (2002) 156.
27 Mortelmans (1994) 11.
28 See on national procedural autonomy, inter alia, Eliantonio (2009); Accetto &
Zleptnig (2005); Kakouris (1997).
29 Eliantonio (2009) 1.
30 Joined Cases C-430/93 and C-431/93 Van Schijndel ECLI:EU:C:1995:441, para 17.
31 Two seminal cases that must be mentioned at this stage are: Case 33/76 Rewe
(Saarland) ECLI:EU:C:1976:188 and Case 45/76 Comet ECLI:EU:C:1976:191.
32 Ex Art 5 EEC Treaty and Art 10 EC Treaty.
33 Jans et al. (2007) 206.
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“[…] take any appropriate measure, general or particular, to ensure fulfilment of
the obligations arising out of the Treaties or resulting from acts of the institutions
of the Union”.
From the perspective of EU law, national procedural law can be seen as
“an ancillary body of law” having the duty to guarantee the effective
application and enforcement of substantive EU law provisions. National
procedural rules apply only as long as they contribute to the effective
application of EU law. However, if they do not, a consequence would be
that the national procedural rules must be adjusted.34
There are two principal difficulties when seeking to apply the
principles of equivalence and effectiveness. First, although the ECJ in
numerous cases has frequently dealt with the principles of equivalence
and effectiveness, it remains somewhat unclear as to how Member States
have to arrange their mechanisms to monitor and enforce labour law in
order to ensure that they comply with their obligations under EU law. This
is partly because principles are by their nature vague and open, to allow
interpretation on a case-by-case basis.35 Moreover, the Court’s case-by-
case approach can depend on the arguments the parties put before it,
which means that it is not always possible to make general statements.
Secondly, the applicability of national procedural laws and practices
is even more complicated when it comes to the free movement principles
embedded in the Treaty. The case law, in particular that concerning the
transnational posting of workers, (implicitly) made clear that Member
States are not only bound by the principles of equivalence and effective-
ness as a floor, but also by the internal market rules, and more in
particular the free movement rights, which provide a ceiling.36
The PWD is not only aimed at promoting the transnational provi-
sion of services, it explicitly states that in addition it aims to ensure a
climate of fair competition and measures guaranteeing respect for the
rights of workers (recital 5 of the preamble). Nevertheless, in the Rüffert
case the ECJ ruled that the PWD in particular seeks to bring about the
freedom to provide services.37 Providing cross-border services is a tem-
porary business activity under EU law, meaning that – in the context of the
34 Kakouris (1997) 1390, 1406 and 1408. See also Accetto & Zleptnig (2005) 396.
35 Jans et al. (2007) 115; Van Gerven (2008) 26-7.
36 See also Kullmann (2013). Unlike the free movement principles, in relation to EU
competition rules and national social policy, the Albany case provides a good
example, in which the principle of solidarity shielded Member State law from far-
reaching EU intervention based on the competition law rules. See Case C-67/96
Albany ECLI:EU:C:1999:430.
37 Case C-346/06 Rüffert ECLI:EU:C:2008:189, para 36.
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posting of workers – the main business remains established in the home
state, as only the service or the service provider crosses the border.38
Principally, the presumption is that the law of the home state remains
applicable for the duration of the provision of services.39 As a result, the
service (provider) is subject to two different regulations, creating what are
called double burdens.40
Host state monitoring and enforcement methods can, in this context,
be qualified, as being “capable of hindering, directly or indirectly, actually
or potentially, intra-community trade”, which is not permitted, unless
justified.41 Following this approach, the question is whether a national
rule or measure hinders or restricts “the ability of the out-of-state actor to
gain access to the market or to exercise freedom of movement”.42 A
consequence of this market access approach43 is that it seems to capture all
national measures that (potentially) affect market access.44 This places
national monitoring and enforcement methods under what is known in
Germany as Generalverdacht (general suspicion), as any measure seems to
be liable to endanger the exercise of the fundamental freedoms.45 Accord-
ing to Barnard this test “could jeopardize the entire edifice of national
38 The freedom to provide services also includes the right of the service recipient to
move to another Member State to receive services. See Joined cases 286/82 and 26/
83 Luisi and Carbone ECLI:EU:C:1984:35. In paragraph 16, the ECJ ruled that “the
freedom to provide services includes the freedom, for the recipients of services, to
go to another Member State in order to receive a service there, without being
obstructed by restrictions, even in relation to payments and that tourists, persons
receiving medical treatment and persons travelling for the purpose of education or
business are to be regarded as recipients of services”.
39 Barnard (2010) 391.
40 The question of the double burden is raised in the context of the posting of
workers, which is based on the freedom to provide services. For instance, Case C-
43/93 Vander Elst ECLI:EU:C:1994:310; Case C-319/06 Commission v Luxembourg
ECLI:EU:C:2008:350 (both on double work permits).
41 Case 8/74 Dassonville ECLI:EU:C:1974:82, para 5.
42 Barnard (2012) 201.
43 See for a discussion of the meaning of the notion ‘market access’: Snell (2010).
44 See Syrpis (2007) ch 2, extensively discussing the distinction between affecting
market access or preventing it.
45 Kullmann (2013) 284. In line with the Dassonville case, with regard to the freedom
to provide services, the ECJ’s ruling in the Säger v Dennemeyer case should be
mentioned, in which the ECJ ruled that this freedom “requires not only the
elimination of all discrimination against a person providing services on the ground
of his nationality but also the abolition of any restriction, even if it applies without
distinction to national providers of services and to those of other Member States,
when it is liable to prohibit or otherwise impede the activities of a provider of
services established in another Member State where he lawfully provides similar
services.” Case C-76/90 Säger v Dennemeyer ECLI:EU:C:1991:331, para 12.
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labour law”.46 Here, she notes, the main view taken is that of the out-of-
state actor, ie the one providing the service.47 This seems to be different in
case of the free movement of workers, whereby the worker mostly benefits
from adequate monitoring and enforcement of his labour rights in the host
state.
As a result, Member States need to balance between complying
with, on the one hand, the principles of equivalence and effectiveness
while, on the other hand, going not so far as to hinder or restrict the
(exercise of the) freedom to provide services.
1.2 Research question
The point set out above is that labour law enforcement is principally a
matter for the Member States. However, when monitoring and enforcing
labour law in cross-border situations, Member States need to abide by the
principles of equivalence and effectiveness as a floor, as well as the ceiling
imposed by the freedom to provide services. As such, enforcing labour
law in transnational situations means that Member States have to perform
a balancing act, not only taking into account the different interests that are
at stake, but also the legal complications posed by the different forms of
worker mobility. Taking this into account, the overarching research
question in this study is
In which ways, and to what extent, do EU rules and case law exert influence on
Member States’ methods to monitor and enforce labour law in transnational
situations?
This research question is aimed at describing and analysing the EU’s
influences on Member States’ methods to monitor and enforce labour law
in cross-border situations. When assessing the EU’s influences, national
enforcement methods are taken as a framework in order to determinewhere
influences have occurred. Three main influences play a role. The first
concerns the principles of equivalence and effectiveness, serving as a floor,
with whichMember States’ enforcement rules and practices have to comply.
Secondly, the conditions imposed by EU rules, in particular regulations and
directives enacted to facilitate the adequate enforcement of workers’ rights.
46 Barnard (2012) 202.
47 Barnard (2012) 201.
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And thirdly, a particular constraint on national enforcement systemsmay be
imposed by the case law developed in the context of the posting of workers.
To answer the main research question, the following sub-questions
have been formulated: In which ways do EU rules and case law exert
influence on national enforcement methods? How is labour law monitored
and enforced in the Member States? Who are the actors that play a role in
the monitoring and enforcement processes? What difficulties confront the
national procedural laws as well as the actors entrusted with the monitor-
ing and enforcement of labour law in cross-border situations? Where did
EU rules and case law have an influence leading to changes in monitoring
and enforcement at Member State level?
1.3 Methodological framework
To answer the question as to the ways and the extent EU rules and case
law exert influence on national methods to enforce labour law in cross-
border situations, the underlying study adopts a comparative law
approach. Three Member States have been chosen: the Netherlands,
Germany and Sweden. In addition, this thesis is based on a case study,
using core employment conditions (minimum wages, holiday pay, and
holiday allowances) as point of departure for studying the enforcement
methods. With regard to the industrial relations enforcement method,
two sectors of industry have been chosen, namely the construction and
temporary agency work sector, to highlight sector-specific enforcement
mechanisms. The choices made are explained further below.
1.3.1 Relevance of this study and difference from other existing studies
Over the past few years, several studies and projects have emerged related
to the cross-border movement of workers and the monitoring and en-
forcement of the rights and obligations arising out of this movement. As
early as 2003, an important start was made to research ‘Effective Enforce-
ment of European Labour Law’ by an international group of legal scholars,
who undertook an analysis of the meaning of the principle of effective
enforcement (according to EU law standards) in the field of labour law,
considering in particular EU directives on equal treatment, restructuring
of enterprises and working time.48 The present study differs from that
research in that a cross-border element has been added, which forms a
48 Malmberg et al. (2003).
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basis for assessing the monitoring and enforcement of employment con-
ditions of employees moving via the free movement of workers and the
posting of workers. A comparative study, conducted in 2011 for the
European Commission, looked at the legal aspects of the posting of
workers in the framework of the provision of services in the EU. This
study addressed questions and difficulties arising in the practical applica-
tion of the posting of workers legislation, as well as in its enforcement in
practice.49
For the underlying research, the 2012 study on the protection of
workers’ rights in subcontracting processes in the European Union is
relevant.50 Besides these legal studies, an important project that was
conducted between 2008 and 2012 should be mentioned: Free Movement
and Labour Law – Conflicts and Impacts (abbreviated: Formula). Within
this project, researchers from different EU Member States have written
country reports as well as reports on particular topics that were – and still
are – of interest in the context of the posting of workers. Three seminars
were held in Oslo, each with a different theme. The 2009 conference was
themed ‘Service Mobility, Posting of Workers, and Labour Market Gov-
ernance’, while the 2010 conference’s theme was ‘Free Movement of
Services – EU Law and Member States’ responses: Convergence or
Conflict?’. A third and final conference, held in 2012, addressed ‘Free
Movement, Labour Market Regulation and Multilevel Governance in an
Enlarged EU/EEA – A Nordic and Comparative Perspective’. Moreover,
the project has increased the awareness of the need to deal with problems
arising out of the cross-border posting of workers from an EU and
comparative perspective.51 Both perspectives are also to be found in the
present study. This study has benefited from the working papers pre-
sented during the seminars.
1.3.2 Comparative legal method: the Netherlands, Germany and Sweden
Although the Netherlands, Germany and Sweden belong to the old(er)
Member States,52 having quite comparable Gross Domestic Product
49 Van Hoek & Houwerzijl (2011b). See also the complementary study: Van Hoek &
Houwerzijl (2011a).
50 Jorens, Peters & Houwerzijl (2012).
51 Evju (Ed.) (2013); Van Hoek & Houwerzijl (2011b).
52 Unlike the Netherlands and Germany, Sweden has not been a member of the EU
from the start, joining the EU on 1 January 1995.
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(‘GDP’) levels53 and relatively high wages54 , the ways in which they
regulate and enforce employment rights differ.55 While in the Netherlands
and Germany, most employment conditions are legally regulated, collec-
tive agreements provide additional protection, and rights and obligations.
In both countries, it seems, enforcement consists of a rather balanced use
of the three methods. While all three methods can be found in Sweden, the
main emphasis is on the industrial relations system. Although Sweden, in
common with the Netherlands and Germany, has statutory legislation
regulating labour law, the most important source of rights and obligations
in labour relations are collective agreements. Another crucial distinction is
that in the Netherlands and Germany, collective agreements can be
generally binding, while there is no system in Sweden that could declare
a collective agreement as generally binding. The problems in relation to
the posting of workers became clear after the Laval ruling in 2007, which
had a huge impact on the Swedish model of industrial relations. As early
as 1992, Bruun et al. stressed that the EU had an individual labour law-
oriented point of view.56 Different focuses exist, as noted by Malmberg et
al., at national and EU level. They emphasise that EU labour law almost
exclusively deals with judicial procedures.57 This more individualistic
approach has challenged the applicability of collective agreements and
their enforcement, which is exclusively – with the exception of health and
safety regulations – left to the social partners.58 These differences have
consequences for the applicability and enforceability of employment
conditions of foreign employees.
The idea of the present study is not to focus merely on what the
similarities or differences in these countries are, nor does it aim to promote
the idea that labour law should be harmonised across the EU Member
53 See <http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/tgm/table.do?tab=table&plugin=1&lan-
guage=en&pcode=tec0000> accessed 28 October 2014.
54 The statutory minimum wage in the Netherlands currently is 1,495.20 EUR. In
Germany, the statutory minimum wage as of 1 January 2015 will be 8.50 EUR per
hour. In Sweden, although there is no statutory minimum wage, the Swedish
National Mediation Office published for 2012 that the average monthly wage
earned in Sweden is 29,000 SEK (approximately 3,340 EUR).
55 In terms of the theory of Varieties of Capitalism, the three countries concerned can
be classified as being coordinated market economies, as opposed to liberal market
economies. Hall & Soskice (2001) ch 1.
56 Bruun (2002) 380. See on the EU’s influence on the Swedish industrial relations
model: Edström (2008a) 434; Bruun & Malmberg (2008).
57 Malmberg et al. (2003) 309-11.
58 Adlercreutz & Nyström (2009) para 91b.
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States.59 Rather, the main aim is to identify the extent and the ways in
which EU rules and case law have influenced, and perhaps will influence,
domestic enforcement systems, highlighting in particular difficulties for
the enforcement method or system, probably caused by the EU influences.
The focus is especially on the relation between EU and Member State law.
Nevertheless, regarding the research question, a comparative study re-
veals whether there are enforcement systems that have been changed, and
if so, what has changed.
Domestic methods to enforce labour law, no matter how different
they may be, have one aim: ensuring that the rules of the game are fairly
played by domestic and foreign employers alike, ie that employees enjoy
their legally acquired rights.60 The underlying study consists (only) of a
legal study on the existing laws and collective agreements in the three
countries chosen. Where possible and available, other relevant facts are
also indicated. The main aim of the comparison is to assess the what-
question, ie the question of what other countries have experienced as a
result of EU influences. The why-question can be addressed only partially,
since a thorough comparative study would need one to study a country’s
social, economic, and political situation.61
Three practical remarks should be made. First, as to the translations
used, they are primarily taken from the sources consulted, insofar as they
were in English. In cases where no translations were available, the
translations are my own. Secondly, unless otherwise provided, the order
of the countries mentioned is the order in which the countries have been
studied. Thus, the following order is often found: the Netherlands,
Germany and Sweden. Thirdly, comparative research faces problems as
to the comparability of the sources (ie information) found. While literature
is abundantly available in Germany, and to a lesser extent in the Nether-
lands, this is hardly true of Sweden, due to the industrial relations system.
Consequently, the information density in Chapters 3 to 7 can vary.
1.3.3 Case study of minimum wages, holiday pay, and holiday allowances
Studying the enforcement of labour law in general, including for instance
dismissal, equal treatment, or health and safety law, would inevitably be
too broad. Thus, a case study has been conducted to gain a more concrete
59 See the Spaak and Ohlin reports, which both explicitly rejected taking such a
direction.
60 See Jacobs (2011) 12 who states that the most developed societies are faced with the
same or similar problems.
61 Jacobs (2011) 14.
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impression of how enforcement is designed at Member State level. The
study focuses on the monitoring and enforcement of minimum wages,
holiday pay, and holiday allowances as laid down in statutes and
collective agreements of the Member States concerned. The reason for
this is that it is acknowledged that “[t]he rules on wages are identified […]
as of paramount importance, besides safety and health and, to a lesser
degree, working time and holidays”.62
Minimum wages, and it can be argued also holiday pay and holiday
allowances, can be seen as belonging to “the ‘hard nucleus of the hard
nucleus’ of protection”,63 not only for posted workers, but also for Union
workers. In more general terms, Davies wrote that the subjects pointed out
in the PWD “are of immediate interest during the period of posting”,64
and it can be suggested that this is also true of other forms of labour
mobility, such as the free movement of workers.
1.3.4 Sectoral approach: construction and temporary agency work sectors
Because social partners play a pivotal role when it comes to norm setting
through collective agreements and the monitoring and enforcement
thereof, it is necessary to move from the general national level to the
sectoral level. The present study focuses on two sectors of industry that
play a key role in transnational employment situations: the construction
and the temporary agency work sectors. Part of this thesis will therefore be
devoted to a study of the monitoring and enforcement of collective
agreements in these two sectors. Many problems related to the non-
compliance with labour law affect these specific sectors,65 which are
potential sources of social unrest and legal uncertainty.66
The construction sector seems to be severely affected by the steadily
evolving integration of the Member States’ economies in the internal
market and the 2004 and 2007 EU enlargements.67 From an enforcement
point of view this sector is of particular interest. The cross-border move-
ments revealed certain gaps in the enforcement of national and EU law.68
62 “Freilich ist mit der Entlohnung gerade der konstenintensivste und mithin für den
Wettbewerb bedeutendste [Arbeitsbedingung] verblieben“. Deinert (1996) 344.
63 Van Hoek & Houwerzijl (2011b) 18 (executive summary).
64 Davies (1997) 579.
65 Van Den Berg, Brukman & Van Rij (2007) (annexed to Kamerstukken II 2006/07, 29
407, nr. 75).
66 Van Hoek & Houwerzijl (2011b) 10.
67 Houwerzijl & Peters (2008b) 4.
68 Houwerzijl & Peters (2008b) 5.
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As for the temporary agency work sector, this is important since –
provided a cross-border element is present – not only the freedom to
provide services can apply, but also the free movement of workers,
resulting in the application of different sets of rights.69 On the one
hand, the agency sector is recognised as an independent sector with
respect to social dialogue, while on the other hand, agency workers are
placed at the disposal of an employer in various sectors, ranging from
construction to banking and other commercial services, to agriculture, and
manufacturing.70 This sector is said to be difficult to control, due to the
triangular relationships71 and due to the transnational use of agency
work, either because the agency itself is established in one Member State
and assigns workers to another one, or because the agency is established
in one Member State and recruits workers from abroad.
Both sectors leave room for social partners not only in a regulating,
but also in monitoring and enforcing roles. Collective agreements can be
concluded and social partners may decide, within the possibilities pro-
vided by Member State law and collective agreements, to set up specia-
lised bodies that control compliance with and ensure the enforcement of
applicable collective agreements and/or statutory law. This makes it even
more interesting to adopt a sectoral approach.
1.4 Outline of the book
This introduction has set out the study’s context, its research question, and
the methodological framework applied. The overall structure of the study
consists of eight chapters, including this introduction.
The EU conditions imposed on national enforcement methods are
described in Chapter 2. Here, the normative fabric is described, consisting
of the principles of equivalence and effectiveness on the one hand, and the
limitations set by the freedom to provide services in the context of the
posting of workers on the other. Finally, Member State liability is assessed
in the light of failure to ensure monitoring and enforcement of rights that
workers derive from EU law.
69 See for this Joined Cases C-307/09 to C-309/09 Vicoplus ECLI:EU:C:2011:64, paras
27-31.
70 Van Hoek & Houwerzijl (2011b) 9-10.
71 Two contractual relationships exist in the context of temporary agency work. One
contract is concluded between the agency and its workers, ie the employment
contract. A second contract is agreed between the agency and the user undertaking
to which the agency worker is assigned, ie the contract for services.
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Chapters 3 to 7 look at substantive labour law in the Dutch, German
and Swedish systems, and how it is monitored and enforced. Chapters 3
and 4 describe and analyse the statutory and collectively regulated
minimum wages and holiday pay and holiday allowances. Based on the
three enforcement methods, Chapters 5 to 7 deal separately with the
judicial, the administrative and the industrial relations enforcement
method established in the Netherlands, Germany and Sweden, set against
the EU legal context. Here, it is shown that the EU has increasingly
influenced these enforcement systems, in different ways. When dealing
with national enforcement methods, it should be noted that enforcement
comprises monitoring whether the law is complied with, through, for
instance, registration or licensing requirements or notification obligations
which allow the authorities to become aware of the presence of (national
and foreign) employers and their foreign employees. On the other hand,
enforcement of the law refers to any procedure or instrument that ensures
compliance with the law.
The study concludes with Chapter 8, which contains an evaluative
section in which the conclusions of Chapters 2 to 7 are brought together
and analysed. Here the central research question is answered.
1.5 Limits of the study
The reader should bear in mind that the study is limited, mostly for
practical reasons.
In the first place, it is beyond the scope of this study to question the
substantive content of the employment conditions with which we are
concerned. It describes the scope of the applicable minimum wages,
holiday pay, and holiday allowances, as regulated in the statutes and
collective agreements under study, but it refrains from any substantial
discussion of their content. It follows from the employment conditions
chosen that the thesis is limited to studying the ways in which and the
extent to which EU rules and case law exert influence on monitoring and
enforcement in the context of labour law.72
The study furthermore analyses the enforcement systems in Ger-
many, the Netherlands and Sweden as such, viewed from a European
perspective. The main issues dealt with are how the enforcement of
72 The reader who is interested in obtaining comprehensive information on the labour
law system of these three countries can consult, inter alia, the volumes edited by
Roger Blanpain published by Kluwer Law International.
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workers’ rights is designed in law and/or collective agreements and
whether and how far the instruments found have been influenced by
EU rules and case law. In this context, the points of reference chosen are
the developments around the 2004/07 EU enlargements.
When it comes to the enforcement of labour law in cross-border
situations, fields such as social security law, migration law and tax law
also play a role. However, these areas fall outside the scope of this study.
This does not detract from either the necessity or the relevance of studying
monitoring and enforcement in these fields of law, but that would require
a different study. One remark should be made in relation to migration law:
this area comes into play when discussing the access of migrant workers to
host states and the applicability of transitional measures agreed upon in
relation to new EU Member States, which is at the moment applicable in
some host states to citizens from Croatia. Migration law has been a tool to
control the labour market, using work permits. However, under EU law,
after the expiry of the transitional measures, such permits may no longer
be requested, and Member States may have found other adequate instru-
ments to help them monitor their labour markets, which are dealt with in
this study as far as the enforcement of labour law is concerned.
When dealing with cross-border mobility, one cannot avoid ques-
tions of private international law. However, in this thesis, questions of
private international law will be dealt with only indirectly as application
of the substantive law, which is part of this study, is built on the fact that,
from the viewpoint of national authorities or parties involved in the
monitoring and enforcement of statutory and/or collective labour law,
the host state law is applied.73 Under the PWD, if Member States have the
hard core employment condition implemented in their law and/or gen-
erally binding collective agreements, these conditions are said to be
mandatorily applicable, provided they are more favourable.74 With regard
to the free movement of workers, the general starting point seems to be
that the law of the host state is generally applicable, unless otherwise
agreed.
As this thesis concerns a legal study based on literature, case law
and applicable legislation, an empirical study forms no part of it. For
instance, studying the policy implications at EU and/or Member State
level of the EU’s influence on enforcement in the Member State, would
73 Literature that, eg, deals with the issue of private international law: Van Hoek
(2000); Houwerzijl (2005); Merrett (2011).
74 Chapter 5 addresses the Brussels I Regulation in the context of questions on
jurisdiction. However, the thesis itself does only address the Rome I Regulation to
a minor extent.
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have demanded another research method, even though the research
question could also be applied in that context. An empirical study would
nevertheless be a valuable contribution to the discussion of the effective
enforcement of EU law, which definitely should be considered and
pursued in future research. This could include other countries, preferably
countries of the new EU Member States, even though or precisely because
they are net exporters of labour.
The research was concluded on 1 June 2014. Later developments
have been taken into account only to a limited extent.
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CHAPTER 2
EU LEGAL REQUIREMENTS FOR NATIONAL
ENFORCEMENT OF EU (LABOUR) LAW
2.1 Introduction
This chapter sketches the jurisprudential and legislative requirements
through which the EU exerts influence on national legal systems. There
are three main rationales for intervening in national enforcement systems:
better application of EU law; compliance with EU law; and the aim of
creating more uniform enforcement across the EU Member States. Influ-
ence is exerted in two ways: initially, the ECJ established jurisprudential
parameters, which need to be taken into account when Member States
authorities monitor and enforce EU law. Moreover, legislative require-
ments were increasingly laid down in EU secondary legislation.1 This
chapter focuses on these two strands.
In order to do so, first, the jurisprudential requirements developed
by the ECJ are addressed in chronological order of developments (section
2.2). In this context, it is necessary to distinguish between the extensive
body of case law developed on the principles of equivalence and effec-
tiveness, consisting of two minimum requirements (equivalence and
effectiveness) and, on the other hand, case law in the context of the
transnational posting of workers, exercised in the context of the freedom
to provide services, which places an upper limit on the possibilities open
to the Member States to monitor and enforce labour law. Secondly, the
legislative requirements will be briefly reviewed, which have developed at
a later stage (section 2.3). Particular attention is paid to EU (secondary)
law, which has been adopted in the context of the enforcement of labour
law in transnational situations, including the Directives adopted in April
2014 to improve the application and enforcement of rights of Union
workers and posted workers.
1 Already in 1968, although not directly related to enforcement of workers’ rights,
there was Regulation (EEC) 1612/68 of 15 October 1968 on freedom of movement
for workers within the Community.
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2.2 Jurisprudential requirements shaping Member State enforcement
methods
2.2.1 Introduction
First of all, the jurisprudential requirements that may shape the ways in
which Member States have to enforce rights that individuals derive from
EU law are dealt with. Below, attention is paid first to the principles of
equivalence and effectiveness, which serve as a floor. On the one hand,
Member States have to meet the minimum requirements of equivalence
and effectiveness, and, on the other hand, when the situation involves the
posting of workers, a ceiling set by the freedom to provide services must
be respected. Both the floor (section 2.3.2) and the ceiling (section 2.3.3) are
set out below.
2.2.2 National procedural autonomy and the principles of effectiveness and
equivalence
A. Introduction
It should be noted that the principles of equivalence and effectiveness
have been dealt with abundantly in the academic literature.2 The present
aim is to review briefly the principle’s content and scope, insofar as that is
relevant to answering the research question. The idea of national proce-
dural autonomy is described first. Then the principles of equivalence and
effectiveness are analysed in different stages of the enforcement process.
Before assessing whether Member States can be held liable for failing to
guarantee adequate enforcement procedures, the actors who are obliged to
comply with the principles of equivalence and effectiveness are presented.
B. National procedural autonomy
EU law grants rights to its citizens that must be monitored and enforced at
Member State level.3 Where there are no relevant EU rules for determining
the procedural conditions under which EU rights are to be protected,
Member States retain the possibility to enforce EU rights in a way that
2 To give only an impression of the richness of the literature (in chronological order):
Hinton (1993); Snyder (1993); Szyszczak (1996); Prechal (1997); Groussot (2003);
Malmberg et al. (2003); Accetto & Zleptnig (2005); Herlin-Karnell (2007); Nebbia
(2008); Flynn (2008); Arnull (2011); Kullmann (2013); Meijer (2014).
3 Case 26/62 Van Gend and Loos ECLI:EU:C:1963:1.
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suits their legal system. However, should the EU adopt harmonisation
measures, then national (procedural) autonomy will be limited. Since the
monitoring and enforcement of labour law are decentralised, it is for the
Member States to provide the necessary instruments. In the words of Van
Gerven, “[…] it is for the Member States to provide remedies and
procedures for the protection of Community rights”.4 In principle, Mem-
ber States are free to monitor and enforce labour law in a manner that fits
their legal systems. Consequently, a mix of instruments and methods can
be found across the EU.
This mix of instruments, however, endangers the uniform interpre-
tation of EU rights. Therefore, the ECJ intervened in what is called the
national procedural autonomy of the Member States to ensure at least a
minimum degree of uniformity.5 Interpreting EU law is the exclusive
competence of the Court. However, de facto, national courts are also
entrusted with that task as their national procedural rules apply when
confronted with a claim based on EU law.6 In that respect, there is shared
competence at different levels. In line with Temple Lang, it can be said that
“the national courts are the allies of the Court of Justice in the enforcement
of Community law”.7
Whether Member States actually benefit from national procedural
autonomy has been critically discussed in the academic literature.8 Accord-
ing to VanGerven, national procedural autonomy could be better referred to
as national procedural competence.9 The term “autonomy” could be mis-
leading, since the Member States have to comply with the principles of
equivalence and effectiveness, meaning they are only partly autonomous.
For instance, according to Kakouris, a former judge with the ECJ, no
autonomy is reserved to the Member States. He holds the view that the
Court regarded national procedural law only as “an ancillary body of law”
with the purpose of guaranteeing the effective application (and enforce-
ment) of substantive EU provisions. In other words, since Member State law
is ancillary to EU law, the former law serves the latter. The national rules
apply only as long as the national procedural rules contribute to the effective
application of EU regulations; otherwise the rule must be set aside.10
4 Van Gerven (2000) 502.
5 Eliantonio (2009) 1.
6 Malmberg et al. (2003) 45.
7 Temple Lang (2006).
8 On procedural autonomy see, inter alia, Kakouris (1997); Prechal (1998); Van
Gerven (2000).
9 Van Gerven (2000) 502. See in that respect Case 45/76 Comet ECLI:EU:C:1976:191.
10 Kakouris (1997) 1390, 1406 and 1408. See also Accetto & Zleptnig (2005) 396.
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In a similar vein, Bobek states that “[t]here is no such thing as
‘procedural autonomy’ of Member States”.11 Autonomy, he argues, would
imply that there are areas of domestic procedural law that are free from
any intervention by EU law and the ECJ. Once an EU right exists at
Member State level, “its reach is limitless”, meaning that the principles of
equivalence and effectiveness cover all stages and all aspects of the
national procedure. The term “autonomy” would create a false impres-
sion, indicating that the Member State has autonomy in procedural
matters. Since certain areas are harmonised at EU level, or else Member
States must comply with the floor served by the principles of equivalence
and effectiveness, “there is no autonomous space of the Member States”.12
Thus, in line with Tridimas, the principle can be more easily defined in
negative terms, pointing at the “discretion left to the national courts after
the obligation to apply the dual safeguards of equivalence and
effectiveness”.13
National procedural autonomy describes the relation between sub-
stantive EU rights and their monitoring and enforcement in the national
legal systems. Autonomy or competence persists only as long as the EU
does not adopt harmonisation measures related to monitoring and
enforcement.
Nevertheless, quite apart from whether Member States retain auton-
omy, it is essential for the Member States to designate or appoint “specific
national bodies”14 that have to deal with EU law (also referred to as
institutional autonomy) and the national procedural rules that apply, ie
procedural autonomy.15 So far, it seems that EU law does not affect the
Member States’ institutional autonomy.16 The Commission v Germany case
clarified that it is not for the EU “[…] to rule on the division of competences
by the institutional rules proper to each Member State […]”.17
In the Commission v Germany case, the applicable EU secondary laws
on agriculture18 provided for comprehensive administrative checks and
11 Bobek (2011) 320.
12 Bobek (2011) 320-1.
13 Tridimas (2006) 424.
14 Joined Cases 51 to 54/71 International Fruit Company NV ECLI:EU:C:1971:128, para
4.
15 Accetto & Zleptnig (2005) 394.
16 Accetto & Zleptnig (2005) 394-5.
17 Case C-8/88 Germany v Commission ECLI:EU:C:1990:241, para 13.
18 ie Regulation (EEC) 729/70 on the financing of the common agricultural policy in
conjunction with Regulation (EEC) 2007/84 laying down detailed rules for the
application of the premium for producers of sheepmeat, and Regulation (EEC)
1244/82 laying down detailed rules implementing the system of premiums for
maintaining suckler cows.
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on-the-spot inspections to guarantee the observance of substantive and
formal conditions. These checks and on-the-spot inspections were left to
the competence of the German Länder, ie they were decentralised. The
Commission refused Germany’s request for EU financing of premiums on
the ground that the German method of carrying out the checks and on-the-
spot inspections would not be uniformly established throughout the
whole territory, since it fell under the responsibility of each Land. Accord-
ing to the Commission, the Federal authorities failed to give concrete
instructions to the Länder authorities to ensure observance of EU law. The
ECJ rejected the Commission’s interpretation, ruling that it was not for the
Commission to encroach upon a Member State’s institutional arrange-
ments. According to the ECJ, the only aspect that could be assessed is
whether the German supervisory and inspection procedures in their
entirety are sufficiently effective to enable the correct application of the
EU requirements.19 So where there are no relevant EU rules for determin-
ing the procedural conditions under which EU rights are to be protected,
the Member States are responsible for setting such conditions in line with
their own legal system.20
This line of reasoning has been confirmed in the ET Agrokonsulting
case, where Bulgarian law prescribed that the jurisdiction in administra-
tive disputes concerning the implementation of the EU’s common agri-
cultural policy depends on the seat of the administrative authority that has
adopted the contested administrative act. The Bulgarian rule failed to take
account of the place where the properties are located, or the place of
residence of the person seeking justice.21 Bulgarian legislation conferred
on a single court all disputes relating to decisions of a national authority
responsible for the payment of agricultural aid under the EU common
agricultural policy.
According to the ECJ, this is not in breach of the principles of
equivalence and effectiveness, as long as the actions “are not conducted in
less advantageous conditions than those provided for in respect of actions
intended to protect the rights derived from any aid schemes for farmers
established under Member State law, and that jurisdiction rule does not
cause individuals procedural problems in terms, inter alia, of the duration
of the proceedings, such as to render the exercise of the rights derived
19 For instance, as regards organisational health and safety in workplaces, the
monitoring and enforcement of the corresponding laws in Germany is also
decentralised. See, eg, Kollmer, Klindt & Balze (2011) § 21 ArbSchG (Getsberger/
Plechinger), para 42.
20 Craig & De Búrca (2011) 220.
21 Case C-93/12 ET Agrokonsulting ECLI:EU:C:2013:432.
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from European Union law excessively difficult, which it is for the referring
court to ascertain”.22
C. Role of the principles of equivalence and effectiveness
From an EU (legal) perspective, a decentralised system of monitoring and
enforcing EU law has some disadvantages. In the context of the single
market, the Monti II Report on a Strategy for the Single Market, published
in May 2010, criticised the decentralised or shared enforcement mechan-
ism. According to Monti II, enforcement “presents a mixed picture of
successes and failures, innovation and old problems”. In addition,
although the report recognises that this system has certain advantages,
one main disadvantage is that it would not “ensure total and homoge-
neous compliance [with EU law]”.23 In line with this, Dougan points out
that the EU’s reliance on a decentralised enforcement system may disrupt
the exercise of the free movement rights and distort the competition
between undertakings in the EU.24
EU law clearly did not intend to harmonise the rules governing the
organisation of the courts, the procedures, the remedies, or other proce-
dural aspects. Thus, as a result, the ECJ was left with the task of striking a
balance between national procedural rules and the need to guarantee that
EU law is properly applied and enforced. Bearing this in mind, the
principle of effectiveness is aimed at “ensuring the integrity and coherence
of the Community legal order as a whole”.25
The principle of equivalence26 , requiring that infringements of EU
law are enforced no less favourably than similar infringements of Member
State law, and the principle of effectiveness27 , resulting from the fact that
national rules may not make the exercise of EU rights less attractive or
even virtually impossible. Both requirements apply cumulatively. In the
context of remedies and sanctions, it should be noted that an additional
criterion has been introduced, determining that remedies and sanctions
must be dissuasive.28
It should be emphasised that these two requirements, serving as a
floor, are not only aimed at guaranteeing access to a certain procedure at
22 Case C-93/12 ET Agrokonsulting ECLI:EU:C:2013:432, para 61.
23 Monti (2010) 96.
24 Dougan (2004) 96.
25 Prechal (1997) 4.
26 Case 68/88 Commission v Greece (Greek Maize) ECLI:EU:C:1989:339.
27 Case 33/76 Rewe (Saarland) ECLI:EU:C:1976:188.
28 Case 14/83 Von Colson and Kamann ECLI:EU:C:1984:153.
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Member State level (which in exceptional circumstances even has to be
established29), but in addition may also determine the level of protection
during the enforcement process, as well as the outcome of such a
procedure, such as the award of damages. Access to protection may
involve access to a court (including locus standi),30 time limits,31 access
to interim measures in summary proceedings,32 and a clear system of legal
protection.33 The two principles moreover apply to conditions that must
apply during the enforcement procedure, including judicial review by the
national court,34 burden of proof,35 and the ex officio application of EU
law.36 Finally, the principles may influence the outcome of the procedure,
referring, inter alia, the taking of interim measures, reconsideration of
irreversible decisions, damages for infringements of EU law by a Member
State37 or by other parties,38 and the right to interest on the damages.39
The basic framework for this two-tier test can be found in the early
cases Rewe (Saarland) and Comet.40 Their very origin can be traced back to
the principle of loyal cooperation as articulated in Art 4(3) second sentence
TEU (ex Art 10 EC Treaty). Based on that principle, Member States must
take any appropriate measure to ensure the fulfilment of their obligations
arising out of the Treaties or resulting from the acts of the institutions of
the Union. Temple Lang qualified this general principle of sincere or loyal
29 Joined Cases C-6/90 and C-9/90 Francovich ECLI:EU:C:1991:428.
30 Joined Cases C-87/90, C-88/90 and C-89/90 Verholen ECLI:EU:C:1991:314.
31 See, eg, Case C-542/08 Barth ECLI:EU:C:2010:193.
32 See, eg, Case C-213/89 Factortame ECLI:EU:C:1990:257.
33 See Case C-268/06 Impact ECLI:EU:C:2008:223; Case C-568/08 Spijker Infrabouw
ECR I-2655.
34 Case C-55/06 Arcor AG ECLI:EU:C:2008:244.
35 Joined Cases C-192/95 to C-218/95 Comateb c.s. ECR I-165; Case 222/84 Johnston
ECLI:EU:C:1986:206; Case C-242/95 GT-Link ECLI:EU:C:1997:376; Case 146/73
Rheinmühlen ECLI:EU:C:1974:12; Case 199/82 San Giorgio ECLI:EU:C:1983:318.
36 Ex officio application of EU law means that when national judges are requested to
rule in a case they may be required to apply EU law on their own motion, without
the parties having relied on EU law. A consequence could also be that a national
possibility to apply EU law ex officio becomes an obligation under EU law. Prechal
(2001), 106. Cases that are relevant in this area: Joined Cases C-87/90, C-88/90 and
C-89/90 Verholen ECLI:EU:C:1991:314; Joined Cases C-430/93 and C-431/93 Van
Schijndel ECLI:EU:C:1995:441; Case C-312/93 Peterbroeck ECLI:EU:C:1995:437;
Joined Cases C-295/04 to C-298/04 Manfredi ECLI:EU:C:2006:461; Joined Case C-
222/05 to C-225/05 Van der Weerd ECLI:EU:C:2007:318.
37 Joined Cases C-6/90 and C-9/90 Francovich ECLI:EU:C:1991:428; Joined Cases C-
46/93 and C-48/93 Brasserie du Pêcheur ECLI:EU:C:1996:79.
38 Case C-453/99 Courage v Crehan ECLI:EU:C:2001:465.
39 Joined Cases C-295/04 to C-298/04 Manfredi ECLI:EU:C:2006:461.
40 Case 33/76 Rewe (Saarland) ECLI:EU:C:1976:188 and Case 45/76 Comet ECLI:EU:
C:1976:191.
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cooperation as the most important one in the EU, imposing an obligation
on all national authorities and courts to comply with all other general
principles.41
Member States must protect the rights individuals derive from EU
law.42 The question is, however, what is meant by rights? Must these
rights be directly effective in order to oblige Member States to do the
utmost to guarantee the full effect of EU law? An attempt to clarify the
term “rights” was made by Van Gerven, who proposed that a right refers
to a legal position, enabling an individual to enforce that right before a
court in order to make good the damages caused by the violation of such a
right.43 More specifically, the Rewe (Saarland) case made it clear that the
ECJ refers to “rights which individuals acquire through the direct effect of
Community law”.44
Workers derive rights from the free movement of workers and the
posting of workers. Regarding the free movement of workers, the ECJ
clearly ruled that this provision is directly effective, in both vertical and
horizontal directions.45 Individuals may therefore rely directly on the
Treaty provision and the corresponding secondary EU law. Based on the
PWD, Member States that have minimum employment conditions that
apply to national employees are under the Directive also obliged to apply
such conditions to posted workers. As long as the provisions of the
Directive appear to be clear and unconditional, which appears to be the
case with the PWD, they have direct effect and may be invoked by an
individual against a Member State. That individuals derive rights from a
directive, then, is only a consequence, not a condition for a directive being
directly effective.46 As the PWD does not harmonise the material content
of the hard-core employment conditions, but only acts as a conflict-of-law
instrument, individuals have to base their claim on national labour law. So
far, directives do not have (or cannot have) a horizontal direct effect.47 In
41 Temple Lang (2008) 77.
42 Van Gerven (2000) 502.
43 Van Gerven (2000).
44 Case 45/76 Comet ECLI:EU:C:1976:191, para 13; Case 33/76 Rewe (Saarland) ECLI:
EU:C:1976:188, para 5.
45 Case 167/73 Commission v France (French Merchant Seamen) ECLI:EU:C:1974:35;
Case 41/74 Van Duyn ECLI:EU:C:1974:133; Case 36/74 Walrave and Koch ECLI:EU:
C:1974:140; Case C-415/93 Bosman ECLI:EU:C:1995:463.
46 Van Gerven (2000) 506-7.
47 Case 152/84 Marshall ECLI:EU:C:1986:84, para 48; Case C-91/92 Faccini Dori ECLI:
EU:C:1994:292, para 20. In Faccini Dori the Court ruled that “a directive cannot of
itself impose obligations on an individual and cannot therefore be relied upon as
such against an individual”.
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case the national provision violates EU law it would be possible to take
action against the state.48
D. The principles of equivalence and effectiveness as a floor
Equivalence
The principle of equivalence (also referred to as non-discrimination)
requires enforcement measures and/or remedies applied to violations of
EU law to be no less favourable than those applied to violations of purely
Member State law.49 This covers formal aspects of enforcement as well as
actual efforts on behalf of the national authorities.50 The principle of
equivalence can be invoked for two purposes. On the one hand, it may
serve as a shield against disproportionate penalties imposed by a Member
State for non-compliance with EU law.51 On the other hand, this principle
can be regarded as a sword fighting for the grant of more effective remedy
to an individual whose right has been violated because a Member State’s
authority disregarded EU law.52
A prominent example that should be mentioned here is the Greek
Maize case.53 In this case, two consignments of maize exported from Greece
to Belgium in fact consisted of maize imported from Yugoslavia, although
officially declared by the Greek authorities as consisting of Greek maize.
Therefore, the agricultural levy payable to the EU had not been collected.
According to the Commission, that fraud had been committed with the
complicity of certain Greek civil servants and a number of senior civil
servants provided false documents and made false statements to conceal it.
48 See on that Case C-91/92 Faccini Dori ECLI:EU:C:1994:292, para 27, where the
Court ruled that, “[i]f the result prescribed by the directive cannot be achieved by
way of interpretation, it should also be borne in mind that […] Community law
requires the Member States to make good damage caused to individuals through
failure to transpose a directive, provided that three conditions are fulfilled. First,
the purpose of the directive must be to grant rights to individuals. Second, it must
be possible to identify the content of those rights on the basis of the provisions of
the directive. Finally, there must be a causal link between the breach of the State’s
obligation and the damage suffered”.
49 Case C-62/93 BP Soupergaz ECLI:EU:C:1995:223, Opinion AG Jacobs, para 58. See
also Case 33/76 Rewe (Saarland) ECLI:EU:C:1976:188, para 5; Case 45/76 Comet
ECLI:EU:C:1976:191, para 5.
50 Jans et al. (2007) 209.
51 Case C-29/95 Pastoors ECLI:EU:C:1997:28.
52 See, eg, Case 14/83 Von Colson and Kamann ECLI:EU:C:1984:153, paras 23-4. See on
the two functions the principle of equivalence may have: Malmberg et al. (2003) 50-1.
53 Case 68/88 Commission v Greece (Greek Maize) ECLI:EU:C:1989:339.
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The applicable EU law did not specifically provide for any penalty, nor
did it refer to Member State laws. As a result of this lacuna, Member States
were required to take all measures to guarantee the application and
effectiveness of EU law.54 The ECJ made it clear that, although the choice
of penalties remains within the Member States’ discretion, infringements
of EU law must be penalised under conditions, procedural and substan-
tive, analogous to those applicable to infringements of Member State law
of a similar nature and importance. It added that the penalty must be
effective, proportionate, and dissuasive.55 Furthermore, national autho-
rities must proceed with the same diligence as they bring to bear in
implementing corresponding Member State laws.56
As to the comparability of an EU rule with a national one, the
Advocate General in the case divided the different comparators into what
he called transversal and vertical comparators. Possible transversal com-
parators could be to compare the applicable procedural rules with those
governing actions to enforce equal treatment in areas such as social
security. On the other hand, one could compare the action under the
Equal Pay Act with a claim by the Race Relations Act.57 With regard to
vertical comparators, he suggested comparing a claim brought under the
Equal Pay Act with one under Art 141 TEC (now Art 157 TFEU), or
comparing a claim for salary arrears based on the EU principle of equal
pay with an action under, for instance, other actions for recovery of salary
arrears, the basis of which is to be found in the national legal system. The
ECJ, however, made it clear that the principle of equivalence would only
apply to purely national legislation.
Comparison between the national procedural conditions relating to
violations of domestic as well as EU law is possible “where the purpose
and cause of action are similar”.58 Thereby, the role played by that
provision in the procedure as a whole, as well as the operation and any
special features of that procedure before the different national courts must
54 Case 68/88 Commission v Greece (Greek Maize) ECLI:EU:C:1989:339, para 23.
55 Case 68/88 Commission v Greece (Greek Maize) ECLI:EU:C:1989:339, para 24. See on
this also Case 14/83 Von Colson and Kamann ECLI:EU:C:1984:153.
56 Case 68/88 Commission v Greece (Greek Maize) ECLI:EU:C:1989:339, para 25.
57 In Case C-185/97 Coote ECLI:EU:C:1998:424, for instance, a comparison by the
national tribunal was made between the Sex Discrimination Act and the Race
Discrimination Act.
58 Case C-261/95 Palmisani ECLI:EU:C:1997:351, para 36; Case C-231/96 Edis ECLI:
EU:C:1998:401, para 36; Case C-326/96 Levez ECLI:EU:C:1998:577, para 41; Case C-
78/98 Preston ECLI:EU:C:2000:247, para 55; Case C-63/08 Pontin ECLI:EU:
C:2009:666, para 45; Case C-246/09 Bulicke ECLI:EU:C:2010:418, para 26.
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be taken into account.59 In the Barth case the ECJ made it clear that
limitation rules, applicable to domestic and EU actions, must be similar.60
Whether that is the case, is for the national court to determine.
An interesting example in that regard is the Bulicke case.61 Ms
Bulicke initiated an action before the Arbeitsgericht Hamburg (Labour
Court Hamburg, hereafter: Arbeitsgericht) seeking compensation for the
damage she had suffered by reason of alleged discrimination. Bulicke
applied for a job at the age of 41, whereas applicants were solicited not to
be older than 35 years of age. Her application was rejected and she
initiated a claim before the Arbeitsgericht. According to the Arbeitsgericht,
Bulicke failed to submit her claim to the alleged perpetrator within the
prescribed time as laid down in § 15(4) General Law on Equal Treatment
(Allgemeines Gleichbehandlungsgesetz), which states that a claim must be
initiated within two months of receipt of the rejection of the job applica-
tion, or within two months of acquiring knowledge of the discrimination.
The Arbeitsgericht, in assessing which time limit applies in the
underlying case, takes into consideration several other time limits that
apply in the labour and discrimination law context. When comparing
various time limitations, the Arbeitsgericht refers, for instance, to a time
limit of three weeks applied in case of wrongful dismissal. Also, actions to
have a fixed-term employment contract declared invalid are bound by a
time limit of three weeks. Collective agreements may contain quite short
time limits, where failure to abide by them also negates the possibility of
initiating a legal claim. According to the Arbeitsgericht, the claim under §
15(4) General Law on Equal Treatment concerns a claim against the
employer. If the employer rejects the employee’s claims, the employee
who considers himself as being discriminated against may initiate a claim
within three months, from the date of the written claim made to the
employer, and bring proceedings before the labour court. If the employee
does not initiate a claim against the employer, but decides to bring an
action directly before the labour court, the time limit of two months
applies, as laid down in § 15(4) General Law on Equal Treatment.62
According to the ECJ, it does not appear that a provision such as
§ 15(4) AGG is less favourable than provisions concerning similar domes-
59 Case C-326/96 Levez ECLI:EU:C:1998:577, para 44, with reference to Joined Cases
C-430/93 and C-431/93 Van Schijndel ECLI:EU:C:1995:441, para 19.
60 Case C-542/08 Barth ECLI:EU:C:2010:193, para 20, with reference to Case C-78/98
Preston ECLI:EU:C:2000:247, para 49; Case C-118/08 Transportes Urbanos ECLI:EU:
C:2010:39, para 35.
61 Case C-246/09 Bulicke ECLI:EU:C:2010:418.
62 Case C-246/09 Bulicke ECLI:EU:C:2010:418, paras 24-34.
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tic actions in employment law. The Court emphasises that it is for the
national court to decide whether the procedural time limits referred to by
the Arbeitsgericht Hamburg are comparable time limits. It further ruled
that it is for the national court to ascertain whether the interpretation of the
time limit laid down in § 15(4) AGG can be upheld.
Equivalence, however, does not mean that Member States have to
extend their most favourable rules to all actions that are based on EU
law.63 What it does mean, as the ECJ clarified, is only that the rules and
procedures for infringements of EU law may not be less favourable than
those for infringements of Member State law.64 Moreover, individuals
should not be able to argue that a particular penalty or procedure does not
fulfil the principle of equivalence because other Member States would
have lower or other penalties.65 Such a requirement under EU law would
result in a de facto harmonisation of enforcement procedures.
In 2012, the ECJ ruled in the Hristo Byankov case that provisions
applicable to actions, including time limits, must apply without distinction
to actions based on infringement of EU law and those based on infringe-
ment of Member State law.66 This seems to go further than what the ECJ
had ruled previously, emphasising that the rules applied to violations of
EU law may not be less favourable than those governing actions for
violations of Member State law. The latter did allow more favourable, but
not less favourable rules.
63 Tridimas (2006) 426. Case C-231/96 Edis ECLI:EU:C:1998:401, paras 37-8.
64 See, inter alia, Case C-378/10 VALE Építési kft ECLI:EU:C:2012:440, para 54. In this
case, VALE Costruzioni Srl, registered in the Rome commercial register, intended
to transfer its seat and its business to Hungary, and to discontinue business in Italy.
Entry in the Hungarian register was deleted. According to the Hungarian court, a
company which was incorporated and registered in Italy could not, by virtue of
Hungarian company law, transfer its seat to Hungary and cannot obtain registra-
tion there in the form requested. A company which was not Hungarian could not
be listed as a predecessor in law. Refusing to record in the commercial register the
company of the Member State of origin as the “predecessor in law” to the
converted company was not compatible with the principle of equivalence if, in
relation to the registration of domestic conversions, such a record was made of the
predecessor company. Moreover, the Hungarian Government did not raise any
argument to justify its recording of the names only of companies which convert
domestically.
65 Jans et al. (2007) 211.
66 Case C-249/11 Hristo Byankov ECLI:EU:C:2012:608, para 70, referring to Case C-
63/08 Pontin ECLI:EU:C:2009:666, para 45; Case C-591/10 Littlewoods ECLI:EU:
C:2012:478, para 31.
Chapter 2
30
Effectiveness
Two presumptions underlie the principle of effectiveness: first, national
procedural rules may impede the full effect of EU law and, second,
existing differences in Member State law might compromise the unifor-
mity of EU law.67 The principle of effectiveness means that Member States
must actually enforce EU law in order to ensure that the rights individuals
derive from EU law are effectively applied.68 As the ECJ emphasised in
the Verviers Drinking Water case, “[…] a Member State may not plead
practical or administrative difficulties in order to justify non-compliance
with the obligations and time-limits laid down in Community directives.
The same holds true of financial difficulties, which it is for the Member
States to overcome by adopting appropriate measures”.69 The essence of
the Rewe (Saarland) and Comet rulings is that the procedural rules may not
make it “impossible in practice” to exercise the EU rights which the
national courts are obliged to protect.70 While Member States are required
to abstain from measures that could violate EU rights, they must intervene
in a situation in which private parties obstruct these rights.71
The well-known Von Colson and Kamann case has shown that if
Member States provide a remedy in the form of damages for the loss
individuals suffered because of unequal treatment, they must adopt
measures which “[…] have a real and deterrent effect on the employer”,
meaning that compensation must be adequate in relation to the damage
sustained.72 The right to compensation in a purely nominal amount could
not satisfy the requirements of an effective transposition of the Directive.73
Von Colson and Kamann both received compensation for expenses they
incurred in submitting their application. For a remedy to be effective, three
sub-requirements must be met, meaning that remedies must be effective,
proportionate, and have a deterrent effect.74
67 Accetto & Zleptnig (2005) 392.
68 Jans et al. (2007) 212, with reference to Case C-42/89 Commission v Belgium (Verviers
Drinking Water) ECLI:EU:C:1990:285.
69 Case C-42/89 Commission v Belgium (Verviers Drinking Water) ECLI:EU:C:1990:285,
para 24.
70 Case 45/76 Comet ECLI:EU:C:1976:191, para 5.
71 Case C-265/95 Commission v France (Spanish Strawberries) ECLI:EU:C:1997:595.
72 Case 14/83 Von Colson and Kamann ECLI:EU:C:1984:153, paras 18, 23.
73 Case 14/83 Von Colson and Kamann ECLI:EU:C:1984:153, para 24. See also Case 68/
88 Commission v Greece (Greek Maize) ECLI:EU:C:1989:339, para 24.
74 Case 14/83 Von Colson and Kamann ECLI:EU:C:1984:153, para 23. See also Case 68/
88 Commission v Greece (Greek Maize) ECLI:EU:C:1989:339.
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In Dekker, the potential employer refused to employ Mrs Dekker
because the insurer would not reimburse the daily benefits to be paid
during her maternity leave. Consequently, the employer would be unable
to employ a replacement during her absence. Mrs Dekker claimed
damages for the financial losses she would suffer from the refusal.
However, such a legal action could only succeed if it was proved that
the employer is at fault and cannot avail himself of any ground exempting
him from liability. According to the ECJ, any breach of the prohibition of
discrimination must, in itself, be sufficient to make the employer liable and
must not depend on proving the employer’s fault.75
Is a requirement first to have recourse to the employer before
initiating judicial proceedings in accord with the principle of effectiveness?
This question was addressed in the Günther Fuß case. According to the
German case law, based on the principle of good faith (Art 242 Civil
Code), a civil servant must, first, make application to the employer. Such a
requirement enables the employer to amend the work schedule and avoids
accumulation of large amounts of hours of time off in lieu as recompense,
bearing in mind that the continuity of the service must be guaranteed.
Although it is a valid reason for obliging employees first to seek compen-
sation directly from their employer, it should be noted that the obligation
on workers to make a prior application to their employer implies a shift of
the burden to comply with EU law, and in particular Directive 2003/88/
EC, to individuals. This would also give authorities the possibility to avoid
compliance with EU law as long as no application has been made. As Art 6
(b) Directive 2003/88/EC is a clearly formulated provision, all authorities
of a Member State, whether decentralised or centralised, must comply “by
that fact alone” with that provision.76 The point in the Fuß case was that
the Member State (authorities) should not be able to benefit from its (their)
own fault.77
As the ECJ ruled in Ecotrade, and reaffirmed in Q-Beef NV and Others,
if Member State law provides authorities a more advantageous limitation
period than individuals, this does not infringe the principle of effective-
ness.78 It is not contrary to the principle of effectiveness if the tax authority
benefits from a longer time limit to recover unpaid VAT than is available
to the taxable person to exercise his right to deduction.
75 Case C-177/88 Dekker ECLI:EU:C:1990:383, paras 23-6.
76 See also Case C-429/09 Günther Fuß v Stadt Halle ECLI:EU:C:2010:717, para 85.
77 Case 148/78 Ratti ECLI:EU:C:1979:110, para 22.
78 Joined Cases C-95/07 and C-96/07 Ecotrade ECLI:EU:C:2008:267, paras 49-54;
Joined Cases C-89/10 and C-96/10 Q-Beef ECR I-7819, para 42.
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There is an interesting case on time limits in the context of the free
movement of workers. A central feature of the free movement rights is the
right of workers to move to another Member State in order to seek a job
and/or to work there. Thereby, EU law grants them the right not to be
discriminated against based on nationality as regards employment con-
ditions, for example. Only a few cases in the context of the free movement
of workers relate to the question of whether national enforcement proce-
dures and/or instruments comply with the principles of equivalence and
effectiveness.
In the Barth case, the applicant unsuccessfully claimed that an
Austrian time limit would violate the free movement of workers. In this
case, Austria has a provision determining that university professors who
have completed 15 years of service in that capacity in Austrian univer-
sities, and who for four years have been in receipt of the length-of-service
increment, shall be eligible for a special length-of-service increment that is
to be taken into account in the calculation of the individual’s retirement
pension. Time spent at a university in a similar capacity in a Member State
also counts. Furthermore, the Austrian provision determined that a claim
on entitlement to benefits must be made within three years of the date at
which the services or activities giving rise to the entitlement were affected.
Barth, a German national, who was employed as a university professor at
the Goethe University Frankfurt from 1 January 1979 until 28 February
1987, was appointed as of 1 March 1987 as an ordinary university
professor at the University of Vienna, Austria. On the date of his
appointment he became Austrian national. The period during which Barth
was employed at the Goethe University Frankfurt had not been taken into
account for the purposes of the special length-of-service increments.
Consequently, Barth did not receive increments.
The Barth case must be seen in relation to the failure to take account
of special length-of-service increments accrued abroad, which had already
been disputed in 2003 in the Köbler case.79 In this case, the ECJ ruled that
the Austrian legislation was in violation with the workers’ right to free
movement. As a result, the Austrian legislature amended the law, follow-
ing which Barth was entitled to the increments mentioned. In a letter of 2
March 2004, which Barth addressed to the University of Vienna, he
applied for the adjustment of his special length-of-service increment.
According to the decision following the administrative appeal, the court
ruled that Barth was indeed entitled to receive the increments as of 1994.
However, taking into account the time limit of three years, which started
79 Case C-224/01 Köbler ECLI:EU:C:2003:513.
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to run on the date when the services or activities giving rise to the
entitlement were affected, increments could only be claimed as of 1 October
2000.80
Before the national court, Barth did not challenge the decision that
he was entitled to receive the increments as of 1994. What he did challenge
was the decision that he was not entitled to receive the increments as of 1
October 2000. Barth argued that this decision would not be in line with Art
39 EC Treaty (now Art 45 TFEU). The ECJ ruled that the previous law that
was contested in the Köbler case was indeed contrary to the free movement
of workers. However, as a result of an amendment to the law, work
periods in other Member States also have to be taken into account, subject
to a limitation period of three years, which can be extended by another
nine months. The ECJ found the three-year time limit to be in line with the
principles of equivalence (ie they were identical for claims under domestic
law as well as claims based on EU law) and effectiveness (ie the limitation
was reasonable).81 According to the Court,
“it does not appear that applying a limitation period in circumstances such as
those in the main proceedings constitutes, by itself, a restriction on the freedom of
movement for workers within the meaning of Article 39 EC. When that limitation
period is applied, the application has an impact on the possibility of obtaining the
special length-of-service increment for a period entirely in the past. It follows that
it is not such as to preclude or deter a worker such as the applicant in the main
proceedings from exercising his rights to freedom of movement for workers,
because the possibility of obtaining that increment in respect of the past is not
dependent on the worker’s choosing to exercise those rights”.82
So, a limitation period as in the underlying case did not hinder Barth from
exercising his free movement right. This would be different if the Austrian
rule were to limit the exercise of an EU right, which would have been the
case if Barth had not been able to claim increments due to the length of
service abroad at all.
When comparing the principles of equivalence and effectiveness, it
seems that compliance with the principle of equivalence is easier to
establish. Equivalence is measurable, in the sense that one can compare
the procedure(s) and instruments used to enforce infringements of Mem-
ber State law side-by-side with those used for infringements of EU law.
80 The judgement in the Köbler case was given on 30 September 2003.
81 In a recent case from June 2014 the ECJ ruled that reasonable time limits are
allowed: Case C-501/12 Thomas Specht and others ECLI:EU:C:2014:2005, para 114.
82 Case C-542/08 Barth ECLI:EU:C:2010:193. See, to that effect, Case C-190/98 Graf
ECLI:EU:C:2000:49, para 24.
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Effectiveness appears to be intangible, being rather a quality standard than
a measurable criterion.83 Nevertheless, both are of great importance for
assessing national monitoring and enforcement instruments.
In fact, simply stated, the principle effectiveness “[…] requires no
more than proper application of Community law and adequate remedies
for the breach of Community rights”.84 The two instrumental require-
ments85 of equivalence and effectiveness are used to check the overall
effectiveness of the procedural rule or enforcement practice.
E. Principle of effective judicial protection
Besides the two principles of equivalence and effectiveness, the ECJ, as of
the mid-1970s, also developed the principle of effective judicial protection,
which national judges must apply when dealing with individuals’ claims
based on EU law. With the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the
principle has been codified in Art 47 EUCFR.86 The EUCFR, Art 6 TEU
determines, has the same legal value as the Treaties. Principally, the
provisions of the EUCFR are addressed to the institutions, bodies, offices
and agencies of the EU and to the Member States only when they are
implementing EU law. This means that when implementing EU law, these
bodies and institutions shall respect the rights, observe the principles, and
promote the application thereof in accordance with their respective
powers and respecting the limits of the powers of the EU as conferred
in the Treaties (Art 51 EUCFR).
The EUCFR draws a distinction between principles and rights. In
regard to principles, it is determined that the provisions of the EUCFR
containing principles may be implemented by legislative and executive
acts taken by institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the Union, and by
acts of Member States when they are implementing Union law, in the
exercise of their respective powers (Art 52(5) EUCFR). Principles as such,
however, are only judicially cognisable in the interpretation of such acts
and in rulings on their legality. Consequently, principles may serve as a
ground for judicial review of the legality or compatibility of the afore-
mentioned EU acts.
83 Kullmann (2013), 289.
84 Jacobs (1997) 26.
85 Jans et al. (2007) 206ff.
86 Referring to an “effective remedy before a tribunal”.
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Article 19 TEU obliges Member States to “[…] provide remedies
sufficient to ensure effective legal protection in the fields covered by Union
law”. In the Von Colson and Kamann judgement, the ECJ made clear that
individuals whose rights were infringed are entitled to effective judicial
protection.87 Referring to Arts 6 and 13 ECHR, the ECJ recognised that
Member States must have judicial procedures available to deal with claims
following infringements of a directive.88
The reach of the principle of effective judicial protection has become
clear in the ECJ’s case law. For instance, this principle may require a national
court to grant interim relief, even if Member State law does not provide for
such a possibility.89 Interim relief, according to AGTesauro, is “considered a
fundamental and indispensable instrument of any judicial system”.90 More-
over, the principle also embraces the possibility for a national judge to set
aside a national rule that infringes EU law91 or to award damages for
violations of rights that individuals derive from EU law92.
What the relation is between the principle of effective judicial protection
and the principles of equivalence and effectiveness is answered neither in the
case law nor in the literature. Prechal, for instance, sees the principle of
effectiveness as an expansion of “the ‘old’ principle of effectiveness”, aimed
at ensuring the EU legal order’s integrity and coherence as a whole.93 The
principle of effective judicial protection, on the other hand, refers to judicial
protection provided by courts. Tridimas interprets the principle of effective
judicial protection the other way round, as the more general principle of
effectiveness of EU law.94 Whether the principle of effective judicial protection
is either a more specific principle of the principle of effectiveness or the
overarching principle has not been clearly stated by the ECJ. What is clear,
though, is that the principles of equivalence and effectiveness and the principle
of effective judicial protection are not used consistently. Byway of example, in
Arcor AG, the ECJ used the principles of equivalence and effectiveness of
judicial protection.95 Later on, the Court refers to the principle of effective
judicial protection, being a general principle recognised under EU law.96
87 Case 14/83 Von Colson and Kamann ECLI:EU:C:1984:153, paras 23-4.
88 Case 222/84 Johnston ECLI:EU:C:1986:206.
89 Case C-213/89 Factortame ECLI:EU:C:1990:257, paras 18-21.
90 Case C-213/89 Factortame ECLI:EU:C:1990:257, Opinion AG Tesauro, 2457.
91 See, inter alia, Case 106/77 Simmenthal ECLI:EU:C:1978:49, paras 21-3.
92 Case C-180/95 Draehmpaehl ECLI:EU:C:1997:208, para 25, with reference to Case
14/83 Von Colson and Kamann ECLI:EU:C:1984:153, paras 23-4.
93 Prechal (1997) 4.
94 Tridimas (2006) 291-92.
95 Case C-55/06 Arcor AG ECLI:EU:C:2008:244, para 170.
96 Case C-55/06 Arcor AG ECLI:EU:C:2008:244, para 174.
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In this case, Arcor sought annulment of a decision taken by the
Bundesnetzagentur, partially approving Deutsche Telekom’s rates for un-
bundled access to its local loop (ie a monthly licence fee for use of the line, a
one-off provision, and a cancellation fee). Arcor argued that the rates
approved by the Bundesnetzagentur were too high. It claimed that the
investment value of the local loop was incorrectly determined by applying
the analytical cost model and the annuity method and by failing to take
account of other costs and expenses. That evaluation, Arcor argued, allowed
calculation of the rates for unbundled access to the local loop on the basis of
fictitious costs related to putting a new local network in place, and not on the
basis of the costs of the existing network. In that regard, the ECJ ruled that,
in case the National Regulatory Authority (‘NRA’) fails to apply EU law
correctly, it is for the national court to ensure the correct application of EU
law. Under the applicable Regulation, the NRA was obliged to ensure that
the application of rates for access to the local loop is calculated in a
transparent, fair, and non-discriminatory manner.
In the context of the present study, the principles of equivalence and
effectiveness together form the more general principle, which, in line with
Prechal, is extended with the principle of effective judicial protection. The
reason for this is that enforcement of labour law refers not only to
protection provided by a court. Although judicial protection plays a
very important role in labour law enforcement, it is necessary to empha-
sise that Member State institutions may also be entrusted to monitor and
enforce labour law. Such institutions make use of administrative enforce-
ment instruments, governed by public law. Taking this into account, the
principles of equivalence and effectiveness should be seen as more
general, thus including the principle of effective judicial protection.
F. Remedies under EU law
The issue of remedies is a recurring subject in the context of monitoring and
enforcing EU law. According to the Oxford Dictionary of Law, a remedy is
defined as “[a]ny of the methods available at law for the enforcement,
protection, or recovery of rights or for obtaining redress for their infringe-
ment”.97 Rights and remedies can thus be seen as two sides of the same coin,
meaning that where there is a right, there must also be a remedy.98 The
97 Law & Martin (2009, 2013) 467.
98 This is expressed by the Latin phrase “ubi ius, ibi remedium”. See for a discussion of the
relationship between rights and remedies: Van Gerven (2000); Eilmansberger (2004).
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argumentum e contrario, then, would be: where there is no right, there need
not to be a remedy.
National legislation provides the conditions under which a remedy
is available, provided, however, that these conditions respect the princi-
ples of effectiveness and equivalence.99 The case Rewe (Kiel), confirmed by
the Unibet case, made it clear that the Treaty “is not intended to create new
remedies in the national courts to ensure the observance of Community
law other than those already laid down by national law”.100 Indeed, it
may be that Member States are not required to create new remedies, but
rather to broaden the scope of existing ones. The ECJ may go further, if the
remedy in question is not able to ensure the respect for an individual’s
rights under EU law.101
G. Actors obliged to comply with the principles of equivalence and
effectiveness
Different parties are involved in monitoring and enforcing labour law. An
important question that arises is to whom the principles of equivalence
and effectiveness are actually addressed. This is of interest as, besides
Member States’ authorities, social partners may also be entrusted with the
enforcement of labour law. As the principles of equivalence and effective-
ness principally regulate the relationship between the EU and its Member
States, it is first necessary to refer to the EU’s understanding of ‘Member
State’. Here, the case Fratelli Costanzo proves to be seminal.
According to the ECJ, “all authorities of the Member States”, which
includes “all organs of the administration, including decentralized autho-
rities such as municipalities”, are under the same obligation as a national
court to apply the provisions of a directive and to refrain from applying
provisions of Member State law which conflict with it.102 This scope was
extended in the Foster v British Gas case. Here, the question whether the
applicants could invoke the provisions of a directive against the privatised
British Gas Company was answered in the affirmative. The ECJ ruled that
such provisions might be invoked against “organizations or bodies which
99 Prechal (1997) 8; Van Gerven (2000), 517.
100 Case 158/80 Rewe (Kiel) ECLI:EU:C:1981:163, para 44.
101 Case C-432/05 Unibet ECLI:EU:C:2007:163, para 41.
102 Case 103/88 Fratelli Costanzo ECLI:EU:C:1989:256, paras 30, 32. See also Case 380/
87 Enichem Base ECLI:EU:C:1989:318, para 17. Also included: tax authorities (Case
8/81 Becker ECLI:EU:C:1982:7); constitutionally independent authorities responsi-
ble for the maintenance of public order and safety (Case 222/84 Johnston ECLI:EU:
C:1986:206); and public authorities providing public health services (Case 152/84
Marshall ECLI:EU:C:1986:84).
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were subject to the authority or control of the State or had special powers
beyond those which result from the normal rules applicable to relations
between individuals”.103
It has been established that Member States may entrust social
partners with the monitoring and enforcement of (collectively agreed)
employment rights and conditions. Social partners have gained an in-
creased role in the field of EU social policy. According to the Treaty of
Maastricht there is a European Social Dialogue, based on which social
partners (may) actively participate in the rule-making process at EU level
(Arts 154 and 155 TFEU). Based on Art 154(1) TFEU, the Commission must
not only consult the social partners before submitting proposals in the
social policy field, but Art 155 TFEU also allows them to initiate a dialogue
at EU level, probably leading to “contractual relations, including
agreements”.104
Although the ECJ in Laval ruled that trade unions could not rely on
the public policy provision enshrined in Art 3(1) PWD, as they are not
“bodies governed by public law”,105 they are seen as self-regulatory
bodies, able to hinder the (exercise of) free movement rights. The Advo-
cate General added that they are not bodies entrusted with a service of
public interest, with powers going beyond the rules that are applicable to
relations between private parties.106 The Walrave and Koch case has shown
that Arts 45 and 56 TFEU oblige not only the state to abstain from creating
obstacles to the exercise of these rights. It has been emphasised that the
exercise of the fundamental freedoms “[…] would be compromised if the
abolition of barriers of national origin could be neutralized by obstacles
resulting from the exercise of their legal autonomy by associations or
organizations which do not come under public law”. It “extends likewise
to agreements and rules which do not emanate from public authorities”
and “agreements and any other collective regulations concerning
employment”.107
Art 56 TFEU has what Barnard calls an “extended vertical direct
effect”, as opposed to a horizontal direct effect. In that sense, decisions or
actions taken by professional regulatory bodies can be equated with state
interventions.108 Consequently, it can be assumed that the principles of
103 Case C-188/89 Foster v British Gas ECLI:EU:C:1990:313, para 18.
104 On the role of the social partners in the law-making at EU level see: Barnard (2012)
67-87.
105 Case C-341/05 Laval ECLI:EU:C:2007:809, para 84.
106 Case C-341/05 Laval ECLI:EU:C:2007:809, AG Mengozzi, para 137.
107 Case 36/74 Walrave and Koch ECLI:EU:C:1974:140, paras 18-20.
108 Barnard (2010) 242.
EU legal requirements for national enforcement of EU (labour) law
39
equivalence and effectiveness not only apply to Member State institutions,
as defined by the ECJ’s case law, but also to social partners acting at
Member State level.
H. Member State liability for violating the principles of equivalence
and effectiveness
Scope and conditions
If they fail to provide EU-proof procedures and institutions to monitor and
enforce EU law, Member States may be held liable. Moreover, it may
enable workers to claim that a Member State did not provide adequate
protection. So far, however, the Member States’ monitoring and enforce-
ment rules and/or practices have been challenged from the perspective
that they would have a detrimental impact on the freedom to provide
services. As yet, no worker has challenged a national procedural rule and/
or practice, claiming that a Member State failed to protect the rights he
derives from the PWD. National time limits have been challenged only in
relation to the free movement of workers.109
Member State liability is one of the main principles of the EU.110 A
famous case on the liability of a Member State was the subject is the
Francovich case.111 Francovich and others claimed, based on Directive 80/
987/EEC providing specific guarantees of payment of unpaid wages that
due to an employer’s insolvency, Italy should be ordered to pay the
outstanding wages. Italy failed to implement the Directive at issue. Under
this Directive Member States have to determine the date from which
payment of claims must be ensured and they have to lay down rules for
the organisation, financing and operation of the guarantee institutions.
Such institutions may be financed entirely by public authorities.
It was argued that it is unacceptable that a “Member State may
thwart the effects of the directive by asserting that it could have required
other persons to bear part or all of the financial burden resting upon it.”
This argument was rejected by the ECJ, which ruled that the Directive
contains a clear obligation that Member States must meet, namely to
establish an appropriate institutional guarantee system in case of an
employer’s insolvency.
109 Case C-542/08 Barth ECLI:EU:C:2010:193, see above.
110 Joined Cases C-6/90 and C-9/90 Francovich ECLI:EU:C:1991:428.
111 Joined Cases C-6/90 and C-9/90 Francovich ECLI:EU:C:1991:428.
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It was established that the Directive’s provisions were sufficiently
precise and unconditional as regards the determination of the persons
entitled to the guarantee and as regards the content of that guarantee.
These two elements are insufficient to enable individuals to rely on those
provisions before a national court. A reason for this is that these provisions
do not identify the person liable for the guarantee and the state cannot be
held liable solely on the fact that it has failed to transpose the Directive in a
timely manner. In sum, the persons concerned cannot invoke the rights
against the state before the national courts where no implementing
measure has been adopted within the prescribed period. The court,
however, ruled further that as Italy had failed to transpose the Directive,
which qualified as a breach of EU law, it was liable for loss and damage
caused by that failure.112
To hold a Member State liable, three cumulative conditions must be
met: the rule of law infringed must be intended to confer rights on
individuals; the breach must be sufficiently serious; and there must be a
direct causal link between the breach of the obligation resting on the State
and the damage sustained by the injured parties.113 Before a legal
provision can confer rights, the content of the right in question and its
beneficiary must be determinable with sufficient precision.114 Granting
rights is not a precondition of direct effect. However, to benefit from
Member State liability, the EU rules infringed must grant rights, failing
which a Member State cannot be held liable.115 Workers and the rights
they have under the free movement of workers provisions and the PWD
can be identified in line with this criterion, based on EU and national (case)
law.
Recalling its Rewe (Saarland) and Comet cases, the ECJ ruled that “the
substantive and procedural conditions for reparation of loss and damage
laid down by the Member State law of the Member States must not be less
favourable than those relating to similar domestic claims and must not be
so framed as to make it virtually impossible or excessively difficult to
obtain reparation”.116
112 Joined Cases C-6/90 and C-9/90 Francovich ECLI:EU:C:1991:428, para 43.
113 Joined Cases C-46/93 and C-48/93 Brasserie du Pêcheur ECLI:EU:C:1996:79; Case C-
352/98 P Bergaderm ECLI:EU:C:2000:361, para 42, with reference to Joined Cases C-
46/93 and C-48/93 Brasserie du Pêcheur ECLI:EU:C:1996:79, para 51. See also Case
C-429/09 Günther Fuß v Stadt Halle ECLI:EU:C:2010:717, para 47.
114 Prechal (2005) 283.
115 Van Gerven (2000) 507.
116 Joined Cases C-6/90 and C-9/90 Francovich ECLI:EU:C:1991:428, para 43. See also
Case C-429/09 Günther Fuß v Stadt Halle ECLI:EU:C:2010:717, para 62.
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Liability for unlawful actions under EU law by private actors
Member State liability is directed to the state and its authorities and
institutions. This excludes social partners. In the field of competition law,
however, there is a possibility for private liability for violations of EU
law.117 The competition law provisions in the Treaty apply directly and
horizontally between private parties. Based on them, private parties may
be held liable for violating these provisions.
An interesting question is whether social partners, when failing to
comply with EU law, can be held liable for that, and if so, on what
ground? Trade unions and employers’ associations can be equated with
state authorities insofar as they regulate the labour market by concluding
collective agreements.118 They have been referred to as bodies “sui
generis”119 or a “special category of private parties”.120 As social partners
can infringe the free movement rights and are obliged to comply with the
principles of equivalence and effectiveness, they should also be liable to
pay damages for infringements of EU law. But the question is on what
ground should they be held liable? Is Member State liability, in a modified
way, the right way, or should we look at the case law in the context of EU
competition law, or do we need to find a basis in national (procedural)
law?
Malmberg, in the context of the Swedish Labour Court’s decision in
Laval, in which the court based the union’s liability on a “general principle of
EU law concerning the liability of private actors”, questions whether there is
such a principle established by the Court. Apparently, the Swedish Labour
Court based its decision on the cases Manfredi, Courage and Raccanelli.
Although Malmberg does not agree with the ECJ’s ruling, he states that
these cases are relevant as they provide a method to determine whether
private individuals may claim compensation for a violation of EU law.
Although the Manfredi and Courage judgements concern competition law,
they may be relevant in relation to horizontally direct effective EU law.
Based on these two cases, Malmberg identifies five steps: (1)
whether a provision of EU law grants rights to individuals which they
can invoke in court; (2) whether the possibility of seeking compensation
117 See Apps (2009), 143. Examples of such cases are: Case C-453/99 Courage v Crehan
ECLI:EU:C:2001:465 and Joined Cases C-295/04 to C-298/04 Manfredi ECLI:EU:
C:2006:461.
118 Apps (2009) 148.
119 Apps (2009) 141.
120 Dashwood (2008) 527.
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for damages suffered is required to ensure the full effectiveness of EU law;
(3) whether the claim brought before the national court may be awarded
according to Member State law; (4) whether there is a possibility under
Member State law to award damages in similar cases (equivalence); and
(5) whether the national (procedural) rule – if it limits the possibility of
claiming damages – renders the exercise of EU law excessively difficult or
virtually impossible (effectiveness). Whether paying compensation for loss
is required to ensure the effectiveness EU law that has been violated is for
the national court to determine.121
It seems that using this five-step approach identified by Malmberg
is in line what has been said about the principles of equivalence and
effectiveness. If a trade union violates an EU right, it can be held liable for
damages suffered by the individual whose EU right has been violated.
When discussing whether damages are required to ensure the full effec-
tiveness of EU law, Malmberg highlights several differences between trade
unions and the undertakings concerned in the Manfredi and Courage cases.
He states that the actions by the undertakings had an illegal aim, while
this cannot be said of collective actions exercised by trade unions, the aim
of which is to protect workers, which is a legitimate interest under EU law.
He emphasises that the actions by the undertakings were covert or hidden,
while collective actions are undertaken in public. Another distinguishing
feature is that the EU has an exclusive competence in the competition law
field, while that is not the case with regard to EU social policy and the
internal market. Based on that, Malmberg argues that the ECJ would not
establish a general principle on the basis of which a trade union would be
liable for an EU-unlawful collective action, if Member States have effective
methods to prevent such actions.122 However, if these other methods are
not in line with the full effectiveness of EU law, they may not be of any
help in preventing the establishment of the possibility of a private party’s
liability in a given case. Nevertheless, the exact conditions under which
Member States are liable are still determined by Member State law.
121 Malmberg (2012) 12-5.
122 Malmberg (2012) 15-6.
EU legal requirements for national enforcement of EU (labour) law
43
2.2.3 Monitoring and enforcing posted workers’ rights: ceiling imposed by the
ECJ’s case law
A. Introduction
Based on the case law dealt with below, it has become clear that the ECJ
also sets a maximum on these instruments, using the free movement
rights. In the terms of Jans et al., these rights fulfil a protective function,
which means that they protect individuals from too much state interven-
tion through procedural rules and enforcement practices.123
The ceiling set on domestic monitoring and enforcement instru-
ments is only applicable in relation to the freedom to provide services, and
not the free movement of workers. Central to the freedom to provide
services is that the service provider is subject to two legal regulations,
namely that of his home state and that of the temporary host state. Host
state rules therefore can be qualified as possibly hindering or restricting
the transnational provision of services, casting domestic monitoring and
enforcement instruments as Generalverdacht.124
Although they enjoy a wide margin of appreciation when determin-
ing the form of procedures, Member States are obliged to abide by the
fundamental freedoms.125 As a result, national enforcement instruments
that aimed – in some cases implicitly – at protecting the posted workers’
rights, came under the ECJ’s scrutiny. Those instruments that, in the
Dassonville line of reasoning were qualified as being “capable of hindering,
directly or indirectly, actually or potentially, intra-community trade”,
were stated not to be allowed, unless justified.126 An assessment of the
ECJ’s case law on the posting of workers has shown that in most cases,
national procedural measures were struck down in line with Dasson-
ville.127 In that sense, the market freedoms can be said to have a review
123 Jans et al. (2007) 213-4.
124 See section 1.1.3, above.
125 Case C-60/03Wolff and Müller ECLI:EU:C:2004:610, para 30. See in that respect also
Case C-390/99 Canal Satéllite Digital ECLI:EU:C:2002:34, paras 27-8; Case C-71/02
Karner ECLI:EU:C:2004:181, paras 33-4.
126 Case 8/74 Dassonville ECLI:EU:C:1974:82, para 5.
127 Case C-43/93Vander Elst ECLI:EU:C:1994:310, paras 14-5; Case C-272/94 Guiot ECLI:
EU:C:1996:147, paras 10, 15 and 22; Case C-165/98 Mazzoleni ECLI:EU:C:2001:162,
paras 22, 24; Case C-164/99 Portugaia Construções Ldª ECLI:EU:C:2002:40, paras 16
and 18; Case C-168/04 Commission v Austria ECLI:EU:C:2006:595, paras 36 and 61;
Case C-60/03 Wolff and Müller ECLI:EU:C:2004:610, paras 31-2; Case C-244/04
Commission v Germany (2006) ECLI:EU:C:2006:49, para 30; Case C-515/08 Santos
Palhota ECLI:EU:C:2010:589, paras 29 and 38.
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function, offering Member States some criteria on the basis of which they
can evaluate their national policies and laws.128
When evaluating whether national methods to enforce labour law
can be justified, the ECJ applies a four-pronged test. National instruments
are justified if they are applied in a non-discriminatory manner, justified
by imperative requirements in the general interest, suitable for securing
the attainment of the objective which they pursue, and do not go beyond
what is necessary in order to attain it.129 This Dassonville approach, as it is
called, captures all national measures that somehow affect market ac-
cess.130 By distinguishing the judicial, administrative and industrial rela-
tions enforcement methods, I shall assess how far the freedom to provide
services embraces a protective role.
B. Judicial enforcement: cross-border claims and subcontractors’
liability
Traditionally, individuals seek protection in court. Placing too much
reliance on a (foreign) worker’s own initiative to start proceedings against
his own employer is precarious. To reiterate Advocate General Alber’s
statement in the Commission v Italy case, it is indeed no longer difficult to
pursue a claim abroad. However, a claim for unpaid wages often does not
involve very large sums of money, which thus may possibly disproportio-
nately raise the costs of bringing the suit.131
In Commission v Italy, Italy required foreign temporary-work agencies
to have a registered branch office in its territory. This measure was aimed
precisely at guaranteeing that, in the absence of such a requirement, workers
would be forced to bring legal proceedings against their employer to enforce
their rights in a foreign court, with scant prospects of success.132 In addition,
the worker would be confronted with costs of an equal or even greater
amount, were he obliged to take proceedings in the court of another
Member State. Advocate General Alber was of the opinion that this is a
measure with a legitimate aim under EU law, namely worker protection,
and found it “wholly convincing” that “[…] an establishment on Italian
territory is apt to make it easier to bring an action against the undertaking”.
128 Azoulai (2008) 1342.
129 Case C-55/94 Gebhard ECLI:EU:C:1995:411, para 37.
130 See Syrpis (2007) ch 2, who extensively discusses the distinction between “affecting”
market access or “preventing” it.
131 Case C-279/00 Commission v Italy ECLI:EU:C:2002:89, Opinion AG Alber, paras 34-
6.
132 Case C-279/00 Commission v Italy ECLI:EU:C:2002:89, para 15.
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However, the ECJ found that this measure could not be justified.
Although acknowledging its aim to protect workers, it went beyond what is
necessary to achieve that aim. Under Art 5(1) 1968 Brussels Convention133,
workers sue their employers in the courts of the state in which they usually
work, even if the employer is domiciled in the territory of another state.134
Apparently, the ECJ accepts that a worker who – temporarily – works in
another Member State than the one in which he habitually works, finds
himself in difficulties when bringing an action in the Member State where
the worker works against an employer established abroad.
A more positive stance can be found in the Wolff and Müller case,
concerning the German joint and several liability system.135 Pereira Félix,
a Portuguese national, was temporarily employed in Berlin as a bricklayer
by a construction undertaking established in Portugal. The latter carried
out work on the building site for Wolff and Müller. According to German
Law on the Posting of Workers, both the contractor and the subcontractor
are liable for payment according to the applicable collective agreement.
Thus, Pereira Félix claimed that Wolff and Müller was liable for sums in
respect of wages136 which he had not received. The Arbeitsgericht Berlin
observed that the German provision’s primary objective was not the
safeguarding of workers’ pay,137 and admitted that the subcontractors’
liability leads to intensive checks and requires evidence from foreign
subcontractors, resulting in extra costs and administrative burdens, which
could therefore render the freedom to provide services less attractive.
Although the ECJ ruled that, indeed, such a provision could impede
the provision of services or render it less attractive,138 such a restriction
may, if applied without discrimination, be justified where it meets over-
riding requirements relating to the public interest, such as the protection of
workers.139 Furthermore, the interest must not be safeguarded by the rules
133 Convention of 27 September 1968 on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judg-
ments in Civil and Commercial Matters [1998] OJ C27/1.
134 Case C-279/00 Commission v Italy ECLI:EU:C:2002:89, paras 17-26.
135 Case C-60/03 Wolff and Müller ECLI:EU:C:2004:610.
136 Minimum wage means, inter alia, the sum payable to the worker after the
deduction of tax and social security contributions. See Case C-60/03 Wolff and
Müller ECLI:EU:C:2004:610, para 19.
137 Case C-60/03 Wolff and Müller ECLI:EU:C:2004:610.
138 Case C-60/03 Wolff and Müller ECLI:EU:C:2004:610, para 32. See in that respect
Case C-165/98 Mazzoleni ECLI:EU:C:2001:162, para 24 and Case C-164/99 Portu-
gaia Construções Ldª ECLI:EU:C:2002:40, para 18.
139 Case C-60/03 Wolff and Müller ECLI:EU:C:2004:610, para 35. See also Case 279/80
Webb ECLI:EU:C:1981:314, para 19; Case C-164/99 Portugaia Construções Ldª ECLI:
EU:C:2002:40, para 20; Case C-165/98Mazzoleni ECLI:EU:C:2001:162, para 27; Case
C-205/99 Analir ECLI:EU:C:2001:107, para 36.
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to which the provider of such a service is already subject in the Member
State of establishment.140 The German liability scheme did fulfil these
requirements, although it was not explicitly aimed at protecting workers.
Nevertheless, the liability of a guarantor provides workers with a real
benefit that contributes to their protection since they are presented with
another party, in addition to their employer, against whom they can
pursue their claims for wages.141 That the workers will be posted
principally only for a few months, and that enforcement of guarantee
claims in the German courts will be difficult in practice, was not relevant
to the ECJ.142 The Court argued that, if the entitlement to minimum rates
of pay constitutes a characteristic of worker protection, then procedural
arrangements ensuring observance of that right must equally be regarded
as being such as to ensure that protection.143
National joint and several liability systems in subcontracting chains
are not prohibited per se, however; their compatibility with EU law
depends on the specific system in question. Liability for social security
contributions or taxes seems to exceed the level of protection provided by
the PWD, as both are applied in the sending Member State.144 In principle,
a system of joint and several liability would seem to be quite effective in
practice, in the sense that it may impact the entire subcontractors’ chain.
Workers are free to claim the payment for minimum wages from any
contractor in the chain, which is also beneficial if one contractor is
insolvent. Nevertheless, the question remains whether posted workers
would indeed go to court to claim their rights.
C. Industrial relations enforcement: negotiations and collective action
Workers’ rights, laid down in (generally binding) collective agreements, may
be protected by social partners. At the EU level, the social partners have
increasingly gained a role in representing and protecting workers (see section
140 Case C-60/03 Wolff and Müller ECLI:EU:C:2004:610, para 34. See also Case 279/80
Webb ECLI:EU:C:1981:314, para 17; Case C-165/98 Mazzoleni ECLI:EU:C:2001:162,
para 25; Case C-164/99 Portugaia Construções Ldª ECLI:EU:C:2002:40, para 19; Case
C-205/99 Analir ECLI:EU:C:2001:107, para 25; Case C-319/06 Commission v Lux-
embourg ECLI:EU:C:2008:350, paras 39-40.
141 Case C-60/03 Wolff and Müller ECLI:EU:C:2004:610, para 16.
142 Case C-60/03Wolff and Müller ECLI:EU:C:2004:610, para 17. See in that respect also
Case C-279/00 Commission v Italy ECLI:EU:C:2002:89, Opinion AG Alber, paras 31-
5.
143 Case C-60/03 Wolff and Müller ECLI:EU:C:2004:610, para 37.
144 Case C-327/92 Rheinhold & Mahla ECLI:EU:C:1995:144; Case C-433/04 Commission
v Belgium ECLI:EU:C:2006:702.
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2.3 below). Besides negotiations on settling a possible dispute between an
employer and his worker on the incorrect or non-application of employment
rights, social partners often have the possibility to initiate a judicial procedure
to protect workers’ rights. If it seems that an employer does not complywith a
collective agreement to which he is bound, trade unions first seek to force
compliance with the agreement through negotiation. If this is unsuccessful,
judicial proceedings will be initiated. Viewed from this perspective, negotia-
tions can be seen as a preliminary requirement before going to court. This
alternative, however, may in most cases only be beneficial for those who are
members of the trade union, unless a trade union has alsomade the protection
of non-member workers part of its business.
What about collective action to protect the worker’s interests? As
indicated, monitoring and enforcing the law concerns a rights conflict.
Collective action is only permitted in case there is a conflict of interest.
This means that the type of collective action in the Laval case, which aimed
at concluding a collective agreement with a non-bound foreign service
provider, falls outside the scope of enforcing rights that workers already
derive from a collective agreement.145 The picture may be different in case
the collective action is aimed at combating social dumping, whereby the
employer is forced, for example, to limit the use of (sub)contractors or
temporary agency workers, or to make sure that the (sub)contractor or the
user undertaking complies with the applicable collective agreement(s).
At sectoral level, trade unions may have established certain funds
for, for instance, holiday pay (Germany and the Netherlands). These funds
may have their own mechanisms for checking whether employers comply
with the obligations laid down in the collective agreement. To monitor
and enforce the generally binding collective agreement in the agency
sector, an enforcement foundation has been established in the Nether-
lands, especially for that reason.146
D. Administrative enforcement: notification obligations, translating
and keeping documents
Monitoring compliance with employment rights presupposes a knowl-
edge of the presence of service providers and their workers. In Rush
Portuguesa, the ECJ made it clear that service providers moving to another
Member State with their staff, even if they are third-country nationals, in
order to provide services, may not be subjected to the necessity of a work
145 Case C-341/05 Laval ECLI:EU:C:2007:809, para 84.
146 These issues are dealt with in extenso in Chapter 6 below.
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permit. This would be discriminatory, as the service providers’ competi-
tors established in the host state are able to use their own staff without
being subject to that obligation.147 Things are different in case an under-
taking is engaged in making labour available, specifically intended to
enable workers to gain access to the labour market.148
Instead, some Member States subject service providers to a prior
notification obligation, which allows them to check that an undertaking
does not avail itself of the freedom to provide services for another purpose
than the service concerned.149 This is especially interesting with regard to
third country nationals, who, if not posted by their employer, need a work
permit to work legally in a Member State. In principle, based on the case
law of the ECJ, this notification obligation does not violate the freedom to
provide services.
Nevertheless, in Commission v Belgium150 , Belgium was accused of
breaching EU law by requiring workers to produce documents proving
that they are moving to Belgium in connection with a posting and that
they legally reside and work in the Member State where the service
provider employs them. Evidence could be provided by any legally
permissible means, such as by providing a posting certificate, ie an
E101-form, issued by the country of origin’s social security authority.
Such evidence is intended to show that a posted worker fulfils the criteria
laid down in the Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement.151
The ECJ found that a prior declaration certifying that the situation of the
workers concerned is in accordance with EU law.152 It allows the host
Member States to check whether the service provider complies with the
obligations under Member State law and/or collective agreements within
the meaning of the PWD.
Member State laws must however be clear in that regard, which was
problematic in the Commission v Luxembourg case. Luxembourg law
required all undertakings – established in Luxembourg or not – whose
workers exercise an activity in its territory, to provide the Labour and
Mines Inspectorate on demand and within as short a period as possible,
the basic information necessary for monitoring purposes. The obligation
147 Case C-113/89 Rush Portuguesa ECLI:EU:C:1990:142, para 12.
148 Joined Cases C-307/09 to C-309/09 Vicoplus ECLI:EU:C:2011:64.
149 Case C-113/89 Rush Portuguesa ECLI:EU:C:1990:142, para 17; Case C-433/04
Commission v Belgium ECLI:EU:C:2006:702, para 15.
150 Case C-433/04 Commission v Belgium ECLI:EU:C:2006:702.
151 Case C-433/04 Commission v Belgium ECLI:EU:C:2006:702, para 12.
152 Case C-433/04 Commission v Belgium ECLI:EU:C:2006:702, para 16, with reference
to Case C-319/06 Commission v Luxembourg ECLI:EU:C:2008:350, para 46; Case C-
490/04 Commission v Germany (2007) ECLI:EU:C:2007:430, paras 41-2.
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thereto arises prior to the commencement of the work. It is difficult, as the
ECJ pointed out, to understand how information can be requested from a
foreign undertaking prior to the commencement of thework, if the enforcing
authority cannot be aware of the presence of that undertaking, unless the
latter has previously announced its arrival in some way. Non-compliance
with that obligation was sanctioned by immediately terminating the posted
worker’s activities. Any failure to comply with the obligation could give rise
to criminal proceedings, which did not follow directly from the contested
provision. The ECJ found the provisions ambiguous and unclear, and
therefore in violation of the freedom to provide services. Such a provision
could likely dissuade undertakings to post their workers.153
Prior authorisation or verification of notifications made before the
undertakings post their workers within the meaning of the freedom to
provide services is not permitted, either. In the Santos Palhota case,154 the
ECJ provided criteria for determining whether national legislation de-
signed to verify the lawfulness of transnational worker movement is
compatible with the free movement of services. Belgium had a simplified
regime that relieved foreign service providers for a period of six months
from the requirement to draw up, inter alia, an individual account and a
pay slip, as required under the Belgian legislation. To use this regime,
service providers needed to send the authorities a prior declaration of
posting and keep copies of equivalent documents available. Workers
could start their work only if the Belgian authorities certified receipt of
that declaration within five working days by providing a registration
number. Otherwise the employer could not benefit from the simplified
regime.155
According to the ECJ, these formalities cannot be considered as
merely a declaratory procedure since certifying a receipt is potentially
capable of becoming a mechanism for verification and authorisation prior
to the commencement of the work. A procedure of that kind must be
considered an administrative authorisation procedure, likely to constitute
a restriction of the freedom to provide services.156 For prior notification to
be allowed, the freedom to provide services may not be made to depend
153 Case C-319/06 Commission v Luxembourg ECLI:EU:C:2008:350, paras 75-82.
154 Case C-515/08 Santos Palhota ECLI:EU:C:2010:589.
155 Case C-515/08 Santos Palhota ECLI:EU:C:2010:589, paras 31 and 33.
156 Case C-515/08 Santos Palhota ECLI:EU:C:2010:589, para 34 referring to the Opinion
of AG Cruz Villalón in that case, para 70. See, by analogy, Case C-168/04
Commission v Austria ECLI:EU:C:2006:595, para 41.
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on a receipt and approval by the authority.157 Instead, the Advocate
General suggested a system of positive silence, whereby a registration
number is presumed to be issued if the authorities failed to reply within
the time limit.158 The ECJ agreed that prior notifications are valuable tools
for monitoring and enforcing labour law.159
In order to be actually able to monitor and enforce the obligations
arising out of the PWD, national authorities must be able to check relevant
documents that can prove such compliance. Not only the employment
contract might be of help, but also pay slips, time sheets, or even inter-
views with the posted workers concerned in order to verify the authen-
ticity of the documents involved. Although English may be a language
that is spoken and understood by many enforcement authorities, this will
probably not be the case for many other official Member State languages.
Translation may thus be inevitable, but that will probably be time-
consuming and costly.
In Commission v Germany, Germany was accused of infringing the
freedom to provide services by requiring service providers established
outside Germany not only to retain certain documents for a maximum
defined period, but also to translate them into German.160 This obligation
was based on the need to allow compliance monitoring with the legal
obligations under the German Act on Posting of Workers and thus to
ensure that posted workers are effectively protected. To undertake the
necessary checks, the enforcement authorities must be able to read and
understand the documents. In line with the ECJ’s market access (or non-
restriction) approach,161 such a requirement would indeed be liable to
restrict the freedom to provide services, as it requires additional expense
and administrative burden for the service provider.162
However, the ECJ found the German obligation to translate certain
documents and to keep them in order to permit control, and thus ensuring
157 The Advocate General points out that, although these requirements make the work
of inspection easier, it could not justify the posting to be conditional on approval of
the declaration through the issue of a registration number. Case C-515/08 Santos
Palhota ECLI:EU:C:2010:589, Opinion of AG Cruz Villalón, paras 71-2.
158 Case C-515/08 Santos Palhota ECLI:EU:C:2010:589, para 76.
159 Case C-515/08 Santos Palhota ECLI:EU:C:2010:589, para 52. See also Case C-244/04
Commission v Germany (2006) ECLI:EU:C:2006:49, para 41.
160 Case C-490/04 Commission v Germany (2007) ECLI:EU:C:2007:430.
161 Case C-76/90 Säger v Dennemeyer ECLI:EU:C:1991:331, para 12. See also: Case C-
272/94 Guiot ECLI:EU:C:1996:147, para 10.
162 Case C-154/89 Commission v France ECLI:EU:C:1991:76, para 17; Case C-279/00
Commission v Italy ECLI:EU:C:2002:89-709, para 17; Case C-398/98 Commission v
Greece ECLI:EU:C:2001:565, para 18; Case C-76/90 Säger v Dennemeyer ECLI:EU:
C:1991:331, para 15; Case C-55/94 Gebhard ECLI:EU:C:1995:411, para 37.
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the social protection of posted workers, to be justified. First, having regard
to the aim of the German law, namely the social protection of workers,
which is recognised as a general-interest objective, the ECJ accepts that the
translation enables the competent authorities to carry out the monitoring at
the building site, which is necessary to ensure compliance with national
provisions aimed at worker protection. Monitoring and enforcing Member
State laws would become illusory, if the documents were unavailable in an
understandable language.163 Secondly, the German obligation merely con-
cerned the translation of four documents (employment contract, pay slips,
time-sheets, and proof of payment of wages), none of them excessively long,
for which standard forms are used. Thirdly, the financial and administrative
burdens are thus not heavy and they contribute to the social protection of
workers.164 Finally, there were no less restrictive measures available that
Germany could have used to ensure the objective of social protection.165
On the contrary, the Commission argued that the general obligation
to translate the relevant documents has become superfluous as a result of
the cooperation system laid down in Art 4 PWD. Apparently, the
Commission to misses the point. National cooperation authorities do not
generally retain these documents, unless Member State law would require
employers to send a copy of these documents to the competent authorities.
An interesting point made by the Advocate General is that there is, up to
now, no standardised EU instrument requiring the use of multilingual
documents in cases of transnational posting of workers. It can be sug-
gested that the EU could provide such a document, eg in the three main
European languages English, French, and German. This would certainly
lessen the administrative and financial burdens for service providers, and
make monitoring and enforcement easier in practice. Since the obligation
to retain the documents was limited to the duration of the posting and of
the building project, it could also be justified.
2.3 Legislative requirements imposed by EU law
2.3.1 Introduction
This section describes the existing EU legislative requirements national
enforcement methods must respect. First of all, the general measures are
163 Case C-490/04 Commission v Germany ECLI:EU:C:2007:430, para 71.
164 Case C-490/04 Commission v Germany ECLI:EU:C:2007:430, para 76.
165 Case C-490/04 Commission v Germany ECLI:EU:C:2007:430, paras 76-7.
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described that were introduced in the context of ensuring the sound
operation of the internal market (section 2.3.2). In the second place, new
directives that were proposed and adopted, aimed at contributing to the
better application and enforcement of mobile workers’ rights, will be
described (sections 2.3.3 and 2.3.4). These sections provide more specific
requirements for how Member States should enforce the freedoms, as a
floor and/or ceiling.
2.3.2 EU rules on jurisdiction, legal aid and evidence
So far, EU law has been broadly concerned with facilitating access to
judicial protection, in line with the general principles introduced below. In
particular, as regards cross-border disputes, it was felt necessary to
intervene in order to substantiate the free movement rights. EU law
predominantly requires that individuals whose rights have been violated
should have access to judicial procedures, as regulated by Regulation (EC)
44/2001.166 Directive 2003/8/EC on legal aid is also relevant in the
context of cross-border disputes.167 Also relevant in this context is
Directive 91/533/EEC on an employer’s obligation to inform employees
of the conditions applicable to the contract or employment relationship.168
This Directive was introduced inter alia because differences in legislation in
the Member States could have a direct impact on the internal market.
2.3.3 Free movement of workers provisions and their enforcement
Neither Art 45 TFEU nor Regulation (EU) 492/2011169 contains provisions
for the monitoring and enforcement of the free movement of workers
rules.170 After several surveys and studies had been conducted, the
Commission identified three problems that need to be addressed at EU
level. In the first place, there are public authorities that do not comply with
EU law, meaning that Member State law is not in conformity with EU law
and/or it is incorrectly applied. It is pointed out, for example, that
166 Regulation (EC) 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition
and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters [2001] OJ L12/1.
167 Directive 2003/8/EC to improve access to justice in cross-border disputes by
establishing minimum common rules relating to legal aid for such disputes [2003]
OJ L26/41.
168 [1991] OJ L 288/32. Also referred to as the Directive on the Proof of the Employ-
ment Contract. Barnard (2012) 564.
169 Regulation (EU) 492/2011 of 5 April 2011 on free movement of workers within the
Union [2011] OJ L141/1.
170 Case C-94/07 Raccanelli ECLI:EU:C:2008:425, para 50.
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different working conditions are applied to domestic workers and Union
workers, leading to unequal treatment. In the second place, the level of
compliance is mitigated by the fact that employers and legal advisors do
not comply with EU law. Often, public and private employers are
unaware of EU rules. This may be caused by a lack of understanding of
the rules. Thirdly, Union workers frequently do not have access to
information or the means to secure their rights. It may seem in practice
that Union workers are not aware of their rights because they lack the
linguistic ability to access services, while the costs of legal advice and
assistance may also be too high.171
As a result of these shortcomings in practice, the Commission found
it necessary to improve the application and monitoring of EU rules on the
free movement of workers, and in particular the principle of non-dis-
crimination based on nationality. Directive 2014/54/EU (‘Union Workers
Enforcement Directive’)172 , in the words of recital 11 of the preamble,
ensures that workers are better informed about their rights, that they are
assisted and protected in the exercise of those rights, and that circumven-
tion of these rules by public authorities and public or private employers
will be contested. Against this background, the Directive provides specific
rules for effective enforcement and will “facilitate the uniform applica-
tion” of the applicable rights of Union workers.173 It is mentioned that the
Directive lays down a floor, allowing the Member States to introduce or
maintain more favourable provisions.174
The Directive contains different types of provisions. In fact, it covers
three strands, namely enforcement, promotion of equal treatment-struc-
tures and bodies-dialogue, and access to information. The Directive
contains an obligation on Member States to ensure that judicial and/or
administrative procedures, including where appropriate conciliation pro-
cedures, for the enforcement of obligations under the free movement of
workers are available to Union workers and their family members.
National time limits are explicitly excluded, except insofar as they comply
with the principles of equivalence and effectiveness.175 Member States
should also enable associations, organisations or legal entities (eg trade
unions, NGOs and others) to engage in administrative or judicial proce-
171 Case C-94/07 Raccanelli ECLI:EU:C:2008:425 4-6.
172 Directive 2014/54/EU of 16 April 2014 on measures facilitating the exercise of
rights conferred on workers in the context of freedom of movement for workers
[2014] OJ L128/8.
173 Art 1 Union Workers Enforcement Directive.
174 The non-regression clause, see Art 7 Union Workers Enforcement Directive.
175 Art 3(5) Union Workers Enforcement Directive.
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dures on behalf or in support of the Unionworker. How this might work out
in practice is left to the Member States. In line with other directives on
equality law, the Directive obliges Member States to designate a structure,
body or bodies for the promotion, analysis, monitoring and support of equal
treatment of all workers or members of their families.176 These bodies can
also be integrated into existing agencies. Moreover, the Directive contains
measures regarding the dissemination of information, obliging Member
States to provide clear, easily accessible, comprehensive and up-to-date
information on rights derived from the free movement of workers.177
2.3.4 Posting of workers provisions and their enforcement
A. Posting of Workers Directive
Member States may find some guidance – however small – in the PWD on
what they must do to ensure that the core conditions to which posted
workers are entitled in the temporary host state are complied with.178 This
Directive does not harmonise the material content of Member State employ-
ment conditions, nor does it exhaustively provide monitoring and enforce-
ment methods to be applied at Member State level.179 Nevertheless,
Member States must take three generally framed provisions into account.
First, Member States must cooperate on information (Art 4 PWD).
Therefore, they are obliged to appoint or create a liaison office or other
bodies. Cooperation must occur between authorities that are competent to
monitor and enforce the core employment conditions, not only within a
single Member State, but also transnationally. Cooperation consists in
176 Art 4 Union Workers Enforcement Directive. See also Art 13 Directive 2000/43/EC
(equal treatment irrespective of racial or ethnic origin) and Art 20 Directive 2006/
54 (equal opportunities and equal treatment in employment and education)
177 Art 6 Union Workers Enforcement Directive.
178 The Preamble of the PWD determines that the Directive is, inter alia, aimed at the
abolition of obstacles concerning the free movement of services (and persons).
Moreover, the completion of the internal market offers a dynamic environment for
the transnational provision of services, prompting a growing number of under-
takings to post employees temporarily in other Member States. Subsequently, the
PWD requires fair competition and measures guaranteeing respect for the rights of
workers. Thus, the general aim is to promote the free movement of services (and
persons) leading to three aims: the social aim to protect the workers concerned, the
social-economic aim to ensure fair competition, and the aim of international private
and European law to ensure legal certainty for employer and employees. Hou-
werzijl (2005) 115-6.
179 Most of the terms and conditions listed in Art 3(1) PWD are harmonised to a
certain extent at EU level, eg working time and equal treatment; most Member
States have such rules. Barnard (2012) 221.
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replying to reasoned requests for information lodged by authorities, poten-
tial abuses or possible unlawful cross-border activities. Cooperation shall
also take place between Member States’ authorities and the Commission.
Moreover, it is important that foreign service providers and their workers
are adequately informed about applicable rights and obligations in the
temporary host state. This means that Member States have to publish
information on the core employment conditions, referred to in the PWD.
Secondly, Member States must take appropriate measures should
the provisions of the Directive be violated (Art 5). Adequate procedures
must be made available to workers and/or their representatives. How-
ever, there is no further specification of what kind of measures should be
taken at domestic level. The PWD merely contains a general obligation to
have monitoring and enforcement measures without indicating what
Member States should do in order to comply with their obligations under
EU law. Thus, taking the EU requirements as whole into account, Member
States may choose their own methods to ensure compliance with EU law.
Thirdly, Art 6 concerns the jurisdiction of national courts, in
particular the host state’s courts. It provides an additional forum for
posted workers, besides Regulation (EC) 44/2001, who work or have
worked in the host state, to initiate judicial proceedings against their
employer in the host state. Compared to Art 5 PWD, this is a concrete
obligation required from the Member States, namely to allow posted
workers to initiate a claim against their employer in the host state.
B. Posted Workers Enforcement Directive
The Posted Workers Enforcement Directive, proposed with the aim of
improving, enhancing and reinforcing the way the PWD is implemented,
applied and enforced in practice in the Member States, was adopted by the
European Parliament on 16 April 2014.180 The Directive was proposed in
March 2012181 , and, unlike the so-called Monti II proposal,182 it was not
180 Directive 2014/67/EU of 15 May 2014 on the enforcement of Directive 96/71/EC
concerning the posting of workers in the framework of the provision of services
and amending Regulation (EU) No 1024/2012 on administrative cooperation
through the Internal Market Information System (‘the IMI Regulation’) [2014] OJ
L159/11 (‘Posted Workers Enforcement Directive’).
181 Commission, ‘Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the
Council on the enforcement of Directive 96/71/EC concerning the posting of
workers in the framework of the provision of services’ COM(2012) 131 final.
182 Commission, ‘Proposal for a Council Regulation on the exercise of the right to take
collective action within the context of the freedom of establishment and the
freedom to provide services’ COM(2012) 130 final.
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withdrawn from the EU’s legislative agenda. According to the press
release issued on 21 March 2012, “[…] the European Commission is taking
concrete action to stamp out the unacceptable abuses. We want to ensure
that posted workers enjoy their full social rights across Europe”.183 In
contrast to what this statement might suggest, it must be interpreted
against the background that posted workers are merely entitled to the
minimum conditions laid down in host state laws and/or generally
binding collective agreements, as determined by the PWD.
Not all provisions laid down in this Directive are new, in the sense
that some provisions codify existing case law (section 2.2.3 above), such as
Art 9 on administrative requirements and control measures. Moreover,
some provisions give concrete expression to Arts 4 to 6 PWD (Arts 2a, 5, 6,
11), while others are newly introduced in an EU context (Arts 3, 7, 10, 12,
Chapter VI, 17, 18). It aims to regulate access to information on the terms
and conditions of employment (Chapter III), monitoring compliance
through national control measures and inspections (Chapter IV), enforce-
ment in administrative or judicial proceedings, as well as joint and several
liability (Chapter V), and the cross-border enforcement of administrative
fines and penalties (Chapter VI).
Some of the provisions are worth mentioning here. To start with,
Art 3 contains factual elements of posting that should help authorities
and/or organisations to establish whether a service provider performs
substantial activities. It also provides criteria to determine whether the
service provided is temporary. Part of this assessment involves examining
whether the posted worker habitually carries out work in a Member State
and whether he returns to or is expected to resume working in the home
state. A problem is that if no home state can be determined, because the
worker has been employed merely for posting to different Member States,
without a habitual working country, the PWD and thus the Posted
Workers Enforcement Directive do not apply.184
New in this context is that also the home Member State is allocated
an active role. Accordingly, the host state authorities shall continue to
183 Press Release, ‘Commission to Boost Protection for Posted Workers’ <http://
europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-12-267_e.htm> accessed 28 October 2014. Pro-
vided it has been correctly quoted by Malmberg and Johansson, the Commission
statement in the press release has been slightly modified. The Malmberg and
Johansson quote refers to the fact “[…] that posted workers are treated on an equal
footing and enjoy their full social rights across Europe” (emphasis added). The
element of treating posted workers on an equal footing does not appear in the
press release as it is available today. Malmberg & Johansson (2012) 4.
184 See on the definitions of posting and posted worker, taking into account the draft
Posted Workers Enforcement Directive: Van Hoek & Houwerzijl (2012).
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control, monitor and take the necessary supervisory or enforcement
measures (Art 7). However, under the PWD, it should be remembered,
it is the host Member State that is responsible for ensuring that posted
workers receive the rights to which they are entitled. This means that the
home state’s role is limited to monitoring and enforcing those aspects that
are covered by their own legislation. The Posted Workers Enforcement
Directive is clear in stating that the home state authorities should not be
required to undertake investigations in the temporary host state (Art 7(6)).
While Art 9 contains a codification of the ECJ’s case law on
acceptable administrative measures, Art 10 states that Member States
shall ensure appropriate checks and monitoring mechanisms, as set by
Member State law, and that the national authorities shall carry out
effective and adequate inspections in their territory.185 Inspections shall
take place primarily on the basis of a risk assessment, highlighting certain
sectors at risk. Although the EU principally does not interfere in national
institutional settings of how enforcement is organised, certain develop-
ments can be observed from the EU’s advance to regulated monitoring
and enforcement in cross-border situations by looking at the Directives.
Through determining that effective inspections must take place, indirectly
the EU also intervenes in the organisational aspects of enforcement.186
Another issue that attracted attention was whether SMEs should be
excluded from the scope of the Directive, based on “the principle that
micro-entities should be excluded from the scope of new legislation unless
the proportionality of their being covered can be demonstrated”,187 the
Commission emphasised that it is not possible to exclude SMEs.188 It
would undermine one of the key objectives, namely the fight against
letterbox companies, and it would create new loopholes. In fact, the
Commission states that better enforcement would benefit SMEs, in that
it increases legal certainty and fairer competition. This is particularly
important, as most undertakings posting workers are SMEs.189 Never-
theless, for them it remains important that information is easily accessible
and their administrative burdens reduced.
185 A provision that is similarly worded is Art 14 Directive 2009/52/EC.
186 See on this Case C-8/88 Germany v Commission ECLI:EU:C:1990:241, section 2.2.2
above.
187 See on the possibility to exclude SMEs from the EU’s regulatory burdens:
Commission, ‘Minimizing regulatory burden for SMEs: Adapting EU regulation
to the needs of micro-enterprises’ (Report) COM(2011) 803 final.
188 COM(2012) 131 final, 11.
189 COM(2012) 131 final, 46.
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2.4 Conclusions
In chapter 2 described the ways in which EU (case) law exerts an influence
on Member State systems to enforce labour law (in cross-border situations)
are described. The ways in which the EU exerts influence can be decom-
posed into jurisprudential requirements, set by the ECJ’s case law, and
legislative requirements, which are laid down in EU (secondary) law.
Within the jurisprudential requirements, there are two limits that Member
State enforcement methods must respect: firstly, the principles of equiva-
lence and effectiveness, serving as a floor, and, secondly, the ECJ’s case
law on the posting of workers in the context of the freedom to provide
services, providing a ceiling on enforcement methods at Member State
level. As to the legislative requirements, EU (secondary) law contains
particular provisions on howMember States must monitor and enforce EU
law as applied to transnational mobile workers.
From a chronological point of view, it was EU case law that first
provided guidance to the Member States. Monitoring and enforcement is
decentralised, which means that every Member State has adopted mea-
sures to ensure compliance with EU law. These measures, however, differ
between the EU Member States, as they are adopted in line with their own
legal system. Initially there were no regulations or directives on how
Member States should monitor and enforce EU law. Thus, the ECJ had to
ensure that the Member State monitoring and enforcement methods
provide at least some degree of uniformity as to the application of EU
rights. The principles of equivalence and effectiveness provide minimum
standards that domestic enforcement methods must meet when monitor-
ing and enforcing the rights that individuals derive from EU law. First
developed within the judicial enforcement method, the principles of
equivalence and effectiveness provide a minimum framework for creating
some uniformity in the application of EU law. A great deal of case law has
been ruled by the ECJ, providing case-by-case guidelines to Member States
on how they should ensure the proper enforcement of EU law. The
principles of equivalence and effectiveness play a crucial role in all stages
of the enforcement process. An important feature that follows from the
ECJ’s case law is that the Member States’ institutional autonomy how to
set up enforcement authorities is not directly affected by the case law. This
means that Member States are free to decide on the (internal) organisation
of their enforcement authorities.
Besides the principles of equivalence and effectiveness, the ECJ’s
case law on the posting of workers,which poses a ceiling on Member State
enforcement methods, is also important. The right of a posted worker to
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move is derived from the right of the service provider to move to another
Member State to provide a service there. Accordingly, all national instru-
ments that are used to enforce labour law can be qualified as imposing
additional (administrative) burdens and have frequently been contested
by foreign service providers and the European Commission, alleging that
some Member State enforcement instruments impinge on the freedom to
provide services. National instruments that make (exercising) that free-
dom less attractive cannot (or should not be able to) be justified. The case
law shows that in many cases, Member States had to adapt their enforce-
ment methods or instruments in favour of an increased right of freedom to
provide services. As a result, enforcement at Member State level becomes
more difficult. The aim of this case law is to guarantee that service
providers are ensured of their EU right to provide cross-border services.
In addition to the jurisprudential requirements, legislative require-
ments have also gradually come to influence enforcement methods, at
Member State level to ensure compliance with rights of Union workers
and posted workers. So far, this has happened only to a limited extent, as
EU law primarily contains substantive rights that workers may invoke.
Moreover, the general idea is that EU law is enforced at Member State
level. Basic monitoring and enforcement provisions can be found in the
PWD. Under the PWD it is the host Member States who must ensure that
the rights and obligations are complied with, and if not, that they are
appropriately enforced. Particular attention is paid to information and
cooperation as well as judicial enforcement by workers and/or their
representatives. Moreover, the Directive creates a possibility for posted
workers to initiate judicial proceedings in the temporary host state. The
consequence thereof is that enforcement has become more difficult.
The EU’s legislative influence will increase with the two Directives
adopted in April/May 2014, aimed at increasing compliance with EU law
by harmonising certain areas concerned with the monitoring and enforce-
ment of the rights of Union workers and posted workers. Both Directives
focus on facilitating the uniform application and enforcement of rights
applicable to Union workers and posted workers (Art 1 in both Direc-
tives). The Posted Workers Enforcement Directive moreover refers to the
aim of uniform implementation of the PWD. These enforcement Directives
do not pescribe all-encompassing enforcement methods through which
Member States have to monitor and enforce the rights of Union workers
and posted workers. Based on the provisions of the Directives, the primary
focus is on the role of the Member States and how their administrative
enforcement method is or should be constructed. In that regard, detailed
requirements are provided with which Member States have to comply.
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Besides, also the judicial enforcement method received attention in the two
enforcement Directives. Within that method, social partners are given an
explicit role in the enforcement of workers’ rights at EU level. Member
States must ensure that workers and their representatives have access to
judicial protection in the (temporary) host state. Even though the role of
the social partners has become more prominent at EU level, it still seems
that the EU, at least in the context of the posting of workers, is much more
in favour of public institutions entrusted with labour law enforcement. It
can be noticed that – as it seems – more efforts as to make enforcement
more uniform are being made in relation to enforcement in the context of
cross-border posting of workers, as this is where most problems arise in
relation to the freedom to provide services. Enforcement instruments
impose extra (administrative) burdens on the service provider which
can limit or make less attractive the exercise of the freedom to provide
services. Any such burden must therefore be justified. As a result, EU
(case) law is putting Member State enforcement of labour law, in this
particular context, under Generalverdacht.
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CHAPTER 3
STATUTORY MINIMUM WAGES, HOLIDAY PAY
AND HOLIDAY ALLOWANCES
3.1 Introduction
This chapter gives an account of statutory minimum wages, holiday pay
(ie paid annual leave) and holiday allowances (ie payment for holiday in
addition to the pay received when on annual leave) that apply to workers
working in Germany, the Netherlands, and Sweden. In conjunction with
Chapter 4, which deals with collectively agreed minimum wages, holiday
pay, and holiday allowances, it provides a framework for examining the
ways in which the Netherlands, Germany and Sweden regulate statutory
minimum wages, holiday pay and holiday allowances. Section 2 begins by
defining the personal scope of statutory labour law on the employment
conditions addressed in this study. The chapter explores how far the
personal scopes found at Member State level are applicable in relation to
Union workers and posted workers. Only if such workers fall within the
personal scope of the regulations on minimum wages, holiday pay, and
holiday allowances are they entitled to these rights. Sections 3.3 and 3.4
further examine the regulation of statutory minimum wages (and ways by
which they may be established), holiday pay, and holiday allowance. It
furthermore examines the material scope and content of these employ-
ment conditions.
3.2 Different employee definitions at EU and Member State level
3.2.1 Introduction
This section sets out the personal scope of labour law at both Member
State and EU level, in order to determine the addressees of the laws on
minimum wages, holiday pay, and holiday allowances. It is shown that
different definitions are used, not only at national but also at EU level.1
1 Also Van Peijpe distinguishes between and questions the worker and self-
employed definitions used at EU level. Van Peijpe (2012). An earlier version of
this article has been published in Dutch: Van Peijpe (2011).
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While differing definitions can be managed quite well at Member State
level, the varying definitions used at EU level are more intricate. The
sections that follow demonstrate the differences and existing difficulties.
EU law contains different definitions of the ‘employee’. When based
on primary EU law, an autonomous Union worker definition applies in
relation to the free movement of workers; EU secondary law also contains
provisions that refer explicitly to the national employee or employment
contract definitions, which is the case in the PWD and Directive 2008/
104/EC on temporary agency work (‘TAWD’).2 These varying definitions
have direct consequences for the applicable standards under national and
EU law.3 What follows addresses the different worker definitions that
exist for Union workers, posted workers and temporary agency workers,
and examines how these definitions are dealt with in Member State law.
3.2.2 EU worker concept: Union workers
As there is no Treaty provision defining who is a Union worker, it was for
the ECJ to develop such a definition. A seminal judgement in that regard
was the Lawrie-Blum case, in which the ECJ stressed that “[t]he essential
feature of an employment relationship, however, is that for a certain
period of time a person performs services for and under the direction of
another person in return for which he receives remuneration”.4 Further-
more, the ECJ ruled that the “person must perform effective and genuine
activities to the exclusion of activities on such a small scale as to be purely
marginal and ancillary”.5 The Trojani case made clear that “nor the level of
productivity of the person concerned, the origin of the funds from which
the remuneration is paid or the limited amount of the remuneration can
have any consequence in regard to whether or not the person is a worker
for the purposes of Community law”.6 No minimum time duration is
required for consideration as a Union worker; the right to move freely
across the border applies to all citizens pursuing an economic activity,
2 [2008] OJ L327/9.
3 Schlachter (2011) 161-3.
4 Case 66/85 Lawrie-Blum ECLI:EU:C:1986:284, para 17.
5 Case C-357/89 Raulin ECLI:EU:C:1992:87, para 10; Case C-456/02 Trojani ECLI:EU:
C:2004:488, para 15.
6 Case C-456/02 Trojani ECLI:EU:C:2004:488, with reference to Case 53/81 Levin
ECLI:EU:C:1982:105, para 16; Case 344/87 Bettray ECLI:EU:C:1989:226, paras 15
and 16; and Case C-188/00 Kurz, né Yüce ECLI:EU:C:2002:694, para 32.
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whether permanently, temporarily, or seasonally.7 It seems that it does
not matter where in the EU the worker’s employer is established.
According to the ECJ in the Dita Danosa ruling, “[t]he sui generis
nature of the employment relationship under Member State law is of no
consequence as regards whether a person is a worker for the purposes of
EU laws”.8 Although the Union worker definition applies to a broad range
of “effective and genuine activities”, the definition does not apply to an
individual who exercises his right freely to provide services, or the
freedom of establishment.9 It is sometimes difficult to draw the line
between being employed (ie dependent work) and being self-employed.
Nevertheless, Member State law may not be applied in a discriminatory
manner, nor may it hinder or impede the exercise of the free movement
rights on services and establishment.10 This means that in cross-border
situations, national definitions of an employee or employment contract
must take account of the freedom to provide services and the freedom of
establishment. Characteristics that are used to distinguish a self-employed
person from an employee are that the former works outside a relationship
of subordination, bearing the risk for any success or failure in his work,
and he is paid directly and in full.11 This concept of self-employment is
very broad.12
The dichotomy between employed and self-employed persons is
relevant to the authorities and social partners that monitor and enforce
statutory labour law and collective agreements. They need to be aware
that, in the case of the free movement of workers, the Union worker
definition applies. It should be noted that the right to free movement of
workers applies directly in vertical relations between a state and an
7 Houwerijl (2011) 264, referring to Verschueren (2009) 10. This has been acknowl-
edged under Regulation (EU) 492/2011 in recital 5 of the Preamble, where it is
established that those persons “who pursue their activities for the purpose of
providing services” also fall within the scope of Art 45 TFEU.
8 Case C-232/09 Dita Danosa ECLI:EU:C:2010:674, para 40, referring to Case C-116/
06 Sari Kiiski ECLI:EU:C:2007:536, para 26. See also Case 53/81 Levin ECLI:EU:
C:1982:105, para 16; Case 344/87 Bettray ECLI:EU:C:1989:226, paras 15-6; Case C-
188/00 Kurz, né Yüce CLI:EU:C:2002:694, para 32; Case C-456/02 Trojani ECLI:EU:
C:2004:488, para 16. In the Jessy Saint Prix case ruled in June 2014, the ECJ stated
that a person retains the status of “worker” within the meaning of Art 45 TFEU,
provided she returns to work or finds another job within a reasonable period after
the birth of her child. Case C-507/12 Jessy Saint Prix ECLI:EU:C:2014:2007, paras
40-1.
9 Van Peijpe (2011) section 2.2.
10 Van Peijpe (2011).
11 Case C-268/99 Jany ECLI:EU:C:2001:616, paras 34, 70-1.
12 Case C-55/94 Gebhard ECLI:EU:C:1995:411, para 25.
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individual and also in horizontal situations between an employer and his
employees.13 From a legal point of view, it seems that the statutory labour
law provisions in all three countries with which we are concerned here
treat Union workers in the same way as national workers. Nevertheless,
some remarks may be made.
Investigating whether employers comply with national labour law,
national authorities and/or social partners, involves identifying the em-
ployer of the individuals foundworking in the workplace. It can be assumed
that enforcement authorities and/or social partners start from the national
employee or employment contract definition with which they are familiar.
Only when identifying the individuals by taking a look at their passports
and asking them to explain whether they have crossed the borders and for
whom they are working may the enforcement authorities and/or social
partners find out more about the (real) nature of the legal relationship. This
may result in a finding that the individual is or is not a Union worker.
The national worker definition is nevertheless helpful for the
following aspect. According to Art 45(2) TFEU, the right to the free
movement of workers entails the abolition of discrimination – direct and
indirect – based on nationality vis-à-vis workers of the host Member State
in regard to employment, remuneration and other employment condi-
tions. As a result, the Union worker must be compared with a worker
already employed in the host Member State, ie the state to which the
Union worker moves to do work. If a national worker, for instance, is
entitled to receive a statutory minimum wage, then the Union worker in
that state is also entitled to that wage.
3.2.3 Member State worker concepts: posted workers and temporary agency
workers
A. Provisions in the Posted Workers (Enforcement) Directive
Article 2 PWD contains two definitions: first, the posted worker is defined,
and second, a statement if given on which worker definition shall apply to
posted workers. Accordingly, a posted worker is someone “[…] who, for a
limited period, carries out his work in the territory of a Member State
other than the State in which he normally works”. This provision further
13 Barnard (2012) 156-8, referring, inter alia, to the following cases: Case 167/73
Commission v France (French Merchant Seamen) ECLI:EU:C:1974:35, para 41; Case
41/74 Van Duyn ECLI:EU:C:1974:133, para 8; Case C-350/96 Clean Car ECLI:EU:
C:1998:205, para 24; Case 36/74 Walrave and Koch ECLI:EU:C:1974:140, para 17;
Case C-281/98 Angonese ECLI:EU:C:2000:296.
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determines that “[…] the definition of a worker is that which applies in the
law of the Member State to whose territory the worker is posted”.
The Posted Workers Enforcement Directive contains criteria that
may help the enforcement authorities and the social partners to identify
genuine posting situations (Art 4). This provision addresses two questions
that arise in the context of posting: whether the undertaking who posts its
workers genuinely performs substantial activities, and whether a posted
worker is posted temporarily. These questions are related to the fact that
posting is supposed to be a temporary activity, after which the workers
return, or are expected to return to resume work in the state from which
they are posted. This latter proviso presupposes a genuine activity of the
service provider in the home state.
In order to determine whether a service provider performs genuinely
substantial activities, host state authorities have to take account of where the
registered office and administration are located, where taxes and social
security contributions are paid, where he holds a professional licence, the
place where the posted workers are recruited and from which they are
posted, the law applicable to the employment contracts, where the sub-
stantial business activity is performed, as well as the number of contracts
that are performed and the company’s turnover realised in the Member
State of establishment (Art 4(2) Posted Workers Enforcement Directive).14
Criteria used to assess whether the posting takes place temporarily
are: whether the work is carried out for a limited period of time; the date
on which the posting starts; whether the posting takes place to a Member
State other than the one in or from which the posted worker habitually
carries out his work according to the Rome I Regulation and/or Rome
Convention; whether the posted worker returns to or is expected to
resume work in the home Member State after completion of the work or
the provision of services for which he was posted; the nature of the
activities; whether travel, board and lodging/accommodation are pro-
vided or reimbursed by the employer who posts the worker, and if so,
how this is done; and also whether there are any repeated previous
periods during which the post was filled by the same or another (posted)
worker (Art 4(3) Posted Workers Enforcement Directive).
Importantly, the Posted Workers Enforcement Directive makes it
clear that failing to satisfy one or more of the factual elements set out
above shall not automatically preclude a situation from being charac-
terised as one of posting. These elements must be assessed on a case-by-
case basis (Art 4(4) Posted Workers Enforcement Directive). There must be
14 See on this: Van Hoek & Houwerzijl (2012).
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an overall assessment. Authorities should be guided by facts that relate
to the performance of work, subordination and the remuneration of the
worker, regardless of how the relationship is characterised (Art 4(5) Posted
Workers Enforcement Directive).
Applying the host state worker or employee definition is based on
the aim of the PWD to coordinate the applicable mandatory minimum
employment conditions.15 The coordinating function of the PWD has been
questioned by Liukkunen, who argues that the PWD “has turned out to
have the effect of bringing closer the collective labour law systems of the
Member States”,16 meaning that it is rather an instrument of harmonisa-
tion than coordination.
B. Member State worker definitions
Not all three Member States have defined who a posted worker is, nor do
they explicitly refer to the national employee or employment contract
definition. Only Sweden, in Section 4 Lag om utstationering av arbetstagare
(1999:678) (Posting of Workers Act),17 provides that a posted worker is an
employee who normally works in another country than Sweden, but who
carries out work for a limited period in the latter country.18 Posted workers
in Sweden are equally covered by the civil law definition of a worker,19 as are
temporary agency workers.20 Nothing similar can be found in the Nether-
lands, and Germany does not refer to a posted worker concept in its
legislation, where it seems that the usual employee definitions are applied.
Germany limits the applicability of the Arbeitnehmerentsendegesetz
(‘AEntG’) (Act on the Posting of Workers)21 to those employers and
employees who are active in, inter alia, one of the following sectors (§ 4):
the construction sector, the industrial cleaning sector, the postal services
sector, and the security services sector. The inclusion of additional sectors
in the 2009 AEntG was aimed at solving the problem of not having a
15 Houwerzijl (2005) 130.
16 Liukkunen (2012) 1047.
17 Lag om utstationering av arbetstagare (1999:678), amended last by Lag (2013:351).
18 This is based on an unofficial English translation of the Posting of Workers Act
(1999:678).
19 Prop. 1998/99:90, Utstationering av arbeitstagare, 4 March 1999, 18.
20 Engblom (2009) 10 and Rönnmar (2010c) 425.
21 Germany enacted its Posting of Workers Act before the PWD was adopted. Gesetz
über zwingende Arbeitsbedingungen für grenzüberschreitend entsandte und für
regelmäßig im Inland beschäftigte Arbeitnehmer und Arbeitnehmerinnen (Arbeit-
nehmer-Entsendegesetz – AEntG) vom 20. April 2009 (BGBl. I S. 799), das zuletzt
durch Artikel 1 des Gesetzes vom 24. Mai 2014 (BGBl. I S. 538) geändert worden ist.
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statutory minimum wage.22 With the introduction of a statutory mini-
mum wage in Germany, as agreed by the 2013 coalition, the personal
scope of the AEntG can be extended to all sectors.23 There was, however,
no disclosure of when that extension is to be expected. The temporary
agency work sector falls outside the scope of the AEntG as it is regarded as
an independent service sector.24 However, since 2012 there has been a
possibility to establish a sectoral minimum wage as well.25 Nevertheless,
the AEntG becomes relevant to temporary agency workers who are
assigned to one of the sectors covered (§ 8(3) AEntG).26 The AEntG not
only includes posted workers, but also employees employed regularly in
Germany, ie employees who have been recruited and are employed in
Germany (§ 1 AEntG).27 This means that all employees, whether Union or
posted workers, who are employed within the meaning of the AEntG are
equally entitled to receive a sectoral minimum wage and holiday pay.
Whether an individual can be qualified under Member State law as
an employee requires a thorough investigation. Thereby, not only the
employment contract and the parties’ definition given to it will be taken
into account, but also the factual circumstances under which the work has
been performed or is expected to be performed.28 Although no single
criterion is decisive, in all three countries it seems that subordination is
one of the main indicators used.29 A variety of criteria are used to establish
whether or not someone can be considered an employee. Besides sub-
ordination and remuneration, the following criteria are relevant: bearing
financial risks; a personal duty to perform work according to the contract;
whether the worker is supposed to use machinery, tools and raw materials
22 The initial act was entitled Gesetz über zwingende Arbeitsbedingungen bei
grenzüberschreitenden Dienstleistungen (Arbeitnehmer-Entsendegesetz – AEntG)
vom 26. Februar 1996 (BGBl. I. S. 227). Amendments made in the 2009 AEntG were
a primarily a result of domestic issues. Schlachter (2010) 42 and 46. See for more
detailed information on the (proposed) amendments of the 2009 AEntG: Willemsen
& Sagan (2008); Sansone & Ulber (2008); Bayreuther (2009); Joussen (2009); Sittard
(2009); Schwab (2010).
23 Koalitionsvertrag zwischen CDU, CSU und der SPD, Deutschlands Zukunft gestal-
ten, 18. Legislaturperiode. BT-Drs. 18/1885, 60; BT-Drs. 18/1558, 1.
24 Schwab (2010) 228.
25 Thüsing (Ed.) (2012) (Pelzner/Kock) § 3 AÜG, para 124.
26 Thüsing (Ed.) (2012) (Thüsing) Einl. AÜG, para 32.
27 Müller-Glöge, Preis & Schmidt (2014) (Schlachter) § 2 AEntG, para 1.
28 Heerma Van Voss (2009) 8-9.
29 Heerma Van Voss (2009) 16. The criterion of subordination in German case law is a
so-called Typusbegriff or typologischer Begriff, meaning that it is a fluid criterion
which can be filled in by the word choice of the contractual parties, the scope of the
job, or whether social security contributions as well as income tax are paid. Junker
(2013) para 100.
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provided by the employer; and if the worker is compensated for his
expenses.30 In all countries concerned, there is an extensive body of case
law that develops and shapes the concept of an employee.
There is no legislative definition of an employee or an employment
contract in Germany and Sweden, where general definitions have been
developed by the courts. In Germany the employee’s job performance is
decisive in determining whether there is an employment relationship.31
According to German case law, an employee is defined as someone “[…]
der sich durch einen privatrechtlichen Vertrag verpflichtet, Dienste zu
leisten, die in unselbständiger Arbeit zu erbringen sind”.32
In contrast, in the Netherlands the employment contract is defined
in the Burgerlijk Wetboek (‘BW’) (Civil Code). Accordingly, an employment
contract is a contract whereby one party (ie the employee) undertakes to
perform work during a given period in the service of another party (ie the
employer) against remuneration (Art 7:610 BW). Temporary agency work-
ers are also qualified as regular employees (Art 7:690 in conjunction with
Art 7:610 BW).33 A similar definition can be found in Section 1 Swedish
Lag om uthyrning av arbetstagare (2012:854) (Act on Temporary Agency
Work)34 . Although not explicitly defined in the German Arbeitnehmerü-
berlassungsgesetz (‘AÜG’) (Act on Temporary Agency Work)35 , the litera-
ture states that the general employee definition applies.36
3.2.4 Legal presumptions on the existence and scope of an employment contract
In the course of making the Dutch labour market and forms of employ-
ment more flexible, the Dutch legislator introduced two rebuttable statu-
tory legal presumptions. No such legal presumptions exist in Germany
30 Heerma Van Voss (2009), in particular chapter III on criteria for identifying an
employment relationship. Moreover, in Sweden a “social criterion” is applied,
which questions whether the economic and social situation of the worker is equal
to that of an ordinary employee.
31 Junker (2013) para 91.
32 Junker (2013).
33 According to Art 7:690 BW, the secondment contract is the employment contract
according to which the worker is assigned to another party by his employer to
work for the other party and his direction.
34 Prop. 2011/12:178, Lag om uthyrning av arbetstagare (Governmental proposal Law
on Hiring Out of Employees).
35 Arbeitnehmerüberlassungsgesetz in der Fassung der Bekanntmachung vom 3.
Februar 1995 (BGBl. I S. 158), das zuletzt durch Artikel 4 Absatz 46 des Gesetzes
vom 7. August 2013 (BGBl. I S. 3154) geändert worden ist (BGBl. I S. 3154).
36 See, eg, Thüsing (Ed.) (2012), Einf., paras 1 and 29.
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and Sweden.37 As a consequence, individuals, simply by meeting the
thresholds, are covered by the protection afforded by the Dutch labour
law provisions. Three reasons justify the introduction of the Dutch legal
presumptions: (1) employers should be discouraged from using bogus
employment constructions; (2) the legal presumptions should lead to an
amicable resolution of conflicts; and (3) the procedural position, in the
sense of proving the existence of an employee’s employment relationship,
should be increased.38
The first legal presumption determines that a person who performs
work for the benefit of another person, in return for weekly remuneration
or for at least 20 hours per month during at least three consecutive
months, is presumed to perform that work pursuant to an employment
contract (Art 7:610a BW). The second presumption, laid down in
Art 7:610b BW, concerns the scope of the employment contract in case
this has not been clearly stipulated in the employment contract. It states
that if an employment contract has lasted for at least three consecutive
months, then the agreed work is presumed to have a scope that is equal to
the average scope of work performed in the previous three months. Both
the assumed worker and the employer can invoke the legal presumptions
and either party may prove that the legal presumption does (not) apply to
their work relationship.39
Applying the legal presumption on the existence of an employment
contract may raise problems in cross-border situations, namely if the
individual performs work or a service as a self-employed individual. A
national authority or organisation must assess whether an individual is to
be qualified as employed or self-employed. A legal presumption qualify-
ing an individual as an employee may benefit the individual; however, he
himself or the service recipient may not want the relationship to be
qualified as one of dependent employment. Both the individual and the
service recipient may provide evidence to prove the opposite.
Van Peijpe raises the issue of the legal presumption probably being
an evidential rule. In that case, he assumes that it could fall under national
procedural autonomy.40 However, he does not substantiate this statement.
The previous chapter has shown that even though Member States retain a
certain degree of national procedural autonomy, they are nevertheless
37 See for an overview of countries that have legal presumptions in the context of
establishing an employee or employment relationship or contract: Heerma Van
Voss et al. (2009) 10-2.
38 De Laat (2006) section 1.
39 Kamerstukken II 1996/97, 25 263, nr. 3, 22-3.
40 Van Peijpe (2011) section 4.
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bound by the two minimum conditions of equivalence and effectiveness,
and the fundamental freedoms laid down in the TFEU. It is hard to see
why qualifying the legal presumption as a procedural rule would make it
easier to invoke that presumption in a cross-border context.
It seems that hardly any working individual has relied on the legal
presumption. It is probable that the instrument is largely unknown, or the
threshold for initiating judicial proceedings is too high to overcome. This is
particularly relevant in the context of combating bogus self-employment.41
3.3 Statutory minimum wages and ways to establish them
3.3.1 Introduction
At the time of writing, in the three countries compared, only the
Netherlands has a nationwide statutory minimum wage, serving as a
minimum floor. In Germany, the introduction of a nationwide statutory
minimum wage is being discussed, and the grand coalition between CDU,
CSU and SPD intends to introduce a nationwide statutory minimum wage
in 2015. Minimum wages exist in certain specific sectors, as regulated by
the German AEntG, which stipulates the ways by which a sectoral
minimum can be established. Both the nationwide statutory minimum
wage in the Netherlands and the ways to set sectoral minimum wages in
Germany are described below. There is no statutory minimum wage in
Sweden and, in all probability, none will be introduced in the future. Here,
wage setting is left to the social partners, based on their collective
bargaining autonomy. The collective bargaining autonomy of the social
partners is also used as an argument in Germany to prevent state
intervention in wage setting. However, this must be seen in a more
nuanced light, by virtue of the fact that the state has provided mechanisms
to make sectoral wages generally binding. In principle, all individuals who
can be qualified as employees or who have an employment relationship
41 In April 2013, in the context of discussing combating bogus self-employment, the
Netherlands considered the option of introducing application proceedings for
procedures in general, which would be less formal than the summary proceedings,
where bailiffs are necessary. Bijlage, Actieplan bestrijden van schijnconstructies, 3
(Brief Minister van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid, Aanpak schijnconstructies,
11 April 2013). The aim is to introduce this change on 1 January 2015. See also Brief
Ministerie van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid, Voortgangsrapportage aanpak
schijnconstructies, 26 November 2013.
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are entitled to the Dutch statutory or German sectoral minimum wage.42
Although not a (statutory) minimum wage as such, a minimum wage
requirement is set for individuals coming from outside the EU (including
Switzerland and the Nordic countries), who want to live and work in
Sweden. To obtain a work permit, a worker’s monthly wage must be at
least 13,000 SEK.43 In case collective agreements regulate higher wages in
a certain sector, these wages apply as the minimum “entry level”.44
3.3.2 Nationwide and sectoral minimum wages
A. Nationwide statutory minimum wage in the Netherlands
Employees in an employment relationship are entitled to the statutory
minimum wage.45 Introduced in 1969, the statutory minimum wage is
aimed at securing a minimum of employment conditions for the most
vulnerable group of employees,46 being enough to make a daily living.47
Employees should be guaranteed a socially acceptable reward for work
done, taking into account the welfare situation in the Netherlands.48
Generally, the statutory minimum wage serves as a floor, from which
derogations may be agreed only if they are more beneficial to the
worker.49
To determine who is entitled to receive a minimum wage and a
minimum holiday allowance, the Dutch Wet minimumloon en minimumva-
kantiebijslag50 (‘WML’) (Minimum Wages and Minimum Holiday Allow-
ances Act) refers to the civil law definition of the employment contract
(Art 7:610 BW). Moreover, the WML itself requires that: (1) the work is
performed personally and with the assistance of no more than two
42 If desirable, persons who do not live and work in the Netherlands can also, by way
of Regulation (Algemene Maatregel van Bestuur), be classified as employees for the
WML (Art 4(3)).
43 Approximately 1,450 EUR in May 2014.
44 Nordegran & Ahlén (2010) 10. The Swedish National Mediation Office publishes
annually the average wage of employees of the foregoing year. For 2012, the
average wage was 29,000 SEK (approximately 3,340 EUR). See Blomqvist et al.
(2013). A summary of the report is available in English, German and French at
<http://www.mi.se/other-languages/> last accessed 28 October 2014.
45 The monthly full-time minimum wage is 1485.60 EUR, in May 2014.
46 Kamerstukken II 1967/68, 9574, nr. 3, 5-6.
47 Kamerstukken II 1967/68, 9574, nr. 3, 14.
48 Kamerstukken II 1967/68, 9574, nr. 3, 12-5.
49 HR 2 March 2001, LJN AB1254, JAR 2001/58 (Hotel New York B.V./Horecabond
FNV), Opinion of Procurator-General Mok, para 3.4.3.5.
50 Wet minimumloon en minimumvakantiebijslag 1968, last amended by Act of
13 May 2014, Stcrt. 2014, 13936 (WML).
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principals; (2) the employment relationship is of a certain duration and is
continuous, ie lasting at least three months, the period between two
assignments not exceeding 31 days; and (3) the extent of the work is not
incidental, meaning that the person must work at least five hours per
week.51 The Dutch WML applies to employees aged between 23 and 65
years. In addition, the act provides for a (considerably lower) youth
minimum wage for young employees aged between 21 and 22 years,
and employees aged between 15 and 23 years.52
B. Introduction of a nationwide minimum wage in Germany
Discussions in Germany on introducing a nationwide statutory minimum
wage are not new. Discussions on whether to introduce a statutory
nationwide minimum wage were held against the background of Eur-
opean developments, such as the introduction of the Services Directive
2006/123/EC and the EU enlargement in 2004. For instance, in 2007, the
Government of Rhineland-Palatinate submitted a concrete proposal to
introduce a nationwide statutory minimum wage.53 The proposal of the
Federal Government, however, was rejected by the Federal States, with a
CDU majority.54 These discussions were unsuccessful until 2013, when the
German Federal Government agreed on the introduction of a nationwide
statutory minimum wage.
Two main arguments have been put forward against the introduc-
tion of a minimum wage. The economic reason concerns mainly the fear
that a statutory minimum wage would increase unemployment, especially
in low-wage sectors.55 The legal reason is that any interference is un-
justified due to the Tarifautonomie (collective bargaining autonomy) an-
chored in German labour law, which provides the social partners with a
regulatory prerogative with regard to employment conditions in the
broadest sense of the word. Any state intervention in regulating minimum
wages needs particular justification.56
Furthermore, although the freedom of contract is seen as a crucial
principle of civil (and labour) law, this principle only applies to the extent
that an equal negotiating position exists. In case there is no such equal
51 Besluit van 2 September 1996, Stb. 1996, 481, 4.
52 This particular youth minimum wage is admittedly lower than the level applied to
workers from the age of 23.
53 BR-Drs. 622/07.
54 Bispinck & Schulten (2008) 155.
55 Bispinck & Schulten (2008) 155.
56 Kocher (2007) 602.
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position, the law provides tools to control the contract. One of the tools in
Germany is § 138 Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (‘BGB’) (Civil Code),57 according
to which, an act in the law is void if it is contra bones mores (sittenwidrig).
Lohnwucher (wage usury) exists when there is a noticeable disparity
(auffälliges Missverhältnis) between the wage an employee receives and
the corresponding performance,58 ie less than one third of the wage paid
in the sector in which the employee is employed59 .
Notwithstanding these two arguments against introducing a statu-
tory nationwide minimum wage, the 2013 coalition agreed to introduce a
minimum wage.60 On 3 July 2014 the Bundestag and on 11 July 2014 the
Bundesrat approved the Gesetz zur Stärkung der Tarifautonomie (Tarifauto-
nomiestärkungsgesetz) (Act on Strengthening the Bargaining Autonomy).61
Thus, with effect from 1 January 2015, a nationwide statutory minimum
wage of 8.50 EUR per hour will apply to all employees providing work on
German territory.62 One argument justifying the introduction of a nation-
wide minimum wage is that the degree to which collective agreements are
binding decreases gradually with the number of generally binding collec-
tive agreements.63 Another problem that was raised in the 2007 proposal
mentioned above was that 2.5 million full-time employees receive a wage
of half the average income (so-called Niedriglohnsektoren).64 In low wage
sectors (eg, hairdressing, hotel and catering, postal services, temporary
57 Naujoks (2010) 204.
58 Löwisch (2008) 2-3.
59 Naujoks (2010) 225.
60 Koalitionsvertrag zwischen CDU, CSU und der SPD, Deutschlands Zukunft gestal-
ten, 18. Legislaturperiode, 67-8.
61 BT-Plenarprotokoll 18/46, 3.07.0214 and BR-Plenarprotokoll 924, Sitzung,
11.07.2014.
62 It follows from the Bundesdruckerei case that the minimum wage regulated at
Bundesland level and applicable in public procurement proceedings cannot be
imposed on workers who perform work outside Germany and who do not cross
the border within the meaning of the PWD. Case C-549/13 Bundesdruckerei GmbH v
Stadt Dortmund ECLI:EU:C:2014:2235, JAR 2014/264 noted by Miriam Kullmann.
See on this case also Kullmann (2014).
63 This is due to the fact that in order to become generally binding, the collective
agreement must cover 50 per cent of the workers. This threshold is hardly met
nowadays. BT-Drs. 18/1885, 1. See section 4.3.2 below. See also BT-Ausschuss-
drucksache 17(11)776 neu, 67-74, containing a similar statement made by Florian
Rödl.
64 Koberski (2011), para 86. More and more workers need to supplement their income
by requesting unemployment benefits financed by taxation. Introducing a statu-
tory minimum wage would therefore lead to a reduction of dependency on the
state. This, however, is omitted from the economic discussions held on the
statutory minimum wage. Supplementing wages via the state thus seems quite
beneficial to employers as it allows them to create more low-wage workplaces.
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agency work, meat processing, and security), workers earn between 2 and
6 EUR per hour (gross). Consequently, more and more workers need to
supplement their income by requesting unemployment benefits financed
from taxation.65
The relation between the Tarifautonomiestärkungsgesetz and the ex-
isting acts that allow the establishment of sectoral minimum wages is
interesting. According to § 1(3) Tarifautonomiestärkungsgesetz, wages estab-
lished in a statutory regulation within the meaning of the AEntG and the
AÜG prevail as long as they do not undercut the wage level of 8.50 EUR
set by the Tarifautonomiestärkungsgesetz. An exception is created for the
construction sector where wages are commonly regulated in generally
binding collective agreements.66 A transitional period for these two acts
has been established until 31 December 2016, after which the level of
wages must meet the statutory minimum.67 Thus, the Tarifautonomiestär-
kungsgesetz will apply in all sectors that are not covered by the AEntG and
AÜG, as well as sectors that are covered but where the hourly wage is
lower than the statutory minimum. As the Tarifautonomiestärkungsgesetz
serves as a fall-back regulation, the AEntG and the AÜG and the govern-
ment decrees (Rechtsverordnungen) on these two acts will prevail. This
applies as long as the agreed minimum wage exceeds the statutory
minimum determined by the Tarifautonomiestärkungsgesetz. Also collective
agreements adopted under § 5 TVG in conjunction with § 4 Abs. 1 Nr. 1
and §§ 5 und 6 Abs. 2 AEntG prevail.68 Therefore, the Tarifautonomie-
stärkungsgesetz will not be considered further here.
C. Ways to establish sectoral minimum wages in Germany
The AEntG, enacted in 1996, states that sectoral minimum wages can be
established. The very reason for introducing this act was the increasing
cross-border provision of work and services in the German construction
sector, provided at prices that were less than 50 per cent of the wage
earned by German construction workers.69 This was possible because
65 Supplementing wages by the state thus seems quite beneficial to employers as it
allows them to create more low-wage workplaces. Rürup (2008) 5-6, referring to a
statutory gross minimum wage of 4.50 EUR. Temporary agency workers would
cost the state approximately 500 million EUR per annum. State subsidies are thus
calculated in the undertakings’ business strategies, which according to Bosch
implies massive misuse. Wetzel & Weigand (2012) 32-3.
66 BT-Drs. 18/1885, 8.
67 BT-Drs. 18/1885, 33.
68 Spielberger & Schilling (2014) 415.
69 Koberski (2011), Einl. AEntG, para 2.
Chapter 3
76
there was no statutory or sectoral minimum wage that national and
foreign employers alike were obliged to observe. Thus, as a result of the
increased mobility of Greek, Portuguese and Spanish citizens into the
German labour market, and in order to tackle the problems in the national
construction sector, the AEntG creates mandatory conditions to be re-
spected by all employers.70
Moreover, Germany has introduced the Act on Minimum Employ-
ment Conditions.71 This act, however, plays only a complementary role in
that it only applies where there are no collective agreements, if merely a
minority of employees are covered by a collective agreement,72 or in
situations in which the AEntG does not apply.73 So far, no use has been
made of this act, and it will therefore not be addressed further here.74
Since the AEntG’s name was amended in 2008, it has become much
more clear that it addresses not only posted workers, but also employees
in regular employment in Germany, including Union workers.75 Due to its
broader scope, it can be said that the act has a market regulating effect:
employers established both in Germany and abroad are subject to the
same rules and thus the same competitive conditions.76
Establishing a sectoral minimum wage involves a mix of public and
private features. It is the AEntG that determines that a generally binding
sectoral minimum wage can be established, which is done by means of
collective agreements. The core employment conditions can be made
binding through statutory provisions or administrative regulations under
§ 2 AEntG (Rechts- oder Verwaltungsvorschriften), or through collective
agreements which have become generally binding either via § 5 TVG or
via statutory regulation according to § 7 AEntG. The sectoral minimum
wage is dealt with in extenso in Chapter 4.
70 Schlachter (2012a) 12-3.
71 Mindestarbeitsbedingungengesetz in der im Bundesgesetzblatt Teil III, Glieder-
ungsnummer 802-2, veröffentlichten bereinigten Fassung, das zuletzt durch Artikel 1
des Gesetzes vom 22. April 2009 (BGBl. I S. 818) geändert worden ist.
72 Willemsen & Sagan (2008) 1220; Sittard (2009) 305.
73 Naujoks (2010) 123.
74 This is thus a dormant law. Thüsing (2008) 592.
75 Gesetz über zwingende Arbeitsbedingungen für grenzüberschreitend entsandte
und für regelmäßig im Inland beschäftigte Arbeitnehmer und Arbeitnehmerinnen.
See also § 1 AEntG. Prior to that amendment, the act in its title merely referred to
posted workers. Koberski (2011) Einl. AEntG, para 109.
76 Schlachter (2010) 18-20.
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3.3.3 Statutory minimum wage
A. Wage concepts at EU level
The Treaty is clear when it states that the EU’s regulatory competence in
the field of social policy does not include the regulation of pay (Art 153(5)
TFEU).77 Nonetheless, in Laval the ECJ decided that “even though, in the
areas in which the Community does not have competence, the Member
States remain, in principle, free to lay down the conditions for the
existence and exercise of the rights at issue, they must nevertheless
exercise that competence consistently with Community law”.78 Conse-
quently, national regulations on minimum wages, whether they are laid
down by statute or in (generally binding) collective agreement, may not
violate EU law, in particular the internal market rights, such as the free
movement of workers or the freedom to provide services, as well as the
provisions on equal treatment between men and women as regards pay
(Art 157 TFEU). Pay in the context of the principle of equal pay is defined
as “the ordinary basic or minimum wage or salary and any other
consideration, whether in cash or in kind, which the worker receives
directly or indirectly, in respect of his employment, from his employer”.
The level of pay can, the provision further states, consist of a piece rate or a
time rate.
When working in another Member State than the one they originally
come from, Union workers are entitled not to be discriminated against
“[…] as regards employment, remuneration and other conditions of work
and employment” (emphasis added) (Art 45(2) TFEU). What exactly
remuneration means does not follow from the Treaty or any other
secondary legislative instrument. But since this is an equal treatment
obligation, a Union worker has equal entitlements to a domestic worker
in a similar position, including the same pay and other employment
conditions. Whether additional wages or holiday allowances are included
thus depends on the Member State’s statutory laws and/or collective
agreements.
Pay is also a relevant condition in the PWD and the only condition
in the key provisos that is not regulated at EU level. Two diverging
definitions are used in the Directive: “minimum rates of pay”, which refers
to pay including overtime rates but excluding supplementary occupa-
77 One reason for excluding pay from the EU’s regulatory competence is that wage
levels differ substantially across the EU’s Member States. Davies (2012) 32.
78 Case C-341/05 Laval ECLI:EU:C:2007:809, para 87.
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tional retirement pension schemes (Art 3(1) PWD), and “minimum wage”
(Art 3(7) PWD). Moreover, the PWD makes it clear that it is the law and/
or the practice of the host Member State that defines the concept of
minimum rates of pay. The ECJ has stressed that the Directive itself
does not provide a substantive minimum wage definition. However, the
host Member State definition may not impede the freedom to provide
services between the Member States.79 The PWD does not oblige Member
States to have or to introduce a minimum wage, minimum holiday pay, or
holiday allowance.80 Nevertheless, it is clear that minimum wages at
Member State level can only be regulated in a way that is in line with Art 3
(8) PWD. In fact, this leads to a harmonised regulation of minimum wages
and other employment conditions.81
As for collective agreements, a difficulty may occur in case such
agreements interpret the notion of a minimum wage more broadly than
the Directive would strictly allow. Moreover, the wage level laid down in
the collective agreement is often higher than the one determined by
statute. Thus the question arises as to what exactly a host state is permitted
to impose as a minimum pay. Rightly, Houwerzijl and Van Hoek observe
that the effectiveness of the PWD, which is aimed at ensuring fair
competition and adequate worker protection, would come under strain
if only the lowest wage (level) could be imposed on a foreign service
provider.82 Moreover, it must be reiterated that the PWD states that
equality of treatment must be observed, which means that national
undertakings in a similar position are subject, in the place in question or
in the sector concerned, to the same obligations as posting undertakings as
regards the key employment terms and conditions, and are required to
fulfil such obligations with the same effects (Art 3(8)). Whether this will
lead to fair competition may be open to doubt, as equality of treatment
must only be guaranteed with regard to the key mandatory (minimum)
employment conditions. In Laval, the ECJ made it clear that Art 3(1)(a) to
(g) PWD determines the level of protection. This is only different in case
79 Case C-522/12 Tevfik Isbir ECLI:EU:C:2013:711, para 37. This case related to a
purely internal situation. However, as the German AEntG applies to domestic and
posted workers alike, the ECJ found it necessary to answer the preliminary
questions in order to ensure that EU law, and in particular the PWD, is uniformly
interpreted. See on such interpretation in purely internal situations: Case C-28/95
Leur-Bloem ECLI:EU:C:1997:369; Case C-352/08 Zwijnenburg ECLI:EU:C:2010:282.
80 Commission, ‘Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the
Council on the enforcement of Directive 96/71/EC concerning the posting of
workers in the framework of the provision of services’ COM(2012) 131 final, 3.
81 Liukkunen (2012) 1047.
82 Van Hoek & Houwerzijl (2011b) 63.
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the service provider voluntarily agrees to apply higher standards of
employment or if the standards applicable under the home state law or
collective agreement is more favourable.83
In Commission v Germany (C-341/02), overtime charges were ex-
cluded from the wage comparison as they explicitly form part of the
minimum rates of pay that is to be applied to workers that are posted
within the meaning of the Directive. Based on the Directive, all working
and employment conditions mentioned in Art 3(1)(a), (b) and (d) to (g)
PWD are excluded from the concept of rates of pay. Minimum rates of pay
would thus refer to pay components with the exception of those elements
that seem to be explicitly excluded.84
Problems may also exist with payments in kind and costs that are
deducted from the wages that are actually paid to (posted) workers, such
as for housing. In some sectors, employees are also allocated allowances
and supplements (eg quality bonuses and bonuses for dirty, heavy or
dangerous work) paid by an employer. The ECJ made it clear that such
elements cannot be treated as constituent elements of the minimum wage
if they are not defined as such by the legislation or national practice of the
Member State to which the worker is posted, and if they alter the
relationship between the service provided by the worker and the con-
sideration which he receives in return.85 In this case the Court also ruled
that “[i]t is entirely normal that, if an employer requires a worker to carry
out additional work or to work under particular conditions, compensation
must be provided to the worker for that additional service without its
being taken into account for the purpose of calculating the minimum
wages”.86
Moreover, “[a]llowances specific to the posting shall be considered
to be part of the minimum wage, unless they are paid in reimbursement of
expenditure actually incurred on account of the posting, such as expen-
diture on travel, board and lodging” (emphasis added) (Art 3(7) PWD).
83 Case C-341/05 Laval ECLI:EU:C:2007:809, para 81.
84 Van Hoek & Houwerzijl (2011b) 66, with reference to Case C-341/02 Commission v
Germany ECLI:EU:C:2005:220.
85 Case C-341/02 Commission v Germany ECLI:EU:C:2005:220, para 39. See also Case
C-522/12 Tevfik Isbir ECLI:EU:C:2013:711, para 38.
86 Case C-341/02 Commission v Germany (2004) ECLI:EU:T:2004:228, para 40. See also
Case C-522/12 Tevfik Isbir ECLI:EU:C:2013:711, para 39.
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B. National statutory wage concepts
As EU (case) law only provides the boundaries of minimum wage
concepts to be respected at Member State level, it is necessary to address
statutory wage concepts at the Member State level. Different minimum
wage concepts apply in the Netherlands and Germany. While the Dutch
statutory minimum wage is a monthly wage, an hourly wage is used in
the German sectoral minimum wages, applicable under the AEntG.
The Dutch statutory minimum wage is to be understood as the
pecuniary income ensuing from the employment relationship. This means
that it has to be paid in money, excluding any payment in kind (Art 6
WML).87 Under civil law, the wage is the amount payable by the
employer for the agreed work, that is a wage paid in consideration of
the work provided, which is broader than the statutory minimum wage
definition.88 Not included in the concept of a statutory minimum wage,
either because they do not have a regular character or because they are
granted on the basis of personal qualities, whereby there is no relation
with the performance of work are: extra income earned for working
overtime;89 holiday allowances; distribution of profits; special payments,
such as an incidental payment for a turnover achieved, payments that will
be awarded under certain conditions with the lapse of time (eg part-
payment of contributions for pensions or savings by the employer);
reimbursement of costs that a worker has to incur for work purposes;90
87 Until 1 January 2005 it was possible for the minimum wage to be paid as
compensation in kind, as it could be estimated in money. See for this Van Slooten
(1999) 100. The amendment was introduced to simplify the legislation as regards
the notion of wage.
88 It does not follow from the WML that the pecuniary income must be paid by the
employer; a third party may also pay the wage, provided certain conditions are
met (Art 7(4) WML). Tips paid by customers may also be included in the
calculation of the statutory minimum wage, provided tips are considered as an
element of the statutory minimum wage and if tips are considered as a normal
component of the remuneration the worker receives from his employer. In general,
this means that tips, which are included in the worker’s remuneration, are
regularly charged to the third party. See on this Kamerstukken II 1967/68, 9574,
nr. 3, 18; HR 2 March 2001, ECLI:NL:HR:2001:AB1254, JAR 2001/58 (Hotel New
York B.V./Horecabond FNV).
89 This is in line with Case C-341/02 Commission v Germany ECLI:EU:C:2005:220, para
40.
90 Eg, a language course that is necessary for the work to be performed or housing
facilities (Kamerstukken II 1967/68, 9574, nr. 3, 18). This has been confirmed by a
court, which ruled that costs incurred for a language course, travel costs, board and
lodging as well as the payment made by the family for the au pair’s health
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Christmas and year-end bonuses; and the employer’s contributions to
medical expenses.91
The German AEntG itself does not lay down the minimum sectoral
wage level. Under § 8 AEntG, the employer is required to pay at least the
gross wage determined by a collective agreement. The obligation applies
regardless of whether these conditions apply under a collective agreement
within the meaning of § 3 Tarifvertragsgesetz (‘TVG’) (Act on Collective
Agreement)92 , a generally binding collective agreement under § 5 TVG or
statutory regulation under § 7 AEntG. The minimum wage may be
calculated by taking into account the type of work performed, the
qualification of the worker, and the region in which the work is per-
formed.93 Prior to the 2009 amendment of the AEntG, it was merely
possible to impose a uniform minimum wage, that is to say the lowest
wage category, without any specific differentiations. According to the
literature, and also based on what has been said previously, the aim of that
Directive would be undermined if only a minimum substance income
were allowed.94
Following the ECJ’s ruling in the Commission v Germany case (C-
341/01), additional wage elements are only permitted if they are paid
reliably, permanently and are proportionately related to the time unit
worked. In Germany, in contrast to the Netherlands, a 13th month wage or
a Christmas bonus can also be included in the concept minimum wage, if
it is paid regularly.95 An example of an extra payment in the German
insurance are all to be considered as costs that are necessary to perform the agreed
work. Therefore, such costs could not be considered as being included in the
minimum wage. Hof Leeuwarden 11 February 2004, ECLI:NL:GHLEE:2004:
AO3778, JAR 2004/65 (Bosschieter c.s./Dembinska).
91 Similar exclusions are found in Dutch and German collective agreements (see on
this Chapter 4 below).
92 § 8(2) AEntG determines that “[e]in Tarifvertrag nach den §§ 4 bis 6, der durch
Allgemeinverbindlicherklärung oder Rechtsverordnung nach § 7 auf nicht an ihn
gebundene Arbeitgeber sowie Arbeitnehmer und Arbeitnehmerinnen erstreckt
wird, ist von einem Arbeitgeber auch dann einzuhalten, wenn er nach § 3 des
Tarifvertragsgesetzes oder kraft Allgemeinverbindlicherklärung nach § 5 des
Tarifvertragsgesetzes an einen anderen Tarifvertrag gebunden ist“. See for more
information Chapter 4 below.
93 The reason for this concretisation is that practice seems to have shown positive
experiences with wage differentiations. Thüsing (Ed.) (2010) (Waas) § 5 AEntG,
para 2.
94 Müller-Glöge, Preis & Schmidt (Eds.) (2014) (Schlachter) § 5 AEntG, para 2. An
overview of the applicable minimum wages within the meaning of the AEntG:
<http://www.bmas.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/pr-mindestloehne-aent-
guebersicht.pdf> accessed 28 October 2014.
95 Thüsing (Ed.) (2010) (Bayreuther) § 8 AEntG, para 14.
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construction sector is the dirty work bonus, to which employers in the
construction sector are entitled if the work performed is dirty.96 Not
viewed as a minimum wage payment, therefore, are payments made
because the employer, for example, requests his worker to work additional
hours.97 The Act further emphasises that relinquishing the minimum
wage is only possible by a court settlement (§ 9 sentence 1) and forfeiture
of the worker’s claim to a minimum wage is excluded (§ 8 sentence 2).
The Dutch statutory minimum wage in July 2014 is based on a
monthly minimum wage of 1495.20 EUR; the weekly or daily minimum
wage is derived from that figure. The WML merely refers to the normal
hours worked by the employee, stating that it concerns working hours that
can be considered in similar employment relations as forming full-time
employment (Art 12). However, the term full-time employment may differ
depending on the sector in which a worker works.98 As the length of a
full-time working week can be 36, 38 or 40 hours, the minimum wage level
may vary. The introduction of an hourly statutory minimum wage has
been discussed now and then, also in the course of the expansion of the EU
in 2004, but with no result. An hourly wage was viewed as necessary to
simplify the monitoring and enforcement task of the Inspectie Sociale Zaken
en Werkgelegenheid (‘ISZW’) (Social Affairs and Employment Inspectorate).
Moreover, it was said to create more transparency for the worker in
determining his own wage. So far, the main argument for not introducing
an hourly minimum wage has been the fact that it would involve an
extensive investigation, taking into account the existing differences in
working time.99 For the posting of workers an hourly minimum wage
would have the advantage of making it easier to compare the host and
home state minimum wages.
96 Thüsing (Ed.) (2010) (Bayreuther) § 8 AEntG, para 11.
97 Thüsing (Ed.) (2010) (Bayreuther) § 8 AEntG, para 8.
98 Regeling van de Minister van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid van 13 mei 2014,
2014-0000059768, tot aanpassing van het wettelijk minimumloon per 1 juli 2014.
99 Brief van de Stichting van de Arbeid aan de staatssecretaris van Sociale Zaken en
Werkgelegenheid, ‘Handhaving wettelijk minimumloon’, 15 juni 2006 and Brief
van de Stichting van de Arbeid aan de minister van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegen-
heid, ‘Wettelijk minimumloon in relatie tot aantal gewerkte uren’, 13 april 2006. As
early as 1982, the Social Economic Council (Sociaal Economische Raad) advised
negatively on the introduction of an hourly minimum wage, which had been
discussed in relation to short-time working arrangements, for technical reasons.
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3.4 Statutory holiday pay and holiday allowance
3.4.1 Introduction
The following focuses on the statutory holiday pay and holiday allowance
as may be available under EU and/or Member State law. Based on EU
law, employees in the countries concerned are entitled to receive holiday
pay, ie paid annual leave. Holiday allowances, ie the payment for holiday
in addition to the pay received when on annual leave, are not granted in
all three countries. Holiday pay at EU and Member State level is addressed
first. Attention is then paid to the holiday allowance, which is regulated by
statute in the Netherlands and Sweden.
3.4.2 Holiday pay at EU level
Under the Working Time Directive 2003/88/EC100 , paid annual leave is
described as annual leave of at least four weeks during which the worker
receives his normal pay.101 The ECJ made it clear that “[t]he purpose of
the requirement of payment for that leave is to put the worker, during
such leave, in a position which is, as regards remuneration, comparable to
periods of work” (emphasis added).102 This refers to the worker’s normal
remuneration, the amount of which must be sufficient in that the worker
shall actually take annual leave. As was made clear in theWilliams v British
Airways judgement, this also concerns components that are paid in
addition to the normal remuneration received. To quote the ECJ:
“any inconvenient aspect which is linked intrinsically to the performance of the
tasks which the worker is required to carry out under his contract of employment
and in respect of which a monetary amount is provided which is included in the
calculation of the worker’s total remuneration, such as, in the case of airline
100 [2003] OJ L299/9.
101 Case C-155/10 Williams v British Airways ECR I-8409, para 19. Paid leave is
included in the ‘pay’ definition of Art 157 TFEU on equal pay between men and
women. Watson (2009) 375 with reference to Case C-360/90 Bötel ECLI:EU:
C:1992:246. In that case, the Court reiterated that pay “[…] comprises any
consideration, whether in cash or in kind, whether immediate or future, provided
that the employee receives it, albeit indirectly, in respect of his employment from
his employer, and irrespective of whether the employee receives it under a contract
of employment, by virtue of legislative provisions or on a voluntary basis” (para
12).
102 Case C-155/10 Williams v British Airways ECR I-8409, para 20, with reference to
Joined Cases C-131/04 and C-257/04 Robinson-Steele ECLI:EU:C:2006:177, para 58;
Joined Cases C-350/06 and C-520/06 Schultz-Hoff ECLI:EU:C:2009:18, para 60.
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pilots, the time spent flying, must necessarily be taken into account for the
purposes of the amount to which the worker is entitled during his annual
leave”.103
The ECJ, however, also stressed that components paid on an occasional or
ancillary basis need not be included in the normal remuneration to be
taken into account.104 The Working Time Directive does not concern
holiday allowances paid in addition to holiday pay, which is left to the
Member States.
The term minimum paid annual holidays in the PWD seems to refer
to the Working Time Directive. Accordingly, minimum paid annual holi-
day concerns holiday pay and the entitlement to holiday itself. National
regulations and collective agreements, however, also seem to award
additional holiday allowances, over and above the holiday pay. According
to the Working Party in its 1999 report, Art 3(1)(b) and (c) PWD also
covers national social fund benefit scheme contributions as well as benefits
that are governed by collective agreements and/or legal provisions, as
long as they do not fall in the sphere of social security.105 If one reads this
in a broader perspective, foreign posted workers are not only entitled to
receive holiday pay within the meaning of the Working Time Directive,
but also, if provided under Member State law, they are entitled to receive
additional holiday allowances that are provided for by statute or collective
agreement.106
3.4.3 Holiday pay and holiday allowance concepts at Member State level
Foreign and domestic employees alike are entitled to receive holiday pay
and holiday allowance. What follows first looks at holiday pay, an
employment condition granted to both foreign and domestic employees.
In the second place, minimum holiday allowance is described, which is
only statutorily granted in the Netherlands to workers who fall under the
scope of the WML. So far, no statutory provision in German law grants
employees a holiday allowance. In Sweden, so-called holiday supplements
are only paid if the employer chooses to do so.
103 Case C-155/10 Williams v British Airways ECR I-8409, para 24.
104 Case C-155/10 Williams v British Airways ECR I-8409, para 25.
105 Working Party, Report on the Transposal of the Directive Concerning the Posting
of Workers (European Commission, Employment & Social Affairs: Industrial
relations & industrial change, 1999). See also Houwerzijl (2005) 134. This informal
and ad hoc Working Party consisted of national experts who reflected and debated
on the interpretation and implementation of the PWD.
106 Houwerzijl (2005) 134.
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A. Holiday pay
Holiday pay is regulated by different acts: the Civil Code (the Nether-
lands), and particular acts regulating annual leave (Germany107 and
Sweden108 ).109 Besides these, collective agreements also play an important
role. Holiday pay in the Netherlands – as well as in Germany and Sweden
– refers to a situation in which the worker during his annual leave is
entitled to his wage (Art 7:639(1) BW). Wage in this context means the
remuneration received based on the employment contract, with the
statutory minimum wage as a minimum. The wage paid during a holiday
must be equal to the amount that the worker would have received if not
on holiday.110 In Sweden, the normal pay is established at local level.
Here, it largely depends on the binding nature of a collective agreement on
the service provider and/or posted worker whether the latter is entitled to
a wage and holiday pay.
The duration of annual leave differs in the three Member States.
According to Dutch law, workers accrue a paid annual leave of at least
four times the agreed working time per week (Art 7:634 BW). The
statutory annual leave is 20 working days, which may be increased by
collective agreement. In Germany, every employee is entitled to a paid
annual leave of at least 24 working days (§ 1 and § 3 Abs. 1 BUrlG). To
accrue 24 days of annual leave there is a waiting period of six months (§ 4
107 Bundesurlaubsgesetz (BUrlG) (Federal Holiday Entitlement Act), Bundesurlaubsge-
setz in der im Bundesgesetzblatt Teil III, Gliederungsnummer 800-4, veröffentlich-
ten bereinigten Fassung, das zuletzt durch Artikel 3 Absatz 3 des Gesetzes vom 20.
April 2013 (BGBl. I S. 868) geändert worden ist.
108 The Posting of Workers Act (1999:678) explicitly declares the Semesterlagen
(1977:480), (Annual Leave Act), to be applicable. According to the Posting of
Workers Act, the following acts also apply to posted workers: the Lag om privat
arbetsförmedling och uthyrning av arbetskraft (1993:440) (Private Job Placement and
Hiring-Out of Labour Act), now the Lag om uthyrning av arbetstagare (2012:854) (Act
on Temporary Agency Work). Moreover, Sweden explicitly provides that posted
workers enjoy the right of association, ie the right of workers and employers to
become a member of a workers’ or employers’ association, and the trade union’s
right to negotiation (Sections 7, 8 and 10 Co-determination Act (1976:580)). It seems
that the application of these rights is covered by the public policy provision laid
down in Art 3(10) PWD. It seems that the application of these rights is covered by
the public policy provision laid down in Art 3(10) PWD. Van Hoek & Houwerzijl
(2011b) 89. However, it seems that it is not possible to include these “collective”
rights under the rights mentioned in Art 3(1) PWD. The ECJ’s ruling in Laval is
quite clear, in the sense that the conditions mentioned in the PWD are exhaustive.
Case C-341/05 Laval ECLI:EU:C:2007:809, paras 80-1.
109 These provisions implement Directive 2003/88/EC.
110 Ktr. Amsterdam 29 June 2012, JAR 2012/195. This is in line with: Case C-155/10
Williams v British Airways ECR I-8409, para 19.
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BUrlG). The legal basis for this entitlement follows from the employment
relationship under § 611 BGB.111 Employees in Sweden are at least entitled
to 25 days’ paid annual leave.
In order to accrue paid annual leave, employees must actually have
worked and earned a wage. In the Netherlands, for instance, in order to
accrue annual leave, the worker must have earned over the agreed
working time (Art 7:634(1) BW). Holiday pay is paid when the worker
takes his annual leave. In order to be entitled to annual leave, the days the
worker has actually worked in the employer’s service during the qualify-
ing year, ie the period of employment, are of importance.112 Swedish law
contains two ways by which holiday pay can be calculated. Under the
same-pay rule, holiday pay is the weekly or monthly pay received when
on annual leave, any fixed pay supplements and holiday supplements
(which is similar to the Dutch holiday allowance) and the percentage rule;
the level of pay is calculated based on a reference period.113 The level of
holiday pay is 12 per cent of the employee’s pay that has become due
during the qualifying (or earning) year (Section 16b Annual Leave Act
(1977:480)). Excluded in the calculation are the holiday pay, compensation
for days when the worker was wholly or partly absent, and pay received
in respect of a lay-off related to the closing of an undertaking affected for
the purpose of enabling the employees to take their annual leave simulta-
neously when there is no entitlement to holiday pay for the same period.
With regard to calculating holiday pay under the Swedish law, benefits in
the form of free accommodation or pecuniary benefits compensating
111 Hohmeister & Oppermann (2013) (Oppermann) § 11 BUrlG, para 1.
112 An exception is made if the employment started after 31 August, meaning that the
worker accrues five days of annual leave (Section 4 Annual Leave Act (1977:480)).
Not included are those days when the employee has been completely absent from
work without pay (Section 7, first and second sentence Annual Leave Act
(1977:480)).
113 Adlercreutz & Nyström (2009) para 200. The percentage rule applies to workers
whose pay: (a) is not determined per week/month, (b) comprises a fixed and
variable component if the latter can be estimated to amount to at least ten per cent
of the aggregate pay during the annual leave year, (c) level of occupation has
varied during the qualifying year, (d) level of occupation changed between the
qualifying year and the time of annual leave, (e) or who has been absent during the
qualifying year for reasons that do not afford an entitlement to holiday pay under
Sections 17-17b, but not if the absence has continued at the same level throughout
the entire qualifying year and continues at the same level at the time of the annual
leave. A distinction is made between the vacation year, ie the year when the leave
is enjoyed, and the earning year (the period is 1 April until 31 March of the next
year). The twelve preceding months comprise the qualifying year.
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special expenses shall not be taken into account (Section 24 Annual Leave
Act (1977:480)).114
With regard to posted workers, under Swedish law, it may be
agreed that such workers are entitled to receive a payment in lieu instead
of holiday pay (Section 5, second and third sentence Annual Leave Act
(1977:480)).115 The payment in lieu is calculated in the same way as the
holiday pay. In line with the Working Time Directive, a payment in lieu is
allowed only if the employment relationship or contract is terminated.
Sweden permits an exception for posted workers, granting them an
allowance in lieu.116 It may be doubted whether this is accordance with
the main aims of the Working Time Directive.117 In the Netherlands,
however, it is possible for an employee who is entitled to a holiday
exceeding the legal minimum of 20 days, to receive a payment in lieu over
the excess part (Art 7:640(2) BW).
B. Holiday allowance
There is no general legal basis in German labour law for receipt of a
holiday allowance in addition to the holiday pay.118 In the Netherlands
there is a statutory determination that each employee shall receive a
holiday allowance. In Sweden, too, some employees are entitled to receive
holiday supplements. Nevertheless, collective agreements or individual
employment contracts may grant employees such an entitlement.119
Employees in the Netherlands are entitled to a statutory minimum
holiday allowance of 8 per cent of the (minimum) wage that their
employer is obliged to pay them.120 The allowance enables employees
114 Moreover, if a worker receives free board in the employer’s household, he is to
receive reasonable compensation for food during the days of annual leave on
which he has not availed himself of that benefit (Section 25 Annual Leave Act
(1977:480)). This provision does not apply to posted workers, as the Posting of
Workers Act (1999:678) does not refer to Section 25 Annual Leave Act (1977:480).
115 Adlercreutz & Nyström (2009) para 201; Nordegran & Ahlén (2010) 16.
116 The Netherlands: Art 7:641(1) BW; Germany: § 7 BUrlG; Sweden: Section 28
Annual Leave Act (1977:480).
117 Joined Cases C-350/06 and C-520/06 Schultz-Hoff ECLI:EU:C:2009:18, para 22.
118 Holiday allowances in Germany, like the entitlement to annual leave, fall under the
Vertragsstatut. Deinert (2013) 321.
119 Germany: Hohmeister & Oppermann (2013) (Oppermann) § 11 BUrlG, para 108;
Sweden: the Annual Leave Act neither prohibits nor allows a holiday allowance to
be granted.
120 The information on the Dutch statutory minimum holiday allowance draws on
chapter III. WML (Arts 15 to 18).
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to pay for the extra costs related to their annual leave.121 The 8 per cent is
paid over the wage which the employer is obliged to pay under the
employment contract. Wage in this context includes the wage components
as included in the statutory minimum wage.122 Only wages that the
employee receives from his employer may be taken into account when
calculating the employee’s holiday allowance. In general, the Act states
that an employee shall receive his holiday allowance once a year in June,
unless otherwise agreed. A maximum is set for the minimum holiday
allowance: it may not be more than three times the statutory minimum
level as laid down in Art 8 WML. The maximum is 4,456.80 EUR.123 Such
a limit is justified by the fact that the statutory minimum holiday
allowance is a minimum employment condition.124
For some branches, a public regulation or collective agreement may
determine that an employer can also comply with his obligations to pay
holiday allowances by giving the employee a voucher in order to avoid
loss of income during holiday, transferred at the expense of a fund or by
paying the holiday allowances to a fund against which the employee is
entitled to payment of his holiday allowances. The value of either the
voucher or the employee’s claim against the fund may not be lower than
the statutory minimum of 8 per cent or the level determined by public
regulation, collective agreement, or generally applicable provision(s) of a
collective agreement.
Under Swedish law, only those employees who receive holiday pay
according to the same-pay rule are entitled to holiday supplements. As
stated before, under the same-pay rule holiday pay is the weekly or
monthly pay received when on annual leave, any fixed pay supplements
and holiday supplements (which is similar to the Dutch holiday allow-
ance). For weekly paid employees this is 1.82 per cent of their weekly pay
and for monthly paid employees it is 0.43 per cent of their monthly pay.
For a worker receiving fixed pay supplements, the weekly or monthly pay
shall be increased by these supplements before the holiday supplements
are calculated.
121 Kamerstukken II 1967/68, 9574, nr. 3, 6.
122 Art 15ff WML also refers to income as a result of social security legislation.
However, the present study will pay no further attention to that aspect as it falls
outside the study’s scope.
123 As of May 2014.
124 Kamerstukken II 1967/68, 9574, nr. 3, 17. A public regulation, a collective agreement,
or generally applicable provisions of a collective agreement may determine that an
employee is not entitled to holiday allowances or only to a smaller amount than the
statutory minimum of 8 per cent Act. This is possible only if the employee receives
a holiday allowance of at least 108 per cent of the statutory minimum wage.
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3.5 Comparative notes and conclusions
The statutory ways to regulate minimum wages, holiday pay and holiday
allowances have been dealt with in Chapter 3. If statutory employment
conditions are to be applicable, individuals must be considered as employ-
ees or workers. Two worker concepts are used within an EU legal context:
an autonomous Union worker concept in the context of the free movement
workers, and a Member State employee concept, which applies in the
context of the cross-border posting of workers. When enforcing statutory
labour rights, it is essential that these two worker concepts are clearly
separated, as each classification entails different ranges of protection. An
individual who is not considered an employee but as self-employed may
not benefit from labour law. An exception applies if the individual has
been wrongly qualified and actually is an employee.
As to the regulation of statutory minimum wages, the three coun-
tries differ greatly from each other. First, there is a statutory monthly
minimum wage in the Netherlands to which all employees covered by the
definition of a contract of employment are entitled. In Germany, there are
sectoral, and as of 1 January 2015 statutory, hourly minimum wages.
Sweden differs from the other two countries in that wages are solely
determined via collective bargaining and by collective agreements. Thus,
regarding Germany and the Netherlands, we see a certain convergence as
to the regulation of national statutory minimum wages. The statutory
minimum wage in Germany has been adopted, although initially seen
quite negatively, to cope with the decrease in collective agreement cover-
age and to allow all workers to receive a basic minimum wage. The EU
lacks competence to regulate pay. Based on Art 3(1) PWD Member States
may apply their own wage definitions. Nevertheless, the ECJ’s case law
plays an important role in defining pay boundaries. The Laval case made
clear that Member States must exercise that competence consistently with
EU law.
As a result of the Working Time Directive, all employees are entitled
to receive holiday pay, defined as the normal pay the employee receives
when on annual leave. In Sweden, the employer and his posted employee
are explicitly permitted under on the Posting of Workers Act (1999:678) to
agree that the latter receives a payment in lieu instead of holiday pay.
Whether this is in line with the Working Time Directive may be ques-
tioned, as it permits a payment in lieu only if the employment contract or
relationship is terminated for whatever reason. Related to paid annual
leave is the length of annual leave. Here, the most favourable rules apply
in Sweden, where employees are entitled to 25 days of leave. In the
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Netherlands, the annual leave is set at 20 days, while it is 24 days in
Germany. Collective agreements may, of course, provide more favourable
annual leave.
A right for employees to receive a statutory holiday allowance,
which is not regulated at EU level, exists only in the Netherlands. Here,
employees are entitled to receive a holiday allowance of 8 per cent of the
employee’s annual wage. Sweden allows holiday supplements for em-
ployees whose employer has decided to pay them. No such statutory
entitlement exists in Germany. Nevertheless, collective agreements may
provide holiday allowances or additional holiday supplements.
Comparing the three countries, it seems that the Dutch system is the
only one that grants all employees, regardless of whether they are foreign
or domestic, a statutory monthly minimum wage, holiday pay, and
holiday allowance. This is the result of the statutory regulation of a
minimum wage, holiday pay and a holiday allowance. This minimum
wage serves as the starting point for calculating the holiday pay and
holiday allowance. Coverage is much more limited in Germany, where
only employees who are employed in one of the AEntG sectors are entitled
to a sectoral minimum wage. Although Germany is going to introduce a
nationwide statutory minimum as of 1 January 2015, the sectoral approach
remains applicable for the construction sector. The situation in Sweden
differs greatly from the Netherlands and Germany, as the labour market is
regulated by collective agreements rather than statutes. As a result,
employees must be covered by a collective agreement before being entitled
to collectively agreed employment conditions.
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CHAPTER 4
SECTORAL MINIMUMWAGES, HOLIDAY PAY AND
HOLIDAY ALLOWANCES
4.1 Introduction
This chapter explores the sectoral minimum wages, holiday pay, and
holiday allowances, as applicable in the construction and temporary
agency work sectors. It follows from the previous chapter that a sectoral
approach is necessary in particular to understand the differences in the
regulation of minimum wages. In order to understand the existing
collective regulation of minimum wages, holiday pay, and holiday allow-
ances, the chapter starts by explaining the Member State systems of
collective labour law, thereby highlighting the main characteristics of
collective agreements and the scope of their application (section 4.2).
This is necessary because Sweden is the only country under consideration
in which there is no system by which to declare a collective agreement
generally binding. To understand the ways employers and employees can
be (or become) bound by a collective agreement, the different models are
explained briefly. The different models largely explain the different modes
of monitoring and enforcing collective and statutory labour law. This is
followed by a description of the applicable collective agreements in the
construction (section 4.3) and temporary agency work sector (section 4.4).
Here, the provisions on minimum wages, holiday pay, and holiday
allowances, are addressed, highlighting the different concepts and scopes
concerned.
4.2 Member State systems of collective labour law
4.2.1 Introduction
Collective agreements play an important role in regulating employment
conditions. A main difference between statutory labour law and collective
agreements is that the latter are not always all-embracing in their scope.
Collective agreements can be concluded at different levels. In the Nether-
lands and Germany, mostly sectoral collective agreements are concluded,
93
with only a few company collective agreements.1 In Germany, collective
agreements may also apply in certain regions, to be determined by the
social partners.2 In Sweden, collective agreements are frequently con-
cluded at three different levels:3 (1) at central level between the top tier
organisations,4 where basic collective agreements are concluded, contain-
ing frameworks for the conclusion of agreements on wages and employ-
ment conditions, the exercise of the right to take industrial action,
negotiations and co-determination5; (2) at national branch or sectoral level
between the national trade unions and employers’ associations, ie national
sectoral collective agreements, containing comprehensive regulations on,
inter alia, wages, working hours, periods of notice, annual leave, travelling
costs6 ; and (3) at local level, between local trade unions and individual
enterprises, eg an agreement to apply provisions of a certain sectoral
collective agreement to workers.7
A collective agreement is considered to be an agreement that
regulates the rights and obligations between the parties to a collective
agreement,8 in principle binding only those who – regarding individual
employers – have signed the collective agreement or who are members of
the employees’ and employers’ organisations that conclude the collective
agreement. As a result, all normative provisions (ie employment condi-
tions) in the collective agreement become binding on the employment
1 The Netherlands: Jacobs (2004) para 198; Germany: Weiss & Schmidt (2008) para
430.
2 This is also the case in the Netherlands. However, it hardly occurs in practice.
3 Adlercreutz & Nyström (2009) para 112; Fahlbeck & Mulder (2009) 18; Malmberg
(2002) 192ff.
4 Collective agreements concluded as this level are also referred to as national inter-
sectoral collective agreements, but are referred to here as basic collective agree-
ments. Malmberg (2002), 193-4.
5 Adlercreutz & Nyström (2009) para 112; Malmberg (2002), 193-4. Basic collective
agreements are concluded for an indefinite period of time. Fahlbeck & Mulder
(2009) 36.
6 Malmberg (2002) 194.
7 Nordegran & Ahlén (2010) 29.
8 The Netherlands: Art 1(1) Wet op de collectieve arbeidsovereenkomst (‘Wet CAO’) (Act
on Collective Agreements) (Wet van 24 december 1927, houdende nadere regeling
van de Collectieve Arbeidsovereenkomst, Stb. 1927, 415, last amended by Stb. 2006,
706); Germany: § 1(1) Tarifvertragsgesetz (‘TVG’) (Collective Agreements Act)
(Tarifvertragsgesetz in der Fassung der Bekanntmachung vom 25. August 1969
(BGBl. I S. 1323), das zuletzt durch Artikel 88 des Gesetzes vom 8. Dezember 2010
(BGBl. I S. 1864) geändert worden ist); Sweden: Section 23 Act on Employee
Consultation and Participation in Working Life (1976:580) (in short: Co-determina-
tion Act), in the literature also referred to as Medbestämmandelagen (MBL), Lag
(1976:580) om medbestämmande i arbetslivet, as last amended by Lag (2013:615).
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contracts concluded between an employer and his employees.9 Collective
agreements contain both contractual and normative provisions. While
contractual provisions regulate the relation between the signatory parties
to the collective agreement, normative provisions contain rights and
obligations of the employer and the employee vis-à-vis each other.10
Two types of collective agreements can be distinguished: collective
agreements applying only to those employees and employers and their
representatives who have signed such agreements (section 4.2.2), and
collective agreements that are declared generally binding (section 4.2.3).
As regards the former type of collective agreements, three situations are
distinguished: first, both the employer and employee are bound by a
collective agreement through membership; second, only the employer is
bound through membership to an employers’ association (referring to so-
called outside employees); and third, neither the employer nor the
employee is bound by a collective agreement (referring to so-called out-
side employers).11 These three scenarios are dealt with below.
4.2.2 Binding by collective agreements
In the first place, collective agreements are not only binding on the
signatory parties, ie employers or their representatives and the trade
union(s), but also on the members of the parties’ organisations.12 It is
irrelevant whether employers and employees become members of one of
the signatory parties before or after the collective agreement has been
signed. Whether an employee is actually bound by a collective agreement
depends on whether he is employed within the sector or trade and within
the territorial area to which the agreement applies and falls within the
personal scope of the collective agreement. For Sweden this is different in
case an employer or worker is already bound by another collective
agreement, as this agreement remains applicable until further notice
(Section 26 Co-determination Act (1976:580)). As collective agreements
have a mandatory effect, deviation from that agreement by an individual
employment contract may not conflict with the collective agreement. The
9 The Netherlands: Art 9 Wet CAO; Germany: §§ 3 and 4 TVG; Sweden: Section 26
Co-determination Act (1976:580).
10 The Netherlands: Jacobs (2004) paras 207 and 212; Germany: Weiss & Schmidt
(2008) paras 442 and 445; Sweden: Malmberg (2002) 197.
11 This distinction is based on Malmberg (2002) for the Swedish system. However,
research has shown that it can also be applied (to a certain extent) to the Nether-
lands and Germany.
12 The Netherlands: Art 9(1) Wet CAO; Germany: § 3(1) TVG; Sweden: Co-determi-
nation Act (1976:580).
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provision that is in conflict with the collective agreement then will be
void.13
Deviation in Germany is explicitly permitted if it is so provided in
the collective agreement itself, or if deviation is in favour of the em-
ployee.14 The latter is also possible in the Netherlands and Sweden.
Collective agreements may, however, also place a ceiling on the level of
labour conditions to be provided, thus not permitting a more favourable
treatment.15 In the Netherlands, no deviation may be made in the event
the social partners have determined that their collective agreement has the
character of a standard collective agreement, either in favour or to the
detriment of the employee.16
In case only the employer is bound by a collective agreement, the
Netherlands, Germany and Sweden have instruments through which
employers (must) also apply (certain provisions of a) collective agreement
to employees who are not members of the signatory trade union. In the
Netherlands, employers are obliged also to apply the provisions on
employment conditions to those employees who are not bound by a
collective agreement or who are bound by another collective agreement
(Art 14 Wet CAO). This guarantees that, as regards employment condi-
tions, member employees and non-member employees are treated equally.
No such obligation exists in Germany and Sweden.
A non-bound employee cannot legally enforce a collective agree-
ment if he is not bound.17 This problem can be remedied by including
incorporation18 or reference clauses19 into individual employment con-
tracts, which are known in all three countries with which we are
concerned here. Under German law, the result of agreeing a reference
clause (Bezugnahmeklausel) is to create equal treatment between employees
13 The Netherlands: Art 12 Wet CAO; Germany: § 4(3) TVG, Weiss & Schmidt (2008)
para 446; Sweden: Section 27 Co-determination Act (1976:580), Malmberg (2002)
199.
14 § 4(3) TVG; Weiss & Schmidt (2008) para 446.
15 Sweden: Malmberg (2002) 200.
16 As a result, under Art 12 Wet CAO the deviation from the agreement would be
void. Jacobs (2004), para 207.
17 The Netherlands: Bouwens, Houwerzijl & Roozendaal (2013) 252-3. See also Koot-
Van Der Putte (2007) 64.
18 The Netherlands: Bouwens, Houwerzijl & Roozendaal (2013) 253; Sweden: Malm-
berg (2002) 205.
19 Cf. Case C-426/11 Parkwood ECLI:EU:C:2013:521, in which the ECJ ruled that a
Member State may not provide that dynamic clauses which refer to collective
agreements which have been negotiated and adopted after the transfer has taken
place are enforceable against the transferee, if the transferee did not have the
possibility to participate in the negotiation of such collective agreements (para 37).
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who are trade union members and those who are not. Through an
incorporation or reference clause, the collective agreement becomes part
of the employment contract and the employee may enforce that contract.
Besides incorporation clauses, two additional possibilities exist in
Sweden through which the provisions of a collective agreement can have
legal effect in relation to non-bound employees: collective agreements may
affect the employment relationship with non-bound employees, supple-
menting individual employment contracts; or statute law permits the
application of certain provisions of a collective agreement to outside
employees, namely where statute law permits derogation by collective
agreement but not by individual employment contracts.20 Labour law
provisions often include a clause permitting employers to apply the same
rules to non-bound workers, who are engaged in work that is covered by
the agreement in question; provided, however, they are not bound by
another collective agreement.21 Swedish courts generally hold that as
industry-wide collective agreements provide standards applicable in that
sector, they shall also apply in workplaces, therefore also covering non-
bound employees.22 An employer that does not apply the provisions of a
collective agreement to outside employees may face a damages claim by
the trade union for breach of the collective agreement.23 Nevertheless,
outside workers remain a sensitive issue: they enjoy the benefits of a
collective agreement but do not pay contributions to the union (the free-
rider problem).24
It may be that neither the employer nor the employee is bound by a
collective agreement (so-called outside employers), which means a collec-
tive agreement has no effect. Employers, however, can decide voluntarily
to apply a collective agreement to the employment contracts they have
concluded with the employees, through incorporation.25
For Sweden, Malmberg emphasises that it is interesting for trade
unions to control the conditions for the supply of labour and to prevent
20 Malmberg (2002) 205-7.
21 Adlercreutz & Nyström (2009) para 563.
22 Fahlbeck & Mulder (2009) 35.
23 Adlercreutz & Nyström (2009) para 565. This includes also binding in relation to
less favourable provisions, based on the idea that if a non-bound employee enjoys
the advantages of a collective agreement, he must also accept the disadvantages
(Adlercreutz & Nyström (2009) para 566).
24 Malmberg (2002) 204.
25 The Netherlands: Koot-Van Der Putte (2007) 51; Germany: Rieble (2004) 85.
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social dumping.26 Although there is no possibility in Swedish law to
extend the collective agreement erga omnes, it seems usual that an outside
employer applies the normative provisions of a collective agreement to its
workers.27 Both the outside employer and his employee can agree on such
application, or the outside employer applies the normative provisions of
the collective agreement on a de facto basis. It may be said that the
collective agreement “represents the custom of the trade”, unless
the parties have agreed otherwise.28 Guidelines may also determine that
the ‘“most proximate” collective agreement should be applied.29 In the
Netherlands and Germany, employers and employees may also agree to
apply voluntarily provisions of a collective agreement, by way of incor-
poration or reference to the collective agreement to be applied in the
employment contract.30 This only changes, at least for the Netherlands
and Germany, if the employment conditions of a collective agreement
become generally applicable.
4.2.3 Generally binding collective agreements
An important instrument to broaden the scope of applicability of collective
agreements is to declare them generally binding, which is known and
frequently used in the Netherlands and Germany. The advantage of
declaring a collective agreement generally binding is that a public order
extends the agreement’s scope to include those employers and employees,
in the relevant (sub)sector, who had so far not been bound by that
agreement. It thus becomes binding on all employers and employees –
national or foreign – who fall within the agreement’s scope.
Although quite adverse towards introducing the possibility to
declare a collective agreement generally binding, in January 2013 the
Swedish Transport Workers’ Union, together with the Transport Group
and the Swedish Road Transport Employers’ Association, expressed the
26 Malmberg (2002) 207. Discussion has thus focused largely on outside employers as
well as the increased competition as of the 1990s from foreign employers providing
temporary services in Sweden.
27 See also on this point Adlercreutz & Nyström (2009) para 567.
28 Adlercreutz & Nyström (2009).
29 Malmberg (2002) 208. A case underlining that idea is Labour Court ruling AD 1976,
No. 65. In that case, overtime rates were not agreed in the employment contract
and the contract was not covered by a collective agreement. According to the
Labour Court, the worker ‘was entitled to overtime allowance in accordance with
the current practice in the trade’, and the current practice was to apply the
collective agreement.
30 The Netherlands: Koot-Van Der Putte (2007) 51; Germany: Rieble (2004) 85.
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idea that Sweden should introduce such a possibility in certain sectors.31
Even though this would be “alien to the Swedish model”, “unhealthy
competition” had led the transport sector to reconsider its opinion in that
respect. This sector is one of the sectors that is experiencing the most
impact from (international) competition. Nevertheless, many of the social
partners still distance themselves from the suggestion. They fear that trade
union membership will drop as a result of generally binding collective
agreements. The generally binding agreement has so far not been
introduced.
A. Generally binding collective agreement
In the Netherlands, following Art 2(1) Wet AVV32, a collective agreement
can be declared generally binding to cover workers and employers with
respect to their employment contracts. An explicit aim of erga omnes
provisions of collective agreements is to prevent competition on employ-
ment conditions, whereby non-bound employers and employees undercut
for instance the wages agreed in the agreements.33 With the implementa-
tion of the PWD in the Netherlands, it has been explicitly determined that
generally binding provisions of collective agreements also apply to work-
ers whose employment contract is governed by other than Dutch law and
who work temporarily in the Netherlands (Art 2(6) Wet AVV).34 Similarly,
the German AEntG determines that generally binding collective agree-
ments are binding on foreign employers, giving such agreements an
exclusionary effect (§§ 3 and 8 AEntG), as otherwise, foreign employers
would not be obliged to respect such agreements. Provisions of a collective
agreement are said to be norms of private law. This means that they can be
contracted out of by way of private international law.35
31 This section is based on Kerstin Ahlberg, ‘Sweden’s Transport Sector Considers
Universally Applicable Collective Agreements’ <http://www.nordiclabourjour-
nal.org/nyheter/news-2013/article.2013-12-10.189254387> accessed 28 October
2014.
32 Wet van 25 mei 1937, tot het algemeen verbindend en het onverbindend verklaren
van bepalingen van collectieve arbeidsovereenkomsten, Stb. 1937, 801, last
amended by Stb. 2013, 405.
33 Para 1 Toetsingskader Algemeen Verbindend Verklaring CAO-bepalingen (AVV),
Stcrt. 1998, 204, last amended by Beleidsregel van de Minister van Sociale Zaken en
Werkgelegenheid van 28 november 2013, 2013-0000158609, tot wijziging van de
Beleidsregel Toetsingskader Algemeen Verbindend Verklaring CAO-bepalingen
(AVV), Stcrt. 2013, 34009.
34 This provision literally enumerates the central conditions mentioned in the PWD.
35 Koberski, Sahl & Hold (1997) § 1 AEntG, para 87; Koberski (2011) § 3 AEntG, paras
65-6, with reference to BAG 4 May 1977 - 4 AZR 10/76, NJW 1977, 2039.
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In the course of the 2004/07 EU enlargements, the Dutch Govern-
ment decided, in line with Art 3(10) second indent PWD, to apply
generally binding provisions of a collective agreement not only to the
construction sector, but to all sectors.36 The main reason for extending the
scope was potential labour displacement, as well as illegal constructions in
the labour market.37 Matters are different in Germany, where the AEntG,
so far at least, only applies to certain sectors.
In Germany there are two ways by which collective agreements can
be declared generally applicable: by an ‘order imposing extension’ (Allge-
meinverbindlicherklärung) (§ 5 TVG), and by a government decree (Rechts-
verordnung) (§ 7 AEntG).38 In the first place, for a collective agreement to
become generally binding throughout the whole territory, parties to a
collective agreement may individually or jointly lodge a request to that
effect with the BMAS (§ 5 TVG). The possibility laid down in § 7 AEntG
was introduced to prevent the social partners from hindering that a
collective agreement can become generally binding, or from worsening
the employment conditions.39 A government decree under § 7 AEntG can
concern only the minimum wage, the duration of annual leave, the
holiday pay or additional holiday allowance, as well as the collection of
contributions to be made in relation to annual leave entitlements to the
social partners’ joint institutions as established.40 For other employment
conditions, the generally binding collective agreement applies.41
It is possible in the Netherlands to gain exemption from the scope of
the generally binding collective agreement. An undertaking may lodge a
request to the Minister of SZW, substantiated by well-founded, weighty
arguments. An important precondition is that the party lodging the
request must be bound by a legally binding collective agreement.42 The
36 Wet van 1 december 2005 tot wijziging van de Wet op het algemeen verbindend en
onverbindend verklaren van bepalingen van collectieve arbeidsovereenkomsten in
verband met de uitbreiding van de werkingssfeer van de wet arbeidsvoorwaarden
grensoverschrijdende arbeid, Stb. 2005, 626.
37 Kamerstukken II 2004/05, 29 983, nr. 3, 2-3.
38 Weiss & Schmidt (2008) paras 456ff. The difference between the two ways is that as
regards § 7 AEntG, the government decree may be enacted without the consent of
the Bundesrat.
39 Koberski (2011), § 7 AEntG, para 13.
40 § 5(1) to (3) in conjunction with § 7(1) sentence 3 AEntG. See for a more detailed
description of the procedure under § 7 AEntG, inter alia: Sittard (2009) 347-8;
Joussen (2009) 359-63; Müller-Glöge, Preis & Schmidt (Eds.) (2014) (Schlachter) § 7
AEntG.
41 Müller-Glöge, Preis & Schmidt (Eds.) (2014) (Schlachter) § 7 AEntG, para 1.
42 Art 2:1 Besluit aanmelding van collectieve arbeidsovereenkomsten en het aanvra-
gen van algemeen verbindend verklaring.
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Minister may grant undertakings dispensation from the generally binding
collective agreement (Art 2(1) second sentence Wet AVV).43 In Germany,
in contrast, an employer may conclude a company collective agreement to
deviate from a generally binding collective agreement. Based on the
principle lex specialis derogat legi generali, a company collective agreement
prevails over a generally binding collective agreement under § 5 TVG.
Consequently, the company collective agreement replaces the more gen-
eral collective agreement.44 This does not, however, apply to collective
agreements within the meaning of the AEntG (§ 3 AEntG).45
B. Conditions for general binding collective agreements
To become generally binding, (provisions of) collective agreements must
meet several requirements. In the first place, one or more parties must
lodge a request for a general binding status.46 Secondly, the collective
agreement must be registered.47 Thirdly, the collective agreement must
apply to a majority of employees employed by an employer who signed
the agreement.48 For Germany, in relation to collective agreements
within the meaning of § 5 TVG, this means that the employer may
not employ less than 50 per cent of the employees covered.49 The law in
the Netherlands specifies that a collective agreement can only be
declared generally binding if the agreement applies to a ‘substantial’
43 In practice, it is the social partners whose collective agreement has been declared
generally binding and for which agreement dispensation is requested who assess a
request for dispensation. Only in the second place will the Minister examine the
request. Stege (2011) 18.
44 According to the ECJ in the Portugaia case, it is not permitted to provide domestic
employers with the possibility to derogate from a generally binding collective
agreement by concluding a company collective agreement, while ruling out that
possibility for foreign employers. This would be contrary to Art 56 TFEU, which
not only prohibits discrimination but also measures that restrict access to another
Member State’s (labour) market.
45 This is a provision within the meaning of Art 9 Rome I Reg. Thüsing (Ed.) (2010)
(Thüsing) § 2 AEntG, para 2, with reference to Junker (2005) 485-6.
46 The Netherlands: Art 4(1) Wet AVV; Germany: § 5(1) TVG and § 7 AEntG.
47 The Netherlands: Art 4 Wet op de loonvorming (Wage Formation Act) (Wet van
12 februari 1970, houdende regelen met betrekking tot de loonvorming, Stb. 1968,
690 as last amended by Stb. 1999, 30); Germany: §§ 6 and 7 TVG.
48 The Netherlands: Art 2(1) Wet AVV; Germany: § 5(1) No. 1 TVG.
49 This requirement applies to collective agreements that will beclared binding via a
government decree under § 7 AEntG. With the Tarifautonomiestärkungsgesetz, the
50 per cent quorum, required to declare a collective agreement generally binding
wihtin the meaning of the TVG, will be replaced by a concretised pubic interest
requirement. BT-Drs. 18/1558, 31.
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majority of the employees employed in a sector.50 Moreover, requests
are published in the Government Gazette (Staatscourant), which allows
parties to bring arguments against a collective agreement to become
generally binding (Art 4(3) Wet AVV).
A different approach applies in Germany, where a collective agree-
ment can only be declared generally binding in consultation with the
representatives of the umbrella employers’ and employees’ organisations
(§ 5(1) TVG). Moreover, German law requires a declaration that the
agreement to be generally binding must be in the general interest (§ 5(1)
TVG and § 7(1) AEntG). Such a general interest is deemed, for instance, to
exist to ensure minimum wages within the meaning of the AEntG or to
preserve peaceful employment relations.51 Similarly, in the Netherlands,
the Minister SZW can refuse to declare a collective agreement generally
binding if the agreement is in conflict with the general interest.52
4.2.4 Laval’s impact on the Swedish industrial relations model53
A. General remarks
As already noted, foreign employers providing temporary services in
Sweden are not automatically obliged to comply with the wage and
holiday provisions in collective agreements. Of course, social partners
can negotiate with outside employers on the application of a (part of the)
collective agreement. However, if the employer rejects doing so, the trade
unions have no other means than organising collective action against the
employer, with the possibility of sympathy actions.54
50 The Toetsingskader Algemeen Verbindend Verklaring CAO-bepalingen in para 4.1
describes how a substantial majority can be determined. Here, all persons
employed by employers who are bound by a collective agreement and who fall
according to their function or type of work within the personal scope of collective
agreement are taken into account. A majority of 60 per cent can be qualified as an
‘important’ majority; a majority between 55 and 60 per can be qualified as an
important majority. The collective agreement will not, or only in exceptional
circumstances, be declared generally binding if the majority consists only of
55 per cent.
51 Joussen (2009) 360.
52 Para 6 Toetsingskader Algemeen Verbindend Verklaring CAO-bepalingen.
53 See for a brief overview of the implications of Laval on the Swedish model:
Rönnmar (2010a).
54 Malmberg (2002) 208. Collective action is permitted insofar as it is not contrary to
legal enactments or agreements (Art 2:17 Constitution). Adlercreutz & Nyström
(2009) paras 72 and 105.
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One characteristic of the Swedish model is that trade union density
is relatively high, with approximately 70 per cent of the employees in the
private sector represented by a trade union,55 and approximately 83 per
cent of the employees in total covered by collective agreements.56 So, in
practice, collective agreements have far-reaching, legally binding effects.57
Moreover, in case of the transnational posting of workers, Ahlberg points
out that, in the past, it was quite common for foreign service providers to
join an employer’s organisation (temporarily) or to join an existing
collective agreement by concluding so-called accession agreements, ap-
plicable to the place where the posted workers perform their work.58
Before the Laval ruling in December 2007, on 30 August 2005 the
Confederation of Swedish Enterprise and LO published a Recommenda-
tion on the adjustment of sector agreements for companies that become
temporary members of the employer associations within the Confedera-
tion of Swedish Enterprise.59 This Recommendation permitted specific
bargaining to modify the provisions of the collective agreement in the
sense that it fits the situation of a foreign service provider and/or
worker.60 As regards pay, it has been emphasised that the confederations
shall agree on the provisions that should be applied regarding pay.
Thereby, they agree to take into account the existing pay structure in
the foreign company, allowing for the better comparability of wage
systems. Whether and, if so, how far this Recommendation has been
applied in practice is unknown.
Nevertheless, possibly due to the Laval ruling, fewer collective
agreements are concluded between Swedish trade unions and foreign
service providers. It appears from the 2013 ILO Committee Report, based
on the statistics of the Swedish National Mediation Office, that the number
of collective agreements in the construction sector signed with foreign
55 Blomqvist (2012) 28-9. See also Rönnmar (2008) 17, who refers to a number of 70 to
75 per cent of workers being trade union members. She states that union density
has decreased in recent years. In 1995, approximately 85 per cent of workers were
members of a trade union. Fahlbeck (2002) 109.
56 Blomqvist (2012) 29.
57 Rönnmar (2008) 16-7.
58 Ahlberg (2013) 309.
59 Recommendation of the Confederation of Swedish Enterprise and the Swedish
Trade Union Confederation (LO) concerning the adjustment of sector agreements
for companies that become temporary members of the employer associations
within the Confederation of Swedish Enterprise (2005).
60 Particularly in relation to insurance contributions, it was recommended that
foreign service providers were not required to pay insurance premiums if they
were already paid in their home state or in case they were of no practical benefit to
posted workers. Van Hoek & Houwerzijl (2011b) 148.
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service providers decreased from 107 collective agreements in 2007, to 40
in 2008, 29 in 2009, and 27 in 2010. No corresponding decrease could be
observed in relation to collective agreements concluded with Swedish
companies.61
B. Laval judgement 2007
The facts of the Laval case are well known. The following paragraphs
therefore address the problems identified with the Swedish system. The
ECJ’s judgement on the scope and interpretation of the PWD and
(exercising) the right to collective action, constituted a severe blow to
the Swedish model of industrial relations. Four problems were discovered:
(1) the so-called Lex Britannia is discriminatory under EU law; (2) the scope
of the core employment conditions mentioned in the PWD; (3) only the
minimum level of employment conditions can be imposed on service
providers; and (4) minimum rates of pay must be defined as prescribed in
the PWD, allowing service providers to assess beforehand what their
workers are to receive for the duration of the posting.62
Discriminatory Lex Britannia63
The Britannia case,64 which led to the Lex Britannia,65 concerned a German
shipping company, owner of the ship Britannia which flew the Cypriot
flag. The Philippine crew was covered by a collective agreement con-
cluded between a Philippine trade union and a Philippine temporary work
agency. When, in July 1988, the Britannia called at the port of Gothenburg,
the Seamen’s Union and the Transport Workers’ Union initiated a boycott.
The aim was to force the captain to sign an ITF66 Special Agreement for
the crew. According to the Labour Court, the industrial actions taken by
the two unions were not in accordance with Section 42 (read in conjunc-
tion with Section 41) Co-determination Act (1976:580). An industrial action
aimed at setting aside an existing collective agreement concluded with
another trade union by which the employer was bound was considered
61 International Labour Conference, Report of the Committee of Experts on the
Application of Conventions and Recommendations (articles 19, 22 and 35 of the
Constitution) (Report III (Part 1A)) (2013) 179.
62 Ahlberg (2013) 313-4.
63 Unless otherwise stated this paragraph is based on: Ahlberg (2010) 1-3.
64 Labour Court ruling AD 1989:120.
65 Case C-341/05 Laval ECLI:EU:C:2007:809, paras 112-21.
66 ITF is the International Transport Workers’ Federation.
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unlawful. Consequently, LO and TCO requested an amendment to the Co-
determination Act (1976:580), as they feared that the trade union’s
possibilities to act in an international context, in particular with regard
to combating social dumping by foreign service providers, would be
restricted.67
Section 42 Co-determination Act (1976:580) was amended,68 deter-
mining that industrial action is lawful if the action is taken by reason of
employment conditions that fall directly within the scope of the Co-
determination Act (1976:580). Employment conditions governed by for-
eign law were not likely to be protected by that act against industrial
action.69 The Government wrongly argued that there would be no
discrimination between foreign and domestic employers. This was an
important statement in relation to compatibility with the EEC Treaty and
the EEC’s market integration efforts.70
The Laval case made it unmistakably clear that applying the Co-
determination Act (1976:580), even though it was aimed at combating
social dumping, is discriminatory.71 The foreign service provider who was
bound to comply with a home state collective agreement was placed on a
par with employers established in Sweden who were not bound by a
collective agreement at all. Justification was not possible, as this provision
was not based on grounds of public policy, public security or public
health.72
Scope of the key provisions and level of protection
It has become clear that the key provisions laid down in the PWD and the
level at which they may be enforced is as provided by the Directive.73
Article 3(1)(a) to (g) PWD contains an exhaustive list, according to which
providing other terms and conditions to service providers is not in
67 This must be seen in the context that Sweden was to become a member of the EEC.
68 In the first place, it was proposed to include a clause to the effect that industrial
action which was aimed at setting aside a collective agreement by which the
employer is already bound would not be unlawful if a ‘foreign’ collective agree-
ment was concerned. The ‘foreign’ element could not pass with a majority. Prop.
1990/91:162, Om vissa fredspliktregler, 27 March 1991, 20, annex 1.
69 Prop. 1990/91:162, 5.
70 Prop. 1990/91:162, 11ff.
71 Case C-341/05 Laval ECLI:EU:C:2007:809, para 113, second sentence.
72 Van Peijpe argues that foreign employers are placed in a disadvantageous position
if they are bound by a foreign collective agreement as they may not enjoy the same
protection as Swedish employers bound by Swedish collective agreements do. See
Van Peijpe (1998) 73.
73 Case C-341/05 Laval ECLI:EU:C:2007:809, paras 73-85.
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accordance with the PWD. It follows that the PWD expressly lays down
the degree of protection applicable to posted workers. An exception is
made if the law or collective agreement applicable in the home state
provides more favourable terms and conditions of employment (Art 3(7)
PWD).74
Implementation of wages through collective agreements
According to the PWD, Member States that do not have a system for
declaring such an agreement generally binding, can apply collective
agreements that are generally applicable to all similar undertakings in
the geographical area and in the profession or industry concerned, or
collective agreements that have been concluded by the most representative
employers and labour organisations at national level, and which are
applied throughout the national territory (Art 3(1) in conjunction with 3
(8) PWD). In Sweden, only wages are not laid down in accordance with
this possibility, as they are set at local company level.75 Moreover, Sweden
failed to rely explicitly on Art 3(8) PWD. This provision requires equality
of treatment, ie that national undertakings are subject to the same
obligations as posting undertakings, and each is required to fulfil such
obligations with the same effects.76 In fact, under the Swedish system,
there was equal treatment: domestic employers, just as foreign employers,
were subject to the procedures for concluding a collective agreement,
namely wage bargaining at undertaking level.77
An option, to which the ECJ refers, would have been to invoke the
public policy provision laid down in Art 3(10) PWD. However, the ECJ
ruled that this option could not be relied upon by trade unions.78
Although the PWD explicitly determines that the central employ-
ment conditions can be laid down in a collective agreement, it limits this
possibility to those agreements that have an erga omnes character. As such,
the PWD fails to recognise the existing diversity of collective agreements
that apply across the EU Member States, in particular those that apply in
the Scandinavian countries.79 This seems, to a certain extent, to contrast
74 Case C-341/05 Laval ECLI:EU:C:2007:809, paras 80-1.
75 It can be said that, regarding the regulation of wage levels, a gradual shift from
central inter-sectoral towards national sectoral wage setting occurred. Malmberg
(2002) 193-6.
76 Case C-341/05 Laval ECLI:EU:C:2007:809, para 66.
77 Malmberg & Sigeman (2008) 1142.
78 Case C-341/05 Laval ECLI:EU:C:2007:809, para 84.
79 Edström (2008b) 182.
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with the Posted Workers Enforcement Directive’s preamble, which lays
claim to respect the diversity of national industrial relations systems and
the autonomy of social partners (recital 14). Diversity and autonomy are,
ostensibly, merely recognised insofar as the boundaries set by the freedom
to provide services, as laid down in the PWD, are respected by the
Member States. As already mentioned, the PWD rather aims at harmoni-
sation, even though this is not the stated the aim of the Directive.80
C. Laval Case Inquiry (2008): assessing the consequences
Following the ECJ’s Laval judgement, the Swedish Government launched a
public inquiry on 10 April 2008 with the aim of resolving the difficulties
the ruling had caused for the Swedish model.81 The inquiry’s results were
published on 12 December 2008.82 Four tasks were assigned to the
inquiry: (1) adopting a position on whether the Lex Britannia should be
amended, abolished or replaced; (2) considering whether the Posting of
Workers Act (1999:678) should be amended; (3) examining whether to use
the public policy option (Art 3(10) PWD) to a greater extent than at
present; and (4) discussing and proposing improvements regarding the
functioning of the liaison office, that is, the Work Environment Authority
(‘WEA’) (Arbetsmiljöverket).
The report considered four options: (1) the introduction of statutory
rules for minimum rates of pay;83 (2) a system for declaring collective
agreement generally applicable84 ; (3) a model within the framework
provided by Art 3(8) second paragraph PWD; or (4) extending terms
and conditions of employment in relation to posted workers, which is not
provided for in the PWD.85 From the outset, the first and second options
80 Liukkunen (2012) 1047.
81 Dir. 2008:38, Konsekvenser och åtgärder med anledning av Laval-domen, 10 April
2008.
82 SOU 2008:123, Förslag till åtgärder med anledning av Lavaldomen, 12 December
2008. A legal review had also been launched by the trade unions in 2008, under-
taken by professors Niklas Bruun and Jonas Malmberg. Woolfson, Thörnqvist &
Sommers (2010) 343. See for the report: Bruun & Malmberg (2008).
83 Woolfson, Thörnqvist & Sommers (2010) 343. Bruun & Malmberg (2008) proposed
the introduction of a sectoral minimum wage.
84 In this context it is necessary to note that if a system to declare a collective
agreement were to be introduced, this would run counter to the Swedish model in
the sense that a court or any other body would then be competent to interpret and
rule on the applicability of a generally binding collective agreement. Collective
action as well as sympathy actions would probably be useless, if not unlawful, as
there would be an authority dealing with the applicability of such collective
agreements. Malmberg (2002) 209.
85 SOU 2008:123, 56-7.
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should be avoided, it was found, as they would “entail a major intrusion
into the Swedish labour market model”.86
Therefore, the inquiry expounded in greater depth on the third
option, according to which collective agreements can be “generally applic-
able” if they apply to all similar undertakings in the geographical area and
the profession or industry concerned (first indent), or if they have been
concluded by the most representative employers’ and employees’ organisa-
tions at national level and applied throughout the national territory (second
indent) (Art 3(8) PWD). The Swedish system fits within the first indent. To
meet the Directive’s threshold, an act must determine that a collective
agreement must meet the criteria of Art 3(8) second paragraph, first indent,
PWD. The advantage is that the social partners can examine whether a
service provider applies Section 5 Posting of Workers Act (1999:678). As
explicit reference is made to Art 3(8) PWD, which seems to emphasise what
already was practice in Sweden, meant direct government intervention in
the social partners’ involvement. No such intervention is known to date.87
The fourth option could not be used, according to the Inquiry. In
Laval the ECJ emphasised that Sweden could also apply a system that is
not explicitly referred to in Art 3(8) PWD, provided it is in compliance
with the freedom to provide services. However, the ECJ stated that Art 3
(1) and (8) PWD could not be used to impose the Swedish system of wage
setting by social partners.88 Thus, the preferred method seems to be the
one mentioned previously.
As a result, the so-called Lex Laval has been adopted, which
introduced one major change, namely a conditional right to collective
action.
D. Limited right to take collective action under the 2010 Lex Laval89
Main changes
The right to take collective action is particularly important for Swedish
trade unions, as it enables them to protect employees in the face of mainly
86 Setting the level of the minimum pay should not become a ‘political decision’. SOU
2008:123, 57.
87 Van Hoek & Houwerzijl (2011b) 25.
88 Case C-341/05 Laval ECLI:EU:C:2007:809, paras 68 and 70.
89 Lag om ändring i lagen om utstationering av arbetstagare (Lex Laval), entered into force
on 15 April 2010, amending the Posting of Workers Act (1999:678) and the
Employment (Co-determination at the Workplace) Act (1979:580).
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absent public law enforcement, except for occupational health and safety
actions. What is novel are the restrictions the new provision imposes on
exercising the right to collective action.90 This restriction had been
proposed by the 2008 Inquiry, which found that it was not a problem
associated with the overall Swedish system of labour market regulation,
but rather the incompatibility of the right to take collective action and the
freedom to provide services.91 It seems that the government does not
understand the real problem. From an EU perspective, as Laval has made
clear, it is important that a service provider is able to know what wages he
has to pay. The Swedish system, although it works perfectly with regard
to an internal situation, does not fulfil the criteria set by the PWD. As wage
bargaining only takes place after the collective agreement or accession
agreement has been signed, wages cannot be established before the
posting takes place. Ergo, the problem, from the perspective of the EU,
lies within the Swedish system of labour market regulation.
Nevertheless, under Section 5a Posting of Workers Act (1999:678),
social partners must, prior to taking collective action, assess whether it
corresponds to conditions contained in a national sectoral collective
agreement that is applied throughout Sweden (Art 3(8) second sub-
paragraph, first indent PWD92). The Lex Laval refers solely to minimum
rates of pay or other minimum conditions in matters referred to in the
central nucleus which are more favourable to posted workers. Moreover,
collective action is not permitted if the foreign employer is able to show
that his workers are afforded at least conditions that are in all essentials as
favourable as the conditions in the central collective agreement.93
Although this legislative change brings Swedish law more in line with
the ECJ’s ruling in Laval, critics are of the opinion that the Swedish
government went too far in restricting the right to industrial action.94
90 Ahlberg (2013); Ahlberg (2010) 314. See on the difficulties to implement the
outcome Brunk, ‘Swedish Laval Inquiry Proposals May Prove Difficult to Imple-
ment’ <http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/eiro/2009/01/articles/se0901029i.
htm> accessed 28 October 2014.
91 Woolfson, Thörnqvist & Sommers (2010) 343.
92 SOU 2008:123, Förslag till åtgärder med anledning av Lavaldomen, 12 December 2008,
152ff.; Prop. 2009/10:48, Åtgärder med anledning av Lavaldomen, 10 November 2009,
28ff.
93 Ahlberg (2013) 314. This necessitates a comparison of the employment conditions
applicable in the service provider’s home state and in Sweden. These conditions
should preferably be compared separately for each matter within the central
nucleus. Employment conditions should not be interchangeable, in that an em-
ployer could prove that he applies better conditions in one area, but worse ones in
another area.
94 Rönnmar (2010a) 286.
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Up to that point, trade unions were in a position to try to induce
foreign employers to sign a collective agreement or an accession agree-
ment, but the employer was free not to sign.95 With the new provision,
unless service providers sign a collective agreement or an accession
agreement, trade unions will not be able to control whether the employer
complies with its obligations under the agreement.96 As pointed out by
LO, in many cases foreign employers agree a ‘real’ employment contract
with their workers and prepare a different contract to show to the Swedish
social partners.97 A trade union will hardly be able to prove that the
contract was set up just to circumvent the level of labour law protection
afforded by Swedish collective agreements.98 Although the Government
does not deny that this may be a problem for the unions, it argues that it
would be inconsistent with EU law to allow industrial relations merely to
satisfy the interest of monitoring and enforcement.99 As these develop-
ments go right to the heart of industrial relations in Sweden, the LO and
TCO submitted complaints to the ILO Committee of Experts and the
European Committee of Social Rights.
Complaint lodged to ILO Committee of Experts
LO and TCO first submitted a complaint to the ILO Committee of Experts,
which delivered its General Report on the Application of Conventions and
Recommendations in February 2013.100 The Committee’s review of the
new act took place in relation to ILO Conventions No. 87 on the freedom
of association and protection of the right to organise, and No. 98 on the
right to organise and collective bargaining.
LO and TCO complained that this new provision only permits
industrial action against a foreign employer where it is aimed at bringing
about a collective agreement restricted to the minimum terms as laid
down in the PWD. Actually, it is the ECJ that, based on the PWD, ruled
that the PWD determines the scope of the level of protection granted to
95 Based on the freedom to conduct a business, the employer may decide whether or
not to sign a collective agreement. This right is, inter alia, recognised in Art 16
EUCFR.
96 Ahlberg (2013) 315.
97 Woolfson, Thörnqvist & Sommers (2010) 344.
98 Ahlberg (2010) 18-9.
99 Ahlberg (2010) 19, with reference to Prop. 2009/10:48, Åtgärder med anledning av
Lavaldomen, 10 November 2009, 35ff.
100 International Labour Conference, Report of the Committee of Experts on the
Application of Conventions and Recommendations (articles 19, 22 and 35 of the
Constitution) (Report III (Part 1A)) (2013).
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posted workers. Any level exceeding that of the PWD, as well as any
conditions exceeding those mentioned in the PWD, are not permitted.
Thus, in line with the ECJ’s case law, the Swedish government limited the
right to take collective action up to the level permitted under the PWD.
The Committee is concerned as to the restricted right to take
collective action and the limited right of posted workers to be protected
by their union. It states that the amendments
“[…] restrict recourse to industrial action to conditions corresponding to the
PWD minimum conditions and further bar unions from taking industrial action
even if they have members working in the enterprise concerned and regardless of
whether a collective agreement covers the workers concerned, provided that the
employer can show that the employees’ terms and conditions are as favourable as
the minimum conditions in the central collective agreement”.101
Even if posted workers are members of a trade union, in line with the
ECJ’s case law, they may only benefit from the level of protection
provided by the PWD. Membership nevertheless allows the unions to
verify whether the posted worker receives the minimum conditions as
determined by the PWD. If they establish that the service provider does
not comply with these conditions, the new Section 5a Posting of Workers
Act (1999:678) permits them to take collective action. Even if the service
provider has “shown” that he respects the minimum employment condi-
tions, if the posted workers can provide documents proving the contrary,
there should be no problem in taking collective action against that service
provider.102
A second complaint was related to the removal of the obligation to
register a representative for a business domiciled in Sweden. However, as
we shall see later, this problem has been solved by introducing a
mandatory notification for service providers as well as the obligation to
appoint a representative.
Complaint lodged to European Committee of Social Rights
A second complaint has been lodged by LO and TCO to the European
Committee of Social Rights, which delivered its opinion (which is not
101 Experts (2013) 179ff.
102 With regard to posted temporary agency workers, Nyström argues that collective
action should be possible if the level provided by the applicable collective
agreement has not been complied with. Collective action is not permittied only
if all conditions set by Section 5a are met. Nyström (2013) 174.
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legally binding) on 20 November 2013.103 Two complaints were made: the
new law would violate Art 6(4) European Social Charter (‘ESC’) concerning
the duty of the state to promote collective agreements and recognise
collective action, and the new law would violate Art 19(4) ESC on the
state’s obligation to ensure that foreign workers are not treated less
favourably than nationals as regards remuneration, employment conditions
and the enjoyment of the benefits of collective bargaining. As a result of the
new legislation, even if posted workers are members of a trade union, the
unions are prevented from representing these members in the same way as
they would represent domestic employees. Collective agreements can only
be agreed concerning a limited range of minimum conditions.
According to the Committee, the new Sections 5a and 5b Posting of
Workers Act (1999:678) violate Arts 6(4) and 19(4) ESC. With the new
legislation, the service provider is not (is no longer) required to appoint
someone on Swedish territory to negotiate collective agreements. This
contravenes Art 6(2) ESC, determining that states should promote the
conclusion of collective agreements. Moreover, preventing a priori the right
to take collective action, in that collective action is merely permitted to
obtain minimum standards, would infringe Art 6(4) ESC. The consequence
that the collective action would be unlawful if not taken in accordance
with the conditions set out in Sections 5a and 5b would also be too
restrictive. Moreover, in relation to Art 19(4) ESC, the Committee con-
cludes that Sections 5a and 5b Posting of Workers Act (1999:678) do not
secure that posted workers are guaranteed the same treatment as other
workers with permanent employment contracts, and is thus not in con-
formity with the ESC. Furthermore, the Committee complains that the
fundamental Treaty freedoms are given priority over core labour rights,
including the right to make use of collective action. This point seems to be
addressed to the EU legislator or the ECJ, as Sweden cannot unilaterally
decide not to respect the Treaty freedoms.
The Swedish provision does not by definition prohibit the exercise
of collective action. Rather, it makes the exercise of that right subject to
certain legally prescribed conditions. If these conditions are not met, the
trade unions are of course free to initiate collective action. It is clear that
the ECJ and the two Committees have a different approach to restricting or
permitting the right to take collective action. While the ECJ is bound by the
Treaty provisions and secondary law derived therefrom, the Committees
merely have to interpret and rule on the international agreements that lie
103 Swedish Trade Union Confederation (LO) and Swedish Confederation of Profes-
sional Employees (TCO) v Sweden, Complaint No. 85/2012.
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within their competence. They are not bound by any other jurisdiction,
which would oblige them to balance different legal systems. Furthermore,
Member States may restrict the exercise of the right to take collective
action by law, if necessary in a democratic society and to protect the rights
and freedoms of others.
E. Lex Laval Inquiry 2012
On 27 September 2012, the Government announced that the amendments
to the Posting of Workers Act (1999:678) were to be evaluated.104 Aspects
to be evaluated include the application of Lex Laval and how trade unions
are working to ensure posted workers basic labour and employment
conditions. A question to be answered is whether the so-called evidence
rule of Sections 5a and 5b in Lex Laval can ensure the application of the
basic working and employment conditions. In addition, the inquiry was to
evaluate the WEA’s role in providing information about applicable labour
law and collective agreements, and the obligation of the social partners to
submit their collective agreements to the WEA. The inquiry was expected
to deliver its results on 31 December 2014, this deadline being extended to
28 February 2015.105
4.3 Construction sector
4.3.1 Introduction
This section deals with the applicable collective agreements on minimum
wages, holiday pay and holiday allowances in the construction sector.
In the Dutch construction sector, the most important generally
applicable collective agreements are the generally binding Collectieve
Arbeidsovereenkomst Bouwnijverheid (‘CAO Bouwnijverheid’) (Construction
Sector Collective Agreement)106 and the Collectieve arbeidsovereenkomst
Bedrijfstakeigen Regelingen voor de Bouwnijverheid (‘CAO BTER’) (Collective
Agreement Specific Regulations Construction Sector).
Germany has three collective agreements: the Bundesrahmentarifver-
trag für das Baugewerbe (‘BRTV’) (Collective Agreement for the Construc-
104 Dir. 2012:92, Utstationering på svensk arbetsmarknad, 27 September 2012.
105 Dir. 2012:92, 1.
106 Collectieve arbeidsovereenkomst voor de Bouwnijverheid 1 januari 2014 tot en met
31 december 2014. Other collective agreements may apply to specific types of
construction work.
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tion Industry),107 containing rights and obligations of a more general
nature, such as working hours, holiday, and dismissal provisions108 ; the
generally binding Tarifvertrag Mindestlohn (‘TV Mindestlohn’) (Minimum
Wage Collective Agreement for the Construction Industry), applicable to
all employers and employees falling within its scope109 ; and the Tarifver-
trag über das Sozialkassenverfahren im Baugewerbe (‘VTV’) (Collective Agree-
ment on the Social Fund Procedure in the Construction Sector), regulating
the holiday pay fund procedure in the construction sector.110
The Swedish construction sector is regulated by two collective
agreements: the National Construction Sector Collective Agreement (By-
ggavtalet riksavtal) and the collective agreement of the 2013 bargaining
round (Avtalsrörelsen 2013) (‘Construction Sector Collective Agreement
2013’). While the National Construction Sector Collective Agreement
contains general provisions that apply to the construction sector, the
Construction Sector Collective Agreement 2013 contains more specific
provisions, concerning the period during which it applies, the wage levels,
and insurances. Moreover, wages are set for individual employees at local
undertaking level.
4.3.2 Personal scope
The collective agreements apply to a wide range of activities and cate-
gories of employees. Detailed rules thereon can be found in the Dutch and
German collective agreements, while no scope is provided in the Swedish
collective agreements. In Sweden, it seems to be left to the social partners
to determine what is covered by collective agreements on a case-by-case
basis. In principle, those who have signed the agreement, and the
107 Bundesrahmentarifvertrag für das Baugewerbe (BRTV) vom 4. Juli 2002 in der
Fassung vom 17. Dezember 2003, 14. Dezember 2004, 29. Juli 2005, 19. Mai 2006,
20. August 2007, 31. Mai 2012 und 17. Dezember 2012. It is a so-called Verbands-
tarifvertrag.
108 Bekanntmachung über die Allgemeinverbindlicherklärung von Tarifvertragswer-
ken für das Baugewerbe, 15.05.2008. It has been declared generally binding for the
Federal Republic of Germany under § 5 TVG.
109 Rechtsnormen des Tarifvertrags zur Regelung der Mindestlöhne im Baugewerbe
im Gebiet der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (TV Mindestlohn) (Anlage 1 der
Neunten Verordnung über zwingende Arbeitsbedingungen im Baugewerbe)
vom 16. Oktober 2013 (BAnz AT 18.10.2013 V1), applicable until 31 December
2017. It is also called Entgelttarifvertrag. This is a government decree within the
meaning of § 7 AEntG.
110 Tarifvertrag über das Sozialkassenverfahren im Baugewerbe (VTV) vom 3. Mai
2013 in der Fassung vom 3. Dezember 2013, which has been declared generally
binding (BAnz AT 04.11.2013 B2).
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members of the signatory parties, are bound (Sections 23 and 26 Co-
determination Act (1976:580)). The Dutch and German collective agree-
ments contain criteria for determining whether an employer or employee,
or an activity falls within their scope. The Dutch CAO Bouwnijverheid
defines employers as natural or legal persons who employ one or more
workers, having them perform work in the Netherlands within the
agreement’s scope.111 This collective agreement covers a broad category
of employees, namely those who: (1) have an employment contract within
the meaning of Art 7:610 BW; (2) have entered into a building contract,
unless the person himself is to be considered an enterprise; and (3) assist
the building contractor as mentioned under (3).112 The agreement also
applies to temporary work agencies that assign workers to employers
within the meaning of the CAO Bouwnijverheid for at least 50 per cent of
their wage bill, unless the agencies are members of one of the employers’
organisations.113 A user undertaking covered by the CAO Bouwnijverheid
is obliged to assess whether the temporary-work agency that assigns
workers for 50 per cent or less of their wage bill is a member of the
ABU CAO (generally binding collective agreement of the Algemene Bond
Uitzendondernemingen) or the NBBU CAO (collective agreement of the
Nederlandse Bond van Bemiddelings- en Uitzendondernemingen). The user
undertaking must ensure that the agency complies with the provisions
laid down in the collective agreement.
In Germany, all undertakings active in the construction industry are
covered by the two collective agreements.114 Based on case law, it is
decisive whether employees of an establishment during their working
hours provide mainly construction work. This is the case if a part of the
occupational total working time in a calendar year occupies more than
111 Art 2 CAO Bouwnijverheid.
112 Art 1(6) CAO Bouwnijverheid. The collective agreement also covers workers
performing administrative tasks or project management, which are not dealt
with further here. It should be noted that provisions applying to either group of
workers can easily be identified, as the collective agreement uses two correspond-
ing symbols: the helmet for construction workers and a monitor for the other
group.
113 It applies, moreover, to agencies that are part of a concern that is directly bound by
the collective agreement.
114 This is the reason why the collective agreement applies to the major construction
business as well as the construction related business. Establishments in the
construction sector also fall within its occupational scope. Here, the term establish-
ment as used in labour law is used, based on which an establishment is defined as
an organisational unit within which an entrepreneur, individually or jointly with
his employees, performs work with the aid of material and immaterial means. Preis
& Temming (2006) 30.
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50 per cent.115 Principally, this excludes undertakings having their seat
abroad, unless they (also) have an undertaking in Germany.116 With
regard to employers established abroad, the BRTV merely applies insofar
as it concerns the terms and conditions of employment that are manda-
torily applicable pursuant to the AEntG. Otherwise, the BRTV applies only
if the employer is either party to the collective agreement or in case he
voluntarily applies the provisions of the agreement.
4.3.3 Minimum wages
All collective agreements contain wage structures that include and exclude
elements in the minimum wage concept. Wages are differentiated based
on age, functions, and their geographic application.
According to the Dutch CAO Bouwnijverheid, besides the age of the
construction worker, the worker’s experience, education, safety and
health, aggravating physical circumstances, leadership qualities and the
extent to which autonomous decisions have been taken are also taken into
account.117 All employees covered, including posted workers and tem-
porary agency workers, are entitled to a fixed agreed wage, which
includes a guaranteed wage (ie the minimum weekly or hourly rate)118
and – if agreed with the worker – a performance reward. Four wage
categories are distinguished: a guaranteed wage for workers older than
22 years, paid regardless of any experience; a guaranteed wage for
workers having a leading function (eg foremen); a guaranteed wage for
workers between 16 and 22 years119 ; and non-experienced workers who
receive a wage based on the basic starting wage.
A detailed overview of the provisions applicable to posted workers
can be found in Annex 3 CAO Bouwnijverheid. The minimum wage
concept entitles all employees to an overtime allowance; bonuses for
unsocial hours for infrastructural work, tidal works, and shift work;
115 Preis & Temming (2006). In addition, also covered are employees who perform
services for which they are mandatorily insured. This refers to employment for
which the worker is insured within the meaning of the Sozialgesetzbuch VI on the
statutory pension scheme. § 1 SGB VI determines that persons who are employed
for pay are subject to compulsory insurance.
116 BAG 6.11.2002 - 5 AZR 617/01, para 23. See also BAG 19.05.2004 - 5 AZR 449/03,
NZA 2004, 1170; BAG 20.7.2004 - 9 AZR 343/03, NZA 2005, 114.
117 See Deel II CAO Bouwnijverheid.
118 Art 40(1) CAO Bouwnijverheid.
119 Roughly speaking, younger employees receive a wage which is between 40 and
87.50 per cent of the wage of those 22 years and older. The CAO Bouwnijverheid
explicitly uses the term minimum wage (minimumloon).
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compensation for on-call work; job classification; guaranteed wage and
wage scales; wage rise; performance pay; holiday allowance (this does not
include holiday pay)120 ; method of paying wages; travel reimbursement;
travel time reimbursement; driver’s bonus and accident-free-driving bo-
nus; compensation for remote construction sites; compensation for work-
ing clothes and equipment; and allowance for masonry work. Under
Annex 2 of the CAO Bouwnijverheid, temporary agency workers are
also entitled to these conditions. An exception is made as to the way of
paying wages, holiday allowances, driver’s bonus and the accident-free-
driving bonus, and allowance for masonry work.
In Germany, minimum wage within the meaning of the AEntG
refers to the total hourly gross wage (Gesamttarifstundenlohn), consisting of
the hourly wage and the construction allowance (Bauzuschlag).121 A
construction allowance includes allowances for frequent changes of the
workplace, dependency on the weather outside the statutory bad weather
period, as well as loss of pay during the statutory bad weather period. It is
paid for each working hour for which payments must be made, but not for
overtime.122 The TV Mindestlohn distinguishes between two wage cate-
gories, both serving as minimum wages within the meaning of § 5(1)
AEntG. Moreover, the wage level depends on the Land where the worker
performs work,123 differentiating between a wage category for a certain
part of the Western Federal Republic of Germany (Tarifgebiet West), as well
as a category for the Länder Brandenburg, Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, Sach-
sen, Sachsen-Anhalt and Thüringen (Tarifgebiet Ost) and for the Land Berlin
(Tarifgebiet Berlin). Only minimum wage categories 1 and 2 are mandato-
rily applicable to foreign employers and employees.124 Higher wage
categories based on other collective agreements or individual employment
contracts remain untouched.125
Similar to the Netherlands, employers under the German BRTV and
TV Mindestlohn must pay allowances and supplements for additional
work (eg overtime), night work, and working on Sundays or bank holi-
120 Vz. Rb. Groningen 5 Oktober 2012, 134889/KG ZA 12-188, ECLI:NL:RBGRO:2012:
BX9234, JAR 2012/269 (Eemshaven), para 5.28, in which the judge ruled that it is
established practice that the 8 per cent holiday allowance is paid to employees, this
practice being based on Art 15(1) WML. Moreover, the holiday allowance must be
considered part of the minimum wage within the meaning of the Wet AVV.
121 § 2(1) TV Mindeslohn; Müller-Glöge, Preis & Schmidt (Eds.) (2014) (Schlachter) § 5
AEntG, para 3.
122 § 2(1) TV Mindeslohn.
123 § 3 TV Mindeslohn.
124 § 2(3) TV Mindeslohn.
125 This, however, is merely declaratory in nature. § 2(2) sentence 2 TV Mindeslohn.
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days.126 Under the AEntG, mere overtime allowances for working over-
time could be applied, but not the working time provisions determining
when an employee works overtime.127 Overtime allowances under the
BRTV comprise 25 per cent of the total hourly gross wage.128 According to
the Federal Labour Court (Bundesarbeitsgericht), to determine whether an
employee works overtime, the individual employment contract or the law
that governs the employment contract is relevant.129
The BRTV contains provisions on the level of overtime allowances,
but fails to regulate when overtime work occurs. Consequently, only the
working conditions that have been regulated by the AEntG may be
mandatorily required from a foreign service provider. Working time
regulations on regulating working hours, the Federal Labour Court
argues, are explicitly omitted from the PWD and thus must not manda-
torily apply to posted workers. Koberski disagrees with the court’s
reasoning and emphasise that overtime work can only be established
when one takes account of the normal working hours. Thus, the working
time definition merely has a functional meaning to determine when
someone works overtime.130 In Germany, therefore, overtime allowances
are paid according to the German rules, but, as far as working time
regulations are concerned, they are further defined by the law that
governs the posted worker’s employment contract.
In Sweden, too, provisions on the type of wages to be applied in the
construction sector differ as between types of wages that can be earned
and paid, and between different types of construction work that can be
performed. All workers are entitled to a so-called fall-back wage, which is
140 SEK per hour (approximately 16 EUR).131 This is used if the employer
and the local trade union cannot agree on a wage in negotiations for
employees at local level. Moreover, a performance wage is agreed for
certain types of work, such as wood, concrete and bricklaying work at
new construction sites; repair, rebuilding and plant production and
demolition work; tiling works; and waterproofing works. It is calculated
126 § 3(6) BRTV. Requiring foreign employers to pay overtime rates, not constituting
an element of the minimum wage, is in line with Art 3(1)(c) PWD. Case C-341/02
Commission v Germany ECLI:EU:C:2005:220, para 40.
127 Thüsing (Ed.) (2010) (Waas) § 5 AEntG, para 4. It follows from Case C-341/02
Commission v Germany ECLI:EU:C:2005:220, para 40, that overtime allowances are
allowed under EU case law. See section 3.3.3 above.
128 § 3(6) No. 6.1 BRTV.
129 BAG 19.05.2004 – AP AEntG § 1 Nr. 16.
130 Koberski (2011) § 5 AEntG, para 25.
131 § 3.6.1 in conjunction with §§ 3.9.2 and 3.9.2 National Construction Sector
Collective Agreement.
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on an hourly basis, unless otherwise provided. Parties may agree on
performance pay, including piece work and pay based on outcome, also
for other types of work. For certain types of work, construction workers
receive a fixed time wage (paid hourly or monthly), unless a performance
wage has been agreed.132 The fixed time wage may be supplemented with
a variable component, being a maximum of six per cent of the time wage.
A time wage is paid for: building services work; earth works; and other
work that is not covered by the performance pay (car drivers, dike
workers, storage workers, elevator installers, reinforcement steel workers,
machine repairers, cleaning staff).133 Particular wages exist for certain
companies, the level of which is determined at local level.134
4.3.4 Minimum holiday pay and holiday allowances
The Dutch and German construction sector collective agreements are quite
extensive in their regulation of an employee’s entitlement to annual leave
and holiday pay and/or holiday allowance. This is not true of the Swedish
collective agreements, which merely determine the level of paid annual
leave granted, but contain no provisions on annual leave. Moreover, in the
Dutch and German sectors holiday pay funds play an essential role in
administering annual leave, holiday pay and holiday allowances. The
following therefore refers mostly to the Dutch and German models.
A. Annual leave
Employees under the Dutch CAO Bouwnijverheid are entitled to 25 days’
holiday, 20 of them based on the statutory minimum. If employees are
older than 55 years, they are entitled to a further 10 age-related days off
(seniorendagen), which increases up to 13 days if the employee reaches the
age of 60.135 Of these annual leave days, the employee is entitled to a total
of 22 days leave, during which he is not obliged to work, with retention of
pay.136 Two days thereof are spent for training, 10 days are determined
after consulting the works council, and the employee can freely spend
the other 10 days, the monetary value of which is paid to the fund. The
employer must pay to the fund the value of the holidays over and above
the statutory minimum (ie 5 days), the minimum holiday allowance of
132 § 4.1 National Construction Sector Collective Agreement.
133 The collective agreements also covers wages for trainees/apprentices.
134 § 2.2.3 National Construction Sector Collective Agreement.
135 Art 35a CAO Bouwnijverheid.
136 Art 36a CAO Bouwnijverheid.
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8 per cent, and three days for brief absences.137 Compared to the Dutch
collective agreement, the German BRTV grants employees paid annual
leave of at least 30 days in a calendar year.138 For every 12 consecutive
days worked, employees accrue one day of annual leave.139 To calculate
the length of the holiday, the periods of employment of the worker,
including work performed for various employers in the construction
sector, are added together. For foreign posted workers, all periods they
have worked in Germany count.140
The German and Dutch regulations differ in that annual leave in
Germany is accrued independently of the employment relationship, but is
based on the employee’s employment history.141 This means that if the
employee enters employment with another employer, he remains entitled
to the paid annual leave he has already accrued. This is also true in the
Netherlands, since transferring annual leave rights to a new employer is
possible based on the contributions paid to the fund.
No particular provisions on annual leave, deviating from the
statutory provisions, have been agreed in the Swedish National Collective
Agreement. Annex I of the agreement, however, refers explicitly to the
Annual Leave Act (1977:480). Based on that, employees are entitled to at
least four weeks’ annual leave, which according to the Annex are to be
taken from June to August (the so-called byggsemestern). At local level, a
recommendation may be issued for the period during which annual leave
is taken. Employers shall inform their employees on annual leave eight
weeks before annual leave starts, and not later than four weeks before the
start of annual leave.
B. Holiday pay and holiday allowance
The calculation of holiday pay and holiday allowances differs in all three
countries. In the Netherlands, holiday allowances under the CAO Bouw-
nijverheid are based on the worker’s fixed agreed wage.142 The five
additional days of annual leave, the ten paid days off143 and the three
137 Art 2(2) Reglement Tijdspaarfonds voor de Bouwnijverheid.
138 § 8 No. 1.1 BRTV.
139 § 8 No. 2.2 BRTV.
140 Preis & Temming (2006) 32.
141 Houwerzijl & Baltussen (2010) 7. This is an unpublished report.
142 Art 46a CAO Bouwnijverheid.
143 Known as roostervrije dagen, ie days during which the employees is not required to
work. According to the collective agreement, the employer is not obliged to pay his
employee, unless he did not pay monetary value of these days off (Art 1(11)
Reglement Tijdspaarfonds voor de Bouwnijverheid).
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days for brief absence are calculated by taking the agreed hourly wage,
including reimbursements following the performance-related pay system,
any specific allowances for taskmasters, foremen, shift work, antisocial
hours for infrastructural work and antisocial hours for tidal works, and
multiplying the total amount by eight. This amount will be multiplied by
the number of days to be paid to the Tijdspaarfonds and divided by the
number of annual wage payment periods (13 or 12 months).144 The
following contributions must be paid to the fund: five additional days
of annual leave (above the statutory minimum of 20 days), and ten days
off. The holiday contributions are paid to the employee’s bank account.145
Construction employees in Germany receive holiday pay and holi-
day allowances of in total 14.25 per cent of their gross wage,146 ie the wage
mentioned in the wage tax declaration including any benefits in kind.
Excluded is the collectively agreed 13th month and occupational pay-
ments with an incidental character, such as a Christmas bonus or an
annual special payment, an allowance in lieu of leave, and redundancy
compensation.147 The employer pays the holiday reimbursements directly
to his workers together with the monthly wage, if the worker takes annual
leave.148 ULAK reimburses the employer’s payments.
Employees in the Swedish construction sector who are covered by the
collective agreements, receive holiday pay (based on the employee’s actual
monthly wage), a holiday allowance (semestertillägg),149 increased by 13 per
cent over the overtime rate, and other wage supplements earned during the
qualifying year. This applies to monthly paid employees. With regard to
hourly paid employees, the collective agreement vaguely determines that
the basic holiday pay and holiday allowance constitute 13 per cent.150
144 Employers may find some guidance on calculating the amount that must be paid to
the Time Savings Fund at the latter’s website <http://www.tijdspaarfondsbouw.
nl/Werkgever/Pages/home.aspx> accessed 28 October 2014.
145 Art 8 Reglement Tijdspaarfonds voor de Bouwnijverheid. Cordares is the organi-
sation entrusted with the administration of holiday pay and holiday allowance.
146 Consisting of holiday pay of 11.4 per cent of the gross wage and a holiday
allowance of 25 per cent of the holiday pay (§ 8 No. 4.1 BRTV).
147 § 8 No. 4.2 BRTV.
148 Preis & Temming (2006) 36.
149 The holiday allowance comprises 0.8 per cent of the actual monthly wage paid
during holiday.
150 Annex I 2010 National Construction Sector Collective Agreement.
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C. Administration by holiday pay funds
Holiday contributions in Germany and the Netherlands are regulated by
sectoral funds established by the social partners: in the Netherlands
Tijdspaarfonds voor de Bouwnijverheid (‘Tijdspaarfonds’) (Time Savings
Fund)151 and in Germany Urlaubs- und Lohnausgleichskasse der Bau-
wirtschaft (‘ULAK’) (Leave Fund for the Construction Sector). Three funds
exist in Germany: SOKA-Bau Berlin for undertakings established in Berlin,
the Bayerische Urlaubskasse for undertakings established in Bavaria, and the
Urlaubs- und Lohnausgleichskasse der Bauwirtschaft for the remaining parts
of Germany as well as for foreign employers that post their workers to
Germany (the so-called Europaverfahren).152
Employers must inform the funds about the names of the partici-
pating employees.153 In the Netherlands, employers must provide their
employees with information about the payments it has made to the
employees’ time saving accounts, by stating this on the employees’
payslips.154
The German construction sector collective agreement is more de-
tailed than the Dutch agreement, specifying the information that the
employer is required to provide. Employers must provide ULAK with:
the name, the undertaking’s legal form or legal representatives of the
undertaking, business address, the bank account, a description of the
activities of the undertaking, name of the employer as well as personal
data.155 The employer has to provide the Fund with a monthly registra-
tion form containing worker-related information.156 Moreover, employers
must ensure that they provide the Fund with a document containing
specifications as to the gross wages for which contributions must be paid,
the reimbursable holiday pay and holiday allowances, as well as the exact
number of registration forms and possible corrections.157
151 ULAK is part of Sozialkassen der Bauwirtschaft (SOKA-BAU).
152 § 8 No. 15.1 BRTV and § 3(1) VTV. Which fund is competent depends on the place
where the employer is established.
153 The Netherlands: Arts 11 and 12 Reglement Tijdspaarfonds voor de Bouwnijver-
heid; Germany: § 5(1) and (2) VTV.
154 Employees also have access to the fund’s website and are themselves able to check
the information in relation to their time saving accounts.
155 Preis & Temming (2006) 42.
156 This includes the gross wage, days worked (if not worked for a full month), the
number of working hours lost or holidays granted or holiday reimbursements
paid. Preis & Temming (2006) 42-3.
157 Preis & Temming (2006) 34.
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Following the ECJ’s judgement in Finalarte, foreign employers may
also be required to participate in the holiday fund, provided this increases
the workers’ protection.158 However, in the context of the posting of
workers, a comparison of the host state and home state holiday regula-
tions must be made (Art 3(7) PWD in conjunction with the ECJ’s case law).
Only in case the host state rules are more favourable may they be applied.
Here, not only the material holiday entitlements but also procedural
protection such as the enforcement of these entitlements in the host state
of the posted worker are taken into account.159
Under the German AEntG, foreign employers that are already
subject to the payment of holiday contributions to a similar institution
in their home country have the possibility either to apply for an exemption
or ask that holiday entitlements already tendered be taken into account.160
Avoiding double burdens for foreign employers is one of the precondi-
tions that must be fulfilled for the Fund to collect holiday pay and holiday
allowances.161 In order to gain exemption, the service provider must: (1)
during the period of posting of his workers is required to pay holiday
entitlement contributions in his home country; (2) have actually complied
with this requirement; and (3) have made the payment to a comparable
institution.162 ULAK has concluded bilateral agreements, in which ex-
emptions from the payment of contributions are regulated.163 Based on
these agreements an exchange of information takes place between the
158 Joined cases C-49/98, C-50/98, C-52/98 to C-54/98 and C-68/98 to C-71/98
Finalarte and others [2001] ECR I-7831. As a result of that case, it was necessary
to broaden the personal scope of the German VTV to also include mixed under-
takings (Mischbetriebe) whose activity is not dominated by providing construction
services. Däubler et al. (2010) (Mayer) § 5 AEntG, para 3.
159 Koberski (2011) § 5 AEntG, para 76, referring to Joined Cases C-49/98, C-50/98,
C-52/98 to C-54/98 and C-68/98 to C-71/98 Finalarte ECLI:EU:C:2001:564; Dan-
witz (2002) 241.
160 § 8 No. 13 and 15.2 BRTV.
161 § 5(3) AEntG in conjunction with § 4(2) TVG.
162 Precisely what a comparable institution is, is not regulated. Koberski (2011) § 5
AEntG, para 75.
163 Eg with institutions in Denmark, France, Italy, Austria and Belgium. There was a
bilateral agreement between ULAK and the Dutch Tijdspaarfonds. However, as
the Vakantiefonds (Holiday Fund) as per 1 January 2006 metamorphosed into a
Tijdspaarfonds (Time Saving Fund), ULAK did not renew the agreement since,
according to ULAK’s opinion, there was no (no longer) comparable regulation. As
a result, the Dutch social partners in the construction sector commissioned a study
by Houwerzijl & Baltussen (2010). The authors conclude that the German regula-
tion is more favourable than the Dutch. However, the authors also note that the
regulations, from a substantive perspective, are closely comparable.
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institutions.164 For institutions with which no bilateral agreement has been
concluded, the employer must contact ULAK directly.165
Aspects that must be considered in the comparison are: the registra-
tion requirements,166 the information requirements of ULAK,167 a summar-
ising document containing the total of all gross wages liable to
contributions, the total of all refundable holiday allowances, the total of
all refundable trainee remunerations, the number of registration forms
included for (manual) workers, the number of registration forms for
trainees, the number of correction included reports, and the account state-
ments of the worker as established by ULAK168, the payment of the holiday
entitlements to the employer,169 and the financial compensations of holiday
entitlements to theworker170. In addition – and this is important in regard to
the protection of workers – one must consider how far the payment of
holiday entitlements by the institution is guaranteed, were the employer not
to pay the contributions. Finally, the institution as suchmust actually be able
to perform its tasks. Aspects such as the organisation and its structure may
thus also be taken into account, particularly looking at whether the
organisation has been established for a relatively long period and whether
it has sufficient financial capacity; the personal and material equipment of
the organisation, and its method of operation.171
In Germany, in relation to the holiday contributions made to ULAK,
a comparison has to involve the entire leave entitlements regulation,
meaning that deficits in one area can be compensated by better entitle-
ments in another (Sachgruppenvergleich172). Consideration must involve
the number of days of leave per calendar year, as well as the amount of
leave pay.173 In addition, the transfer of holiday entitlements and the
transferability of holiday and holiday pay must also be taken into
164 Preis & Temming (2006) 43.
165 Koberski (2011) § 5 AEntG, para 76, with reference to BAG 20.07.2004 – 9 AZR
343/03, NZA 2005, 114 and Schlachter (2002) 1247.
166 §§ 5 and 6 VTV.
167 § 4 VTV.
168 § 6(2) and (7) VTV.
169 § 13 VTV.
170 §§ 14 and 15 VTV.
171 Koberski (2011) § 5 AEntG, para 76.
172 This is in fact a functional comparison.
173 Koberski (2011) § 5 AEntG, para 30. LAG Hessen 19.03.2007 - 16 Sa 1297/06, para
33, in which the court ruled that: “Der Hinweis der Beklagten auf steuerliche
Vorteile für entsandte Arbeitnehmer nach luxemburgischem Recht ist schließlich
schon deshalb unerheblich, weil in den vorzunehmenden Günstigkeitsvergleich
nur die Normen einbezogen werden könne, die sachlich miteinander vergleichbar
sind, also den gleichen Gegenstand regeln.“
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account.174 In Sweden, on the other hand, the comparison takes account of
all essential aspects of the employment conditions.
Since Art 3(7) PWD has not been implemented in the Netherlands,
the Minister of Social Affairs and Labour (Minister of SZW) made it clear
that the comparison should take place for each employment condition.
This ‘item per item’ method of comparison is, the Minister argued, based
on the idea that it relates to mandatory employment conditions that lay
down a minimum level. Accordingly, it is not possible to exchange a
minimum condition for something else. In relation to the construction
sector, applicable at that time, a more global comparison of the packages
of employment conditions was made, however. Nevertheless, although
the Minister did not object to this more global comparison in principle, he
emphasised that if being a posted worker means that he is deprived of
more favourable employment conditions in the host state due to that
method, then individual employment conditions must be compared.175
4.4 Temporary agency work sector
4.4.1 Introduction
The temporary agency work sector differs from the construction sector in
that agency work, under EU andMember State law, is a separately regulated
form of (atypical) employment. The following sections address the regula-
tion of temporary agency work at EU and Member State level. First, the
statutory regulation of temporary agency work is described (section 4.4.2).
Secondly, the subsequent sections deal with the collective agreements that
apply in the Netherlands, Germany and Sweden, thereby addressing their
personal scope and identifying the applicable minimum wage provisions
and provisions on holiday pay and holiday allowances (section 4.4.3).
4.4.2 Statutory regulation of temporary agency work
A. Scope
Besides collective agreements, statutes regulate temporary agencywork.176 In
the Netherlands, the Waadi (Wet allocatie arbeidskrachten door intermediairs)
174 LAG Hessen 19.03.2007, 16 Sa 1297/06, para 32.
175 Houwerzijl (2005) 312-4. See also Houwerzijl & Baltussen (2010) 20.
176 For a review of how temporary agency work is regulated in various EU Member
States and the US see Blanpain & Hendrickx (2013).
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(Allocation of Workers via Intermediaries Act)177 contains rules on the
assignment of temporary agency workers to a user undertaking.178 In
Germany, the AÜG regulates legal and combats illegal temporary agency
work.179 And in Sweden, the agency work market is regulated by the Act on
Temporary Agency Work (2012:854), which implements TAWD.180 The
relationship between the temporary agency worker and the temporary
work agency is qualified as an employment relationship. This means that
all individuals are covered, foreign or not, who can be classified as employees
within the meaning of the national definitions set out in Chapter 3.
In the Netherlands, four conditions must be met to qualify the
relationship as falling within the rules for temporary agency work: (1)
there must be an employment contract within the meaning of Art 7:610
BW; (2) the agency must have an allocation function, meaning that the
agency’s aim of allocating workers must lie within its normal business
activities or occupation, and may not just be ancillary or done only
sporadically;181 (3) agency workers must be employed by the agency for
assignment to the user undertaking182 ; and (4) agency workers must
perform their work under the supervision and direction of the user
undertaking.183
In line with Directive 2008/104/EC on temporary agency work,184
agency work in Germany must be temporary in nature.185 This is the case
if it is already clear at the start that the assignment of workers will
terminate. Assigning agency workers on a temporary basis to a user
177 Wet van 14 mei 1998, houdende regels voor de niet-openbare arbeidsbemiddeling
en het ter beschikking stellen van arbeidskrachten, Stb. 1998, 306, as last amended
by Stb. 2012, 260.
178 See on (the background of) temporary agency work and how it is regulated in the
Netherlands Houwerzijl (2013a).
179 BT-Drs. 6/2303, 9ff. See in more general terms (in English) on temporary agency
work in Germany Weiss (2013).
180 In the course of adopting the TAWD, a government inquiry was instituted with the
aim of adopting new legislation to cover all agency workers. There was a fear that,
were it left to the social partners to implement the Directive, workers not covered
by a collective agreement would not enjoy the rights afforded by the Directive.
SOU 2011:5, Bemanningsdirektivets genomförande i Sverige, 24 January 2011
(English summary) 21-2.
181 Kamerstukken II 1996/97, 25 263, nr. 3, 33-4.
182 For the question of whether Art 7:690 BW applies it is not relevant which name
parties apply to their relationship. Kamerstukken II 1996/97, 25 263, nr. 3, 10-1 and
Ktr. Sittard 13 February 2008, JAR 2008/157. In this case, the undertaking assigned
the worker to itself, which was declared not to be covered by Art 7:690 BW, but by
Art 7:610 BW.
183 CRvB 31 oktober 2005, JIN 2005/370; Hoogeveen (2007) 6-7.
184 [2008] OJ L327/9.
185 § 1(1) sentence 2 AÜG. Thüsing (Ed.) (2010) (Waas) § 1 AÜG, para 109c.
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undertaking is no longer required in the Netherlands.186 Time restrictions
can be found in the collective agreements, however. Since 2011, all types of
temporary agency work provided in Germany, which are conducted
within the framework of the undertaking’s economic activity, must
comply with the norms of the AÜG.187 Moreover, temporary agency
work in undertakings in the construction sector for work that is regularly
performed by (construction) workers is, with certain very limited exemp-
tions, prohibited (§ 1b AÜG).188 The prohibition was a response to
increasingly serious shortcomings, in particular regarding the illegal
employment of foreign workers in the construction sector since the entry
into force of the Act in 1972. It came into effect as of 1 January 1987.189 It is
clear that if this prohibition were to be abolished, temporary agency
workers would become protected under the AEntG, as construction
work is a sector to which the AEntG applies.190 Although there is much
discussion about the compatibility of this prohibition, also in relation to
the freedom to provide services, that issue will not be discussed further
here.191
The AEntG is relevant to agency work if agency workers are hired
out to an undertaking that is covered by the AEntG, when at least the
mandatory employment conditions mentioned in § 2 AEntG as well as
generally binding collective agreements must be respected (§ 8(3) in
conjunction with § 4, § 5(1) to (3) and § 6 AEntG). Following § 2(4)
AEntG, conditions on the hiring-out of workers, in particular agency
workers, are mandatory for foreign and domestic employers/temporary
186 Following the Parliamentary discussion, it seemed to be self-evident that assign-
ments are temporary in nature. Kamerstukken II 2010/11, 32 895, nr. 3, 2.
187 Until 2011, this concerned only undertakings that assign workers commercially,
with profit as the aim. As such, the scope has been broadened to cover all types of
workers’ assignment to third parties. Some types of work are exempted from the
Act’s scope, namely work performed within a onsortium (Arbeitsgemeinschaft). See
for more information Thüsing (Ed.) (2012) (Waas) § 1 AÜG, para 125.
188 See more extensively on the limitations of temporary agency work in the construc-
tion sector: Salamon (2012).
189 Hamann (2011a) discussing the usefulness of the prohibition and its compliance
with the freedom to provide services.
190 Müller-Glöge, Preis & Schmidt (Eds.) (2014) (Wank) § 1b AÜG, para 5; Hamann
(2011a) 340. See for a discussion of the question whether extending the scope of the
AEntG to also include the temporary agency work sector is in conformity with the
Constitution: Hunnekuhl & Dohna-Jaeger (2007). The authors conclude that in
principle such an extension does conform with the Constitution. However, they
provide that the provision through which statutory regulations can be enacted
should contain clear conditions, which seemed not to be the case under the AEntG
applicable at the time the article was written.
191 Hamann (2011a).
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work agencies. Taking into account the European context and comparing
§ 2(4) AEntG with the other conditions mentioned in the PWD, only the
employment and working conditions of agency workers seem to be meant
(eg § 9 AÜG).192
Temporary agency workers in Sweden are generally employed for
an indefinite term, the main reason being that the employment contract
under the Employment Protection Act (1982:80) is of an indefinite term
(Art 4).193 In principle, no legal restrictions apply to temporary agency
work. However, it should be noted that the Co-determination Act
(1976:580) provides trade unions with the right to negotiate before the
employer decides to have work performed by agency workers, provided
the employer or his organisation is party to the collective agreement in
question (Sections 38 and 39 Co-determination Act (1976:580)). The trade
union is not permitted to object to agency work, but it is enabled to object
to illegal practices,194 as when the hiring of agency workers is likely to
lead to the circumvention of labour law protection offered by statutory
provisions and/or collective agreements, or runs counter to otherwise
generally accepted practices.195 Although it rarely occurs in practice, it
gives trade unions the possibility to influence the undertaking’s decision-
making.196
One basic feature of the TAWD is the principle of equal treatment (Art
5). Accordingly, temporary agency workers shall enjoy at least those work-
ing and employment conditions that apply in the user undertaking. As the
Directive refers to binding and general rules in force at the user undertaking,
it can be assumed that if there are no such binding working and employ-
ment conditions, no entitlement can be claimed.197 It further narrows down
the ‘basic’ working and employment conditions to the duration of working
time, overtime, breaks, rest periods, night work, holidays and public holi-
days, pay, equal treatment as between men and women, and any action to
combat discrimination based on sex, race or ethnic origin, religion, beliefs,
disabilities, age or sexual orientation (Art 3(1)(f) in conjunction with Art 5).
For definitions of pay, employment contract or employment relationship,
and worker, Member State law must be consulted (Art 3(2) TAWD).
192 Thüsing (2012) (Thüsing) Einl. AÜG, para 62. See also Franzen (2011), in particular,
459-60. See also Houwerzijl (2005) 137.
193 Nyström (2013) 164.
194 Nyström (2013) 166.
195 Ahlberg (2008) 51; Rönnmar (2010c) 426; Nyström (2013) 166.
196 Nyström (2013) 166; Ahlberg (2008) 51.
197 Engels (2013) 15.
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All three countries permit deviations from the equal treatment/pay
obligations. In the Netherlands, deviation is possible by collective agree-
ment applicable to the temporary work agency, provided the collective
agreement provides for a regulation that combats the misuse of successive
assignment periods. If deviation is based on the user undertaking’s collec-
tive agreement, the agreement must oblige the user to verify compliance
with its own collective agreement. German law permits temporary work
agencies – domestic and foreign198 – to choose between applying the equal
pay/treatment obligation or a collective agreement.199 If it is generally the
case that the equal pay/treatment obligation applies, this counts equally for
domestic and foreign temporary work agencies. However, if collective
agreements deviate from the equal pay/treatment obligations, that option
must also be granted to the foreign temporary work agency. Sweden has
made use of the possibility to apply an exception as regards permanently
employed employees. This permits derogations as regards pay, for which
the social partners are responsible, according to the Swedish model.200
B. Temporary agency work in a cross-border context
Transnational temporary agency work can either fall under Art 45 TFEU,
the free movement of workers, or the PWD,201 depending on the type of
mobility invoked. An employee who moves to another Member State and
who becomes employed with an agency that is established there falls
under the scope of the free movement of workers rules. An employee who,
on the other hand, is employed by an employer established abroad and
who moves only temporarily to another Member State because his
employer provides services falls under the scope of the rules on the
posting of workers.202 Nevertheless particular provisions apply in relation
to posted temporary agency workers.
198 Nevertheless, as is the case with domestic collective agreements, their foreign
counterparts must equally meet several requirements to benefit from the deviation.
It must regulate the employment conditions mandatorily, it must contain condi-
tions that can be invoked before a court, and must ensure the principle of equal
treatment. Thüsing (Ed.) (2012) (Pelzner/Kock) § 3 AÜG, paras 100-1, inter alia
referring to: Case C-164/99 Portugaia Construções Ldª ECLI:EU:C:2002:40. See also
BT-Drs. 17/2510, 5.
199 § 10(4) sentences 1 to 3 AÜG.
200 Nyström (2013) 170.
201 See in general on transnational temporary agency work Schlachter (2012a);
Schlachter (2012b).
202 Case 279/80 Webb ECLI:EU:C:1981:314, explicitly recognises that the transnational
provision of manpower can be considered to fall under the freedom to provide
services. The ECJ ruled that “where an undertaking hires out, for remuneration,
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Article 1(3)(c) PWD applies to temporary employment undertakings
or placement agencies that “hire out a worker to a user undertaking
established or operating in the territory of a Member State, provided there
is an employment relationship between the temporary employment
undertaking or placement agency and the worker during the period of
posting”. Further, the PWD determines that Member States shall ensure
that, no matter which law applies to the employment contract, they
guarantee workers that are posted to their territory “the conditions of
hiring-out of workers, in particular the supply of workers by temporary
employment undertakings” (Art 3(1)(d)). Moreover, Art 3(9) states that
“Member States may provide that the undertakings referred to in Article 1
(1) must guarantee workers referred to in Article 1 (3) (c) the terms and
conditions which apply to temporary workers in the Member State where the work
is carried out” (emphasis added).203
With this provision, Member States can entitle posted temporary
agency workers to the same employment conditions as domestic tempor-
ary agency workers in the host state. According to Schlachter, “[f]or an
internal market it would be logical that the rules for posted agency
workers do not differ in content depending on the category of either
national or transnational posting”.204 For (posted) temporary agency
workers, the TAWD is equally applicable, if implemented in Member
State law. If Union workers are employed by a temporary-work agency,
then, based on the principle of equal treatment laid down in Art 45 TFEU,
they are entitled to receive employment conditions that are equal to those
who are regularly employed with the agency. It seems that temporary
agency workers, whether under the PWD or Art 45 TFEU, can be treated
equally if a Member State so decides.
This is justified by the fact that, unlike traditional posting situations
under Art 1(3)(a) PWD, hiring-out temporary agency workers is “char-
acterised by the fact that the movement of the worker to the host Member
State constitutes the very purpose of the provision of services effected by
the undertaking providing the services and that that worker carries out his
tasks under the control and direction of the user undertaking”.205 As a
result, hiring-out workers through a temporary-work agency is an activity
staff who remain in the employ of that undertaking, no contract of employment
being entered into with the user, its activities constitute an occupation which
satisfies the conditions laid down in the first paragraph of Article 60. Accordingly,
they must be considered a ‘service’ within the meaning of that provision” (para 9).
203 See also Van Hoek & Houwerzijl (2011b) 88.
204 Schlachter (2012a) 7.
205 Joined Cases C-307/09 to C-309/09 Vicoplus ECLI:EU:C:2011:64, para 51.
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“specifically intended to enable workers to gain access to the labour
market of the host Member State”.206 Such equality of treatment ensures
that workers can enjoy the right of free movement “without discrimina-
tion by permanent, seasonal and frontier workers and by those who
pursue their activities for the purpose of providing services”.207
As regards the relation between the PWD and the TAWD, the
inquiry held in Sweden due to the transposition of the TAWD proposed
to apply the equal treatment principle in full to posted temporary agency
workers. The level of wages posted temporary agency workers were
allowed, were those laid down in the applicable collective agreement or
were the subject of individual bargaining.208 The same applies to paid
annual leave. However, the Government found this to be contrary to the
PWD,209 which seems to be a very narrow reading of the PWD’s provi-
sions. Article 3(9) PWD explicitly allows Member States to increase the
level of protection of posted temporary agency workers.
4.4.3 Applicable collective agreements
A. Collective agreements
Two collective agreements apply in the Netherlands: the generally applic-
able ABU CAO,210 which applies to agency work employment contracts
between temporary agency workers and an employment agency,211 if and
insofar as the sum of the agency work wage and salary bill is at least 50
per cent of the agency’s total annual wage and salary bill on which social
security contributions are due. And the NBBU CAO (which is not
generally binding), which applies to small and medium-sized temporary-
206 Joined Cases C-307/09 to C-309/09 Vicoplus ECLI:EU:C:2011:64, para 30.
207 Recital 5 Regulation (EU) 492/2011 of 5 April 2011 on freedom of movement for
workers within the Union [2011] OJ L141/1.
208 Nyström (2013) 174.
209 Nyström (2013).
210 CAO voor uitzendkrachten 2012-2017, concluded between FNV Bondgenoten,
CNV Dienstenbond, De Unie and LBV. See for an English and Polish version of
the ABU Collective Agreement the ABU’s website (www.abu.nl).
211 Also referred to as temporary-work agency. An agency is defined as an enterprise
within the meaning of the Works Councils Act which means “[a]ny organisation
operating in the community as an independent entity in which work is performed
on the basis of a private-law or public-law employment contract” (Art 1(1)(c) Wet
op de ondernemingsraden (Works Council Act)).
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work agencies.212 Undertakings affiliated to that collective agreement are
exempted from the scope of the generally binding ABU CAO.213 Only the
generally binding collective agreement concluded by the ABU CAO is dealt
with below, not only because most temporary-work agencies are covered by
that agreement, but also because, having regard to the employment condi-
tions concerned in the underlying study, the NBBU CAO employs a broadly
similar structure.
In Germany there are two (non-generally binding) sectoral collective
agreements. One agreement exists between the Interessenverband Deutscher
Zeitarbeitsunternehmen (‘iGZ’) (Association of Temporary Employment
Agencies) and the Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund (‘DGB’) (Trade Union
Confederation),214 having concluded a framework collective agreement
(Manteltarifvertrag), a framework wage collective agreement (Entgeltrah-
men-Tarifvertrag), and a wage collective agreement (Entgelt-Tarifvertrag).215
Yet another agreement applies between the Bundesarbeitgeberverband der
Personaldienstleister (‘BAP’) (Employers’ Association of Staffing Agen-
cies)216 and the DGB.217 Moreover, collective agreements are concluded
at undertaking level as well as works council agreements (Betriebsverein-
212 CAO voor uitzendkrachten 30 maart 2009 – 31 december 2013 (‘NBBU CAO’).
Translations in English, German and Polish are available on the NBBU’s website
(www.nbbu.nl).
213 Art 2(2) ABU CAO.
214 Concluded on behalf of its following members: Industriegewerkschaft Bergbau,
Chemie, Energie (IG BCE), Gewerkschaft Nahrung – Genuss – Gaststätten (NGG),
Industriegewerkschaft Metall (IG Metall), Gewerkschaft Erziehung und Wis-
senschaft (GEW), Vereinte Dienstleistungsgewerkschaft e.V. (ver.di), Industriege-
werkschaft Bauen – Agrar – Umwelt (IG BAU) and Gewerkschaft der Polizei (GdP)
(‘iGZ-DGB’).
215 Tarifverträge Zeitarbeit iGZ-DGB-Tarifgemeinschaft 2013-2016.
216 There was a merger in 2011 between the Bundesverband Zeitarbeit Personal-
Dienstleistungen e.V. (BZA), now BAP and the Arbeitgeberverband Mittelstän-
discher Personaldienstleister (AMP).
217 Concluded on behalf of its members: Industriegewerkschaft Bergbau, Chemie,
Energie (IG BCE), Gewerkschaft Nahrung – Genuss – Gaststätten (NGG), Indus-
triegewerkschaft Metall (IG Metall), Gewerkschaft Erziehung und Wissenschaft
(GEW), Vereinte Dienstleistungsgewerkschaft e.V. (ver.di), Industriegewerkschaft
Bauen – Agrar – Umwelt (IG BAU) and Gewerkschaft der Polizei (GdP) (‘BAP-
DGB’). Until 31 October 2013 there was also a collective agreement concluded
between Arbeitgeberverband Mittelständischer Personaldienstleister (‘AMP’, now
‘BAP’) (Employers’ Association Medium-Sized Staffing Agencies) and Christlicher
Gewerkschaftsbund (‘CGB’) (Christian Trade Union Federation). However, accord-
ing to information provided on BAP’s website, the collective agreement expired
without substitution. See <http://www.bmas.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/
pr-mindestloehne-aentg-uebersicht.pdf> accessed 28 October 2014.
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barungen).218 Furthermore, other sectoral collective agreements may also
contain provisions on and for temporary agency work conducted in the
specific sector,219 determining that the equal pay/treatment principle is
applied.
Three main collective agreement regulate the Swedish agency
sector: the White-Collar Agency Workers Collective Agreement for Salar-
ied Employees in Staff Agencies between the Swedish Association of Staff
Agencies, Unionen and the Swedish Confederation of Professional Asso-
ciations (Avtal för tjänstemän); the Blue-Collar Agreement for Staff Agen-
cies between the Swedish Confederation of Trade Unions (LO) and the
Swedish Association of Staff Agencies (Arbetare Avtal för bemanningsföre-
tag); and an agreement in the health care sector.220 However, for the
underlying study, only the Blue-Collar Agency Workers Agreement is
dealt with.221
B. Personal scope
The collective agreements contain criteria that help to assess whether or
not an undertaking is covered. In the Netherlands, in principle, all
agencies are covered by the ABU CAO in case the agency’s main activity
is to allocate employees to user undertakings within the meaning of Art
7:690 BW, unless the agency is covered by the non-generally binding
NBBU CAO or by another sectoral collective agreement.222 As the
collective agreement has been declared generally binding, it covers
national and foreign employees and employers alike.
As there are no generally binding collective agreements in the
German and Swedish temporary agency work sectors, these agreements
bind only those who are a party to one of these agreements, or in case the
employer voluntarily applies one of them (section 4.2.2 above). In Ger-
218 Under § 77 Betriebsverfassungsgesetz (‘BetrVG’) (Law on labour relations in the
workplace), a works council agreement is an agreement between the employer and
the works council, as representative of the workforce.
219 One example is the steel sector region in North Rhine-Westphalia, where the IG
Metall (Bezirksleitung NRW) has concluded a collective agreement with eg
Arbeitgeberverband Stahl e.V. Tarifvertrag zur Bezahlung von Leiharbeitnehmern,
applicable to the Manteltarifvertrag Stahl, effective as of 1 January 2011, between
the Arbeitgeberverband Stahl e.V. and IG Metall, Bezirksleitung Nordrhein-West-
falen, in particular § 2.
220 Rönnmar (2010c) 426, with reference to Berg (2008) 238ff.
221 The White-Collar Agency Workers Collective Agreement 2013 applies to agencies
affiliated to Bemanningsföretagen and particularly concerns, inter alia, employees
providing engineering work, and work in the scientific and academic sphere.
222 Art 2(3) and (4) ABU CAO.
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many, union density in the agency sector is low, which means that
collective agreements often apply to temporary agency workers based
on a reference clause.223 If agencies do not belong to one of the employers’
associations, it is likely that they will refer to an existing collective
agreement in order to circumvent the application of the equal pay/
treatment principle.
The Swedish Blue-Collar Workers Agreement applies to agencies
which are member of the Bemanningsföretagen and trade unions affiliated
to LO. This agreement applies particularly to construction work, building
maintenance work, the forestry and woodworking industry, and the hotel
and restaurant industry.
It must be added that the Dutch ABU CAO contains particular
provisions for posted temporary agency workers and temporarily em-
ployed Union (temporary agency) workers. With regard to posted tem-
porary agency workers,224 the collective agreement indicates the
provisions that apply – in full or in part – to workers with an employment
contract governed by foreign law. Applicable provisions cover holiday
and holiday allowance as well as generally recognised public holidays,
provisions on wages, agency workers assigned to an undertaking active in
the construction sector, wage increase, bonuses for irregular working
hours, and overtime, and work-related expenses and allowances.
Moreover, with regard to temporary agency workers that do not
permanently reside and/or work in the Netherlands, the agency is obliged
to enter into negotiations with such workers in order to agree on alter-
native working conditions that would better fit the need of this particular
group of workers.225 The agency must ensure that the value of the
working conditions for these workers is the same as those of other
(domestic) temporary agency workers. As a result, the agency may, after
consultation with the agency worker, agree in writing that holiday
allowances are paid in cash by increasing the worker’s actual (weekly,
monthly, or periodic) wage.226 As to the payment of wages, the agency is
permitted to pay the wage partly in tax-free reimbursements or benefits in
kind, for instance as regards double accommodation costs, transport costs
223 Waltermann (2010) 483.
224 See Art 46 in conjunction with Annex IV ABU Collective Agreement.
225 This is in line with Art 45 TFEU, based on which, equal treatment of situations that
are in fact different, can be qualified as discriminatory. Houwerzijl & Kullmann
(2010) 28.
226 Art 44(2) and (3) ABU CAO. Holiday allowances are regularly paid per annum.
The same is possible for four days off in excess of the statutory holiday entitlement
(Art 35), the reserve for short-term absenteeism (Art 37) and public holidays, with
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from and to the place of residence in the country of origin, and extra costs
for living expenses. Any conversion must be mentioned on the agency
worker’s payslip. Conversion may not lead to a situation in which the
worker’s pay falls below the statutory minimum.227 The agency shall also
ensure that the employment contract and associated documents and
information (including the Working Hours Act and possibly other subjects
that are of interest) are available in Dutch as well as in the language of the
agency worker.
C. Minimum wage
The status of the collective agreements affects the applicability and thus
enforceability of the employment conditions laid down in these agree-
ments. While in the Netherlands, the generally binding collective agree-
ment grants all temporary agency workers who fall within its scope a
certain wage, which can be enforced in court; in Germany only the
statutory regulation determines, as a minimum, the wage to be paid to
temporary agency workers. The situation is different in Sweden, where the
provisions on wages (and also holiday pay and holiday allowances) apply
only if employees are member of the signatory trade union, or in the cases
described above.
The Dutch ABU CAO determines that the ‘actual wage’ is the actual
gross wage, excluding holiday allowances, bonuses, other allowances,
overtime and other compensation, allocated on the basis of the number of
hours worked.228 The wage, and if applicable, expense allowances are
calculated on the basis of the number of hours worked.229 Moreover, the
wage is to be determined based on the function that the agency worker
the limitation that the company sets aside a reserve for this and the has agency
opted for a system that in the event of a generally recognised public holiday on
which the temporary agency worker does not work on that day on account of that
public holiday, then the agency work employment contract continues.
227 There are some restrictions, however. Conversion, inter alia, of wages, bonuses for
irregular working time and overtime or compensation hours is limited to a
maximum of 30 per cent of the wage (Art 19(1) ABU CAO). Reserves are only
made for the actual wage accrued, and not over the converted wage. Finally, the
already converted wage that the agency worker wishes to convert into tax-free
reimbursements or tax-free benefits in kind will not exceed 81 per cent of the
amount of the extraterritorial costs which the agency wishes to pay or provide tax
free.
228 Art 1(g) ABU CAO.
229 Art 19(1) ABU CAO. This will be done in accordance with Arts 22 to 28 and Annex
I ABU CAO.
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performs,230 which means that if the worker assigned to a user under-
taking, the pay scales of the applicable collective agreement are rele-
vant.231 In principle, for the first 26 weeks the wage determined in the
ABU CAO applies, unless the agency and the temporary agency worker
agree in writing that from the first day of the assignment, the wage
applicable at the user undertaking applies.232
A sectoral statutory minimum wage for temporary agency work
was adopted in Germany in 2011. As of 1 December 2011, the statutory
regulation provides the minimum wage to be paid during the assignment
as well as when unassigned. This provision was introduced to combat any
wage dumping, which was supposed to be caused especially by transna-
tional temporary agency work due to the expiry of the transitional
measures that applied in relation to the free movement of workers.233
With regard to the free movement of workers, the legislator wanted to
prevent any situation in which a foreign “dumping-wage” collective
agreement could set aside the equal pay principle.234 This statutory
regulation is based on a collective agreement, which can be declared
generally applicable by the BMAS.235 Under the AÜG, hourly minimum
wage levels can be established by the enactment of a statutory regulation.
The social partners who have agreed on nationwide hourly wages can
jointly propose that the BMAS should fix a wage in a statutory regulation
(§ 3a(1) AÜG).236 The statutory regulation itself claims to be applicable to
both domestic and foreign agencies.237 As the provision refers to mini-
mum rates of pay,238 the statutory regulation provides geographical
hourly wages for Berlin, Brandenburg, Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, Sachsen,
Sachsen-Anhalt and Thüringen, and a wage for the other federal states.239 In
230 Art 18 ABU CAO. An overview can be found in Annex I ABU CAO.
231 It is the agency that classifies the agency worker according to the information
provided by the user undertaking (Art 18(2) ABU CAO).
232 Art 2 ABU CAO. This has been explicitly determined for agency workers that are
assigned to a user undertaking that is covered by the CAO Bouwnijverheid.
233 Hamann (2011b) 330.
234 Hamann (2011b) 331.
235 § 3a(1) AÜG.
236 This proposal must be seen separately from the collective agreement, although the
latter may provide the basis for it. Thüsing (Ed.) (2012) (Thüsing) § 3a AÜG, paras
4-5.
237 Erste Verordnung über eine Lohnuntergrenze in der Arbeitnehmerüberlassung
vom 21. Dezember 2011 (BAnz. 2011 Nr. 195 S. 4608), replaced by Zweite
Verordnung über eine Lohnuntergrenze in der Arbeitnehmerüberlassung vom
26. März 2014 (BAnz AT 26.03.2014 V1).
238 Müller-Glöge, Preis & Schmidt (Eds.) (2014) (Wank) § 3a AÜG, para 5.
239 See § 2(2) Zweite Verordnung.
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periods when the worker is assigned as well as in periods when no
assignments are made, the wage must at least be the statutory sectoral
minimum.240
Provisions on wages can, in addition, also be found in the German
(framework) wage collective agreements, whereby the statutory minimum
serves as the absolute minimum. As the statutory regulation merely
declares the wage to be mandatorily applicable, the collective agreements
contain provisions allowing employees not only a basic wage, but also on-
site or variable supplements.241 The collective agreements furthermore
grant overtime allowances for work provided outside the agreed working
time.242
In Sweden, two mechanisms to establish the workers’ wages apply
to blue-collar temporary agency workers regularly employed with an
agency established in Sweden: the guarantee wage paid if not assigned,
and the wage paid according to the user undertaking’s national collective
agreement when assigned. Wages consist of an hourly or monthly fixed
wage plus additional entitlements. First, it should be noted that if
temporary agency workers are employed full-time in Sweden for an
indefinite period, they are usually entitled to a guaranteed wage, ie the
employee’s individual minimum wage, which is paid if the employee is
assigned for not longer than ten days, when working at the agency itself,
thus not assigned or when on a training course.243 The general reference
point is the wage laid down in the nationwide collective agreement.244
Secondly, temporary agency workers who are assigned to a user
undertaking are entitled to the wage applied according to the national
collective agreement under which the user is bound. The hourly or
240 § 10(5) AÜG.
241 § 4 iGZ-DGB framework collective agreement respectively § 13(2) BAP-DGB
framework collective agreement.
242 Under the iGZ-DGB framework collective agreement the overtime allowance is
25 per cent for each additional hour worked.
243 The translation of the Blue-Collar Agency Workers Collective Agreement contains
monthly and hourly minimum wages. The collective agreement determines that
the wages agency workers earn in periods in which they are not assigned is set at
108 SEK (13 EUR) for skilled workers and 100 SEK (12 EUR) for others. Nyström
(2013) 169. See § 5(2) Blue-Collar Agency Workers Collective Agreement. This
guaranteed wage is paid based on the actual working hours per month, but with a
maximum of eight hours per day.
244 Nyström (2013) 172. This collective agreement is different from the one applicable
in 2010, whereby a worker received a wage of 90 per cent of the worker’s average
earnings over the past three months, which may be not less than the guarantee
wage. If the temporary agency worker is assigned for more than ten days, the rule
is that he receives the wage he would have earned if he had been directly
employed with the user undertaking. Ahlberg (2008) 49.
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monthly wage is calculated based on the Blue-Collar Agreement for Staff
Agencies. However, this wage may not undercut the agency’s guaranteed
wage. The collective agreement also determines that agency workers are
entitled to receive variable compensation, such as performance pay,
piecework pay, a bonus and commission.245 A user undertaking may
also bargain with the local trade union on the worker’s wage, agreeing
that the agency shall pay its worker a wage according to the user under-
taking’s wage.246 Blue-collar workers are also entitled to an amount in
addition to their normal wage (the so-called public holiday wage),
for working late or night work and in weekends and on public holidays
(§ 5(4)). Agency workers also receive additional pay for overtime. It may
also be agreed that the worker receives time off. Compensation for
overtime includes holiday pay. This, however, does not apply to workers
who are paid on a weekly or monthly basis. It is explicitly agreed that the
construction sector collective agreements apply in case the temporary-
work agency is a member of LO and is bound by those agreements.247
D. Minimum holiday pay and holiday allowance
Annual leave
For each full month worked, an agency worker in the Netherlands accrues
the right to 16 hours’ holiday. This may amount to 24 days over one year
(Art 35 ABU CAO). According to the German iGZ-DGB framework
collective agreement, in case of a full-time employment, temporary agency
workers in their first year of employment receive 24 days’ annual leave,
increasing to 25 days in the second, 26 in the third, 28 in the fourth, and 30
in the fifth year of employment (§ 6.2.1). The Swedish Blue-Collar
Collective Agreement explicitly refers to the law on annual leave.248
245 If these incentives are calculated in arrears, the reference point to be taken into
account is the previous three months, unless the local social partners agree
otherwise.
246 If the assignment lasts not longer than ten days and does not affect more than 20
persons, the wage is calculated based on the preceding three months, with the
guaranteed wage serving as a minimum.
247 Annex A4, No. 1 2010 National Construction Sector Collective Agreement.
248 § 18 Blue-Collar Agency Workers Collective Agreement.
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Holiday pay and holiday allowance
In all three countries concerned, temporary agency workers can be entitled
to holiday pay and a holiday allowance under the collective agreements,
provided they apply. Temporary agency workers in the Netherlands are
entitled to a holiday allowance of 8 per cent of their actual wage over the
days worked, holidays and public holidays.249 If the worker’s contract
with the agency ends and is not continued with a new employment
contract, the holiday allowance shall be paid automatically. If the agency
worker requests, the agency has to compensate the holidays in excess of
the statutory entitlement in cash (Art 35(5)). For the first 26 weeks, agency
workers receive a supplement for accruing 16 hours’ holiday per month,
expressed as a percentage of the worker’s actual wage (Art 35(6)). This will
be increased by the waiting day compensation in accordance with Art 33
(4). The supplement will be reserved for the worker’s annual leave and
constitutes the worker’s holiday pay.
In Germany, under the iGZ-DGB framework collective agreement
holiday pay consists of the wage from the wage tables, based on the
regular monthly working time. Any supplements exceeding this are not
considered (§ 6.3). Moreover, the worker is entitled to annual bonus
payments, such as additional holiday allowances,250 as well as Christmas
bonuses after sixth consecutive months251 (§ 8). A condition is that there
must be an employment relationship at the moment the bonuses are paid.
If the worker decides to leave the agency before 31 March of the following
year, the bonuses must be repaid, unless the worker has been dismissed by
the agency. Holiday pay and holiday allowances are related to an average
working week of approximately 35 hours.252 Almost the same provision
can be found in the BAP-DGB framework collective agreement.253 Blue-
collar temporary agency workers in Sweden are entitled to 13 per cent
holiday pay and (additional) holiday allowances (§ 18). The collective
agreement does not contain a proviso determining which wage should be
taken as reference point for calculating the holiday pay and holiday
allowance.
249 Art 36(1) ABU CAO.
250 Holiday allowances are paid in June and the Christmas bonus in November, and
their level increases congruently with the seniority of the employment relationship
between the worker and the agency.
251 After sixth months, the worker is entitled to a holiday and Christmas bonus of each
150 EUR (gross), as of the third and fourth year of employment 200 EUR (gross)
and as of the worker’s fifth year of employment 300 EUR (gross).
252 § 3.1 in conjunction with § 6a iGZ-DGB framework collective agreement.
253 § 2 in conjunction with § 15 BAP-DGB framework collective agreement.
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4.5 Comparative notes and conclusions
Chapter 4 dealt with the sectoral regulation of minimum wages, holiday
pay, and holiday allowances. Coverage by a collective agreement and
depends on whether or not the employer and/or employee is a party to
and covered by a collective agreement. In the Netherlands and Germany,
collective agreements can be declared generally binding, covering all those
who fall within their scope. A generally binding collective agreement can
have a similar effect to statute law, but at sectoral level. As there is no
possibility to declare a collective agreement generally binding in Sweden,
the social partners must ensure that employers sign collective agreements.
Otherwise, employers and their employees may decide on their own what
wage will be paid. Precisely this Swedish model of industrial relations was
at stake in the Laval case. The Laval judgement reveals the limits of the
Swedish industrial relations model in the context of the posting of workers.
As a result of that judgement, Sweden has assessed ways to amend
its system, and adopted an amended Posting of Workers Act (1999:678) in
April 2010, known as the Lex Laval. While the option to provide for the
possibility to declare collective agreements generally binding was rejected,
the new provision limiting the exercise of the right to take collective action
was passed by the Swedish Parliament. Based on this amendment, the
social partners may take collective action only if several conditions are
met. It must, inter alia, be assess whether the collective action corresponds
to conditions contained in a national sectoral collective agreement applied
throughout Sweden. Moreover, no collective action may be held if foreign
employers are able to show that his workers are afforded at least condi-
tions that are at least as favourable as conditions of the national sectoral
collective agreement. It should be observed that Laval has had a huge
impact on the way Sweden regulates and enforces employment rights.
Although the Swedish industrial relations model works within an “inter-
nal” situation, this is not the case (anymore) due to the (case law in the
context of the) PWD. It has shown the limits of the Swedish industrial
relations model, which is not recognised as such under the PWD. There-
fore, the Swedish Government launched an Inquiry on Lex Laval in 2012,
due to be published by the end of December 2014.
A look into the sectoral regulation of minimum wages, holiday pay
and holiday allowances in the construction and temporary agency work
sector has provided a mixed picture. In the Netherlands, employees are
protected by the generally binding collective agreements applicable in
both sectors. The agreements apply to foreign and domestic employers
and employees. The social partners in the Netherlands identified particular
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provisions that apply to Union workers and posted workers. As a conse-
quence of the general binding nature of the collective agreements applicable
in the two sectors, all employees falling under the scope of one of these
agreements are entitled to a sectoral minimum wage, holiday pay, and
holiday allowance. The latter corresponds to the statutory holiday allowance
of 8 per cent. In Germany, on the other hand, generally binding collective
agreements exist only in the construction sector, not for the temporary agency
work sector. This means that in relation to construction work, all employees
are entitled to receive a sectoral minimum hourly wage and an amount
comprising holiday pay and holiday allowance. The rights for temporary
agencyworkers are not mandatory, with the exception of a sectoral minimum
wage. The entitlement to holiday pay and holiday allowance thus depends on
being bound to a collective agreement or if such has been individually agreed
in the employment contract. In Sweden, as has been said above, no collective
agreement is generally binding, meaning that, if the employer and the
employee are covered by one of the agreements due to membership of one
of the signature parties or in case the employer has signed the agreement
directly, the employees will receive a wage, holiday pay, and probably also a
holiday allowance in accordance with the provisions of relevant collective
agreements. And if employers are not bound, their employees will not be
entitled to the aforementioned labour conditions.
From an EU perspective, the Dutch and German legal systems seem
to fit EU law, and in particular the PWD, best. The employment conditions
are regulated by the collective agreements that are published, allowing
workers and employers to know beforehand what they are entitled to or
obliged to do. This, to a certain extent, is not true of the Swedish system. It
may be observed that EU law in the context of the posting of workers
seems to prefer national legislation or collective agreements that are
declared generally binding.
As the free movement of workers is based on the principle of equal
treatment, no difficulties can be seen in the way employment conditions
are regulated. Even though the EU explicitly states that it respects the
“diversity of national industrial relations systems” (recital 14 Posted
Workers Enforcement Directive), studying the Swedish industrial relations
model has shown that it cannot protect the (minimum) wage of posted
workers. The PWD allows Sweden to regulate wages in a way that is not
explicitly laid down as prescribed by the Directive. This, coupled with the
case law, does, however, not allow Swedish trade unions to compel non-
bound employers (ie service providers) to sign a collective agreement by
means of collective action. It seems that Sweden will not change its way of
regulating labour law, at least not in the near future.
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CHAPTER 5
JUDICIAL ENFORCEMENT METHOD
5.1 Introduction
Under EU rules and case law, everyone whose rights and freedoms have
been violated must be afforded access to a court or a tribunal (Arts 47
EUCFR and 19 TEU). Having access to a court or tribunal means access to
judicial protection.1 Four main subjects are addressed in this chapter. It
starts with discussing the legal rules on access to a court (section 5.2). The
discussion embraces the legal regulation of jurisdiction, domestic rules on
locus standi for individual employees and social partners, interim procedures
and collective redress, and legal aid. Secondly, aspects of judicial procedures
are described, such as time limits and evidential rules (section 5.3). Thirdly,
an instrument is discussed that has gained particular importance in the
enforcement of worker’s rights: the liability of a (sub)contractor or a user
undertaking for the payment of minimum wages, holiday pay and holiday
allowances (section 5.4). Finally, existing remedies are exemplified in case
employees did not (or only partly) receive their wage holiday pay and
holiday allowance (section 5.5).
5.2 Access to a court
5.2.1 Introduction
If the substantive rights dealt with in Chapters 3 and 4 are to be effectively
guaranteed, the parties concerned need to be able to initiate legal action
against an employer who fails to observe such rights. One of the questions
that arises in cross-border situations is whether the court that has been
petitioned has jurisdiction. An important instrument adopted at EU level
is Regulation (EC) 44/2001 on the jurisdiction and the recognition and
1 It has been said that in line with Arts 6 and 13 ECHR, the ECJ recognised that
Member States must have judicial procedures for dealing with claims following
infringements of a directive. See, eg, Case 222/84 Johnston ECLI:EU:C:1986:206. See
section 2.2 above.
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enforcement of judgements in civil and commercial matters.2 Article 6
PWD is also relevant, as it ensures that foreign workers have access to a
court in their (temporary) host state in case their rights have been
infringed. As a result, domestic rules on jurisdiction and access to a court
in cross-border disputes are largely uniform in this respect (sections 5.2.2
and 5.2.3). Another measure enacted to facilitate cross-border access to
judicial protection is the Legal Aid Directive (section 5.2.6). Two of the
measures that are also dealt with in this section, which have not been
regulated at EU level, are group litigations (section 5.2.4) and interim
measures (section 5.2.5).
5.2.2 EU rules on jurisdiction: Regulation (EU) 44/2001 and Article 6 PWD
To facilitate the sound operation of the internal market, in which free
movement rights are ensured, the EU adopted Regulation (EU) 44/2001
on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgements in civil
and commercial matters (‘Brussels I Regulation’).3 The Brussels I Regula-
tion applies to all civil and commercial matters, and matters relating to
individual contracts of employment.4
An employee, or his representative, who wishes to sue his employer
for not paying the minimum wage to which he is entitled, may do so,
taking the following rules into account. An employer may be sued in a
court of the Member State in which he is domiciled or in another Member
State (Art 19). There are two options here, namely in the courts of the place
where or from where the employee habitually carries out his work or
where he did so, or if there is no place where the employee does or did
habitually carry out work, in the court of the place where the business
2 Regulation (EC) 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition
and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters [2001] OJ L12/1
(Brussels I Regulation). Regulation (EU) 1215/2012 of 12 December 2012 on
jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and
commercial matters [2012] OJ L351/1 (Brussels I-Bis Regulation) will enter into
force as of 10 January 2015, replacing Regulation (EC) 44/2001. In relation to
employment contracts, no substantial amendments have been made. See on this
new Regulation: Kramer (2013).
3 See in particular recitals 1 and 2 of the preamble. For an interesting article on the
process of Europeanisation of civil procedures see: Tulibacka (2009).
4 Art 1, in conjunction with Chapter I Section 5. Recital 138 of the preamble
determines that “[i]n relation to […] employment, the weaker party should be
protected by rules of jurisdiction more favourable to his interests than the general
rules provide for”.
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which engaged the employer is or was situated.5 The parties to an
employment contract are allowed to derogate from these rules only to a
limited extent. If they wish to do so, they must do so by agreement, either
entered into after the dispute has arisen, or by allowing the employee to
bring a legal action in the courts other than those referred to above
(Art 21).
Article 67 Brussels I Regulation determines that this shall not affect
rules governing jurisdiction in specific Community instruments or in
Member State legislation harmonised pursuant to such instruments. An
example is Art 6 PWD, under which, the host Member State has to ensure
that posted workers may (also) institute civil actions there. It is explicitly
stated that it is the Member State in which the work is temporarily carried
out which has to guarantee that posting employers apply the core
conditions to their posted employees for the duration of their posting
(Art 3(1) PWD). Furthermore, this provision does not prejudice the right
under existing international conventions on jurisdiction to institute legal
actions in another state (eg, the employee’s home state). Article 6 PWD has
been reiterated in Art 11 Posted Workers Enforcement Directive. Similarly,
Art 3 Union Workers Enforcement Directive determines that the state in
which the Union worker works shall ensure that judicial procedures are
available for the enforcement of the rights derived from Art 45 TFEU and
Arts 1 to 10 Regulation (EU) 492/2011.6
5.2.3 Locus standi of employees and social partners
Having established the EU rules on jurisdiction, we now look at whether
and, if so, how individuals and social partners can gain access to a
Member State court. This involves the question of locus standi, ie the
right or capacity of an individual to bring an action or to appear in a court,
which is closely related to issues of jurisdiction. Based on EU law,
5 Art 60 Brussels I Regulation clarifies that a company or legal person or association
of natural or legal persons is domiciled in the place where it has it statutory seat,
central administration or principal place of business.
6 Directive 2014/67/EU of 15 May 2014 on the enforcement of Directive 96/71/EC
concerning the posting of workers in the framework of the provision of services
and amending Regulation (EU) No 1024/2012 on administrative cooperation
through the Internal Market Information System (‘the IMI Regulation’) [2014] OJ
L159/11 (‘Posted Workers Enforcement Directive’) and Directive 2014/54/EU of
16 April 2014 on measures facilitating the exercise of rights conferred on workers in
the context of freedom of movement for workers [2014] OJ L128/8 (‘Union
Workers Enforcement Directive’). See on these Directives sections 2.3.3 and 2.3.4
above.
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employees who cross borders must have access to a court if their employer
fails to observe their rights. For posted workers, in addition, access to the
temporary host state court must also be guaranteed. An underlying
principle known from labour law is that, before initiating proceedings in
court, an employee first has to call his employer to account for not
complying with his obligations under national statutory law and/or
collective agreements, before initiating judicial proceedings. The domestic
rules on locus standi of individual employees and social partners are
considered below.
A. Locus standi of Union workers and posted workers
Locus standi of Union workers
Foreign employees who are regularly employed – even temporarily – by
an employer in the host state and whose rights under Dutch, German or
Swedish statutory and collectively agreed employment agreements have
been infringed can, in principle, institute legal proceedings. In that regard,
the labour courts (Germany and Sweden) or civil courts (the Netherlands
and Sweden) enjoy broad jurisdiction. Both the Dutch Civil Court7 and the
German Labour Court8 are competent to deal with employees’ claims
concerning rights that arise out of an employment relationship,9 including
claims based on a failure of the employer to pay the statutory or (generally
binding) collective minimum wage, holiday pay, and holiday allowance.
Access to the Civil Court in the Netherlands is only granted if the work the
employee has performed normally is or lately has been performed in the
Netherlands.10 In Germany, it suffices that the Labour Court can rule on a
claim if the claim arises out of the employment relationship.11 This is
likely to be the case if a foreign employee is employed by an employer
established in Germany.
7 Art 6(b) Wetboek van burgerlijke rechtsvordering (‘Rv’) (Code of Civil Procedure).
8 § 2(1) No. 3a Arbeitsgerichtsgesetz (‘ArbGG’) (Act on Court Procedure in Labour
Law Matters (Arbeitsgerichtsgesetz in der Fassung der Bekanntmachung vom 2.
Juli 1979 (BGBl. I S. 853, 1036), das zuletzt durch Artikel 3 des Gesetzes vom 10.
Oktober 2013 (BGBl. I S. 3786) geändert worden ist), das durch Artikel 3 des
Gesetzes vom 10. Oktober 2013 (BGBl. I S. 3786) geändert worden ist).
9 The German provision speaks about “aus dem Arbeitsverhältnis“ and the Dutch
provision about “[…] zaken betreffende […] een arbeidsovereenkomst“.
10 Art 6(b) Rv; Kamerstukken II 1990/91, 26 855, nr. 3, 35.
11 §§ 2 and 3 ArbGG; Hauck, Helml & Biebl (2011) (Helml) § 2 ArbGG, para 25; Bader,
Creutzfeldt & Friedrich (2008) § 2 ArbGG, para 7; Germelmann, Matthes &
Prütting (1999) (Schlewing) § 2 ArbGG, para 56.
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The situation in Sweden is different. Here, the competence of the
Labour Court depends on whether the employer and employee are bound
by a collective agreement. If both the employer and the employee are
bound, the Labour Court is competent. In situations where the employer
and/or employee are not bound, the Swedish District Court is competent.
The Swedish Labour Court, in first and final instance, deals with any
dispute initiated by an individual employer or an employers’ association
or a trade union.12 Accordingly, the Labour Court has jurisdiction in all
labour disputes covering disputes on collective agreements, collective
labour legislation and individual employment contracts.13 These largely
concern disputes between employers’ associations or individual employ-
ers and trade unions concerning collective agreements, the Co-determina-
tion Act (1976:580) or other disputes, provided the parties are bound by
the same collective agreement.14 Thus, the Swedish Labour Court deals
only with disputes in case both the employer and the employee are bound
by a collective agreement or in case the employer is bound by a collective
agreement and must apply the agreement to its non-unionised employ-
ees.15 Particular rules apply to disputes regarding temporary agency
work.16 Accordingly, the Judicial Procedure in Labour Disputes Act
(1974:371) applies to disputes regarding temporary agency work, which
means that the Labour Court is assigned competence. The reason for this
particular provision is that the Labour Court can rule on a case between a
user undertaking and a temporary agency worker.17 Consequently, the
provision presumes that in case there is a dispute between the temporary
agency worker and a user undertaking, the parties will be considered as
employee and employer. Otherwise, the employees would have to go to
the District Court, merely because they have no employment relationship
with the user undertaking.
The Swedish District Court is competent regarding disputes invol-
ving employees that do not belong to an established trade union (ie a trade
12 Section 2:1 Judicial Procedure in Labour Disputes Act (1974:371) (Lag om rättegång-
en i arbetstvister).
13 Fahlbeck (2002), 126.
14 Section 1:1 Judicial Procedure in Labour Disputes Act (1974:371).
15 Engblom (2009) 26.
16 Section 17 Act on Temporary Agency Work (2012:854).
17 Prop. 2011/12:178, 65. This is consistent with the Diskrimineringslag (2008:567)
(Discrimination Act), Chapter 6, Section 1(1). To allow a variety of individuals to
have access to judicial protection, the Discrimination Act (2008:567) determines
that job seekers and individuals who perform work as temporary or borrowed
labour shall also be regarded as employees.
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union not being a party to the collective agreement) and their employer.18
Disputes can be brought before the District Court in cases where the
Labour Court has no jurisdiction,19 or where the dispute concerns a
member of a trade union who is not represented by his trade union.
Individual employees who are not member of a trade union are entitled to
bring a case against their employer based on a failure to comply with
statutory labour provisions, such as the Annual Leave Act, or their
employment contract; claiming compliance with a collective agreement
is not possible if employees are not members of the signatory trade union.
Locus standi of posted workers
Particular rules apply in relation to posted (temporary agency) workers, as
they are regularly employed in their home state and only temporarily
posted to the host state. Because of Art 6 PWD, host Member States must
provide posted (temporary agency) workers with an additional forum,
enabling them to initiate legal action in the temporary host state.
All three countries have implemented this provision. While in
Germany and the Netherlands claims of posted workers can also be based
on generally applicable provisions of (certain sectoral) collective agree-
ments, no such option exists in Sweden, if neither the employer nor the
posted worker is a member of the signatory parties to the collective
agreement. As Sweden does not have a system by which collective
agreements may be declared generally binding, there is no possibility
for the employee to enforce compliance with a collective agreement when
their employer is not bound or when no incorporation clause has been
inserted in the individual employment contract.
To simplify posted workers’ access to the court, all countries refer
(directly or indirectly) in their laws to the core employment conditions
based on which posted workers have access to judicial protection. Em-
ployees who are only temporarily employed in the Netherlands may lodge
a claim with the civil court, if the claim is based on one of the following
provisions: Art 1 Wet arbeidsvoorwaarden grensoverschrijdende arbeid
(‘WAGA’) (Terms of Employment (Cross-Border Work) Act)20 (referring
18 Schmidt (1977) 39.
19 Section 2:1 Judicial Procedure in Labour Disputes Act (1974:371).
20 This Act partly implements the PWD. Wet van 2 december 1999 tot uitvoering van
de Richtlijn 96/71/EG van het Europees parlement en van de Raad van de
Europese Unie van 16 december 1996 betreffende de terbeschikkingstelling van
werknemers met het oog op het verrichten van diensten (PbEG 1997, L 18) (Wet
arbeidsvoorwaarden grensoverschrijdende arbeid), Stb. 1999, 554.
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to the applicable provisions of the Civil Code to posted workers), Arts 7 or
15 WML (minimum wage and minimum holiday allowance), Art 2(6) Wet
AVV (generally binding collective agreements relating to key central
employment conditions), as well as Art 8 or 11 Waadi (equal treatment/
pay obligation).21 In any case, the rules on jurisdiction should not be
interpreted too narrowly.22
A similar approach is found in Germany. Here, posted workers who
base their claim directly on employment conditions laid down in German
statutory or administrative regulations (§ 2 AEntG), mandatory collec-
tively regulated employment conditions (§ 8 AEntG), or the liability of the
contractor for the payment of minimum wages and payments to be made
to the joint institutions such as ULAK (§ 14 AEntG), may bring their case
before the German Labour Court (§ 15 AEntG).23
§ 15 AEntG does not provide an exclusive jurisdiction for German
Labour Courts, but creates an additional jurisdiction in cases of transna-
tional postings.24 That provision itself does not claim to have international
jurisdiction within the meaning of Art 67 Brussels I Regulation,25 but
ensures that material and procedural law run pari passu.26 A close reading
of that provision makes it clear that it applies to employees who are or
have been posted within the scope of the AEntG.
In Sweden, under Section 10 Posting of Workers Act (1999:678), the
Judicial Procedure in Labour Disputes Act (1974:371) is applicable to the
21 Though not explicitly referred to in Art 6(c) Rv, the worker’s claim may also
concern the Working Time Act (Kamerstukken II 2002/03, 28 863, nr. 3, 5). This
provision was implemented quite some time after the official deadline for trans-
position of the PWD. It appeared that this provision initially had been implemen-
ted, but was omitted in the review of the Code of Civil Procedure.
22 Kamerstukken II 1999/00, 26 855, nr. 3, 35. As far as collective agreements are
concerned, it is important to note that under Art 6(b) Rv, the Dutch judge does not
have jurisdiction to rule on foreign collective agreements, ie agreements that have
been concluded for employment relationships situated outside the Netherlands.
This follows from the addition of the word “individual” to the employment
relationship. The argumentum e contrario is that the Dutch judge is competent to
rule on Dutch collective agreements. Nevertheless, the Dutch judge may have
jurisdiction if it follows from the circumstances of the case.
23 Koberski (2011) § 15 AEntG, para 10, referring to BAG 11.09.2002 – 5 AZB 3/02 –
NZA 2003, 62 and BAG 19.05.2004 – 5 AZR 449/03 , NZA 2004, 1170 according to
which the provision claims not only jurisdiction for foreign (posted) workers, but
also entitles the labour courts to deal with disputes arising out of the AEntG.
24 Müller-Glöge, Preis & Schmidt (Eds.) (2014) (Schlachter) § 15 AEntG, para 3. See
also BAG 2.07.2008 – 10 AZR 355/07 (LAG Hessen 12.02.2007 16 Sa 1366/06)
confirming the additional jurisdiction for cross-border postings.
25 BAG 2.07.2008 – 10 AZR 355/07 (LAG Hessen 12.02.2007 – 16 Sa 1366/06), NZA
2008, 1084, referring to Preis & Temming (2006) 194ff.
26 Müller-Glöge, Preis & Schmidt (Eds.) (2014) (Schlachter) § 15 AEntG, para 1.
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employee’s claim based on the core employment conditions of (Section 5
(1) or (3)), including which the Annual Leave Act (1977:480)), the right of
association, and the right of negotiation (Section 7 Posting of Workers Act
(1999:678)). An employee who is not a trade union member cannot enforce a
collective agreement against the employer in court, even though the latter
may be obliged to apply it to his employees. However, if the application of
the collective agreement has been agreed, the employee can rely on his
employment contract. Non-bound employees are to a certain extent de-
prived of the possibility to enforce the provisions of the collective agree-
ment.27 This is not because there is a procedural rule that hinders them from
initiating judicial proceedings, but rather because employees derive no
rights from a collective agreement if they are not a member of the signatory
trade union. This is similar in the Netherland and Germany, in the event the
collective agreement has not been declared generally binding.28
The Laval Inquiry Committee, which had to propose measures in
response to the Laval case, concluded that the existing situation was
contrary to EU law, and in particular Art 6 PWD. Whether this conclusion
is correct can be disputed. The PWD does not oblige Member States to
introduce core employment conditions as such. Only if Member States
have such employment conditions, and they are laid down as provided by
the Directive, then they must also be guaranteed to posted workers. This
also means that posted workers must be able to claim their rights in court.
Notwithstanding, the Committee recommended that posted workers
should be given a special right to claim terms and conditions, laid down
in statutory law and in collective agreements, even if they are not
members of the signatory trade union. Posted workers, the Committee
argues, should be able, at least for the duration of the posting, to refer to
the applicable collective agreement.29
However, the Swedish Labour Court and one of the leading
employers’ organisations objected to this proposal. According to the
employers’ organisations, such a rule would discriminate against foreign
employers, as they would become ‘bound’ by a collective agreement but
not as prescribed by the PWD (Art 3(1) and (8)). This would not apply to
domestic employers and is therefore discriminatory, and probably not
permitted under Rush Portuguesa.30 Moreover, it would be idiosyncratic as
27 Adlercreutz & Nyström (2009) para 565.
28 See also Art 14 Wet CAO in the Netherlands below.
29 SOU 2008:123, 67.
30 Case C-113/89 Rush Portuguesa ECLI:EU:C:1990:142.
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regards the Swedish model, under which employers and employees can
only become bound by a collective agreement if both are members of one
of the signatory parties or if the employer is obliged to apply the collective
agreement to all employees or if the individual employment contract
contains an application or reference clause.
In disputes, in particular if they involve a cross-border element, an
important question is who bears the costs after the court has given its
ruling. Often, unless the judge determines otherwise, the parties in labour
law disputes bear their own costs.31 In that regard, judicial proceedings in
labour law can be said to be “inexpensive”; workers do not therefore face
high costs for proceedings initiated against their employer.
Based on a study conducted in 2011 by Van Hoek and Houwerzijl,
posted workers hardly ever initiate judicial proceedings in the host state in
order to claim their rights.32 There are many reasons why posted workers
initiate relatively few proceedings.33 Based on the better-off approach,
which means that posted anyway – even if underpaid – receive more
favourable employment conditions when being posted, they have no
interest in initiating proceedings. Secondly, although awareness-raising
initiatives have been undertaken, it seems that the information still does
not reach the posted workers. Thirdly, it seems that posted workers do not
dare starting a proceeding against their employer, trying to avoid any
legal conflicts. One of the reasons for this is that they are economically
dependent on their employer making the posting. Fourthly, workers that
are posted seem to be suspicious of the judicial system in their home
country and transfer this distrust to the host state courts.34 In addition, it is
difficult to find one’s way in another state’s judicial system. It should be
added that financial aspects may also deter a posted worker from relying
on the jurisdiction clause in the host state. As the Advocate General in the
Commission v Italy case emphasised,
“It may be true that, in the abstract, it is no more difficult to pursue a legal claim
in another Member State. […] the reason for the provision at issue is not mistrust
31 The Netherlands: Art 237 Rv; Germany: § 12a ArbGG; Sweden: Chapter 5 Section 2
Judicial Procedure in Labour Disputes Act (1974:371).
32 Van Hoek & Houwerzijl (2011b) 140.
33 The reasons are based on Van Hoek & Houwerzijl (2011b) 141-2.
34 Reference should be made to the Gal-Met case, in which the Polish employer paid a
fine, after an amicable settlement of the dispute, for not paying the collectively
agreed wage to its Polish workers who were working in Denmark. Back in Poland,
Gal-Met initiated proceedings against the three employees for which it had paid
the fines in order to recover the fines paid. See for a more detailed overview of the
problems with questions on private international law and jurisdiction: Evju (2010).
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of the courts of other Member States, but the resources of the workers affected.
Since in the case of unpaid wages and salaries it is […] generally not a question of
very large sums of money, there is a particular risk that the cost of bringing a
legal action will be disproportionately high”.35
Moreover, even though it is possible to pursue a claim abroad, it is
generally more expensive to do so in the event a correspondence lawyer
must be engaged. Furthermore, language barriers may be present, requir-
ing documents to be translated. It can be assumed that more importantly,
besides the financial and practical aspects mentioned, when initiating a
claim in another Member State it can be expected that judicial proceedings
“[…] can operate psychologically to inhibit the worker in question”.36
Another problem posted workers seem to face is that they are sometimes
unaware of their employer’s identity. This will usually become apparent
when problems are experienced with the payment of wages.37
Another difficulty may be that home state courts in which posted
workers can also initiate proceedings are not obliged to apply host state
law. Therefore, Grušić suggests obliging the home state court to apply the
host state mandatory employment conditions. Making the home state
court co-responsible for the judicial enforcement of labour law may indeed
remove – at least partly – the difficulties mentioned.38 One reason why
this should be considered is that it may be more likely that posted workers
will pursue their claim in a home state court, as they are more familiar
with the country’s legal system, language and so on. The key problem that
exists is that, so far, EU law does not require the home state court to rule
on foreign law applicable under the PWD. It is the host state that must
guarantee the key central employment conditions to posted workers in
their territory, and the PWD “leaves open which terms can be invoked if a
posted worker sues in his home country”.39 Art 9(3) Rome I Regulation40
may not be of any help, either, as it determines that “Effect may be given
to the overriding mandatory provisions of the law of the country where
the obligations arising out of the contract have to be or have been
35 Case C-279/00 Commission v Italy ECLI:EU:C:2002:89, para 34.
36 Case C-279/00 Commission v Italy ECLI:EU:C:2002:89, Opinion AG Alber, paras 34-6.
37 Muller (2010) 55.
38 Grušić (2015). In Dutch law, there is an example of a provision obliging the home
state court to respect host state law, namely Art 2 WAGA.
39 Evju (2010) 90.
40 [2008] OJ 177/6 (Rome I Regulation).
Chapter 5
152
performed, in so far as those overriding mandatory provisions render the
performance of the contract unlawful […]” (emphasis added).
The last part of the sentence is probably related to the illegality of
the contract as a result of applying the overriding mandatory provisions.41
Failure to observe host state employment conditions hardly leads to
unlawfulness of the contract. It rather allows the employee to institute
proceedings in which he claims the payment of his wage and holiday pay
and allowance, probably including interest, but it would not render the
contract itself illegal. In fact what is needed, according to Grušić, is the
reintroduction of Art 7(1) Rome Convention, according to which
“[…] effect may be given to the mandatory rules of the law of another country
with which the situation has a close connection, if and in so far as, under the law
of the latter country, those rules must be applied whatever the law applicable to the
contract. […]” (emphasis added).42
This provision is formulated so as to leave room for discretion to the home
state court, and may therefore not solve the problem. As a result, it is for
the home state court to rule on a case based on its own conflict of laws
rules.43 It is not very likely that this provision will be reintroduced, nor
will the PWD and the two enforcement Directives be amended in this
regard.
A new provision has been included in the Posted Workers Enforce-
ment Directive, which may help to overcome this dilemma. Art 11
determines that
“Member States shall ensure that the employer of the posted worker is liable for
any due entitlements resulting from the contractual relationship between the
employer and that posted worker. Member States shall in particular ensure that
the necessary mechanisms are in place to ensure that the posted workers are able
to receive:
41 Grušić (2015).
42 Grušić (2015). In order to establish which foreign law must be applied, the
Guiliano/Lagarde report, 27, determines that there must be a genuine connection,
which seems to exist “[…] when the contract is to be performed in that other
country or when one party is resident or has his main place of business in that
other country”. Furthermore, the report emphasises that there must be a connec-
tion between the contract as a whole and the law of a country other than that to
which the contract is submitted. Mario Guiliano and Paul Lagarde, Report on the
Convention on the law applicable to contractual obligations [1980] OJ C282/1.
43 Evju (2010) 91.
Judicial enforcement method
153
(a) any outstanding net remuneration which, under the applicable terms and
conditions of employment covered by Article 3 of Directive 96/71/EC,
would have been due;
(b) any back-payments or refund of taxes or social security contributions
unduly withheld from their salaries;
(c) a refund of excessive costs, in relation to net remuneration or to the quality
of the accommodation, withheld or deducted from wages for accommoda-
tion provided by the employer;
(d) where relevant, employer’s contributions due to common funds or institu-
tions of social partners unduly withheld from their salaries”.
This provision obliges the home states to ensure that posted workers can
initiate proceedings in the above situations.
B. Locus standi for social partners
Social partners have an interest of their own that both domestic and
foreign employees comply with their (generally binding) collective agree-
ments. Ensuring compliance with a collective agreement also creates a
level playing field, at least insofar as employees and employers are
covered. In the context of the posting of workers, social partners thus
can not only protect the legal position of posted workers, but can also
ensure the competitiveness of domestic workers.44
Social partners have different options to enforce collective agree-
ments. In the Netherlands and Sweden they have, viewed overall, (far-
reaching) possibilities to ensure compliance with the applicable collective
agreements to which they are parties. The rights of social partners in
Germany are less strong. Here, only ULAK, the social partner institution
for the holiday fund in the construction sector, has received a monitoring
and enforcing role.
Monitoring and enforcing (generally binding) collective agreements
is a task for the social partners that have signed the agreement. No public
role is ascribed to them in the Netherlands and Sweden. Social partners in
the Netherlands have a more powerful role when it comes to monitoring
and enforcing generally binding collective agreements, even if the em-
ployee is not a union member. Employers’ and employees’ representatives
can invoke the nullity of a clause in an individual employment contract
that contravenes a generally applicable collective agreement.45 They can
do so regardless of whether or not the opposite party is a member of one
44 Houwerzijl (2005) 154.
45 Art 3(2) Wet AVV.
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of the organisations.46 This, however, does not very often happen in practice,
with the parties to the collective agreement going to court47; they often have
their own dispute resolution mechanisms in their collective agreements. If
informal steps do not succeed, trade unions take the case before the civil court.
An equivalent provision applies in relation to collective agreements that are
not generally binding, with the difference that only the signatory parties
(based on reciprocal contractual obligations) can enforce the collective agree-
ment.48 Furthermore, a trade union or employers’ association can request the
Minister of Employment and Social Affairs to commence investigations in
that regard (Art 10 in conjunction with Art 3(4) Wet AVV).49 Generally, the
Minister, which is in practice the ISZW, has to act upon such a request. As of
1 January 2014, legal persons entrusted with the monitoring and enforcement
of collective agreements are also permitted to submit a request.50
In a note of November 2011, the FNV complained that its monitor-
ing and enforcement options were restricted in some ways. This refers to
the fact that the ISZW is allowed to check the employer’s administration,
while a trade union would be denied such a possibility, unless an
employer were voluntarily to assent to a request.51 That would enable
the trade union to assess how far rights and obligations have been
ignored, before taking possible legal action against an employer. Whether
the social partners are indeed restricted in their options for ensuring
compliance with collective agreements may be left open at present, except
to note that the role of the state and the social partners cannot be equated.
Moreover, monitoring and enforcing generally binding collective agree-
ments involves financial efforts, taking into account that the agreements
are also enforced on those employees who are not union members. In fact,
such activities are time-consuming and costly. The difficulty is that where
46 Van Drongelen (2012) 344.
47 Bouwens, Houwerzijl & Roozendaal (2013) 252. Two examples are: Rb. Groningen
5 Oktober 2010, ECLI:NL:RBGRO:2012:BX9234, JAR 2012, 269 (FNV Bondgenoten/
REMAK S.A.); Rb. Roermond 10 August 2011, ECLI:NL:RBROE:2011:BR4863, JAR
2011, 234 (FNV Bondgenoten/Mooy Oost Europa Service BV) noted by Edith JA
Franssen.
48 Art 15 Wet CAO.
49 The investigations consist of an audit by the ISZW, that, based on general
administrative law, may enter the business and examine the books. Van Drongelen
(2012) 348-9.
50 The new paragraph has been included in Art 10(2) Wet AVV by Wet van 9 oktober
2013 tot wijziging van de Wet structuur uitvoeringsorganisatie werk en inkomen
en enige andere wetten in verband met fraudeaanpak door gegevensuitwisselingen
en het effectief gebruik van binnen de overheid bekende zijnde gegevens, Stb. 2013,
405.
51 FNV (2011) 24.
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institutions governed by private law are concerned, there are no instru-
ments available to gain access to an employer’s workplace, for instance.
In relation to their employee members, Swedish trade unions have a
very powerful role when it comes to disputes concerning a collective
agreement or an employment relationship. As already mentioned, a trade
union may bring an action before the Labour Court on behalf of its
members, even if the individuals concerned do not want to proceed. A
precondition is that the parties are bound by a collective agreement or the
dispute concerns an employee employed in a sector or activity by an
employer who is bound by a collective agreement which he must apply to
that employee. As the Labour Court is only competent to deal with cases
in which there is a collective interest, only the social partners have direct
access to the Labour Court if the dispute concerns one of their members.52
The protection afforded non-members is rather limited, if not absent.
The Swedish union’s strong position can be explained by the fact
that the union has an interest of its own that the collective agreement
should be applied (correctly). From a more collective point of view it
can also be said that if an individual is acting on his own, the outcome of
the dispute might also have an impact – negative or positive – on other
trade union members. Thus, in light of the general interest, a trade union
has the right to represent its members.53 Moreover, it does not matter
whether the social partners pursue a claim to advance their members’
interests or whether they have a claim of their own. From a more practical
point of view, it also seems valuable as, before bringing a claim to the
Labour Court, the trade union has to assess the likelihood that the claim
will succeed. Moreover, in case the employer brings an action against the
participants in an unlawful strike, there are most likely a large number of
defendants whom the union can represent.54 In practice, it often seems
impossible for an individual employee-member to enforce his contractual
rights without trade union support.55 Union members receive both
financial as well as practical support in case of a conflict between the
member and his employer.56 Only in case the trade union refuses to do so,
can the employee initiate legal action himself.57 If, in this context, we
consider Art 5 PWD, it seems that the Directive does not prohibit such a
52 Adlercreutz & Nyström (2009) para 386.
53 Schmidt (1977) 57-8.
54 Schmidt (1977) 41-2.
55 Malmberg (2002) 190.
56 Bruun (2002) 36-7.
57 Schmidt (1977) 42.
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powerful role of representatives, as this refers to procedures that are
“available to workers and/or their representatives”.
But what about employees who are not member of a trade union
and whose employer is not obliged to apply a collective agreement to
them? Here, two situations must be distinguished: the situation in which
the non-unionised employee is employed by an employer that is a party to
the collective agreement, and the situation in which neither the employer
nor the employee are bound by a collective agreement. In proceedings
before the Labour Court, trade unions are not permitted to act directly on
behalf of a non-member, for instance by initiating proceedings claiming
compensation for a violation of the collective agreement. Matters are
different if the employer or his representative is party to the collective
agreement. This also holds true for the Netherlands.58
Another, but essential, characteristic of the Swedish model is that
only few disputes are settled in court.59 An explanation for this is the
perception that conflicts of rights should be resolved through negotia-
tions.60 In line with that idea, mostly dispute negotiations61 must take
place before going to the Labour Court.62 The purpose of dispute
negotiations is to settle the dispute out of court and, in case no settlement
can be reached, to prepare the case for court.
The Swedish Judicial Procedure in Labour Disputes Act (1974:371)
explicitly requires the parties first to negotiate before lodging a claim with
the Labour Court, either as requested by the Co-determination Act
(1976:580) or as requested and regulated by the applicable collective
agreement.63 No such obligation applies to cases dealt with by the District
Court.64 In case the parties do not negotiate, the consequence would be
that the Labour Court will refuse to deal with the dispute. An exception
may apply in case the cause for not having negotiated is not the plaintiff’s
responsibility. A similar obligation applies as regards disputes between
employees and employers in the construction sector and the agency
58 Art 14 Wet CAO creates only an obligation on the employer towards the trade
union, provided the employer is bound by the collective agreement.
59 Van Hoek & Houwerzijl (2011b) 138-9.
60 Nyström (2004) 6-7.
61 In the literature, also the term grievance negotiations or procedures are used. See
Fahlbeck (1977) and Fahlbeck (1987).
62 Section 4:7 Judicial Procedure in Labour Disputes Act (1974:371) and Section 63 Co-
determination Act (1976:580). This type of bargaining can be referred to as
“grievance bargaining on disputes of rights”, a form of negotiation recognised
under Section 10 Co-determination Act (1979:580). Nyström (2004) 8.
63 Section 4:7(1) Co-determination Act (1976:580).
64 Adlercreutz & Nyström (2009) para 416.
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sector.65 Particular provisions on dispute negotiations are also laid down
in the Co-determination Act (1976:580).
If the trade union fails to commence negotiations an employee who
has been or still is a member of the trade union and who is affected by the
dispute, may bring an action within one month after the expiry of that
time.66 If however, under the Labour Disputes (Judicial Procedure) Act
(1974:371) negotiations must precede a court action, the aforementioned
time limit shall apply to the right to start negotiations. A court action can
then be brought within three months after the conclusion of the negotia-
tions.67 An employee who cannot be represented by a trade union must
institute court proceedings, taking account of a time limit of four months,
starting from the day he became aware of the circumstances to which the
claim relates, and within two years after the occurrence of such
circumstances.
Compared to the Netherlands and Sweden, a trade union in
Germany has only marginal possibilities to enforce a collective agreement.
Here, enforcement of the core employment conditions under the AEntG is
left to the public authorities (see Chapter 7 below). An exception is the
possibility of ULAK, which will be dealt with separately below. In
Germany, as employees are the beneficiaries of the rights included in
collective agreements, they go to court themselves.68 Besides, and more
importantly, there is also a legal obstacle against trade unions directly
initiating a legal action against an employer based on a collective agree-
ment. Direct action is only possible if the employer himself is a party to the
collective agreement concluded with the trade union, which is, for
instance, the case if a collective agreement has been concluded between
the trade union and an individual employer.69 If the collective agreement
has been concluded by an employers’ and employees’ organisation (a so-
called Verbandstarifvertrag70), claims initiated by a trade union cannot be
directed against the employer but only against the employers’ organisa-
tion, as a single individual employer is not a party to the collective
agreement.71 Unlike the Netherlands and Sweden, where membership
of an employers’ association allows employees to file suit directly against a
65 § 10 National Collective Agreement 2010 for the construction sector; albeit less
detailed, § 23 Blue-Collar Agency Workers Collective Agreement.
66 Section 66 Co-determination Act (1976:580).
67 Section 66 in conjunction with Section 65 Co-determination Act (1976:580).
68 Franzen (2004) 45. See also Rieble (2004) 83.
69 Franzen (2004) 38-9.
70 Often concluded for a specific branch or sector.
71 Rieble (2004) 83; Löwisch & Rieble (2012) para 71.
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non-complying employer, Germany adheres to a so-called Verbandstheorie.
It is the employers’ association that is party to the collective agreement
and any claims based on the agreement should be directed to the
association.
It is argued that, if a claim against an individual employer who is
not a signatory to the collective agreement were to be permitted, this
would lead to a situation in which a third party would be required to
comply with an agreement he has not signed, as it is the Verband that is
direct party to the collective agreement.72 So, a trade union has only
limited possibilities to enforce the applicable collective agreement before a
court.73 Although there are arguments that plead in favour of the trade
union having the possibility to bring a legal action against a non-comply-
ing employer, like the fact that the employer is obliged to comply with the
collective agreement concluded by its employer organisation, they have so
far not found widespread support.74
A caveat, however, exists in relation to a prohibitory injunction
(Unterlassungsklage). Trade unions can argue that when an employer who
is bound by a collective agreement does not (correctly) apply it, the
union’s right to collective bargaining is violated.75 A successful claim
must involve a grave neglect of the contractual obligations on the part of
the employer. In bringing such claims before the court, trade unions have
an indirect method to seek compliance with collectively agreed employ-
ment conditions. Nevertheless, relying on the violation of the right to
collective bargaining is hardly a realistic option to ensure compliance with
the collective agreement. A criterion that must be met for the claim to be
successful is that the right must be severely and illegally impaired. The
Messlatte is, according to Franzen, quite high for a claim to be successful.76
Another option would be to initiate legal action by a representative
(Vertreterklage, based on § 11(2) No. 5 ArbGG), where trade unions act
in court as representatives of the employee.
In Germany, ULAK has been granted particular enforcement rights.
ULAK, the paritarian institution administering holiday pay and holiday
allowance for the construction sector, is permitted to ensure that domestic
72 Franzen (2004) 39.
73 Franzen (2004) 42.
74 Franzen (2004) 40.
75 This right is laid down in Art 9 Abs. 3 GG, which determines that “[d]as Recht, zur
Wahrung und Förderung der Arbeits- und Wirtschaftsbedingungen Vereinigungen
zu bilden, ist für jedermann und für alle Berufe gewährleistet“ (emphasis added).
Pfarr & Kocher (1998) 47.
76 Franzen (2004) 47-9.
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and foreign employers comply with the rules on holiday pay and holiday
allowance. If it appears that domestic and/or foreign employers do not
pay the contributions and there is no bilateral agreement by which that
issue can be resolved, then ULAK has an independent right to request the
employer to fulfil his obligations. ULAK can base its monitoring and
enforcement on two provisions: § 8(15) BRTV (in relation to employees
employed regularly in Germany) and § 15 AEntG (relating to posted
workers).
ULAK may act against an employer, foreign or domestic, to ensure
that posted workers receive their entitlements.77 Initially, there were some
legal problems with regard to the jurisdiction of German labour courts.
While in some cases the German labour courts did deny jurisdiction in
cases where ULAK had initiated an action against a foreign employer,
jurisdiction was created later on through the Lugano Convention in
conjunction with paragraph 1 Protocol Nr. 3 on the application of
Art 57 Lugano Convention78 and the PWD.79 One of the problems was
that there were no contractual relation between the foreign employer and
ULAK and thus ULAK could not enforce compliance, as the employer was
not obliged to fulfil his duties in Germany. The question of whether
German labour courts have jurisdiction in proceedings which have been
initiated against foreign employers has been resolved since 1997, with the
inclusion of § 15 AEntG (ex §§ 7 and 8 AEntG).80
Although ULAK does not initiate proceedings on behalf of the
employees concerned, the practical effect is that if the holiday contribu-
tions are paid to ULAK, the employee is able to request ULAK for
payment of the holiday pay and holiday allowance. The responsibility
for enforcing these entitlements is thus withdrawn from the individual
employee and entrusted to ULAK. This contributes to actually guarantee-
ing the rights to which employees are entitled. In a case between an
employer established in Luxembourg and ULAK, the court made it clear
that the sole possibility to claim material rights in a court, wherever that
77 Koberski (2011) § 15 AEntG, para 8, referring to Protocol of the Council Nr. 7 on
Art 3(1)(1)(b) and (c) of 20 September 1996.
78 BGBl. 1994 II, 2699.
79 Koberski (2011) § 15 AEntG, para 8.
80 BT-Drs. 13/8994. The labour courts are competent based on § 2(1) No. 6 ArbGG.
Generally, the place of jurisdiction is Wiesbaden (§ 48(2) ArbGG, § 8 No. 16.1
BRTV, § 2(1) No. 6 ArbGG and § 27(1) VTV). Exceptions apply if the employer is
established in one of the new Bundesländer or Bavaria (§ 8 No. 16 BRTV and § 23(2)
and (3) VTV).
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may be, is not comparable to the simple, quick and free-of-charge
procedure of the holiday pay fund.81
Under the Posted Workers Enforcement Directive, trade unions and
other third parties (eg associations and organisations) that have a legit-
imate interest in ensuring that the provisions of the PWD are complied
with, may engage in any judicial proceedings (Art 11). A precondition is
that the trade union has received prior approval from the worker
concerned. This possibility must be provided while taking account of
domestic rules on locus standi. Similarly, the Union Workers Enforcement
Directive determines that social partners may, in accordance with the
criteria laid down in Member State law and with the worker’s approval,
engage on behalf of or in support of the Union worker in any judicial
procedure that has been provided for the enforcement of rights under
Art 45 TFEU and Arts 1 to 10 Regulation (EU) 492/2011 (Art 3(2)). The
consequence thereof is that when social partners are acting on behalf or in
support of Union or posted workers or their employers, they need the
workers’ or employers’ prior approval. This does, as it seems, not prevent
social partners to initiate a judicial proceeding to defend their own
interests. It seems that Art 11(4(b) Posted Workers Enforcement Directive
and Art 3(3) Union Workers Enforcement Directive do not provide a
possibility for social partners to represent foreign workers without their
consent. The provisions clearly refer to ‘other competences’ which means
that they do seem to refer to other kinds of competences with the
exception of judicial proceedings. While this seems less problematic in
relation to workers and employers that are not represented, this may be
different in relation to those who are represented by a trade union or an
employers’ association. Particularly for Sweden this means that the right
of trade unions to initiate a judicial proceeding even without the consent
of the member-employee is mitigated. But this only applies to foreign
workers, namely those who invoke the free movement of workers or who
are posted by their employer. Whether this has an impact on workers who
do not cross the border is unclear. According to the principle of equiva-
lence, infringements of EU law may not be enforced less favourably than
infringements of similar national law. Based on that, it could be argued
that also for intra-state situations social partners need to have the approval
of the worker or employer. In fact, this means that the Member State
standards are to be lowered.
81 LAG 19.03.2007, 16 Sa 1297/06, para 38.
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5.2.4 Summary proceedings
Protecting employees in court also includes providing the possibility to
initiate summary proceedings. That summary proceedings can fulfil an
important role in ensuring effective judicial protection has been made
clear in the opinion of AG Tesauro in Factortame (No. 1), who stated that
interim protection
“[…] can be seen to be a fundamental and indispensable instrument of any
judicial system, which seeks to achieve, in the particular case and always in an
effective manner, the objective of determining the existence of a right and more
generally of giving effect to the relevant legal provision, whenever the duration
of the proceedings is likely to prejudice the attainment of this objective and
therefore to nullify the effectiveness of the judgment”.82
So far, there has been no preliminary question on the importance of
interim protection in labour law at EU level.83 Nevertheless, it is clear
that if interim protection is permitted under Member State law, national
conditions must pay attention to the minimum requirements of equiva-
lence and effectiveness.84
Summary proceedings are available in all three countries, subject to
certain conditions. Most importantly, the claimant must show an urgent
interest, justifying that a court ruling must be given in a very short time.
No urgent interest may exist in equal pay cases, as they often concern
claims for the receipt of equal (ie higher) remuneration.85 A similar
argument applies in relation to compensation for unfair dismissal. Matters
are different in case the employee is – merely – entitled to a minimum
wage, often calculated in a way that allows an individual to make a living.
Consequently, an urgent interest might be proven with regard to claims on
unpaid wages and also holiday pay. This may not necessarily be the case
in relation to holiday allowances, as they are paid in addition to the
holiday pay (ie the pay received by the worker when on leave). Besides
demonstrating an urgent interest, each country has its own conditions that
must be fulfilled to gain access to summary proceedings.
An employee wanting to initiate summary proceedings in the
Netherlands must show that he has a pressing interest. This term has
82 Case C-213/89 Factortame ECLI:EU:C:1990:257, AG Tesauro, para 19.
83 Cases concerning interim measures are, however, frequently dealt with by the Civil
Service Tribunal.
84 See section 2.3.2 above.
85 Malmberg (2003) 182-3.
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two meanings: access to the summary proceeding judge and awarding the
relief requested. In principle, these conditions are fulfilled if an employee
claims before the Dutch civil court the payment of his wages, as wages are
essential to be able to make a living.86 The urgency is to be derived from
the claim as formulated. Notably, the plaintiff is not required to initiate
substantive proceedings parallel to the summary proceedings. If, however,
the case is also brought before a court in a substantive hearing, that court
is free to rule based on the facts of the case, and it may revoke a judgement
given in summary proceedings.87 Besides the criterion of urgency, the
Dutch Supreme Court ruled that the judge must assess whether the claim
is plausible, and he must assess the recovery risk.88 In case substantive
proceedings have started, the employee may request an interim injunction
that applies for the duration of the proceeding. Such a request, however,
must be closely related to the substantive proceedings.89
Summary proceedings in Germany are admissible if there is reason
to assume that a party might be impeded in obtaining his rights or that
this has become substantially more difficult due to a change in the existing
conditions.90 It is necessary for the plaintiff to show that interim proceed-
ings are reasonable. Competence resides with the Labour Court that
would also be competent in the substantive proceedings.91 As in the
Netherlands, it is not necessary to initiate substantive proceedings. How-
ever, if an appeal is lodged against the interim decision, the court in the
substantive proceedings may revoke the judgement. Nevertheless, it
seems that summary proceedings in labour law play only a minor role
in Germany,92 as labour law proceedings generally take less time than
regular civil proceedings.93 In principle, in Germany an employee may
86 Van Der Grinten, Bouwens & Duk (2011) 123.
87 Art 257 Rv.
88 HR 28 May 2004, NJ 2004, 602 (Hiensch International B.V./Bögels), para 3.5.1.
89 Art 223 Rv; Van Der Grinten, Bouwens & Duk (2011) 123-4.
90 § 935 ZPO. That summary proceedings are available for labour law follows from
§ 62(2) and § 85(2) ArbGG in conjunction with §§ 935ff. ZPO (Zivilprozessordnung
in der Fassung der Bekanntmachung vom 5. Dezember 2005 (BGBl. I S. 3202; 2006
I S. 431; 2007 I S. 1781), die durch Artikel 1 des Gesetzes vom 8. Juli 2014 (BGBl. I S.
890) geändert worden ist).
91 § 937 ZPO.
92 Walker (2005) 46. Walker mentions that summary proceedings in labour law
approximately concerned 1 per cent of the labour law proceedings.
93 § 9 ArbGG contains the principle that labour law proceedings should be acceler-
ated. In the Netherlands, application proceedings (verzoekschriftprocedure) apply in
dismissal law, which are stated not to take (in principle at least) longer than eight
weeks. Aanbeveling 1.1 Kring van Kantonrechters (this is only a general principle,
not a legally enforceable rule).
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initiate summary proceedings if he bases his claim on the fact that his
employer did not pay what was required. This means that the claim must
be limited to the net amount claimed, excluding taxes and social security
contributions, since the latter are not necessary to make a living, as only
this satisfies the urgent needs of the employee.94 In case a provisional
injunction is granted and the employer is ordered to pay the net wage, the
case is satisfied in that the substantive proceedings only confirm the
interim judgement. If the employment relationship is still in existence,
the employee must prove that he has an employment contract, that he has
worked, and that he is claiming a wage entitlement. An important point is
that the employee can only claim the payment of wages if he does not
have any savings or any other earnings that he may use to make a living,
or can rely on unemployment benefits or social benefits, which limits the
usefulness of the procedure.95
Similarly, in Sweden, an individual may request the court to adopt
an interim measure to secure the individual’s rights,96 provided the
individual is able to show that it is probable that he has a claim against
another that is or can be the basis for judicial proceedings or any other
similar procedure, and that it is reasonable to suspect that the opposing
party carries on activities that will hinder or render it more difficult to
exercise or realise the individual’s right or reduce the value of that right.97
The court may impose an injunction, ordering the defendant to cease
certain activities or to perform in a certain way, subject to a penalty. It is
also possible for the court to issue an order subject to a penalty, obliging
the opposing party to respect the applicant’s claim. When dealing with a
procedure for an interim measure, the court must (and this is similar to the
situation in the Netherlands) pay attention to the probability of the
outcome in the substantive proceedings and the costs that may result
from the later withdrawal of the interim measure. Interim measures
should not be permitted in the absence of compelling reasons.98
94 This similarly applies in relation to default interests. Reinhard & Kliemt (2005) 552.
95 Reinhard & Kliemt (2005). Furthermore, the amount requested may only be a net
amount.
96 Interim or provisional measures are regulated in the Code of Judicial Procedure
(1942:740) (Rättegångsbalk), last amended by Lag (2013:663).
97 This is largely based on a translation made available by the Swedish state, Ds.
1998:000, up to date until 1 January 1999 (SFS 1998:605), available at <http://
www.government.se/content/1/c4/15/40/472970fc.pdf= accessed 28 October
2014.
98 Malmberg (2003) 175.
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5.2.5 Possibility of collective redress: group litigation
If a group of employees is concerned, it may be reasonable to institute a
group action in court, ie an action whereby two or more claims are bundled
and brought before a civil or labour court. Whether, and, if so, under which
conditions such an action can be initiated in all three countries concerned is
outlined.99 First, the initiatives addressing the issue of collective redress at
EU level are dealt with, before dealing with domestic group litigation rules.
A. European initiatives
So far, the right to collective redress or group action is not regulated at EU
level. The two Enforcement Directives allow social partners to appear for
foreign employees, and do not touch on Member State rules on group
actions. However, the advantages of a group action have not gone
unnoticed at EU level. On 11 June 2013, the European Commission issued
a (non-binding) Recommendation on common principles for injunctive
and compensatory collective redress mechanisms in the Member States
concerning violations of rights granted under Union Law.100 Although not
specifically addressed to one particular field in which collective redress
may have a role to play, the Recommendation has been set up with
particular regard to consumer collective redress. However, as emphasised,
due account must be given to the existing legal traditions and legal orders
of the individual Member States.101 According to the Preamble, recital 6,
“[i]t is a core task of public enforcement to prevent and punish the violations of
rights granted under Union law. The possibility for private persons to pursue
claims based on violations of such rights supplements public enforcement. […]”
(emphasis added).
In principle, if there is a public authority that is empowered to decide that
there has been a violation of EU law, collective actions (at least, this is the
idea) should start after the proceedings of that authority. In case a
collective redress action has been initiated and the public authority
launches proceedings, the court may not give a decision that could conflict
99 For information on collective or group actions in general, the following website
contains comparative information <http://globalclassactions.stanford.edu/= ac-
cessed 28 October 2014.
100 Recommendation C(2013) 3539/3. This Recommendation is accompanied by
Commission Communication, ‘Towards a European Horizontal Framework for
Collective Redress’ (Communication) COM(2013) 401/2.
101 Recital 4 Recommendation C(2013) 3539/3.
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with a decision contemplated by the public authority.102 The accompany-
ing Commission Communication103 explains the main differences be-
tween both. While public enforcement, it says, is aimed at prevention,
detection and deterrence of infringements, private enforcement is aimed at
securing compensation for victims.104
Collective redress, the Recommendation states, may be of particular
relevance in the field of consumer protection105, competition law, environ-
mental protection, protection of personal data, financial services legislation,
and investor protection. The reasonwhy collective redress is seen as a positive
instrument is the fact that it allows many similar claims to be bundled in a
single court action. This contributes to procedural economy and/or efficiency
of enforcement. Claims by individuals are often so small that potential
claimants would not consider it worth initiating proceedings. In that sense,
an instrument such as collective redress facilitates access to justice.106
This Recommendation encourages all Member States to have or
introduce the possibility for collective redress in situations of mass harm,
ie a situation in which two or more natural or legal persons concerned
“[…] claim to have suffered harm causing damage resulting from the same
illegal activity of one or more natural or legal persons”.107 It may also be
(or become) a useful supplementary tool in labour law, considering that it
emphasises that in case of cross-border disputes Member State laws will
not prevent a single collective action in a single forum.108
B. Group litigation at domestic level
Collective redress may take various forms; one form is group litigation
whereby one party acts as a representative of the group (ie a representa-
tive claim). A precondition here is that the claims must be similar and
102 Section 33 Recommendation C(2013) 3539/3.
103 Recommendation C(2013) 3539/3, 7.
104 This, however, is not the first and only initiative that has been taken at EU level. As
early as 1984 the possibility of consumer collective redress or class actions was
raised in a Commission paper. In addition to consumer protection, collective
redress measures have been adopted, inter alia, in the area of intellectual property
enforcement, Directive 2004/48/EC on the enforcement of intellectual property
rights [2004] OJ L195/16. Hodges (2008) 102ff. See also Tzakas (2011); Tzankova
(2007) (on access to justice in case of large-scale damages).
105 Recommendation C(2013) 3539/3, recital 1 of the Preamble. See, eg, Cremers &
Bulla (2012) discussing the possibility of collective redress in relation to posted
workers.
106 COM(2013) 401/2, 4.
107 COM(2013) 401/2, Section 3(a) and (b).
108 COM(2013) 401/2, Section 17.
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suitable for joint disposition. Group litigation is known in the Netherlands
and Sweden, but not in Germany.109
In Germany, discussions on group litigation have been held in the
context of the equal treatment principle.110 What is known in German
labour law is the possibility of a representative action (gewillkürte Prozess-
standschaft), whereby the trade union can represent the rights of its
member-employees in court. This, of course, is also possible in the
Netherlands and Sweden. In Germany, however, this seems to be the
only way by which a trade union can initiate judicial proceedings. An
independent right thereto to protect its own interests exists only vis à vis
the association (the Verband) that had concluded the collective agreement.
Trade unions have no locus standi to initiate a claim against a non-
complying employer. Necessary items are the authorisation of the em-
ployee and a legitimate interest on the part of the trade union. It is not
clear from the outset that, on becoming a member of a trade union, the
union can enforce claims of its employee-members. This may be different
if the statutes of the trade union state explicitly that the union enforces the
rights of its employee-members.111 Apart from that, it can be said that the
joint enforcement of claims is not possible in Germany.112
Sweden in fact has two types of group actions. The classical group
litigation,113 known since 2003, is not very important in the area of labour
law due to the strong role of the social partners. It is nevertheless
interesting to describe the general system.114 The second type of repre-
sentative group litigation is possible in the Labour Court, where trade
unions have a strong right to represent their employee-members. For
them, a group action within the meaning of the Group Proceedings Act
(2002:599) seems to be superfluous. According to Lindblom, the trade
109 Franzen (2004) 49-50. See also Rieble (2004) 83, stating that in particular trade
unions request the possibility of a Verbandsklage. See more extensively on group
actions, ch 3 of Pfarr & Kocher (1998).
110 Franzen (2004) 51.
111 Franzen (2004) 53.
112 Franzen (2004) 55.
113 There are three types of group litigation: private group (or class) actions (ie “true”
group action); organisation group actions; and public group actions. An additional
possibility is for parties harmed to seek protection in court, or rather an alternative
permitting collective redress for individual claims that would likely be unrealistic if
dealt with individually. Lindblom (1997) 820 and 828. In 2009, twelve group
actions (eleven private group actions and one public group action) have been
started in Sweden since the introduction of that Act in 2002. Lindblom (2009) 31.
114 Rules on such an action can be found in the Group Proceedings Act (Lag om
grupprättegång) (2002:599), which entered into force on 1 January 2003. See more
extensively Nordh (2001); Lindblom (2007).
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union’s right to initiate a legal action on behalf of its employee-employees,
whether they wish it or not, is a ‘radical’ kind of group action. Individual
employee-members are bound by the judgement and may intervene in the
action.115 Here, there is neither an opt-in nor an opt-out system. Moreover,
most cases that concern organised employees and employers are settled out of
court through negotiation, and so judges are relatively seldom called on to
enforce employees’ rights by adjudication. Thus, from an implausible and
theoretical point of view, a (private) group action may be of value for
employees who are not members of a trade union and are thus not repre-
sented. In this regard, only claims that are based on statutory labour law are
convenient for a group action. This possibility does not exist with respect to
claims on collectively agreed wages, holiday pay or annual leave allowances.
A group action seems to be a realistic instrument to protect –
collectively – the interests of foreign employees in the Netherlands.116 Trade
unions, or other interest groups, may institute a legal action to protect
similar claims of employees, provided the union’s statute covers the
protection of individual employees (Art 3:305a BW).117 The possibility of
a general group action in the Netherlands, inter alia for labour law cases, has
been introduced for reasons related to the fact that employees, afraid that
their employment relationship might be disrupted, refrain from bringing
legal action against their employer.118 A group action is likely if the interests
of the individuals taken alone are ‘marginal’, but considerable when viewed
in its totality.119 Leaving it solely to an individual to start proceedings may
115 Lindblom (2006) 232.
116 See for a general overview of the two ways of collective redress, possible under the
Act on Collective Settlements of 2005 (Wet Collectieve Afwikkeling Massaschade) and
collective action under Art 3:305 BW is possible: Tzankova & Lunsingh Scheurleer
(2009).
117 Van Schaick (2011) para 29. That trade unions can also invoke Art 3:305a BW in
order to protect the interests of its employee-members has been established in Vz.
Rb. Groningen 5 Oktober 2012, 134889/KG ZA 12-188, ECLI:NL:RBGRO:2012:
BX9234, JAR 2012/269 (Eemshaven-zaak), para 5.5.
118 HR 8 April 2011, JAR 2011/135 (ABVAKABO FNV/Unieke Kinderopvang BV), in
particular the Conclusion of Advocate General Spier, para 3.8. In the ABVAKABO
FNV v Unieke Kinderopvang BV case, the Advocate General argued that a group
action in which the employer will be requested to comply with the applicable
collective agreement cannot be initiated because their claims would be too different
as the collective agreement would apply to each worker individually, on an
individual basis. This, however, seems to be no problem in case the collective
agreement applies to all workers equally by virtue of an incorporation clause and
in case it concerns basically the same claim, such as requesting the payment of the
collectively agreed wage as well as the agreed holiday allowance. See also Rayer
(2011) 34-5.
119 Frenk (1994) 2.
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not protect the interests of an individual, or only insufficiently so. Moreover,
for interest groups the threshold of bringing a claim is lower than for an
individual. A group action may also have a preventive effect.120 Never-
theless, individuals may have valid reasons not to become part of the group
action, because of fears that their employment relationship could be
distorted or that their employer takes retaliatory action.121 Employees
may therefore raise objections to being part of the group.122
A precondition for initiating a group action in the Netherlands is
that a trade union must aim at promoting the interests of others as well as
its own interests, and these interests must actually have been developed
and practiced in that regard.123 The union’s own interests refer to a
financial or an idealistic interest.124 Moreover, the group of claims must
be suitable for bundling.125 Almost any claim may be brought in a group
action against an employer,126 except for damages claims.127 The simple
reason why damages claims are not possible is that they must be able to be
individualised.128 The general idea is that it can be difficult to establish the
exact damage for each individual participating in the group action.
Distributing the damages among its members seems not to be a problem;
it is, however, not allowed, unless it merely represents its own mem-
bers.129 An interest group may – outside the scope of a group action – still
claim damages suffered by virtue of a wrongful act. In contrast, claiming
damages in a group action is in any event possible in Sweden; however,
damages must be requested for each plaintiff individually.130
120 Kamerstukken II 1991/92, 22 486, nr. 3, 2 and 25.
121 Frenk (1995), section ‘Bezwaar door belanghebbenden’.
122 Art 3:305a(4) BW.
123 Van Drongelen (2012) 346, with reference to HR 27 June 1986, NJ 1987, 743 (Contact
Milieubescherming c.s./Gemeente Amsterdam).
124 Kamerstukken II 1991/92, 22 486, nr. 3, 22. These interests can be derived from the
organisation’s statutes.
125 Kamerstukken II 1991/92, 22 486, nr. 3, 22-3.
126 See for the first example Rb. ’s-Gravenhage 6 september 1989, ECLI:NL:
RBSGR:1989:AH2820, KG 1989, 345, ultimately ruled in HR 30 november 1990,
ECLI:NL:HR:1990:ZC0064, RvdW 1990, 218.
127 Art 3:305a(3) BW; Kamerstukken II 1991/92, 22 486, nr. 3, 24.
128 One legal problem that has been identified if such a group damages action were to
be allowed is that the individual interests are often too diverse and thus not
suitable for bundling, which is a prerequisite for Art 3:305a BW to be applicable. A
practical issue that causes difficulties concerns the fact that the totality of the
damages must be assessed, based on the damage suffered individually by a party.
The question, then, is how the damages will be divided between the parties
concerned. See Frenk (1994) 30.
129 Kamerstukken II 1991/92, 22 486, nr. 3, 29-30.
130 Lindblom (2009) 14; Lindblom (2006).
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Two important procedural aspects must be addressed. In the first
place, before starting a group action against an employer a trade union
has, within two weeks,131 to consult with the employer,132 unless this is
impossible or useless.133 In the second place, a judgement only binds the
trade union and the employer. Nevertheless, although the declaratory
judgement binds only the litigants, the operative part of the judgement can
have a wider effect.134 Individuals may oppose the consequences of a
judgement.135
Similar criteria apply in Sweden, where a group action is possible if
the action is founded on similar circumstances of the members of the
group, the action may not be inappropriate, the claims cannot be equally
well pursued by individual actions of the group members, the group must
be appropriately defined, and the plaintiff’s financial capacity must be
appropriate to be able to represent the group members.136
As a result of the two Enforcement Directives, trade unions in the
Netherlands and Sweden will explicitly have to ask the prior approval of
the workers whom they want to include in the group action (Art 3(2)
Union Workers Enforcement Directive and Art 11(3) Posted Workers
Enforcement Directive). In practice, there might not change anything as
trade unions perhaps already asked for an approval.
5.2.6 Access to legal aid
In order to be able to bear the costs of a judicial procedure granting legal
aid enables individuals to access judicial protection as well as legal
representation by, for instance, a lawyer. Access to judicial protection as
well as legal aid is protected under EU law (Art 47 EUCFR). According to
Art 47(3) EUCFR “[l]egal aid shall be made available to those who lack
sufficient resources in so far as such aid is necessary to ensure effective
access to justice” (emphasis added). With the adoption of Directive 2003/8/
EC to improve access to justice in cross-border disputes by establishing
131 A shorter period may suffice. Kamerstukken II 1998/99, 26 693, nr. 3, 7; Van
Drongelen (2012) 346-7.
132 Art 3:305a(2) BW.
133 Frenk (1994) 134.
134 Kamerstukken II 1991/92, 22 486, nr. 3, 27. See also Frenk (1994) 142-4.
135 Art 3:305a(5) BW.
136 Section 8 Group Proceedings Act (2002:599). This draws on an English translation
provided by the Swedish Government downloaded from <www.government.se/
content> accessed 28 October 2013.
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minimum common rules relating to legal aid for such disputes,137 legal
aid for cross-border disputes has been harmonised at EU level. Moreover,
the Netherlands, Sweden and Germany have adopted rules for disputes
that do not involve a cross-border element.
A. Legal aid in cross-border disputes: Directive 2003/8/EC
Directive 2003/8/EC is aimed at improving access to justice in cross-border
disputes by establishing minimum common rules relating to legal aid for
such disputes. Foreign employees, in particular posted workers, even if they
are not regularly resident in the country in which they seek judicial
protection, do have access to legal aid.138 This makes access to court
much easier when a cross-border dispute about civil and commercial
matters is involved (recitals 9 and 10). As regards the term legal aid in the
Directive, it refers to “pre-litigation advice with a view to reaching a
settlement prior to bringing legal proceedings” and “legal assistance and
representation in court, and exemption from, or assistance with, the cost of
proceedings of the recipient, including the costs referred to in Art 7 and the
fees to persons mandated by the court to perform acts during the proceed-
ings”.139 This Directive is relevant to the cross-border posting of employees
and possible disputes that arise about the (temporary) applicability of the
host states’ key employment terms and conditions.140 All three countries
have implemented this directive in their domestic legislation.
137 [2003] OJ L26/41 (Legal Aid Directive). See more generally on this Directive:
Storskrubb (2008) ch 10.
138 Directive 2003/8/EC has been implemented in: The Netherlands: Wet van
19 februari 2005 tot aanpassing van de Wet op de rechtsbijstand aan richtlijn
2003/8/EG van de Raad van 27 januari 2003 tot verbetering van de toegang tot de
rechter bij grensoverschrijdende geschillen, door middel van gemeenschappelijke
minimumvoorschriften betreffende rechtsbijstand bij die geschillen, Stb. 2005, 90
(original act: Wet van 23 december 1993, houdende regelen omtrent de door de
overheid gefinancierde rechtsbijstand, Stb. 1993, 650, as last amended by Stb. 2011,
650), see in particular Arts 23a to 23k (Chapter IIIa); Germany: Gesetz zur
Umsetzung gemeinschaftsrechtlicher Vorschriften über die grenzüberschreitende
Prozesskostenhilfe in Zivil- und Handelssachen in den Mitgliedstaaten (EG-
Prozesskostenhilfegesetz), 20 December 2004, BGBl. 2004 I, 3392, as last amended
by Gesetz zur Änderung des Prozesskostenhilfe- und Beratungshilferechts,
31 August 2013, BGBl. 2013 I, 3533, see in particular § 114 ZPO, referring to
§§ 1076 to 1078 ZPO; Sweden: Rättshjälplag (1996:1619), last amended by Lag
(2014:329) (Legal Aid Act), last amended by Lag (2012:449), see in particular
Sections 22(a) to 22(d).
139 Art 2(2)(a) and (b) Directive 2003/8/EC.
140 See on this also Van Hoek & Houwerzijl (2011b) 139-40.
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B. Legal aid at domestic level141
Union workers and posted workers alike in the Netherlands, Germany
and Sweden are permitted to apply for legal aid. Disputes with a cross-
border element involve a situation in which the individual seeking legal
aid does not regularly reside in the country where legal aid is sought.142
This is particularly relevant for posted (agency) workers, who regularly
carry out their work in the territory of their home Member State and are
merely temporarily posted to another Member State.143 The rules applic-
able to legal aid concerning disputes in cross-border situations and the
rules applicable without cross-border situation are described.
All three countries have implemented the Legal Aid Directive in their
Member State laws. In Germany, the ArbGG determines that the provisions
on legal aid also apply in case there is a transnational labour law dispute.144 In
principle, in the Dutch and Swedish laws on legal aid, both countries apply
broadly similar criteria when granting legal aid in cross-border disputes as
those that apply to internal disputes. This means that, with a few exceptions,
posted workers and Union workers alike must fulfil the conditions set by
Member State law to be granted legal aid. The following explains the rules
applicable to both posted and Union workers, unless otherwise stated.
Inability to bear costs
Legal aid is granted to those who cannot bear the costs of judicial
proceedings.145 In Germany, eligibility to receive legal aid depends on
141 This section merely deals with legal aid as provided by the state and not legal
expenses insurances. Nevertheless, it is worth mentioning that in a recent case, the
ECJ ruled that a person who is insured with legal expenses insurance may freely
choose whether he wishes a lawyer to him represent in court, and if so, which one.
In this case, the legal expenses insurer caused the possibility of lawyer representa-
tion to depend on the insurer’s view of who was of the opinion that the case could
be dealt with by one of his own employees. This, according to the ECJ, was
contrary to EU law. Case C-442/12 Sneller v DAS ECLI:EU:C:2013:717, decided in
the Netherlands by HR 21 februari 2014, 11/04252, ECLI:NL:HR:2014:396, JAR
2014/87 (Jan Sneller/DAS).
142 This is explicitly mentioned in The Netherlands in Art 23b Wet op de Rechtsbij-
stand and in Sweden in Section 22a Legal Aid Act (1999:1619). German law seems
to draw on Directive 2003/8/EC in this regard.
143 cf. Art 2(1) Directive 96/71/EC.
144 § 11(1) ArbGG. See also § 114 ZPO, referring to § 1076 to 1078 ZPO (implementing
Directive 2003/8/EC).
145 The Netherlands: Art 12 Wet op de Rechtsbijstand; Germany: § 114 ZPO; Sweden:
Section 6 Legal Aid Act (1996:1619).
Chapter 5
172
there being a sufficient chance of succeeding in the case.146 If requested,
the judge can provide an individual with a lawyer, provided, however, the
opposing party also has a lawyer. Moreover, parties under Dutch and
German law can request a lawyer to be assigned.147 The party lodging the
request should make clear which of the two measures he requests.
Similarly, the Legal Aid Act (1999:1619) in Sweden grants legal aid if
the applicant requires legal counsel.148 In line with Art 7 Legal Aid
Directive, costs of translations and travelling are reimbursed.149
It is further of interest whether legal aid also covers the costs of the
losing party. According to the Legal Aid Directive, costs of the opposing
party are only covered if such costs would have been covered had the
recipient of legal aid been domiciled or habitually resided in the Member
State in which the court is sitting.150 This is particularly relevant for posted
workers, as in countries where the legal aid covers the costs of the losing
party, they will not be ordered to pay these costs.
Income criteria
Legal aid in the Netherlands and Sweden is granted only if the applicant can
prove that he earns no more than the maximum set by the law. No legal
maximum income criteria apply in Germany. Legal aid in the Netherlands is
provided if the individual requesting it can prove that he does not earnmore
than 25,600 EUR per annum, if single, and not more than 36,100 EUR if
living in a joint household.151 Moreover, no legal aid is provided if the
individual owns more than the so-called tax-free property (ie savings and
investments), which amounts to 21,139 EUR in 2014.152 The maximum
level in Sweden is approximately 29,300 EUR (SEK 260,000) per annum.
Individuals with children may benefit from a lower maximum level.153
In principle, the Dutch, German and Swedish laws start from the
assumption that the individual who wants to bring a case before a court
146 § 114 ZPO.
147 The Netherlands: Art 24 Wet op de Rechtsbijstand; Germany: § 121 ZPO.
148 Section 7 Legal Aid Act (1999:1619).
149 The Netherlands: Art 23e(1) Wet op de Rechtsbijstand; Germany: § 46 Gesetz über
die Vergütung der Rechtsanwältinnen und Rechtsanwälte (Lawyers’ Remunera-
tion Act) (as part of the costs incurred by the lawyer); Sweden: Section 11(b) Legal
Aid Ordinance (1997:404).
150 Art 3(2) Directive 2003/8/EC.
151 Art 34 Wet op de Rechtsbijstand.
152 Art 34(2) Wet op de Rechtsbijstand.
153 1700 EUR less per child, with a maximum of 8500 EUR less. Section 6 in
conjunction with Section 38 Legal Aid Act (1996:1619).
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must pay from his own income, taking into account any debts or main-
tenance obligations.154 This is in accordance with Art 3(3) Legal Aid
Directive. There are different ways of calculating the employee’s contribu-
tion. While the amounts in the Netherlands are set in relation to the annual
income earned, in Sweden the amount is related to the costs incurred for
bringing the case to court. In Germany, in contrast, calculating the
remaining property also takes account of amounts received under the
social security legislation and maintenance obligations. After deducting
these costs, the reasonable amount that the individual can be requested to
pay is calculated; the costs may be paid in instalments (§ 115 ZPO). No
legal aid is granted if the costs of the judicial proceeding do not exceed
four monthly instalments.
Different criteria for foreign employees in cross-border disputes
Particular provisions on the maximum income which the employee may
earn in order to be eligible for legal aid exist for applicant employees who
do not regularly reside in the Member State in which the dispute is
brought before a court. The provisions deviating from the general criteria
applied implement Art 5(4) Legal Aid Directive, according to which
foreign employees not habitually residing in the Netherlands, Germany
or Sweden at the moment the dispute arises, who are unable to bear the
costs of legal assistance by virtue of the differences in costs of living
between the Member State where they habitually live or reside and the
Netherlands, receive legal aid from the state.155 This particularly makes it
for posted workers easier to initiate judicial proceedings in the temporary
host state if the costs are covered. Moreover, there is no particular income
threshold above which no legal aid will be paid. With regard to Sweden,
an individual involved in a cross-border dispute may receive legal aid,
even if his annual income exceeds 29,300 EUR (SEK 260,000).156
154 The Netherlands: Art 35 Wet op de Rechtsbijstand in conjunction with Besluit van
4 februari 2009, houdende regels met betrekking tot de eigen bijdrage voor de
rechtzoekende in geval van verlening van gesubsidieerde rechtsbijstand alsmede
enige nadere regels omtrent de vaststelling van de financiële draagkracht van de
rechtzoekende (Besluit eigen bijdrage rechtsbijstand); Germany: § 115 ZPO;
Sweden: Section 23 Swedish Legal Aid Act (1996:1619).
155 Art 23d Wet op de Rechtsbijstand; Germany: § 1078(3) ZPO; Sweden: Section 22b
(2) Legal Aid Act (1996:1619).
156 Section 22b Legal Aid Act (1996:1619).
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5.3 Aspects of judicial procedures: time limits and evidential rules
5.3.1 Time limitations and access to judicial protection
Time limits principally fall under national procedural autonomy, as long
as they respect the two minimum requirements of equivalence and
effectiveness (see section 2.2.2 above). The following, first, gives an
account of the question of which law governs the time limits. This is
necessary as in transnational situations it is not necessarily the case that
host state law applies. An overview of is given the applicable time limits
for initiating judicial proceedings claiming the payment of (minimum)
wages, holiday pay and holiday allowance.
A. Law governing time limits
Although access to judicial protection as such is provided in all three
countries, domestic laws often limit the possibility of taking action in court
via time limits. Pursuant to EU case law, there generally seems to be no
problem with time limits as such; according to EU (case) law, as we have
seen in Chapter 2, the ECJ leaves it to the Member State law to determine
the applicable periods within which action must be taken. In transnational
situations, however, the question arises as to which law does govern time
limitations. We have already seen that, as far as the central working and
employment conditions of the PWD are concerned, they have been
qualified as mandatory if they are regulated as prescribed by the Directive.
But what happens if the substantive law of different legal systems applies?
Is the time limit governed by the applicable substantive right, ie one of the
central conditions under the PWD, or is the time limit governed by the
home state legislation? Answering these questions is essential in relation
to the cross-border posting of workers. Pursuant to Art 12(1)(d) Rome I
Regulation, “[t]he law applicable to a contract by virtue of this Regulation
shall govern in particular […] the various ways of extinguishing obliga-
tions, and prescription and limitation of actions”.
Accordingly, time limitations regularly link with the Vertragssta-
tut.157 The provision also makes it clear that rules on prescription and
limitation of actions are qualified as rules of substantive law.158 So, if a
posted worker is entitled to receive the Dutch statutory minimum wage, it
157 Deinert (2013) 335.
158 This is not necessarily the case in Common Law states. Bamberger & Roth (Ed.)
(2013) (Spickhoff) Art 12 VO (EG) 593/2008, para 11; Vonken & Verhagen (2013)
paras 30 and 175.
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can be assumed that the Dutch Civil Code will determine the applicable
time limit.
B. Time limitations at Member State level
Access to judicial protection is curtailed by time limits, which limit the
enforceability of labour rights in court.159 Time limits are regulated by
statutory laws as well as collective agreements. The reason for having time
limits is to ensure legal certainty and legal clarity. We can distinguish
between general time limits and more specific time limits that apply to
labour rights laid down in collective agreements.
Statutory time limits
In the Netherlands, the time limit for bringing a legal action to claim a
wage that has not been paid in accordance with the statutory minimum
wage, including holiday pay, is five years (Art 3:308 BW). This time limit
starts to run one day after the entitlement has fallen due.160 The same time
limit of five years applies to the holiday allowance (Art 20 WML).161 The
time limit starts from the moment the holiday allowance should have been
paid (normally in May or June).162
In Sweden, for claims related to holiday pay, compensation in lieu
of annual leave or damages, proceedings must be instituted within two
years, running from the end of the annual leave year in which the
employee should have received the benefits (Section 33 Annual Leave
Act (1977:480)). This time limit is explicitly stated to apply also in relation
to claims of temporary agency workers as well as posted (temporary)
workers.163
159 At Member State level, time limits consist of limitations of action (Verfallfrist) and
periods of prescription (Verjährungsfrist). The following will not draw upon this
distinction.
160 A shorter time limit can be agreed in a contract, which excludes agreeing a longer
time limit. Hartkamp & Sieburgh (2013) paras 422 and 438.
161 By virtue of Art 19 WML, every stipulation that is contravenes the aforementioned
act is void.
162 The period of prescription is the same for claims related to working time based on
Art 7:642 BW concerning the right to annual leave, which is applicable via the
WAGA which implements the PWD.
163 Section 16(1) Act on Temporary Agency Work (2012:854) and Section 10 Posting of
Workers Act (1999:678).
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Sectoral time limits
The German AEntG determines that for a time limit to be valid, it must be
laid down in a collective agreement that has been declared generally
binding under §§ 4 to 6 or under § 7 AEntG.164 A precondition is that the
time limit must be at least six months.165 This time limit applies only in
relation to the sectoral minimum wage regulated within the meaning of
the AEntG. As a result of the mandatory nature of the rights derived from
the AEntG, this time limit applies equally to domestic and foreign
employees.166 For the construction sector, the time limit can be found in
§ 2(5) TV Mindestlohn. In relation to the right to holiday pay and holiday
allowance, § 4(4) TVG determines that rights laid down in a collective
agreement can only be limited by that collective agreement.167 Under § 4
(4) TVG, employees must first claim their entitlements from their em-
ployer in writing within two months after they have fallen due (§ 15(1)
BRTV). If the employer rejects the objection or does not respond within
two weeks after having received the claim, the employee has to start legal
proceedings within two months. In relation to claims from ULAK, the
collective agreement provides a time limit of four years (§ 24(4) VTV). This
unequal time limitation does not seem to be problematic under EU law. In
the Ecotrade case, the tax authority could benefit from a more favourable
time limitation than a private person.168
In Germany, time limits in the temporary agency work sector can be
regulated by an individual employment contract or a collective agree-
ment.169 The collective agreements in the agency work sector prescribe a
two-step approach by requiring the employee first to seek to induce his
164 § 9 sentence 3 AEntG. The government’s legislative proposal initially determined
that time limits due to which the rights to a minimum wage expire are prohibited.
However, a later inclusion states that time limits are permitted if they are agreed
by the social partners. Koberski (2011) § 9 AEntG, paras 1 and 7.
165 The right of social partners to agree on time limits in collective agreements follows
from their collective bargaining autonomy. Koberski (2011) § 9 AEntG, para 13.
This provision is to be qualified as Eingriffsnorm, equally applicable to all employ-
ees covered. It does not, however, mean that time limitations should incidentally
be qualified as Eingriffsnormen. Deinert (2013) 335. In Germany, most time limits
serve the interests of the parties and not a public interest.
166 Cf. Deinert (2013) 335.
167 Koberski (2011).
168 Joined Cases C-95/07 and C-96/07 Ecotrade ECLI:EU:C:2008:267.
169 Thüsing (Ed.) (2012) (Pelzner/Kock) § 3 AÜG, para 74. See, eg, also BAG 23.03.2011 –
5 AZR 7/10, para 29; ArbG Köln 7.09.2011 – 20 Ca 4254/11, NZA-RR 2012, 29 (on
limitation on action in case of entitlements accrued during temporary agency
work).
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employer to comply with the agreement, before initiating a case in court.
Tight time limits apply under these collective agreements: the employee
has two170 or three171 months to prompt his employer to comply with his
obligations under the collective agreement after the claim has fallen due,
and must initiate judicial proceedings within three months.
In a case decided in 2011, the BAG had to deal with the question of
whether time limits can be considered as belonging to the basic employ-
ment conditions within the meaning of the TAWD.172 According to the
BAG, this question should be answered in the negative. The BAG ruled
that the AÜG distinguishes between employment conditions (conditions
that the user undertaking applies to its own employees) and contractual
conditions (conditions that apply between the agency and the employee).
Time limits belong to the contractual conditions agreed between the
agency and the employee. Moreover, time limits are not an integral part
of the basic employment condition “pay”. Time limits solely concern the
way the right is enforced. Consequently, the applicable time limit is the
one that has been contractually agreed or that has been laid down in a
collective agreement. This case is of interest to Union workers, who are
employed by an employer established in Germany.
As no specific time limit has been regulated in Germany for the
sectoral minimum wage within the meaning of the statutory regulation
containing a minimum wage for the German temporary agency work
sector, the literature assumes that claims on the basic employment condi-
tions fall under the statutory time limit of three years (§ 195 BGB),173
rather than under a collectively or individually agreed one.174 Whether
this can hold up under the BAG’s case law is to be doubted. However, it
seems plausible that the statutory period of prescription applies if none of
the collective agreements is applicable to the employment relationship in
question and if no time limit has been individually agreed. Generally, the
BAG applies the statutory time limit in relation to a claim for equal pay/
treatment.175
In Sweden, it should be reiterated that for claims based on a
collective agreement, first the parties to this agreement must use the
applicable grievance procedures, and if these fail, court proceedings
170 § 16 BZA-DGB framework collective agreement.
171 § 10 iGZ-DGB framework collective agreement.
172 BAG 23.03.2011 – 5 AZR 7/10.
173 Or a shorter period which has been agreed between the employer and the
employee (§ 202(1) BGB).
174 Ulber & Ulber (2013), § 10 AÜG, paras 83-4.
175 BAG 13.3.2013 – 5 AZR 954/11.
Chapter 5
178
must be initiated within three months after the conclusion of the negotia-
tions (Section 65 Co-determination Act (1976:580)) (see section 5.2.3).176
5.3.2 Evidential rules: Directive 91/533/EEC
Directive 91/533/EEC on an employer’s obligation to inform employees
of the conditions applicable to the contract or employment relationship
adds to the protection of employees in that employers are obliged to
inform their employees, not later than two months after commencement of
the work and in writing, about specific elements of the employment
contract. As its Preamble states, the Directive is designed to provide
employees with protection against possible infringements of their rights
by obliging employers to provide their employees a certain set of informa-
tion. This increases the cognisance of employees who have certain rights
and thus places them in a position to enforce them, if necessary. Moreover,
greater transparency will be created on the labour market. Due to its broad
personal scope, the Directive covers all employees who are paid and have
an employment contract or relationship, as defined by the law in force in a
Member State and/or governed by the law in force in a Member State
(Art 1(1)).177
The employer must provide information on the essential aspects of
the employment contract or relationship (Art 2(1)), including: the initial
basic amount, other component elements, and the frequency of payment
of the remuneration to which the employee is entitled; the length of the
employee’s normal working day or week; and where appropriate, the
collective agreements governing the employee’s conditions of work or in
the case of collective agreements concluded outside the business by special
joint bodies or institutions, also the name of the competent body or joint
institution within which the agreements were concluded (Art 2(2)).178 As
far as the basic amount and the length of the normal working day or week
176 See § 10 Nr. 5.2 National Collective Agreement for the Construction Sector 2010;
§ 23 Blue-Collar Agency Workers Collective Agreement; § 14 White-Collar Agency
Workers Collective Agreement.
177 Member States may exclude certain employees from the application of this
Directive. This concerns workers with an employment contract or relationship
that does not exceed the total duration of one month and/or with a working week
not exceeding eight hours, or of a casual and/or specific nature provided, in these
cases, that its non-application is justified by objective considerations (Art 1(2)).
178 Article 2(2) has direct effect, meaning that the ECJ found these conditions to be
sufficiently precise and unconditional to be directly applicable. Joined Cases C-
253/96 to C-258/96 Kampelmann ECLI:EU:C:1997:585, paras 38-40.
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are concerned, a reference to the laws, regulations and administrative or
statutory provisions or collective agreements is sufficient (Art 2(3)).
The employer must provide information in the form of a written
employment contract, a letter of engagement, one or more other written
documents, where one of these document contains all information, except for
information about the expected duration of a fixed term contract, the amount
of paid leave, and the applicable collective labour agreements (Art 3(1)).
Particular attention has been paid to employees who work abroad
(Art 4). This is of particular interest to posted workers. Before the
employee commences work abroad, he must receive additional informa-
tion on the duration of the employment abroad, the currency to be used
for paying remuneration, the benefits in cash or kind attendant on the
employment abroad, and the conditions governing the employee’s repa-
triation.179 An exception is made for short periods abroad, not exceeding
one month. In such cases, the obligations arising from that provision will
not apply at all.
In the 2008 Commission v Luxembourg case on the posting of workers,
the ECJ made it clear that Directive 91/533/EEC has been implemented in
all Member States. Therefore, a host state cannot – in addition – impose
compliance with its national transposition of the Directive. Furthermore,
the ECJ stated that “[i]t is evident that compliance with the requirement
laid down in [the Luxembourgish law] is ensured by the Member State of
origin of the posted workers”.180 A host state may not make a foreign
service provider subject to obligations to which he is already subject in the
home state.181 According to the Court, Member States may choose to
apply their legislation or collective agreements entered into by both sides
of industry to any person who is employed, even temporarily. Never-
theless it should be noted that such a possibility is subject to the condition
that the employees concerned, who are working temporarily in the host
state, do not already enjoy the same protection, or essentially comparable
protection by virtue of obligations to which their employer is already
subject in the Member State in which it is established.182
Notwithstanding that imposing double obligations is not permitted,
it follows from case law on the posting of workers, and with the
implementation of the Posted Workers Enforcement Directive, that it is
179 Information on the currency and the benefits may also be provided by way of
reference to the laws, regulations and administrative or statutory provisions or
collective agreements.
180 Case C-319/06 Commission v Luxembourg ECLI:EU:C:2008:350, paras 39-40.
181 Case C-319/06 Commission v Luxembourg ECLI:EU:C:2008:350, para 41.
182 Case C-319/06 Commission v Luxembourg ECLI:EU:C:2008:350, para, 42.
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permitted to require a foreign service provider to translate a few docu-
ments enabling the controlling and enforcing authorities to check com-
pliance with the PWD.183
5.4 Liability for the payment of minimum wages and holiday
allowance
5.4.1 Introduction
So far, legally regulated liability mechanisms apply in Germany and the
Netherlands.184 It is unknown at this time whether Sweden will introduce
such a liability system. However, an equivalent instrument is used in
practice. In the following, first, attention is paid to the Dutch and German
liability schemes, describing their aim and function as well as their scope.
The Swedish equivalent will then be examined. Secondly, limited joint and
several liability is dealt with, as introduced by the 2014 Posted Workers
Enforcement Directive.
5.4.2 Liability schemes at Member State level
A. Aims and functions
The Netherlands and Germany have each adopted a liability scheme.
While Germany introduced its chain (subcontractors’) liability in 1999,
before the PWD implementation period has expired, user liability was
introduced in the Netherlands in 2010.185 The user liability was introduced
due to the 2004/07 EU enlargements which increased the use of foreign
temporary-work agencies and foreign temporary agency workers. Despite
183 Case C-490/04 Commission v Germany (2007) ECLI:EU:C:2007:430. See on this,
sections 2.3.3 and 7.4.3.
184 Several (part) studies have been undertaken on a contractor’s liability Houwerzijl
& Peters (2008b) (based on country reports of Austria, Belgium, Finland, France,
Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Spain); Van Hoek & Houwerzijl (2011b)
130-4; Van Hoek & Houwerzijl (2011a) 254-7; Jorens, Peters & Houwerzijl (2012).
At EU level, in relation to illegally resident third country nationals, a liability of the
(main) contractor has been introduced in Directive 2009/52/EC 18 June 2009
providing for minimum standards on sanctions and measures against employers of
illegally resident third-country nationals [2009] OJ L168/24, Art 8.
185 Wet van 23 december 2009 tot wijziging van titel 7.10 (arbeidsovereenkomst) van
het Burgerlijk Wetboek in verband met de totstandbrenging van een inlenersaan-
sprakelijkheid met betrekking tot de voldoening van het toepasselijke minimum-
loon en de toepasselijke minimumvakantiebijslag, Stb. 2009, 620 and 621.
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these different backgrounds, the liability schemes have similar aims: to
combat fraudulent practices and prevent illegal work. A liability scheme
provides workers with an additional party to whom they can address their
wage claim, in case their employer does not pay. Moreover, the German
liability is aimed at creating fair employment conditions in the labourmarket.
Initially, liability in Germany was established merely for the con-
struction sector, where raids were found to be ineffective in combating
wage dumping and illegal employment.186 Moreover, chain liability was
found necessary in relation to the massive and continuous circumvention
of the AEntG.187
User liability in the Netherlands must be seen in the context of the
sector’s own monitoring tools and the administrative (public) tools avail-
able. The Dutch temporary agency work sector is largely self-governed by
the social partners. As a result, in 2007 the sector itself introduced a
certification system (see section 6.4.3).188 The user liability supplements
this certification system. This liability furthers compliance with labour law
“without too much administrative obligations and efforts”,189 which is in
line with the state’s approach to assist the self-regulatory measures
established by the agency work sector by public means in order to combat
fraudulent agencies.190 Today, we can find a mix of private sectoral and
public enforcement in the agency sector.191
The Dutch liability model was largely inspired by the German
system, to which reference was made in the Wolff and Müller case on
which the ECJ ruled in 2004.192 Wolff and Müllermade clear that EU law, in
particular the PWD, is not by definition against a liability system,
provided, of course, the boundaries set by EU (case) law are respected.
TheWolff and Müller case shows that the liability of the contractor who has
engaged a subcontractor is an effective instrument. Importantly the ECJ
ruled that,
186 Often, raids impacted victims more severely than the offenders. Thüsing (Ed.)
(2010) (Mohr) § 14 AEntG, para 4, with reference to BT-Drs. 14/45, 17ff.
187 Koberski (2011) § 14 AEntG, para 3.
188 See on the Dutch liability mechanism Houwerzijl & Peters (2010) 5; Schram & Sol
(2007) section 4.
189 Van Hoek & Houwerzijl (2011b) 134.
190 At the time of the introduction of Waadi, the state’s policy was focused on
deregulation, leading to the abolition of the licensing system for undertakings
that allocate workers. Houwerzijl & Peters (2010) section 3.
191 The Minister of Employment and Social Affairs is assessing whether it is possible to
introduce an administrative chain liability. Brief Ministerie van Sociale Zaken en
Werkgelegenheid, Voortgangsrapportage aanpak schijnconstructies, 26 november
2013. See section 7.5.2.
192 Houwerzijl (2013b) 214.
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“[…] if entitlement to minimum rates of pay constitutes a feature of worker
protection, procedural arrangements ensuring observance of that right, such as the
liability of the guarantor in the main proceedings, must likewise be regarded as
being such as to ensure that protection” (emphasis added).193
Even though this instrument actually enhances the employee’s possibility
to enforce his rights, a 2012 study of the protection of workers’ rights in
subcontracting cases in the EU made clear that “effective impact of the
rules is seriously hampered, because it is up to the worker to commence
proceedings […]”.194
B. Scope of the liability schemes
There are two main differences between the Dutch and German liability
systems. In the first place, whereas the Dutch system is a user undertaking
liability, the German one is a subcontractor’s chain liability. Secondly,
as a result of the user liability in the Netherlands, it is solely applicable
in situations involving temporary agency work. The German chain
liability can be used in all sectors that are covered by the AEntG, which
may include agency work if it falls within the scope of the aforementioned
law.195
The two systems are similar in that they restrict the liability to the
sectoral (Germany) or statutory (the Netherlands) net minimum wage, ie
after deductions related to social security contributions and taxes.196 As it
only concerns the minimum wages, workers have to initiate proceedings
against their employer to claim the part of the wage that exceeds the
minimum. The Dutch Government justifies this limitation by referring to
the restraint of the state in interfering in horizontal relationships.197 State
intervention is only possible up to the statutory minimum wage and
minimum holiday allowance. In that sense, the user liability is only aimed
at combating the more severe forms of underpayment.198 Moreover, the
193 Case C-60/03 Wolff and Müller ECLI:EU:C:2004:610, para 37.
194 Jorens, Peters & Houwerzijl (2012) 100.
195 It must be emphasised that the liability concerns only the collectively agreed wage.
This follows from § 8 AEntG, which refers only to employment and working
conditions laid down in collective agreements. Koberski (2011) § 14 AEntG, paras
25-6.
196 For Germany, this follows directly from § 14 AEntG.
197 As we shall see in Chapter 7 below, the role of the Labour Inspectorate is also
limited to monitoring and enforcing compliance with the statutory minimum
wage, and does not embrace the collectively agreed wage, which is often higher.
198 Kamerstukken II 2008/09, 31 833, nr. 3, 3.
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Dutch Minister SZW argued that liability for the full contractually agreed
wage would involve additional work and costs for the user undertak-
ing.199 For the employee, however, it creates an additional burden when
seeking to enforce payment of his wage.200
In 2011, the FNV with the support of the Dutch Government,
requested that the user liability be extended as to include the collectively
agreed minimum wage.201 This would trigger better compliance with the
rules. Due to the Posted Workers Enforcement Directive, the Dutch
Government has announced that it will assess whether it is possible to
introduce not only a liability scheme in the construction sector, but also
more generally. The Government also intends to assess whether a chain
liability is an option. A precondition is that it is possible for the contractor
to confirm whether his subcontractors pay the correct wages.202
In Germany, contractors are liable for the payment of the minimum
wage or making payments in relation to holiday pay and holiday
allowance to a joint institution, such as ULAK (§ 14 AEntG).203 A
precondition for liability under § 14 AEntG is that the main contractor
must have concluded one or more works or services contracts with other
subcontractors. Interestingly, main contractors are also liable regardless of
whether they are themselves covered by the AEntG or not. It is sufficient
that there is a contract with a subcontractor who under the AEntG is
required to comply with the minimum wage levels and holiday entitle-
ments.204 Workers may claim against the main contractor directly, with-
out having first held their own employer liable.205 In case of foreign
employers, the net wage will be calculated on the basis of the home state’s
199 Kamerstukken II 2008/09, 31 833, nr. 3, 3-4.
200 Houwerzijl and Wilkinson apply a decision theoretic approach, ie the strategic
game model, in order to discuss how the interaction between EU and Member
States laws affects the choice of participants (ie contractors) under liability
schemes. They analyse the role and decisions of participants based on a compe-
titive game structure, the cooperative game structure and the prisoner’s dilemma
preferences structure. Houwerzijl & Wilkinson (2013).
201 FNV (2011) 39.
202 Kamerstukken II 2012/13, 17 050, nr. 428, 6, accompanied by an Annex containing
an Actieplan bestrijden van schijnconstructies, 5-6. See also Brief Ministerie Sociale
Zaken en Werkgelegenheid,Voortgangsrapportage aanpak schijnconstructies,
26 November 2013.
203 Gesetz zu Korrekturen in der Sozialversicherung und zur Sicherung der Arbeit-
nehmerrechte, BGBl. I, 3843 vom 19. Dezember 1998. It was the Bündnis 90/Die
Grünen and the SPD that brought forward this legislative initiative. Thüsing (Ed.)
(2010) (Mohr) § 14 AEntG, para 2.
204 Emmert (2009).
205 Thüsing (Ed.) (2010) (Mohr) § 14 AEntG, para 20.
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deductions of taxes and social security contributions.206 Only the wage for
the time the employee has actually worked is taken into account.207
Besides these liability schemes, Dutch and German law also contain
a liability scheme in relation to social security contributions and income
tax.208 This allows the public authorities to start proceedings as well,
which supplement the minimum wage liability.
C. Restricting liability
In the Netherlands, the user undertaking is not liable if the agency is certified
at the moment the parties conclude the contract (Art 7:692(2) BW). The CAO
Bouwnijverheid explicitly determines that undertakings that are covered by
the generally binding collective agreement may only conclude agreements
with certified agencies (Art 6(8)). This means that if the agency is to be
certified after the contract has been agreed, the user undertaking may be
liable.209 According to the Government, the user liability system should
encourage user undertakings established in the Netherlands to contract with
certified agencies, whether they are established in the Netherlands or
abroad.210 A sectoral instrument to ensure that the provisions of a collective
agreement are applied (correctly) is Art 5 CAO Bouwnijverheid, which
determines that, when making use of subcontracting, employers must
ensure that the provisions of the collective agreement are complied with in
relation to all individual employment contracts to which the collective
agreement applies. If an employer contracts with a self-employed person,
he must make an agreement to do so in the subcontracting agreement.
In Germany, contractually agreed limitations can neither set aside
nor minimise the statutory strict liability of § 14 AEntG.211 Main contractors
are thus forced to contract with reliable subcontractors in order to avoid any
liability, rejecting offers that are obviously too low to comply with the
requirement to pay the minimum wage and holiday entitlements.212 If the
206 Koberski (2011) para 27.
207 Koberski (2011) para 28.
208 The Netherlands: Wet van 4 juni 1981, Stb. 1981, 370 (Wet Ketenaansprakelijkheid),
laid down in Arts 34 and 35 Invorderingswet 1990 (Tax Collection Act), Stb. 1990,
222, last amended by Stb. 2010, 139. See more extensively on this liability:
Houwerzijl & Peters (2008a); Germany: Gesetz zur Erleichterung der Bekämpfung
von illegaler Beschäftigung und Schwarzarbeit vom 23. Juli 2002, in particular
§ 28e(3a-f) SGB IV.
209 Houwerzijl & Peters (2010) section 2.
210 Kamerstukken II 2008/09, 31 833, nr. 4, 2-3.
211 Werner (2000) 228.
212 Emmert (2009) 35; Müller-Glöge, Preis & Schmidt (Eds.) (2014) (Schlachter) § 14
AEntG, para 1.
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contractor has been held liable, it may be difficult in practice to exercise a
right of regress, especially in case of a transnational situation.213 Suing
foreign contractors may complicate contracting with foreign subcontractors.
Main contractors could be compelled to exercise reluctance in concluding
contracts with subcontractors or they may need to request certain risk
premiums.214 Main contractors may also contract with subcontractors by
negotiating that the subcontractor shall ensure compliance with the
AEntG.215 Main contractors can also retain part of the remuneration to be
paid to a subcontractor or request a bank guarantee.216 It may be proble-
matic in practice to conclude contracts involving the retention of part of the
remuneration until all requirements by the subcontractor are fulfilled. Bank
guarantees are also an option to ensure compliance with contractual
obligations. They could be extended as to also cover a right of redress.
The duration of such guarantees must be as long as the period under the
statute of limitation. With regard to bank guarantees, small and medium
sized enterprises would encounter difficulties as the financial framework
within they can operate is often exhausted.217 Subcontractors may also be
requested to negotiate with their contractors to ensure they comply with the
AEntG.218
D. Swedish equivalent
Although there is no statutory liability scheme in Sweden, there seems to
be a “functional equivalent” laid down in the Co-determination Act
(1976:580), Sections 38 and 39.219 Based on these provisions, trade unions
have the right to negotiate and possibly veto the engagement of a certain
subcontractor by an employer.220 A precondition is that both the subcon-
tractor and the employer must be bound by a collective agreement
covering the work in question. Exempted from the obligation to negotiate
are short-term and temporary arrangements or work requiring expert
213 Thüsing (Ed.) (2010) (Mohr) § 14 AEntG, para 6; Franzen (2003) 192.
214 Franzen (2003) 192.
215 Werner (2000) 228.
216 Müller-Glöge, Preis & Schmidt (Eds.) (2014) (Schlachter) § 14 AEntG, para 1; and
Koberski (2011) § 14 AEntG, para 53.
217 Franzen (2003) 191.
218 Franzen (2003) 191.
219 Van Hoek & Houwerzijl (2011b) 127-8, with reference to Ahlberg (2010). See on this
also Jorens, Peters & Houwerzijl (2012) 78.
220 See for an example of a court case concerning this instrument Labour Court rulings
AD 2004:99 and AD 2005:46, referred to by Bengtsson (2014) 9-11.
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knowledge, as well as the use of temporary agency work (Section 38 Co-
determination Act).221
The procedure consists of a negotiation stage, during which the
employer must provide the trade union with information about the
contractor(s) with whom he intends to conclude a contract. In addition,
the employer must provide information on the conditions under which the
contractor’s employees work, their education in work environment issues,
their wage, the tax conditions, and other information the trade union may
need to decide whether the contractor is an employer who fulfils his duties
to the employees and society at large. Taking into account all the
information it receives, the trade union may object to an employer’s
decisions, if it is convinced that engaging the contractor would probably
entail violations of statutory labour law or a collective agreement by
which either the employer or the contractor is bound.
In sectors where subcontracting is frequently used, a simplified,
alternative procedure may be used. Within this procedure, the employer
compiles a list of contractors it probably wants to engage. The employer
must verify the contractor’s liability in relation to the collective agreement.
This list is handed over to the trade union. Based on a system of silent
assent, meaning that as long as the trade union does not object, the
employer is free to engage any of these contractors without having to
negotiate every time, as described above.222
This simplified procedure has certain advantages. First, engaging
reliable contractors frees employers from the duty to negotiate with the
unions. Even though a trade union cannot object to a contractor solely
because it is not bound by a collective agreement, a non-bound contractor
is not likely to be accepted on the list. An exception applies if a genuinely
self-employed contractor is concerned, with no employees. As the simpli-
fied procedure merely applies in relation to contractors that are bound by
a collective agreement, engaging a contractor that has no collective
agreement must be according to the procedure laid down in the Co-
determination Act (1976:580).
In the Swedish view, liability in the temporary agency work sector
seems to cause practical legal problems, as a result of the triangular
relationship. The question that arises is whether a temporary agency
worker can hold liable not only his employer but also the user undertaking
for not having paid the wage that has been agreed in the collective
agreement that is applicable to the user undertaking. In a Labour Court
221 Nyström (2013) 175.
222 Ahlberg (2010).
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case in 1990,223 it was made clear that temporary agency workers could
hold their employer liable for the fact that the user undertaking failed to
abide by the wage rules laid down in the collective agreement. During the
implementation period for the TAWD on temporary agency work, it was
emphasised that it is the agency that is and remains responsible for
complying with the equal treatment obligation.224 Accordingly, if a user
undertaking violates the Act on Temporary Agency Work (2012:854), the
agency is responsible and may be ordered to pay damages. Recourse may
be taken by the agency against the user undertaking.
It follows from the 2012 report on liability mechanisms that the
Swedish equivalent seems to work quite well in an internal domestic
situation. However, it is far less effective in cross-border situations, and in
particular in relation to the posting of workers. Checking the reliability of
foreign contractors is difficult and moreover, foreign employees are
seldom members of a Swedish trade union, meaning that the union
does not have access to the employees’ employment contracts.225 A role
could be ascribed to the liaison office, the Work Environment Authority, in
that regard (see Chapter 7 below).
5.4.3 Limited joint and several liability under the 2014 Posted Workers
Enforcement Directive
The issue of subcontracting liability is regulated in the Posted Workers
Enforcement Directive. One reason brought forward was that it is a
relevant instrument as there may be situations in which the employer
somehow disappears or perhaps never even existed.226 As early as 2009,
the direct subcontractor’s liability was regulated in Directive 2009/52/
EC providing minimum standards on sanctions and measures against
employers of illegally resident third-country nationals (Art 8). Article 12
of the Directive determines that, in order to tackle fraud and abuse,
Member States may regulate that in subcontracting chains the contractor
of which the employer (service provider) is a direct subcontractor can be
held liable by the posted worker, in addition to or in place of the
employer. Before introducing such a liability, Member States have to
consult the relevant social partners in accordance with national law
and/or practice. This liability must apply on a non–discriminatory and
223 Labour Court ruling AD 1990:87.
224 Prop. 2011/12:178.
225 Jorens, Peters & Houwerzijl (2012) 103.
226 COM(2012) 131 final, 19.
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proportionate basis. More compelling is the second paragraph of Art 12,
which requires Member States to provide measures allowing posted
workers employed in the construction sector to hold the direct subcon-
tractor liable, in addition to or in place of the employer. This provision is
particularly directed at enabling posted workers to hold the direct
contractor liable for outstanding remuneration within the meaning of
the PWD. However, in line with Art 5 and 6 PWD in conjunction with
Art 11 Posted Workers Enforcement Directive, Member States can also
permit social partners to hold the direct subcontractor of the service
provider liable.
This limited joint and several liability applies with respect to any
outstanding net remuneration corresponding to the minimum rates of pay
and/or contributions due to common funds or institutions of social
partners insofar as they are covered by Art 3 PWD. Moreover, it applies
only in relation to “[…] worker’s rights acquired under the contractual
relationship between the contractor and his subcontractor”, meaning that
this instrument is only intended to implement a liability scheme for posted
workers if and for as long as they are posted. More stringent rules, as
apply in Germany, for instance, may be provided if they are non-
discriminatory and proportionate with regard to the scope and range of
subcontracting liability. The Directive explicitly mentions that this type of
more stringent liability may also apply to sectors other than those in the
Annex of the PWD.
Member States may determine that a contractor, who has under-
taken due diligence obligations as defined under Member State law, shall
not be liable. The text of the Directive contains an alleviated liability
scheme compared to the Commission proposal of 21 March 2012. More
radically, the Commission proposal contains a provision determining that
a contractor who has undertaken due diligence is not liable.
The Directive furthermore allows Member States to deviate from the
obligation to accept liability for activities in the construction sector. They
must, however, take other appropriate enforcement measures, in accor-
dance with EU law and Member State law and practice, and, in a direct
subcontracting relationship, they must allow effective and proportionate
sanctions against the contractor to tackle fraud and abuse in situation
when workers have difficulties obtaining their rights. Member States that
adopt or permit other measures must inform the Commission about the
measures’ effectiveness.
Under the new Directive, the Commission will be allocated a crucial
monitoring role, ensuring that the liability schemes applied at Member
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State level are in compliance with the Directive.227 In line with this,
Member States must inform the Commission about the measures taken
based on Art 12. Relevant information must be made generally available in
the most relevant language(s), “the choice being left to the Member State”.
5.5 Civil sanctions and remedies
The issue of sanctions arises after the claimant has successfully instituted a
case in court. Ever since the ECJ’s ruling in the Von Colson and Kamann
case, it is known that if Member States sanction a violation of EU law, this
sanction must
“[g]uarantee real and effective judicial protection. Moreover it must also have a
real deterrent effect on the employer. It follows that where a Member State
chooses to penalize the breach of the prohibition of discrimination by the award
of compensation, that compensation must in any event be adequate in relation to
the damage sustained”.228
Based on that case, a symbolic pecuniary compensation is insufficient.
Moreover, Art 47 EUCFR determines that everyone whose rights under
EU law have been violated has the right to an “effective remedy”. The EU
law this article deals with does not itself contain any provision on the type
of civil remedies that can or even should be awarded as the result of an
infringement of an individual’s rights under EU and domestic labour
law.229 If there are no harmonisation measures in this regard, EU case law
227 The Netherlands has welcomed this monitoring role of the Commission. Brief
Ministerie van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid, Betekenis bereikte akkoord
over de handhavingsrichtlijn, 30 January 2014.
228 Case 14/83 Von Colson and Kamann ECLI:EU:C:1984:153, para 23.
229 In the Juuri case, the ECJ emphasised that Directive 2001/23/EC makes the
transferee employer responsible for the termination of the contract of employment
or employment relationship where the transfer of the undertaking involves a
substantial change in working conditions, the consequences of that responsibility
being governed by the applicable Member State law. However, the ECJ ruled that
Art 4(2) Directive 2001/23 must be interpreted as not requiring a Member State to
guarantee the employee a right to financial compensation, for which the transferee
employer is liable, in accordance with the same conditions as the right upon which
an employee can rely where the employment contract or relationship is unlawfully
terminated by his employer. However, the national court must ensure that the
transferee employer bears the consequences the applicable Member State law
attached to termination by an employer of the employment contract or relation-
ship, such as the payment of the salary and other benefits relating, under that law,
to the notice period with which an employer must comply. Case C-396/07 Juuri
ECLI:EU:C:2008:656, paras 29-30.
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states that it is for the Member States to have adequate remedies, whereby
they have to take account of the principles of equivalence and effectiveness
(see Chapter 2 above).
In principle, national courts have a panoply of measures available
for infringements of domestic labour law (in cross-border situations).
Generally, the following instruments are at their disposal: prohibitory
and mandatory injunction, compensation and damages, a declaration, and
specific performance orders.
When it comes to unpaid wages, holiday pay and holiday allow-
ance, the first of the employee’s requests in court is that the court shall
order specific performance from the employer, namely that the required
payments shall be made. This applies to statutory and collectively agreed
provisions alike. In the Netherlands, based on Art 15 Wet CAO and Art 3
Wet AVV, employers’ associations and trade unions may claim compen-
sation for damages they or their members suffer from a party that acts in
contravention of one or more provisions of the collective agreement. A
delinquent employer is often also ordered to pay interest. Besides the
statutory interest of, at this point in time, (a mere) three per cent,230 in the
Netherlands, pursuant to Art 7:625 BW, employers may be ordered also to
pay the statutory supplement for late payment of the statutory minimum
wage. This also relates to the entitlement to holiday allowance.231 In
Germany, an employer may be ordered to pay interest of 4.62 per cent
over the gross wage (§ 288 in conjunction with § 247 BGB).232 Swedish
courts may award compensation for damage suffered as well as give
declaratory judgements, compelling the non-compliant employer to ob-
serve the applicable provisions of statutory law or collective agreement.
The Swedish Labour Court cannot order the alleged party to pay a given
wage rate.233 In the context of collective agreements, Section 54 Co-
determination Act (1976:580) determines that if an employer, an employee,
or an organisation is in breach of the Co-determination Act or a collective
bargaining agreement, economic and punitive damages shall be paid.234
Similarly, the national construction sector collective agreement (Byggavta-
let riksavtal) determines that an employer who violates the provisions of
230 Arts 6:119 and 6:120 BW. The statutory interest rate can be found in: Besluit van
18 januari 1971, houdende vaststelling van een algemene maatregel van bestuur als
bedoeld in de artikelen 1286 en 1804 van het Burgerlijk Wetboek, Stb. 1971, 27, last
amended by Stb. 2012, 285.
231 Van Der Grinten, Bouwens & Duk (2011) 199.
232 Säcker & Rixecker (2012) (Ernst) § 288 BGB, para 13; Müller-Glöge, Preis & Schmidt
(Eds.) (2014) (Koch) § 46 ArbGG, para 19.
233 Adlercreutz & Nyström (2009) paras 407-10.
234 Rönnmar (2009).
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the collective agreement is obliged to pay damages. Compensation shall
cover the loss incurred and the violation.235
As for contractor liability as applied in Germany for the sectors covered
by the AEntG and in the Netherlands for the temporary agency work sector,
what a Member State court can do is order the employer to pay the
outstanding net amount(s) of wages, holiday pay and/or holiday allowance.
The 2014 Posted Workers Enforcement Directive, in line with
existing case law dealt with earlier, obliges Member States to “lay down
rules on penalties applicable in the event of infringements of Member State
provisions adopted pursuant to this Directive […]. The penalties provided
for shall be effective, proportionate and dissuasive” (Art 20). No such
provision can be found in the Union Workers Enforcement Directive;
perhaps the principle of equal treatment was found sufficient in guaran-
teeing that sanctions are effective, proportionate and dissuasive. However,
recital 29 states that, in referring to fundamental rights, this directive
respects the right to an effective remedy and a fair trial. In addition, it
determines that Member States must introduce measures that are neces-
sary to protect Union workers from any adverse treatment or adverse
consequence in reaction to a complaint, or proceedings aimed at enforcing
the free movement of workers’ rights (Art 3(6)).
5.6 Comparative notes and conclusions
Chapter 5 addressed the judicial enforcement method at Member State level.
Judicial enforcement refers to the role of civil and labour courts in Member
States, applying EU law correctly and in the end ensuring that the law is
complied with. The chapter pinpointed where EU (case) law has had
influence, and probably will exert an influence in the future, on the im-
plementation of the two enforcement Directives. The following subjects have
been presented: access to a court, aspects of judicial procedures (eg time limits
and evidential rules), liability schemes for the payment of minimum wages,
and civil sanctions and remedies (recovery of rights and compensation).
This chapter revealed that the EU has regulated certain features of
the judicial enforcement method applied or implemented at Member State
level. In the context of access to a court, some legislative influences could
be identified: Directive 91/533/EEC on information to be provided by the
employer as to essential aspects of the employment relationship (1991),
Art 6 PWD concerning access of posted workers to the host state courts
235 See Sections 37 and 38 National Construction Sector Collective Agreement 2010.
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(1996), Brussels I Regulation on jurisdiction in civil and commercial matters,
including employment matters (2001), and the Legal Aid Directive (2003).
With the implementation of the Posted Workers Enforcement Directive, a
limited joint and several liability will also be regulated at EU level.
Although EU law recognises a role for social partners in the context
of judicial enforcement (see Art 6 PWD, Art 11 Posted Workers Enforce-
ment Directive, and Art 3 Union Workers Enforcement Directive), their
role in the enforcement of labour law has not been extensively regulated at
EU level. Consequently, it is for the Member States to determine whether,
and if so how far social partners have a role in enforcing workers’ rights.
This may also include their own interests in seeking compliance with their
own collective agreements. At Member State level, social partners have
far-reaching possibilities to initiate judicial proceedings on behalf of their
own or the worker’s interests (the Netherlands and Sweden). Proceedings
can be started, claiming not only statutory labour rights, but also collective
labour rights as laid down in (generally binding) collective agreements.
The role of the social partners in Germany is, in general, limited to a
certain extent. Here, only ULAK, the joint institution of the social partners
in the construction sector, has a powerful role in enforcing holiday pay
and holiday allowances. Their role, however, is limited to just that.
Individual workers in Sweden who are member of a trade union
are, in principle, not themselves allowed to initiate proceedings in the
Labour Court in case their wage under a collective agreement has not been
paid. This is reserved for the Swedish trade unions. This is only different
in case the trade union decides not to take action. That individual workers
themselves may not initiate proceedings may be problematic as Art 47
EUCFR is clear when it states that everyone whose rights and freedoms
guaranteed by EU law are violated has the right to an effective remedy
before a tribunal. On the other hand, the Swedish model is based on
industrial relations, where labour rights are regulated and enforced by the
social partners. In that sense, it may be argued that workers who are
members of a trade union are far better protected through their trade
union representatives than when they have to enforce their rights on their
own. An additional benefit is that a trade union will always first try to
settle the dispute out of court, before commencing judicial proceedings.
In the Netherlands and Sweden, the trade unions may bring an
action, even if the worker concerned does not want to. This mostly
happens in a situation in which an employer who is bound by a collective
agreement fails to abide by that agreement. It is in the trade union’s
general interest as well as that of the employers’ association to ensure
compliance with their agreements. Social partners in the Netherlands may
Judicial enforcement method
193
even initiate a group action, which is not regulated at EU level. In relation
to minimum wages, the German social partners have weaker rights than
their colleagues in the Netherlands and Sweden; they may not initiate
judicial proceedings demanding compliance with a (generally binding)
collective agreement. There is no EU influence here.
The two enforcement Directives will not require any changes at
Member State level in this regard. Nevertheless, both Directives emphasise
the need for access to judicial protection for workers and/or their
representatives. What both Directives require is that trade unions who
are willing to initiate proceedings on behalf of or in support of workers,
must receive the workers’ prior approval before doing so (Art 11(4)(b)
Posted Workers Enforcement Directive and Art 3(3) Union Workers
Enforcement Directive). The question is what kind of impact this has on
the situations of the three countries analysed: Germany where ULAK has a
strong role in relation to holiday pay and holiday allowance; the Nether-
lands as regards group actions and actions based on collective labour law;
and Sweden where trade unions may initiate proceedings even in the
absence of their employee-member’s consent. It seems that the Directives’
provisions are addressed to initiating proceedings on behalf of or in
support of Union workers and posted workers. Consequently, bringing
the employer before a court due to a violation of the collective agreement
seems still possible without the worker’s approval as long as it concerns
the contractual relationship between the trade union and the employers or
their representatives. IAs has been said earlier, foreign workers do often
not initiate a judicial proceeding against their employer. Therefore, the
requirement to request the worker’s consent may delay the procedure or
may lead to the situation in which no procedure will be initiated at all.
A new aspect is the introduction of a limited joint and several
liability in the context of the posting of workers. At the time of writing,
liability schemes can be found in the Netherlands (user liability, intro-
duced in 2010 as a result of the EU enlargements) and Germany (sub-
contractors’ chain liability, introduced in 1999 to combat wage dumping
and illegal employment in the construction sector). The Dutch and Ger-
man schemes differ: while the Dutch is a user undertaking liability,
allowing the temporary agency worker to claim the payment of the net
minimum wage from the user undertaking, the German is a subcontrac-
tors’ liability that allows the worker to claim his minimum wage from all
parties in the chain. Sweden, although it does not have such a scheme, has
a ‘functional equivalent’. Trade unions have the right to negotiate and
possibly object to the engagement of a certain subcontractor by an
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employer. To use this instrument, both the subcontractor and the em-
ployer must be bound by a collective agreement for the work in question.
The German chain liability was disputed in the Wolff and Müller
case, in which the ECJ made it clear that EU law, in particular the PWD, is
not against a liability system as such, provided the boundaries set by EU
(case) law are respected. According to the ECJ, if minimum rates of pay
constitute a feature of worker protection, then procedural arrangements
ensuring compliance with that right must likewise be regarded as being
such as to ensure that protection. Workers are given a second party from
whom they can claim the payment of the net wages unpaid, which
increases their chances of success.
With the adoption of the Posted Workers Enforcement Directive in
2014, the EU now regulates a limited liability. One of the reasons for
establishing a limited liability is that employers seem to disappear or may
even never have existed (Art 12). The liability applies in relation to a
worker’s rights acquired under the contractual relationship between the
contractor and his or her subcontractor. Member States, like Germany, that
have a more stringent liability system, may, in conformity with EU law,
continue to apply that system, if it is applied in a non-discriminatory and
proportionate manner. Member States are required to introduce such a
liability for activities mentioned in the Annex of the PWD.
Member States that have no subcontracting liability scheme for
wages, like the Netherlands and Sweden, may for activities that are not
listed in the Annex of the PWD take other appropriate enforcement
measures, in accordance with EU and Member State law and/or practice,
which permit effective and proportionate sanctions against the contractor.
Although introducing a subcontractor’s liability is optional, this develop-
ment may induce Member States that have no such liability scheme to
introduce one, or at least to assess the existing enforcement measures, and
improve them if they are found to be insufficient. While the Netherlands in
the context of the Posted Workers Enforcement Directive has contem-
plated the introduction of subcontractor liability, it may be assumed that
Sweden will not do so. Sweden is perhaps also not required to introduce
liability as it has not regulated wages within the meaning of the PWD.
Besides these legislative influences, the ECJ’s case law provides
guidance on how Member State courts have to apply national time limits
and sanctions and remedies for breaches of the rights workers derive from
EU law. Time limits are currently not regulated at EU level, nor are there
any intentions to do so. Nevertheless, as time limits vary across the
Member States, they have to respect the jurisprudential principles of
equivalence and effectiveness as developed in the ECJ. As to remedies,
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ever since the ECJ’s ruling in the Von Colson and Kamann case it is known
that if Member States sanction a violation of EU law, this sanction must
guarantee real and effective judicial protection. Sanctions must also have a
genuine deterrent effect on the employer and be adequate in relation to the
damage sustained. Symbolic pecuniary compensation is insufficient.
Moreover, following Art 47 EUCFR, everyone whose rights under EU
law have been violated has the right to an “effective remedy”.
The 2014 Posted Workers Enforcement Directive, in line with Von
Colson and Kamann, obliges Member States to “lay down rules on penalties
applicable in the event of infringements of national provisions adopted
pursuant to this Directive […]. The penalties provided for shall be
effective, proportionate and dissuasive” (Art 20). No such provision can
be found in the Union Workers Enforcement Directive. However, recital
29 states that, referring to fundamental rights, the Directive respects the
right to an effective remedy and a fair trial. In addition, it determines that
Member States must introduce measures that are necessary to protect
Union workers from any adverse treatment or adverse consequence in
reaction to a complaint or proceedings aimed at enforcing free movement
of worker rights (Art 3(6)). This provision may induce Member States to
reconsider their existing sanctions and remedies in the context of cross-
border worker mobility.
Thus, we can see that within the judicial enforcement method, the
EU has increasingly guided Member State enforcement, with the aim of
making judicial enforcement in the context of cross-border worker mobi-
lity easier, not only for Union workers, but also, if not particularly so, for
posted workers. The principles of equivalence and effectiveness remain
applicable, as a floor, to those instruments that have only partly been
harmonised.
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CHAPTER 6
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS ENFORCEMENT
METHOD
6.1 Introduction
Enforcing employment conditions via the industrial relations enforcement
method refers to the supervision and enforcement of (collective) labour
law entrusted to social partners. Besides being involved in the judicial
enforcement of labour rights, as dealt with in the previous chapter, social
partners have their own (often complementary) mechanisms to ensure
compliance with rights laid down in collective agreements. This chapter
thus first introduces the role of the social partners, at both EU and Member
State level, in monitoring and enforcing collectively agreed employment
conditions (section 6.2). Secondly, measures are described within indus-
trial relations institutions at Member State level to improve compliance
with employees’ rights (section 6.3). In the third place, sector-specific
instruments that have been introduced are explored, focusing on the
construction and temporary agency work sectors (section 6.4). Finally,
the role of collective action as an instrument ensuring compliance with
labour law is analysed (section 6.5).
6.2 The role of the social partners
6.2.1 Introduction
Social partners fulfil an important role in the context of labour law. They
not only regulate employment conditions, they are also obliged to ensure
that these agreements are complied with and, if not, that compliance is
enforced. Below, their role at EU and domestic level in the monitoring and
enforcement of collective agreements is briefly introduced.
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6.2.2 Role of the social partners in the enforcement of labour law: the EU
perspective
The Treaty of Maastricht recognised social partners at EU level as “co-
regulator”.1 In line with Art 154 TFEU, the Commission has to consult the
social partners on the possible direction of legislation before submitting a
legislative proposal. If action at EU level is found to be advisable, the
Commission must consult management and labour on the content of the
envisaged proposal. Moreover, social partners can inform the Commission
of their wish to agree on contractual relations, including agreements, at EU
level.2 There are two ways to implement collective agreements: through
what are called autonomous collective agreements, which are to be
implemented by social partners at Member State level, or by asking the
Council to issue a decision making the collective agreement generally
applicable.
According to Smismans, the “social partners can negotiate on
whatever they want and can even sign European agreements on issues
which are not covered by the social matters on which the Community has
competence”.3 This, however, applies solely to autonomous collective
agreements concluded by the social partners at EU level. A Council
decision that makes the collective agreement binding on those who are
covered by it must confine itself to matters referred to in Art 153 TFEU
(Art 155(2) TFEU). In principle, the effectiveness of a European collective
agreement depends on its implementation at Member State level.4 There-
fore, difficulties encountered at Member State level with non-compliance
with collective agreements are a matter for the Member State social
partners and Member State laws.5
An increased role in the monitoring and enforcement of labour
rights can be seen in the context of the posting of workers. Article 5 PWD
refers to the possibility of social partners to enforce obligations under the
Directive (see Chapter 5 above). They may, as we have seen, be allowed to
initiate proceedings under the Posted Workers Enforcement Directive
1 Marginson & Keune (2012) 1. The European Social Dialogue is one of the measures
adopted to strengthen the social dimension of European integration. See, inter alia,
extensively on the European Social Dialogue: Faro (2000) and Franssen (2002).
2 Branch (2005) 322.
3 Smismans (2007) 343.
4 Even (2008) 219, provides the example of the UK, where collective agreements are a
kind of gentlemen’s agreements, which are not legally binding and thus not legally
enforceable.
5 According to Marginson & Sisson (2004) 39-40, the OMC belongs to the framework
for a European industrial relations system.
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(Art 11) and the Union Workers Enforcement Directive (Art 3). The Posted
Workers Enforcement Directive also permits management and labour to
monitor the application of the relevant terms and conditions of employ-
ment of posted workers. This is particularly relevant in Member States
where management and labour are entrusted with the implementation of
the key central terms and conditions imposed by the PWD.6 A pre-
condition, however, is that an adequate level of protection be guaranteed,
equivalent to that resulting from the PWD and the Posted Workers
Enforcement Directive.7
While the Posted Workers Enforcement Directive attaches value to
close cooperation between the Commission and the Member States in
order to guarantee adequate and effective implementation and enforce-
ment, the role of social partners (and labour inspectorates) is mentioned
only indirectly in this context. Recital 16 states that “Close cooperation
between the Commission and the Member States, and where relevant,
regional and local authorities, is therefore essential, without neglecting the
important role of labour inspectorates and the social partners in this respect”
(emphasis added). An interesting provision can be found in the Union
Workers Enforcement Directive. Art 5 of that Directive makes explicit
reference to the role of social partners. Member States have to encourage a
dialogue with appropriate social partners having a legitimate interest in
contributing to combating discrimination on nationality grounds.8
6.2.3 Role of the social partners in the enforcement of labour law: the Member
State perspective
Since collective agreements are contracts under private law, concluded
between the trade unions and employers’ associations, there is no role for
state involvement in monitoring and enforcing them. For Germany,
however, it should be noted that regarding the wage and holiday provi-
sions laid down in a generally binding collective agreement, within the
meaning of the AEntG, the Finanzkontrolle Schwarzarbeit (‘FKS’) (Financial
Control of Undeclared Employment) is also responsible for monitoring
and enforcement (see Chapter 7 below).
In the Netherlands, generally binding collective agreements come
close to state-created standards.9 Even though generally binding collective
6 Recital 8 Posted Workers Enforcement Directive.
7 Recital 33 and Art 10(4) Posted Workers Enforcement Directive.
8 See on this also recital 22.
9 The term state-created standards has been taken from Kahn-Freund (1954) 200.
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agreements are, as to their effect, similar to legislation, it is for the social
partners to enforce such agreements. The Dutch FNV emphasises that
even if the social partners are responsible for ensuring compliance with
(generally binding) collective agreements, difficulty may arise as to the
limited competences of social partners. For instance, social partners have
no competence to inspect the employer’s books.10 Moreover, Union
workers are often not members of a trade union and are not willing to
expose any abuses. The FNV therefore suggests that the Labour Inspecto-
rate should be made competent to monitor and enforce (generally binding)
collective agreements. Reference is made to Germany and Finland, where
the state authorities are competent to enforce collective agreements.11 This
statement should be somewhat nuanced for Germany. We have seen that
the FKS in Germany is entrusted only with the enforcement of the
provisions of the AEntG and the collective agreements based thereon,
because it is necessary that all employers that are obliged to abide by the
minimum conditions that apply mandatorily under the AEntG (Chapter 5
above). According to Koberski: “[…] die Ziele des Gesetzes, hierzu gehört
auch die Angleichung der Wettbewerbsbedingungen, lassen sich nur dann
erreichen, wenn die tatsächliche Einhaltung der in diesem Gesetz zwin-
gend ausgestalteten Arbeitsbedingung durch alle normunterworfenen
Arbeitgeber gewährleistet ist”.12 The necessity of ensuring that all workers
covered by the said acts work according to the employment conditions to
which they are entitled led to making a state authority responsible for
monitoring and enforcing those conditions. In this model, social partners
have only a limited role.
Matters are different in the Swedish model, as there is no possibility
to declare a collective agreement generally binding, nor is there a statutory
minimum wage to serve as a floor. Thus, only if the employer is bound by
the collective agreement can a trade union start negotiations or initiate
proceedings to compel the employer to abide by the agreement’s provi-
sions. The problem of monitoring and enforcement by the social partners
in relation to non-unionised employees and non-bound employers has
been recognised in an OECD study of 2012 on the Swedish immigration
10 FNV (2011) 24.
11 FNV (2011).
12 Koberski (2011) § 17 AEntG, para 2.
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policy and its changes in 2008. According to the OECD, the Swedish
‘inspection system’ is based on trade union oversight.13
6.3 Measures to improve compliance with employees’ rights:
information and cooperation
6.3.1 Introduction
For foreign employees and their employers alike, it is of great importance
that they are aware of the rights and obligations they have. The social
partners’ strategies for disseminating information on applicable rights and
obligations are presented first (in section 6.3.2). One question here is
whether under EU law it is the responsibility of the Member State or the
social partners to disseminate information on collectively agreed rights to
foreign workers. Different opinions exist at EU and Member State level.
This is followed by a survey of existing (possibilities of) transnational
cooperation between social partners (section 6.3.3).
6.3.2 Disseminating information on applicable rights and obligations
A. Access to information
Access to information is crucial in that it allows foreign employers and
foreign employees to know what rights and obligations they have before
they cross the border. This is even more important in cross-border
employment situations, due to the unfamiliarity of foreign employers
and their foreign employees with Member State regulations. Not knowing
what employment rights foreign employees are entitled to may deprive
them of the possibility to initiate judicial proceedings. Thus, this would
seem to be a precondition for effective enforcement. In the context of the
posting of workers, Art 4(3) PWD determines that “[e]ach Member State
shall take the appropriate measures to make the information on the terms
and conditions of employment referred to in Art 3 generally available”.
13 OECD (2011) 126. See also Woolfson, Herzfeld Olsson & Thörnqvist (2012) 175,
stating that “the problem of ensuring decent work for seasonal migrant workers
cannot simply be laid at the door of the Swedish trade unions and entails wider
problems for trade union organization confronted with increasingly diverse and
mobile workforces in an era of globalization”. Prior to the 2008 amendments, the
social partners, and in particular the trade unions, had a powerful role in
immigration issues, being able to determine whether or not workers could enter
the Swedish labour market.
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Under the Posted Workers Enforcement Directive, Member States should
make the applicable collective agreements generally available on the
internet. Similarly, Art 7 Union Workers Enforcement Directive obliges
Member States to disseminate information on rights of Union workers.
Clearly, EU law addresses the Member State authorities to publish all
relevant information on labour rights, whether statutory or collectively
regulated.
While the Member State responsibility is clear in relation to statu-
tory labour law, it is less self-evident as regards employment rights laid
down in collective agreements. As social partners conclude collective
agreements, then from the point of view of the Member States, it is the
primary, indeed the sole responsibility of the social partners to ensure that
domestic and foreign employers and employees are informed about the
contents of the applicable collective agreements.14 This viewpoint does not
seem to correspond with that of the EU. It can be assumed that Member
States have to oblige social partners to make the (core conditions laid
down in) collective agreements generally available in a variety of lan-
guages. Failing to do so could probably be punished.
Websites
Information on collective agreements is mostly found on the websites of
the trade unions and the employers’ organisations. What stands out is that
the trade union’s commitment to publish information is quite often
restricted to information provided in the country’s original language
and in English. In regard to the Dutch construction sector, it can be said
that substantial efforts are made to disseminate information in nine
languages on particular websites.15 The FNV has employed Polish-speak-
ing staff to facilitate communication with Polish Union workers in
particular. The temporary agency work sector has also launched an
English and Polish website to inform (potential) employees and employers
about their rights and obligations.16 On these websites, the texts of the
collective agreements can also be found in both English and Polish.
14 Chapter 7 below deals with Member States’ obligation to disseminate information
in the context of the transnational posting of services and the free movement of
workers (see section 2.2 above).
15 See <http://www.nlconstruction.info/index.html> accessed 28 October 2014.
16 See for the English website <http://www.abu.nl/engels/brochures/brochures>
and the Polish website <http://www.abu.nl/pools/informacje-dla-pracownikw-
tymczasowych> both accessed 28 October 2014. The website is also available in
Bulgarian and Romanian.
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In Germany, ULAK regularly disseminates information on the
holiday pay fund in the form of brochures, made available in different
languages not only for employers but especially also for employees.17
Furthermore, contact persons can be contacted in 39 languages.18 Posted
workers will be informed annually about their entitlements in their own
mother tongue. Requests can be made in German, but also in the appro-
priate mother tongue, in writing or otherwise. Information brochures and
forms can be downloaded from the internet.19
The Swedish Building Workers Union’s website provides informa-
tion in ten languages (Swedish, English, German, Polish, Estonian, Span-
ish, Latvian, Lithuanian, Russian and Chinese) directed to foreign
employees and their employers.20 Basic information is provided on
various subjects, like details on how to contact Byggnads and referring to
two regions that have interpreters (Malmö and Gothenburg). It is also
stated that there is no statutory minimum wage but that the individual
wage is negotiated by the trade union at local level.
When consulting the Swedish trade unions’ websites in the con-
struction sector and the temporary agency work sector, it is striking that
hardly any (translated) collective agreements can be found. As said above,
Byggnads publishes some minimal information on employment conditions,
but not on the applicable collective agreements. Byggindustri has pub-
lished an English translation of the collective agreement; however, it is a
version dating from 2010.21 Here, it seems, foreign employers and
employees must contact the trade union or employer’s association directly
in order to receive information on applicable collective agreements and
labour provisions in the construction sector. Collective agreements, in
Swedish only, can be found in the temporary agency work sector, where
Bemanningsföretagen (the Swedish Staffing Agencies, an employers’ orga-
nisation) has uploaded the three applicable collective agreements. An
outdated English translation of the blue-collar collective agreement applic-
17 For employers, information brochures can be found in 11 languages, and for
employees brochures are available in 13 languages.
18 See <http://www.soka-bau.de/soka-bau_2011/desktop/de/Europa/Kontakt/
index.html> accessed 28 October 2014.
19 Preis & Temming (2006) 207-8.
20 See for the information provided in this subsection <http://byggnads.se/Om-
Byggnads/Equal-pay-for-equal-work/Equal-pay-for-equal-work/> accessed
28 October 2014.
21 It can be downloaded from <http://publikationer.bygg.org/Userfiles/Info/820/
Byggavtalet_2010_5_EN_ren.pdf> accessed 28 October 2014.
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able until the end of April 2012 can be downloaded from the website of
Bemanningsföretagen.22
A lack of (financial) resources, Van Hoek and Houwerzijl write, may
lead to a “clear absence of monitoring and enforcement of rights at CLA
level”.23 Member States may probably have to consider introducing
sanctions for not publishing the core employment conditions laid down
in collective agreements. Otherwise, the Commission may probably
commence infringement proceedings for failure to comply with the
PWD and the Posted Workers Enforcement Directive.24 On the other
hand, social partners themselves (should) have their own interest in
making their agreements transparent and available to all those whom
they address.
Identifying core employment conditions in the context of the posting of workers
The Dutch collective agreements for the construction and agency sector
contain special appendices stipulating which provisions apply or even
which parts of applicable provisions are meant for posted workers and
Union workers. In addition, a special regime applies to posted temporary
agency workers in the construction sector.25 With regard to the posting of
workers, the Ministry SZW website has published four generally applic-
able collective agreements in English, namely: the construction sector, the
temporary agency sector, the metalworking and electrical engineering
industry, and the insurance industry agreements.26 Of course, other
collective agreements can also be found on the Ministry’s website. All
generally binding collective agreements are published, but the majority
are in Dutch only.27 It seems that social partners have scarcely used the
22 See <http://www.bemanningsforetagen.se/om-oss/in-english> accessed 28 Octo-
ber 2014.
23 Van Hoek & Houwerzijl (2011b) 202.
24 Art 5 Posted Workers Enforcement Directive clearly determines “Member States
shall ensure” that the terms and conditions are made available.
25 Van Hoek & Houwerzijl (2011b) 76.
26 Website of the Ministry of Employment and Social Affairs on the posting of
workers, below listing three translated generally binding collective agreements:
<http://cao.szw.nl/index.cfm?rubriek_id=392840&hoofdmenu_item_id=16507&-
menu_item_id=16538&link_id=101179> accessed 28 October 2014.
27 See for the collective agreements that have been registered with the Ministry of
Employment and Social Affairs: <http://cao.szw.nl/index.cfm?fuseaction=app.
caoOverzicht&menu_item_id=16534&hoofdmenu_item_id=16507&rubriek_
item=392846&rubriek_id=392840> accessed 28 October 2014.
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option of placing English translations of (some of the provisions of)
collective agreements on the Ministry’s website.28
In Germany, ULAK’s website also contains information in various
languages on the applicable minimum wage.29
As the Swedish WEA is not responsible for distributing information
on collective agreements, it is up to the social partners themselves to
publicise such agreements as apply. However, with the introduction of
Section 9a Posting of Workers Act (1999:678) in 2013, trade unions are
required to submit collective agreements which they may enforce with the
support of industrial action according to Section 5a Posting of Workers
Act (1999:678) to the WEA.30 For instance, identifying what wages would
be applicable to workers posted by their employer is often not possible
before the posting is undertaken.31 As a result of the Laval judgement, LO
together with other affiliates is carrying out a project to help foreign
service providers identify the elements that can be included in the term
minimum rates of pay.32 At the time of writing it is unclear whether this
exercise has been completed.
The Commission and the Member States may provide support to
the social partners (Art 8(3) Posted Workers Enforcement Directive) in
order to ensure that posted workers and service providers have access to
the applicable terms and conditions of employment laid down in the PWD
and in the Posted Workers Enforcement Directive.
B. Contact points
Contact points assist employees in identifying, inter alia, the applicable
employment conditions and where to go if these conditions are not
complied with. In the context of the free movement of workers, the public
consultation conducted by the Commission between June and August
2011 led to the conclusion that “[s]etting up contact points or structures in
the Member States was seen as an important measure by the majority of
the respondents”. Trade unions, as well as private companies and regional
authorities, also highlighted that supporting organisations are important,
28 This was already established in Stichting van de Arbeid, Tweede evaluatie van het
Samenwerkingskader (2011) 5.
29 See <http://www.soka-bau.de/soka-bau_2011/desktop/de/Europa/Broschue-
ren> accessed 28 October 2014.
30 Sweden herewith complies with Art 5(4) Posted Workers Enforcement Directive.
31 Ahlberg (2010) 19.
32 Ahlberg (2010) 20.
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too.33 The Union Workers Enforcement Directive contains a provision on
contact points, structures or bodies to promote equal treatment (Art 5).
One main task with which such bodies should be entrusted is to provide
information to all relevant stakeholders and to support Union workers.34
According to this provision, Member States make sure that such bodies are
aware, make use of and cooperate with existing information and assis-
tance services at EU level (eg Your Europe, SOLVIT, EURES, Enterprise
Europe Network and the Points of Single Contact).35 This provision refers,
albeit implicitly, to Member State authorities. Nevertheless, social partners
may also have a role to play here, by exchanging and providing informa-
tion on situations where the rights of Union workers have been violated.36
An example can be mentioned from Germany, where the Trade
Union Confederation (Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund, DGB) has set up the
initiative Faire Mobilität (fair mobility), which is financed in part by the
Federal Ministry of Employment and Social Affairs.37 This project aims at
enforcing fair minimum wages and fair employment conditions. Accord-
ingly, the counselling offices inform about rights on the labour market,
provide free advice (in various languages and if necessary with an
interpreter / translator), and the centres cooperate with the DGB trade
unions.38 So far, offices have been opened in Berlin, Munich, Frankfurt on
the Main, Hamburg, Dortmund and Stuttgart, each office having its own
speciality (industrial cleaning industry, construction sector, health care
sector, food and meat processing industry, posting of workers and
contracts for services) and providing information in different languages
(English, German, French, Polish, Bulgarian, Romanian and Russian). In
addition to these counselling offices, there is an organisation in Berlin and
Hamburg that focuses on migrant workers, which is related to and closely
cooperates with the DGB.39
33 COM(2013) 236 final, 7. The respondents that gave their views on the main
problems EU migrant workers face when exercising the right to free movement
were: citizens, national authorities, trade unions, employers’ organisations and
associations (eg NGOs).
34 COM(2013) 236 final, 12.
35 COM(2013) 236 final, 21.
36 See Kullmann & Houwerzijl (2013).
37 See <ww.faire-mobilitaet.de/informationen/++co++3b9487e0-1b69-11e2-b8f1-
00188b4dc422> accessed 28 October 2014.
38 See <http://www.faire-mobilitaet.de/beratungsstellen> accessed 28 October 2014.
39 Berlin-Brandenburg: <http://berlin-brandenburg.dgb.de/beratung/migranten>
and Hamburg: <http://www.hamburg.arbeitundleben.de/migration> both ac-
cessed 28 October 2014.
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6.3.3 Transnational cooperation between social partners: the exchange of
information and best practices
Transnational cooperation may take place at various levels. It may also
take different forms,40 one of which is the exchange of information.
Strictly speaking, it is not an instrument for monitoring and enforcing
collective agreements. However, transnational cooperation may help
social partners to identify particular problems, discuss solutions, or at
least the approaches taken, to solve difficulties encountered at sectoral or
Member State level when it comes to the applicability and enforceability of
collective agreements.
In the context of the posting of workers, in some countries there is
transnational cooperation between social partners (and in particular their
holiday funds) in relation to the comparability of employment condi-
tions.41 This is particularly relevant as double burdens should be pre-
vented, such as the payment of holiday contributions. Transnational
cooperation between social partners may also be of interest to exchange
information on the applicable employment conditions and to exchange
best practices. Cooperation can also be agreed in bilateral agreements, see
the agreement between the German ULAK and their counterparts in other
Member States.42
At EU level, trade union confederations cooperate within ETUC
(European Trade Union Confederation).43 ETUC can be a platform to
exchange information on problems related to labour markets and mon-
itoring and enforcing employment conditions. It has certain focus points,
such as the posting of workers and equal treatment of migrant workers,
both being platforms for information exchange and cooperation. Besides
40 Generally, four forms of transnational cooperation can be distinguished: (1)
communication networks aimed at exchanging information in a bi- or multilateral
way; (2) coordination networks aimed at coordinating common interests; (3)
cooperation networks aimed at developing common measures and activities on a
case-by-case basis; and (4) meta-organisations aimed at establishing decision
making structures and continuous activities. Larsson (2012) 153.
41 Van Hoek & Houwerzijl (2011b) 149. See for Germany: Koberski, Sahl & Hold
(1997) § 1 AEntG, para 191.
42 See also Van Hoek & Houwerzijl (2011b) 149-50.
43 The following Swedish confederations are members of ETUC: LO Swedish Trade
Union Confederation (Landsorganisationen i Sverige), Saco Swedish Confederation
of Professional Associations (Sveriges Akademikers Centralorganisation), and TCO
Swedish Confederation of Professional Employees (Tjänstemännens Centralorganisa-
tion). For Germany, the DGB takes part in ETUC and for the Netherlands, the FNV,
CNV (Christelijk Nationaal Vakverbond, National Federation of Christian Trade
Unions) and MHP (Vakcentrale voor middengroepen en hoger personeel, Trade Union
Federation for Middle Classes and Higher Level Employees) are members.
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this, ETUC participates in the European Social Dialogue. In the construc-
tion industry, a similar role is ascribed to the European Federation of
Building and Woodworkers (EFBWW).44
Although not necessarily related to Union worker mobility, a nice
example is the frequent cooperation between Nordic trade unions in the
Council of Nordic Trade Unions (Nordens Fackliga Samorganisation),
founded in 1972.45 Even though this council does not necessarily address
cross-border issues, an advantage of such cooperation is that requests can
be lodged more easily with trade union colleagues abroad. Mutual trust
encourages the constant exchange of views and information. Moreover,
Council of Nordic Trade Unions also cooperates closely with the Baltic Sea
Trade Union Network (BASTUN).46
At regional cross-border level, a pioneer in transnational coopera-
tion is the Doorn group,47 which consists of trade union confederations of
the Benelux countries and Germany. The aim is to coordinate collective
bargaining transnationally in order to develop strategies to avoid wage
competition. Information is exchanged on collective bargaining. Later, the
Group extended its field of cooperation beyond wage matters, such as
lifelong learning. The Doorn group also contributed to the establishment
of transnational collective bargaining coordination at EU level.48
Transnational cooperation may be restricted as trade unions and
employees have difficulties defining their core interests in transnational
terms. Often, national and local interests and bargaining strategies dom-
inate. Due to the national focus of trade unions, only limited financial
resources are made available to international trade union organisations.
Moreover, the diversity of collective bargaining systems may not easily fit
with each other.49
44 Members of the EFBWW are: IG BAU and IG Metall (Germany); FNV Bouw and
CNV Vakmensen (the Netherlands); and GS, Svenska Byggnads, Svenska Elek-
trikerförbundet, Svenska Målareförbundet, Unionen and SEKO (Sweden).
45 This is a trade union confederation, consisting of 16 national trade unions,
representing approximately nine million employees. See <http://www.nfs.net/
languages/english/about-nfs-906369> accessed 28 October 2014. See also <http://
www.lotcobistand.org/our-activities-and-network> accessed 28 October 2014.
Bruun et al. (1992) 16-7.
46 See <ww.bastun.nu> accessed 28 October 2014.
47 This paragraph is based on Eurofound, ‘Doorn Group’ <ww.eurofound.europa.
eu/areas/industrialrelations/dictionary/definitions/doorngroup> accessed 28
October 2014.
48 See also, briefly, on the Doorn group Bruun & Hepple (2009) 51.
49 Keune & Schmidt (2009) 19.
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6.4 Sector-specific enforcement mechanisms
6.4.1 Introduction
In the construction and the agency work sectors the social partners have
set up special mechanisms and institutions for ensuring compliance. The
following looks at measures taken in the construction sector (section 6.4.2),
relating to identity verification on construction sites and social partner
institutions monitoring and enforcing collective agreements. Moreover,
within the temporary agency work sector, quality standards have been
introduced for agencies, as has the Dutch Foundation for Compliance,
entrusted with ensuring compliance with the generally binding collective
agreement (section 6.4.3).
6.4.2 Tools available to ensure compliance in the construction sector
A. Identity verification in the construction sector: best practices from
Sweden
To facilitate monitoring of the presence of (foreign) employees and to
increase the possibilities of making sure that labour rights are complied
with, the Swedish social partners in the construction industry created a so-
called ID06. This is a means to prevent illegal work and economic crime as
well as promoting healthy competition.50 This instrument has the advan-
tage that the employees’ identity can be more easily established, because
all employees must carry such an identity card when entering the
construction site and during their work.
The General Provisions defined for the ID06 contain identity re-
quirements and attendance records.51 Accordingly, subcontractors and
suppliers must provide the main contractor in writing and in advance
with the names and civic registration numbers of the employees. Every
employee working on the building site, whether employed with the main
contractor or the subcontractor, must wear a visible identity badge or
50 The participating trade unions are: Elektriska Installatörsorganisationen (EIO),
Glasbranschföreningen, Maskinentreprenörerna, Målaremästarna, Plåtslageriernas
Riksförbund, Sveriges Byggindustrier och VVS Företagen med stöd av Byggche-
ferna/Ledarna, Byggnads, Målareförbundet och SEKO, all working together in
Byggbranschen i Samverkan.
51 See the General Provisions on Identity Requirements and Attendance Records, to
be downloaded from <http://www.id06.se/in_english> and the information
sheet, to be downloaded from <http://publikationer.bygg.org> both accessed 28
October 2014.
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authorisation card. The main contractor must maintain a list of every
individual who is present on the building site (called the personnel
register). He is obliged to retain this register for two years. This list
must be provided to the Swedish Tax Authority on request. In case
persons have not pre-registered or do not have an identity card, the
main contractor may refuse them entry to the building. A penalty payment
is levied of 500 SEK (approximately 58 EUR) for each employee of the
subcontractor (ie the employer involved) and for each day of being unable
to show his identity (by an identity card or visible identity badge).
Reference must be made to the ID06 in agreements concluded between
the main contractor and his subcontractor(s).52
Inspired by the Swedish ID06, the Dutch Minister SZW has exam-
ined the possibility of introducing a similar identity verification instru-
ment (called the ID12).53 Based on satisfactory experience in Sweden, a
pilot project was started in the mushroom sector on 1 January 2014.54
Problems mainly relate to violations of the WML, unfair competition, and
circumventing social security contributions and taxes. Most problems
occur in sectors where a lot of small(er) undertakings are active and
where use is made of semi-skilled and unskilled workers, fixed-term
employment relationships and great pressure on labour costs from low
profit margins. This means sectors such as construction and temporary
agency work. The idea is that not only directly employed employees must
have such an identity card, but also employees who are hired or employed
through subcontracting chains, ie all individuals employed and/or pro-
viding work.
It is not clear what kind of information the identity card should
contain. However, it is suggested that it should include the name and
address of the employer, as well as the work permit, education and the
Declaration of Independent Contractor Status (VAR-verklaring).55 This
ID12 is meant to assist not only the social partners in monitoring the
collective agreements, it also enables some authorities to carry out their
tasks (Tax Authority, Labour Inspectorate, Immigration and Naturalisa-
tion Service (Immigratie- en Naturalisatiedienst), Employee Insurance
Agency (UWV Werkbedrijf), municipalities and the Social Insurance Bank
52 See on this also § 11 No. 1.3 National Construction Sector Collective Agreement
2010. Whether this fine has a deterrent effect is questionable.
53 Kamerstukken II 2012/13, 29 407, nr. 173.
54 This pilot is planned to be evaluated in the middle of 2014. Brief Ministerie van
Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid, Tweede voortgansrapportage aanpak schijn-
constructies, 4 July 2014.
55 Kamerstukken II 2012/13, 29 407, nr. 173, 2.
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(Sociale Verzekeringsbank)). It is thus an instrument for the private and
public enforcement of labour law, social security law, and tax law.
B. Social partner (monitoring and enforcement) institutions in the
construction sector
In the construction sector, social partners in the Netherlands and Germany
have set up particular institutions entrusted with the monitoring and
enforcement of (part of) the collective agreement. In Sweden, social
partners also pay close attention to monitoring the correct payment of
wages; however, they have not set up a particular institution to do so.
The Dutch construction sector has detailed rules for a special
complaint procedure. The Bureau naleving & werkingssfeer (Compliance
Committee),56 which is part of the Technisch Bureau Bouwnijverheid (‘TBB’)
(Technical Office Construction Sector), has been set up to monitor and
enforce the CAO Bouwnijverheid (Art 13).57 In case there is a well-
founded indication that the collective agreement has not been complied
with, the parties to the agreement may lodge a complaint in writing with
the Technical Office. The Office’s findings will be set down in an
investigation report.58 Each party to the collective agreement may make
a report.59 The party issuing the report must do this in writing and must
mention: name and address; signature; name and address of the employer
addressed in the report; an accurate description of the undertaking’s
activities combined with arguments showing that the employer has not
complied with the agreement. This means that anonymous complaints
cannot be made. If necessary, the reporter may be requested to provide
additional information.
The procedure then works as follows. If the Compliance Committee
decides to start investigations of the alleged non-compliance with the
agreement, it will give the employer two weeks’ prior notice.60 In
principle, investigations will be conducted on the employer’s premises.
If an employer refuses investigations on his premises, investigations will
look at the documents provided by the employer. The employer may be
56 See the Dutch website <http://www.bureau-naleving-werkingssfeer.nl> accessed
28 October 2014.
57 Its mode of operation is laid down in Annex 2 CAO BTER. It has been emphasised
that the employer must comply with the CAO Bouwnijverheid (Art 13 CAO
Bouwnijverheid and Art 12 CAO BTER).
58 Bouwnijverheid (2011).
59 Art 3(1) CAO BTER.
60 Art 4 Annex 1 CAO BTER.
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requested to provide the Committee with a list with the names of the
persons working in the employer’s undertaking, payslips, annual state-
ments, paid overtime, and signed employment contracts.61 The employer
has three weeks to provide these documents.62 If the outcome of the
Committee’s investigations is that the employer had indeed failed to comply
with his obligations under the collective agreement, he will receive the
opportunity to improve matters regarding such omissions within six weeks.
Besides the social partner institutions, which are generally entrusted
with ensuring compliance with the generally binding collective agree-
ment, the Tijdspaarfonds (Time Savings Fund) should be mentioned. The
administration of the holiday contributions is entrusted to Cordares,
which monitors whether employers pay the correct contributions. Em-
ployers must list the wages and the premiums paid, and for each wage
period must provide Cordares with an individualised statement of wages
and premiums (Opgave Loon Premie). Based on this, Cordares can assess
whether the correct income tax and premiums have been paid. If the
employer has failed to pay the contributions, Cordares will send an
omission letter in which the employer is requested to comply with his
obligations. If the employer does not follow this request, the employees
will be informed accordingly.63
In Germany, ULAK, the holiday pay fund in the construction sector,
is the responsible organisation that monitors and enforces the holiday pay
fund collective agreement. The role of ULAK in the industrial relations
enforcement method is relatively minor, as its capacity to monitor and
enforce the holiday provisions is limited to starting judicial proceedings
(see Chapter 5 above). ULAK has no role in assessing whether the
employer has paid the contributions correctly. If ULAK has established
that the employer had not complied, it may start proceedings directly,
without reminding the employer of the fact that he has failed to make the
required holiday contributions.64 For posted workers, ULAK is quite
beneficial in that they may initiate a claim for holiday pay or holiday
allowance directly against ULAK,65 provided they have left Germany for
at least three months prior to the claim.66
61 Art 4 Annex 1 CAO BTER.
62 Employers must cooperate with investigations (Art 11(4)).
63 This paragraph is based on Houwerzijl & Baltussen (2010) 9-10.
64 If the employer does not pay within the prescribed time limit, it is clear that he is in
default. Soka-Bau, Urlaubsverfahren bei Entsendung auf Baustellen in Deutsch-
land: Informationsbroschüre für Arbeitgeber (2013) 27.
65 Preis & Temming (2006) 206.
66 § 8 No. 6.1f BRTV; Preis & Temming (2006) 207.
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In the Netherlands, the employee’s entitlements are merely obliga-
tions on the employer. Compliance with the rules can thus only be
enforced against the employer, and not the Tijdspaarfonds. In that regard,
Houwerzijl and Baltussen point out the tense relationship that may arise
between the employee and his employer as the result of a conflict over the
holiday contributions.67 In Germany, too, there are, in principle, no direct
claims against ULAK, except in the case mentioned above. However, as
stated before, ULAK has competence unilaterally to initiate proceedings
against non-complying employers.
The National Construction Sector Collective Agreement 2010 con-
tains a general provision on monitoring employees’ wages, whether
organised or not (§ 3 under 10). This provision clearly shows that the
trade union is willing to monitor and enforce its own collective agreement.
This obligation, however, applies only if the employer is a member of the
employers’ association that is party to the collective agreement. Conse-
quently under Swedish labour law and industrial relations, there seems to
be a huge gap when it comes to the enforcement of wages of non-bound
employers and their employees. An employer who is not member of the
signatory employer’s association cannot be forced to abide by the collec-
tive agreement. Thus, where no right exists, there can also be no monitor-
ing and enforcement by the social partners.68
67 Houwerzijl & Baltussen (2010) 12.
68 An interesting feature of the Swedish construction sector is that, as the Advocate
General discussed in the Laval case, the Building Workers’ Union closely monitors
what employers pay their employee ( Case C-341/05 Laval ECLI:EU:C:2007:809,
Opinion AG Mengozzi, paras 284-92). To do so, in the past, employees were
required to pay 1.5 per cent of their wage as a “monitoring fee” to the local
Building Workers’ Union. Members and non-members alike were obliged to
contribute financially to the local Building Workers’ Union, as compensation for
the checks carried out. However, the Union could not make it clear whether and if
so how much it spent on monitoring the wages. Examinations of the union’s
expenditures emphasised that the amount not spent on monitoring wages was also
spent on other more general local Building Workers’ Union activities. Thus, the
contributions paid were not used solely for monitoring purposes. This, according
to the European Court of Human Rights in the Evaldsoson and others v Sweden case,
was contrary to the individual’s right to the peaceful enjoyment of possessions, laid
down in Art 1 of Protocol No. 1 European Charter of Human Rights (ECtHR,
Evaldsson and others v Sweden, Application No. 75252/01, 13 February 2007).
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6.4.3 Self-regulation in the temporary agency work sector
A. Quality standards: improving the quality of agency work
The temporary agency work business is largely based on a mix of
statutory regulation and self-regulation. Part of this self-regulation is
that the sector itself establishes standards that enhance the quality and
the bona fide character of agency work. Quality standards have been
introduced in both the Netherlands and Sweden. In the Netherlands, the
private certification system has been backed up by a statutory registration
obligation (see section 7.3.4).
Voluntary standards
There are two certificates in the Dutch agency sector: one for temporary-
work agencies registered in the Netherlands (NEN-4400-1) and one for
foreign agencies (NEN-4400-2). The standard’s main aim is to limit the risk
of recovery and penalties for employers imposed by the Inland Revenue
and other government agencies.69 Both domestic and foreign agencies are
subject questioning as to whether the agency complies with Dutch law:
both domestic and foreign agencies are questioned.70 NEN-4400-2 refers
to checking and assessing any company having its registered office out-
side the Netherlands that provides workers for work under the super-
vision or direction of a third party and for testing and assessing any
contractor or subcontractor having its registered office outside the Nether-
lands to determine whether they are organised in such a way that it may
be safely assumed that they will comply with obligations stemming from
employment.71 The distinction between foreign and domestic agencies is
justified because foreign agencies are not subject to Dutch law, and are
thus not monitored by public authorities.
Strictly speaking, requesting a certificate is not mandatory. How-
ever, the CAO Bouwnijverheid includes an obligation that construction
undertakings falling within the scope of the agreement may only contract
69 The number of temporary-work agencies registered since 30 November 2013 is
3,639. Most of them are agencies established in the Netherlands, but they also
include agencies from Belgium, Estonia, Germany, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Po-
land, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, and the UK. See for a current overview of the
certified agencies: <ww.normeringarbeid.nl/keurmerk/pagina/volledigelijst.
aspx> accessed 28 October 2014.
70 Kamerstukken II 2008/09, 31 833, nr. 3, 6.
71 Information about NEN 4400 and the Labour Standards Register, available at:
<http://www.normeringarbeid.nl> accessed 28 October 2014.
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with certified temporary-work agencies (Art 6(8) CAO Bouwnijverheid). A
certificate can therefore be compelled, also for foreign temporary-work
agencies.
In Sweden in 2004 a system for the authorisation or accreditation of
temporary-work agencies was established by the social partners LO, HTF
and the Swedish Association of Staff Agencies.72 The system is one of
voluntary authorisation for temporary-work agencies, ensuring that the
agencies are reputable companies, meeting the standards of professional-
ism.73 A committee, consisting of representatives of the parties to the
agreement, decides whether or not an agency shall be authorised. The
authorisation must be renewed annually.
Requirements
Having a certificate does not mean that an agency complies with labour
legislation and collective agreements. In the Netherlands, monitoring the
agency’s compliance with the applicable labour law, as well as social
security and tax obligations, is based on the employer’s own statement.
Moreover, only compliance with the statutory minimum wage has been
checked. It sufficed for the agency to prove that it complies with the
provisions on the statutory minimum wage, even though it may not pay
the wage laid down in the generally binding ABU CAO. Thus, the FNV
requested a change to the criterion to verify whether the collectively
agreed wage is paid.74 As of 1 July 2014, part of the assessment under-
taken before receiving a certificate is a control of compliance with the
collective agreement. The registered agencies are controlled twice a year;
non-compliant agencies can be suspended and deregistered.75 Coopera-
tion takes place with the Foundation for Compliance with the Dutch ABU
CAO (see next paragraph below) and information is exchanged with the
Tax Authority and the ISZW on the names of the agencies that have not
lodged a request for certification takes place.76
In Sweden, quite substantial conditions must be fulfilled. The
agency must be: a member of the Swedish Association of Staff Agencies
72 Together these associations have approximately 400 affiliates.
73 See on the authorisation <ww.bemanningsforetagen.se/auktorisationer> accessed
28 October 2014.
74 FNV (2011) 17.
75 Schram & Sol (2007) section 4. See also Mundlak, Schram & Sol (2012).
76 Brief Ministerie van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid, Maatregelen arbeidsmi-
gratie uit Midden- en Oost-Europa (2011) 11.
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and the Confederation of Swedish Enterprises; it must be bound by
collective agreements (unless there is no agreement); it must comply
with the general terms of delivery of the Association of Staff Agencies;
it must have operated as a limited company for at least twelve months; it
must have an equality plan; it must emphasise that it is authorised when
advertising services; and it must have paid the authorisation fee.77 If an
agency has not been active for at least twelve months, it may become a
non-authorised member of the Swedish Association of Staff Agencies. In
that case, the agency has to comply with a number of the abovementioned
conditions to show that it is legitimate. Application for authorisation is
then done after the agency has presented its first annual report.78
B. Foundation for Compliance with the Dutch ABU CAO
Foundation’s tasks
Besides the certification system for agencies, in 2004 the Netherlands
temporary agency work sector set up a Foundation for Compliance with
the Agency Collective Agreement (Stichting Naleving CAO voor Uitzend-
krachten, SNCU).79 The reason for the introduction of this Foundation was
to get a grip on compliance with the generally binding ABU CAO in the
agency work sector. The Foundation has two main aims: providing
information and giving advice about the applicable provisions of the
collective agreement as well as other related working and employment
conditions, and conducting monitoring and enforcement of the sector’s
collective agreements including the Collective Agreement on Social Fund
for the Agency Sector (CAO Sociaal Fonds voor de Uitzendbranche), in
cooperation with other competent authorities.80 A central task of the
Foundation is to act informally and judicially on behalf of the parties,
also including measures to be taken against those who do not comply with
the collective agreements.81
77 See for this paragraph: Ahlberg (2008) 49-50. See also Nyström (2013) 168.
78 See on the conditions for authorisation <ww.tryggbemanning.se/in-english>
accessed 28 October 2014.
79 The Foundation is financed by contributions made to the Social Fund for the
Agency Sector and is composed of four workers’ and four employers’ representa-
tives.
80 Art 3 Statuten Stichting Naleving CAO voor Uitzendkrachten, Stcrt. 2011, 2014,
declaring the Foundation’s statutes generally binding.
81 Art 4 Statuten Stichting Naleving CAO voor Uitzendkrachten.
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Monitoring and enforcing collective agreements
Monitoring and enforcement is assigned to a special commission within
the Foundation: the Commission Compliance Collective Agreements for
Temporary Agency Workers (Commissie Naleving CAO voor Uitzendkrach-
ten, hereafter: the Compliance Commission). Temporary-work agencies
and their workers may lodge a complaint (also anonymous), substantiated
by relevant proof, if it is suspected that an agency does not comply with
the regulations.82
To establish whether an agency did indeed not abide by a collective
agreement, the undertaking concerned will be requested to provide the
relevant documents within ten days. Failure to comply with this request
results in a reminder, giving the employer another five days to comply
with the request. In case of the employer’s continuing failure to comply,
proof of default will be sent, giving the employer another three days to
comply. Before an undertaking is controlled, it will be informed about the
date of the investigation. Cancelling that date attracts a fine of between
400 and 800 EUR.83 Costs incurred for these investigations must be paid
by the agency. The temporary-work agency will receive a report within
eight weeks of the investigation.84
A fixed fine for damage is payable if an agency that has received
proof of default continues to refuse to comply with the request to provide
certain information, unless special circumstances justify the failure.85 The
fines may be increased if the request is ignored. The damages paid will be
spent on the Foundation’s monitoring and enforcement activities.86
Moreover, the Foundation can initiate judicial proceedings if employ-
ers fail to honour requests sent by the Foundation. When initiating judicial
proceedings, the Foundation claims for damages it has suffered.87 The
Government’s attitude to the Foundation is quite positive; it rejects any state
involvement as it is for the social partners to monitor and enforce their own
82 See <ww.sncu.nl/nl/klacht-indienen> accessed 28 October 2014.
83 Cancelling the date within 14 days attracts a fine of 400 EUR, and 800 EUR within
seven days (Art 5(7) Reglement II Werkwijze van de Commissie Naleving CAO
Uitzendkrachten).
84 Art 5(10) Reglement II Werkwijze van de Commissie Naleving CAO Uitzend-
krachten.
85 Art 6(1) Reglement II Werkwijze van de Commissie Naleving CAO Uitzendkrach-
ten.
86 Art 5(2) Statuten Stichting Naleving CAO voor Uitzendkrachten.
87 To gain an impression of the many judicial proceedings the Foundation has
initiated, the reader should consult the Foundation’s website: Stichting Naleving
Cao voor Uitzendkrachten, ‘Vonnissen en Arresten’ <ww.sncu.nl/nl/resultaten/
vonnissen-en-arresten> accessed 28 October 2014.
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collective agreements.88 The state assists private enforcement in two ways:
first, by declaring collective agreements generally binding, and second, by
allowing social partners to request the Minister SZW to commence an
investigation based on Art 10 Wet AVV. Moreover, the Labour Inspectorate
and the social partners exchange information to improve enforcement.89
If the parties to the agreement do not announce that they will start
proceedings within a period of two weeks, the Foundation itself is
competent to do so.90 The Foundation may start legal proceedings based
on Art 15 Wet CAO and Art 3 Wet AVV.91 Chapter 4 paid attention to the
fact that social partners may claim damages for violating the collective
agreement to which they are bound. A frequently found clause in
collective agreements is that social partners agree to penalty clauses
(boetebedingen), which permit the social partners to claim from the party
that violates one or more provisions of the collective agreement to pay a
fixed sum in compensation (forfaitaire schadevergoeding).92
Cooperation and exchange of information
To improve the exchange of information, the Labour Standards Associa-
tion, which administers the agency sector’s quality standards, has agreed a
covenant with the Foundation.93 According to this covenant, the Founda-
tion may pass on information about undertakings that fail to comply with
a request made by the Foundation to provide certain information (Art 3).
88 Beleidsnota, Aanvullende informatie bij de brief aan de Tweede Kamer over
arbeidsmigratie uit de EU ( Werkgelegenheid (2011)) <http://www.rijksover-
heid.nl/documenten-en-publicaties/notas/2011/11/18/arbeidsmigratie-uit-de-
eu.html> accessed 28 October 2014. The opinion that it is for the social partners to
enforce their own agreements has not changed since 1998. See on this also
Houwerzijl (2005) 316.
89 Kamerstukken II 2011/12, 32 872, nr. 6, 7-8.
90 Art 7(2) Reglement II Werkwijze van de Commissie Naleving CAO Uitzendkrach-
ten.
91 See section 4.2.3 above.
92 Pursuant to Art 6:91 BW, which deals with penalty clauses, a contractual penalty
clause is every contractual provision stipulating that the debtor, if he fails to
perform his obligation correctly, has to pay a sum of money or deliver another
performance, regardless of whether this sum of money or other performance is
meant to be compensation for damages or just an incentive to perform the
obligation. This provision also includes compensation clauses (schadevergoedings-
bedingen). See for a case Gerechtshof Amsterdam 18 December 2012, ECLI:NL:
GHAMS:2012:BZ0127, JAR 2013/30, m.nt. A. Stege (Interpool BV/Stichting Nalev-
ing CAO voor Uitzendkrachten).
93 Convenant gegevensuitwisseling Stichting Normering Arbeid en Stichting Nalev-
ing CAO voor Uitzendkrachten, 11 February 2011.
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An agency may lodge a complaint against the exchange of information
within two weeks of receipt of a letter from the Foundation, stating its
intention to exchange information. The information that will be exchanged
concerns only undertaking-specific information, and not information on
statistics and other data (Art 5). The main aims of this covenant are: to
ensure adequate application of collective agreements, encourage to effi-
ciently combat non-compliance with the law and provisions of collective
agreements, and combating abuses in the agency sector (Art 1).
6.5 Collective action and the enforcement of labour rights
6.5.1 Introduction
The right to collective action, recognised in various international and
national regulations, is primarily an instrument to place pressure on an
employer to grant a wage increase or to provide employees with additional
employment rights. The following assesses whether and, if so, how far
collective action may play a role in the enforcement of employment rights.
6.5.2 Disputes of right and disputes of interest divide
In the Laval case, the ECJ ruled that the right to take collective action is
recognised both by various international instruments like the European
Social Charter (expressly referred to in Art 151 TFEU) and ILO Convention
No. 87 concerning freedom of association and protection of the right to
organise,94 as well as by instruments developed at EU level, such as the
Community Charter of the Fundamental Social Rights of Workers (also
referred to explicitly in Art 151 TFEU) and the EUCFR.95 According to Art
28 EUCFR, for instance,
“[w]orkers and employers, or their respective organisations, have, in accordance
with Union law and national laws and practices, the right to negotiate and
conclude collective agreements at the appropriate levels and, in cases of conflicts
of interest, to take collective action to defend their interests, including strike
action” (emphasis added).
94 It should be noted that the right to strike, as such, is not recognised in any single
ILO Convention. Instead, the entitlement to the right to strike is derived from the
freedom of association and the right to organise as laid down in the ILO
Constitution and ILO Conventions Nos. 87 and 98. Novitz (2003) 273.
95 Case C-341/05 Laval ECLI:EU:C:2007:809, para 90.
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It follows from this provision that collective action is only permitted in
case of a conflict of interests. This is also determined by Art 6(4) of the
European Social Charter, referring to “the right of workers and employers
to collective action in cases of conflicts of interest”. The difference between
a conflict of interests and a conflict of rights may be blurred in the context
of enforcing labour rights.96 Nevertheless, it is crucial to determine
whether enforcing legally enforceable and judiciable rights can fall under
the ‘conflict of interests’ concept, or whether a collective action is not an
option to secure compliance with employees’ rights.
In this context, the differentiation made by Kahn-Freund may help
clarify the difference between a rights conflict and an interests conflict. He
writes that “[i]ntergroup conflicts may bear two different kinds of relation-
ship to the standards set up by the groups”.97 Accordingly, conflicts may
originate in different opinions about how the provisions of a collective
agreement are to be interpreted or on the scope of application of such a
provision. This is referred to as a conflict of rights. This assumes that the
provisions in a collective agreement concluded between the social partners
are considered to be legally enforceable, if the employer and his employees
are somehow covered. Any questions arising from a collective agreement
can thus be brought before a court. Alternatively, a conflict may concern a
trade union demand to increase wages or to establish a holiday scheme,
which is qualified as a conflict of interests.98 Nielsen writes that “[a] conflict
of interest arises in areas where no valid collective agreement applies”.99
This dichotomy applies in the Netherlands, Germany and Swe-
den.100 In the Netherlands101 and Germany102 , workers and/or social
partners have judicial means to enforce provisions of a (generally binding)
96 Cf. Evju (2011) 224, who writes that “[c]onflicts of interest are present under the
surface in all disputes, but some conflicts are capable of transformation into
conflicts of right”.
97 By groups, the trade unions and employers’ representatives are meant.
98 Kahn-Freund (1954) 205. See also Malmberg et al. (2003) 102-4.
99 Nielsen (2013) 163.
100 The Netherlands: Jacobs (2003) 84, Jacobs (2004) paras 219-28, Jaspers (2004) 23ff.;
Germany: Brox (1982) para 684, Walker (1993) 769; Sweden: Schmidt (1977) 23;
Fahlbeck (2002) 125.
101 The right to collective action in the Netherlands, in the absnece of a constitutional
right, is based directly on Art 6(4) ESC. See for an overview on the role of Art 6(4)
ESC in the Netherlands: Jaspers (2004). An important case in this context is HR 30
May 1986, NJ 1986, 668 (NS).
102 The right to collective action in Germany is derived from the Tarifautonomie
(collective bargaining autonomy) as developed by the German labour courts,
which is the right of the social partners to conclude collective agreements to
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collective agreement. As a result, a collective action is not an option to
enforce labour rights. To a certain extent, matters are different in Sweden.
6.5.3 Collective action forcing an employer to sign a collective agreement
In the Swedish context, if trade unions are to be able to control compliance
with the provisions of a collective agreement, the employer and the
employees must be bound by that collective agreement. This binding is
the trade union’s entrance ticket to monitor and enforce the collective
agreement. In order to (try to) force an employer to sign a collective
agreement, trade unions may organise a collective action. Although,
strictly speaking, this is not an instrument to enforce (already existing)
labour rights, from a Swedish perspective it is a very useful instrument. It
can provide access to protection if the collective action is successful,
resulting in the employer becoming bound. The Laval case is a perfect
example of such a situation. Here, the Swedish construction sector union
initiated a collective action to force Laval to sign the collective agreement,
which would have resulted in Laval being bound by an agreement
guaranteeing his employees a huge package of rights which exceeded
the scope of the PWD.
A major difficulty of the Swedish system of labour law and
industrial relations is that there is no system for declaring a collective
agreement generally binding, albeit one is currently being discussed in the
transport sector. Being entitled to employment conditions laid down in a
collective agreement presupposes either membership of both the employer
and his employees, or the application of incorporation clauses based on
which employees may derive rights from their individual employment
contract. This means that there is nothing to enforce, in the sense that as
there are no employment conditions to be observed by a non-bound
employer, they cannot be legally enforced. From an internal Swedish
perspective, this system works quite well, as approximately 70 per cent of
the employees are members of a trade union and approximately 83 per
cent of the employees in total are covered by collective agreements.103
regulate employment conditions. As such, the collective action is only legal if it is
aimed at concluding a collective agreement. However, there is a discussion in the
literature on whether the right to take collective action may be used to pursue other
aims of a collective nature than those mentioned in Art 9(3) GG. Generally, a
collective action must concern the protection and the furtherance of employment
and economic conditions. Otherwise the scope of Art 9(3) GG would be exceeded.
Däubler argues that the right is too narrowly construed and should be broadened
(Däubler (2011) 242-4). See for another opinion: Rieble (2004) 83.
103 See section 4.2.4 above.
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From an EU perspective, and particular the freedom to provide services,
however, the way of regulating the labour market by collective bargaining
as is done in Sweden does not meet the necessary requirements of clarity
and transparency, as required by the PWD.104 According to the ECJ, a
“[…] collective action such as that at issue in the main proceedings cannot be
justified in the light of the public interest […], where the negotiations on pay,
which that action seeks to require an undertaking established in another Member
State to enter into, form part of a national context characterised by a lack of
provisions, of any kind, which are sufficiently precise and accessible that they do not
render it impossible or excessively difficult in practice for such an undertaking to
determine the obligations with which it is required to comply as regards
minimum pay”.
As a result, the ECJ’s ruling threatens the maintenance of the entire edifice
of Swedish labour law and industrial relations. This seems to contrast with
the 2014 Posted Worker Enforcement Directive, stating that “[r]espect for
the diversity of national industrial relations systems as well as the
autonomy of social partners is explicitly recognised by the TFEU” (recital
14). The Union Workers Enforcement Directive puts it somewhat differ-
ently, stating that it “[…] respects the different labour market models of
the Member States, including labour market models regulated by collec-
tive agreement” (recital 30). The latter statement seems much broader,
which could be the result of the different rights and obligations involved
under the free movement of workers and the posting of workers.
In the literature it has been argued that, where employees cannot
initiate judicial proceedings under the law, or where there is hardly any
public enforcement of labour law, the possibility to exercise the right to
take collective action should be made available.105 Malmberg et al. write
that “conflicts over the enforcement of EC labour law must be treated as
interest conflicts in so far as workers have no access to adequate judicial
enforcement procedures”. This seems a plausible claim, from the point of
view of worker protection. But enforcement, including access to judicial
protection, must only be warranted if an individual can derive rights from
(implemented) EU law. As stated earlier, where there is no right, there is
no remedy. In order to comply with the standards established by the PWD
and the ECJ, Sweden would need a generally binding collective agree-
ment, which is not likely to occur, as it would be in stark contrast to the
existing model. This would allow social partners to use the judicial
104 Case C-341/05 Laval ECLI:EU:C:2007:809, para 110.
105 Malmberg (2003) 104.
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enforcement method, as described in Chapter 5. An obligation on the
service provider to designate a contact person with whom the social
partners may seek to engage the service provider to enter into collective
bargaining with the host state social partners during the period in which
the services are provided does not make a difference (Art 8(1)(f) Posted
Workers Enforcement Directive). A service provider still needs to sign a
collective agreement in order to become bound, and to allow social
partners to enforce compliance. A question then arises as to whether,
supposing that the applicable terms and conditions were to be made
available in a clear and accessible manner, a collective action would be
permitted merely to induce the employer to sign the agreement.
6.6 Comparative notes and conclusions
Chapter 6 addressed the industrial relations enforcement method found at
Member State level. It provided an overview of measures adopted by the
social partners to increase compliance with collectively agreed labour
rights. The existing instruments of the social partners at Member State
level are largely untouched by EU influences. EU legislation creates an
obligation on Member States to ensure that social partners do what they
are required to do within their competences.
Directives, as Art 288 TFEU clearly determines, are addressed to the
Member States; the latter are responsible for the correct and timely
implementation, application and enforcement of the rights individuals
derive therefrom. Nevertheless, at Member State level, workers often
derive their labour rights from (generally binding) collective agreements.
Collective agreements are private contracts, concluded between employ-
ees’ and employers’ associations. That EU law can also be laid down in
collective agreements is recognised at EU level (Art 154 TFEU). Based on
this provision, collective agreements agreed upon by the social partners at
EU level can become binding either via Council Decision (which has the
force of a directive), or via autonomous agreements to be implemented at
Member State level, in a way that is appropriate to that state’s labour law
and industrial relations system. Moreover, social partners have become
more visible in the two enforcement Directives, even though these instru-
ments seem to recognise a role for social partners within the legally
regulated methods of monitoring and enforcing labour rights. There is
therefore hardly any direct legislative EU influence on the Member States’
industrial relations enforcement method.
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Nevertheless, indirect EU influences can be found. First, in the
context of providing information to foreign employees and foreign service
providers, EU law, in particular the two enforcement Directives, obliges
Member States to provide the relevant (translations of) (generally binding)
collective agreements. The reason for this is that, as has been shown
earlier, foreign workers and service providers are often unaware of their
rights. Information thereon is crucial as it allows proper monitoring and
enforcement. As a result, Member States must ensure that the social
partners make the necessary efforts and make information on at least
the core employment conditions available in as many languages as
possible. From a legal perspective, Sweden provides a good example:
Section 9a Posting of Workers Act (1999:678) obliges the social partners to
submit their collective agreements to the WEA, which acts as a liaison
office in the context of the PWD. However, it seems that this provision is
not enforced in practice, as only one translated and two collective agree-
ments in Swedish are published on the WEA’s website. In the Netherlands
and Germany, where no such provision has been adopted, more (trans-
lated) collective agreements are published online, to be consulted by
foreign workers and their employers. Summaries of the agreements are
sometimes also provided.
The EU’s indirect impact is also visible in the context of temporary
agency work. In the Netherlands especially, the 2004/07 EU enlargements
have induced the agency work sector to reconsider their monitoring and
enforcement role. Consequently, in 2004, the social partners jointly set up a
foundation, which has been ascribed a monitoring and enforcement role.
Its main function is to ensure compliance with the generally binding
collective agreement in that sector. Although the foundation’s functioning
can certainly be improved, in common with many organisations or
institutions entrusted with monitoring and enforcement, it shows that
the social partners in that sector take their role seriously. To date, the
foundation has initiated many judicial proceedings against temporary-
work agencies that have failed to apply the collective agreement.
Another example is the Swedish ID06 identity requirement, adopted
by the social partners in the construction sector. In order to allow social
partners to fulfil their monitoring and enforcing role, this identity badge
helps them identify available workers at a construction site, and who their
employer is. Not having such a badge means not gaining access to the
construction site. The Netherlands has also considered introducing such
an identification badge, inspired by the Swedish model. The outcomes of a
pilot scheme have not been published at the time of writing.
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As to the exercise of the right to take collective action, which is by
definition the right of social partners to protect the interests of their
members, it has been argued that, strictly speaking, collective action is
not an enforcement instrument. It covers conflicts of interests, not rights
conflicts, which are for the courts to resolve. However, in relation to
Sweden the right to take collective action is important, as it can, as an
ultimate remedy, be used to compel an employer (if necessary by sym-
pathy actions) to sign a collective agreement or an accession agreement.
Laval obviously has shaken up the Swedish model of industrial relations.
In fact, the case has revealed, from an EU perspective, the problems that
may arise if the system is not designed in a way which the PWD
apparently addresses. EU law does not seem to accept the Swedish model
in the context of the posting of workers. In order to steer the Swedish
model in the direction of greater compliance with the main conclusions
derived from Laval, the Swedish legislator added a restricted right to
collective action into the Posting of Workers Act (1999:678). Here, the
Swedish legislator went quite far, lacking insight in the real problem,
which is the way collective agreements are binding, a way that is not
explicitly recognised at EU level, in particular in the PWD. Thus, it is not
the collective action as such that is problematic, rather it is the combina-
tion of the way collective agreements become binding, and forcing a non-
bound employer to sign a collective agreement. In this context, in relation
to Sweden, it is also necessary to emphasise the lack of transparency to
‘outsiders’ of applicable rights and obligations under existing collective
agreements, ie to those employers and employees who are not member of
one of the signatory parties. This relates to what has been established
earlier, namely that there exists an information deficit as to publish (the
content of) collective agreements in Sweden. So, even if the model
functions perfectly in an internal setting, it does not in a cross-border
posting situation. This is the result of the predominance of the freedom to
provide services and the unequal treatment between Union workers and
posted workers.
We can thus see that social partners in the Netherlands and Sweden,
where ensuring compliance with collective agreements is left to the social
partners, frequently seek new solutions to cope with their tasks.
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CHAPTER 7
ADMINISTRATIVE ENFORCEMENT METHOD
7.1 Introduction
This chapter focuses on the role of the Member States and their authorities
and institutions. Monitoring and enforcement by public authorities, ie
administrative enforcement,1 is complementary to the judicial and indus-
trial relations enforcement that was discussed in the previous two chap-
ters.2 In the first place, Member States are in principle not engaged in
the enforcement of collective agreements, since these are private contracts
to be enforced by the parties and employees themselves. Moreover, the
state’s competences and instruments differ from those available to indivi-
duals and employees’ and employers’ associations. In relation to the EU,
states are responsible for the correct and timely implementation, applica-
tion and enforcement of EU law, and if the state fails to fulfil its
obligations, it is liable to the EU as well as individuals who have been
harmed.3
Although all Member States with which this study is concerned have
state authorities that are responsible for monitoring and enforcing labour
law provisions, it can be seen that the instruments that are available to each
authority differ. This chapter deals first with the role of Member States and
their authorities in providing access to information on the applicable
substantive as well as procedural laws (section 7.2). The transnational and
intra-state cooperation between various authorities forms part of this
section. Secondly, the chapter describes the measures the states have
introduced to monitor the law (section 7.3). Among the measures are the
obligation on Union citizens to register with the authorities, the obligation to
notify the posting of workers, and the registration and licensing obligation
1 According to Morris (2012) 21, it refers to “institutional modes of enforcement”,
including licencing, inspectorate and administrative enforcement modes. It is a
proactive approach.
2 See on the complementary role of administrative processes: Malmberg (2003)
110-1.
3 As to the former, it is the Commission that may bring a case against a non-
complying Member State under Art 258 TFEU and/or Art 260, which refers to the
concept of Member State liability (see section 2.3.8 above).
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of temporary-work agencies. Thirdly, the responsible enforcement autho-
rities that are entrusted with the monitoring and enforcement of minimum
wages, holiday pay and holiday allowances are introduced. Their field of
action and their monitoring and enforcement competences are described
(section 7.4). Finally, the administrative sanctions are described that can be
imposed for failure to comply with the measures to monitor compliance as
dealt with in section 7.3, as well as the employment conditions (section 7.5).
7.2 Information and cooperation on applicable rights
7.2.1 Introduction
To guarantee compliance with employment conditions, the state is in-
volved in providing information on the applicable laws, and (sometimes)
(generally binding) collective agreements. Information may be provided
by various means, such as websites or brochures, which may provide the
texts of the laws, or describe the laws that must be observed. A second
issue concerns administrative cooperation, not only between authorities
within a state, but also between authorities of different states (cross-border
cooperation). Cooperation in this context refers to the exchange of in-
formation on labour law and the collective agreements to be applied, as
well as where employees should go if their rights have been infringed. It
may also relate to cooperation to combat abuses in certain vulnerable
sectors, in which abuses of labour law, tax law and social security law may
occur. The following describes the existing means for providing informa-
tion (section 7.2.2) and administrative cooperation (section 7.2.3).
7.2.2 Providing access to information
A. General considerations
Guaranteeing that employees, whether foreign or not, receive their entitle-
ments, presupposes that both the employees and their employers know
their rights. Thus, awareness-raising is a prerequisite for ensuring that
foreign employees know their rights, to be able to enforce them in court or
to lodge a complaint with the responsible authority. Providing adequate
information has three main advantages: it reduces violations of workers’
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rights derived from EU law,4 it creates a level playing field between
employers and service providers, and it creates legal certainty.
Information can be disseminated through various channels, such as
by publishing flyers or brochures, and mentioning applicable labour
regulations on websites of responsible monitoring and enforcement
authorities, ministries, and social partners. Most often, the labour minis-
tries and the enforcement authorities publish information on applicable
legislation and sometimes also collective agreements on their websites.
Generally, the websites of the enforcement authorities provide a compre-
hensive overview of laws, which collective agreements are relevant, and
where to lodge a complaint.
B. Information for Union workers
When studying the various websites and other official documents of the
states, it becomes clear that none of the states provides particular informa-
tion to Union workers nor do the states refer particularly to Union
workers. It seems that information is addressed to whom it may concern.
Based on the principle of non-discrimination laid down in Art 45 TFEU,
the information provided on labour law and collective agreements is
equally applicable to domestic and Union workers. In the context of the
EU enlargements 2004/07, the Netherlands, for instance, has published
brochures together with the Polish embassy and other Polish organisa-
tions. These brochures contain basic practical information on living and
working in the Netherlands. This was done because Polish employees at
this point in time represent the largest group of (new) migrants working in
the Netherlands.5 Similarly, in Sweden, the website of the Work Environ-
ment Authority contains basic information about working in Sweden.6
4 Commission, ‘Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the
Council on measures facilitating the exercise of rights conferred on workers in the
context of freedom of movement for workers’ (Communication) COM(2013) 236
final, 13 and 22; and Commission, ‘Proposal for a Directive of the European
Parliament and the of the Council on the enforcement of Directive 96/71/EC
concerning the posting of workers in the framework of the provision of services’
(Communication) COM(2012) 131 final, 30-1.
5 Kamerstukken II, 2010/11, 29 407, nr. 118, 5. So far, information is available – most
comprehensively – in Polish, but also in German, Bulgarian, Spanish, French,
Hungarian, Portuguese, Romanian and Slovakian on the Inspectorate’s website.
Overview of the website’s languages: <http://www.inspectieszw.nl/other_
languages/index.aspx> accessed 28 October 2014.
6 See <http://av.se/inenglish/working> accessed 28 October 2014.
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General information on working in Germany can be found on the website
of the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees.7
Member States will probably need to address Union workers more
actively with the adoption of the Union Workers Enforcement Directive.
Recital 5 of that Directive determines that many employees are still
unaware of the rights they derive when exercising the right to free
movement of workers. There is still a gap between law in the books and
law in practice.8 Information on applicable terms and conditions of
employment should be made widely available, not only to employees
from other Member States, but also to employers and other interested
parties in more general terms.9 Furthermore, the Directive determines that
“Member States shall provide, in more than one official language of the institu-
tions of the Union, information on the rights conferred by Union law concerning
the free movement of workers that is clear, free of charge, easily accessible,
comprehensive and up-to-date. This information should also be easily accessible
through Your Europe and EURES”.10
More specifically, the Directive determines that the rights of Union
workers under the Directive and Regulation (EU) 492/2011, “are brought
to the attention of the persons concerned throughout their territory, in
particular Union workers, and employers, by all appropriate means”.11
This implies that the authorities somehow know the persons concerned,
including Union workers. Otherwise the information cannot be addressed
particularly to these workers. According to the Directive, “[t]he more
effective the system of public information and prevention is, the less need
there should be for individual remedies”.12
Art 6(2) refers to information published in more languages than one
of the 24 official languages of the institutions of the Union. We have seen
that the Member State websites contain general information on labour law
and/or industrial relations. The information provided in the Netherlands,
Germany, and Sweden is available in different languages, and conforms to
the Directive’s requirements.
7 See <www.bamf.de/EN/Willkommen/ArbeitBeruf/Arbeitsrecht/arbeitsrecht-
node.html> accessed 28 October 2014. See also <www.make-it-in-germany.com/
en/working/guide-to-working-in-germany> accessed 28 October 2014.
8 The Preamble refers to “a gap between the legislation and its application in
practice”.
9 Recital 23 of the preamble of the Union Workers Enforcement Directive.
10 Art 6(2).
11 Art 6(1) Union Workers Enforcement Directive.
12 COM(2013) 236 final, 13.
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For rights and obligations arising out of an employment relation-
ship or contract, it is the employer who has to inform his workers in line
with Directive 91/533/EEC.13
C. Information for posted workers
Under the PWD, host Member States must make information on the core
employment conditions generally available (Art 4(3) PWD).14 It is unclear
when and to whom the information must be made available.15 The Laval
case makes clear that it is seen as problematic under the PWD if the service
provider is not able to know in advance, ie before posting its workers,
what wage it has to pay. In order to contribute to clarity, the PWD
explicitly lays down the ways in which employment conditions must be
regulated (Art 3(8)). Whether Art 4(3) PWD requires Member States also to
publish information on the actual possibilities for the enforcement of the
employees’ rights is questionable.
Repeatedly, the European Commission has emphasised the neces-
sity of publishing relevant information on the applicable core employment
conditions as laid down in the PWD. Before the PWD was adopted, an
amended 1993 Commission Proposal determined that “[i]n the absence of
such information the abovementioned collective agreements [this refers to
collective agreements within the meaning of Art 3(8) PWD] cannot be
imposed upon foreign providers of services”. Again, according to a 2008
Commission Recommendation, Member States should improve access to
information.16 Accordingly, Member States should clearly indicate which
terms and conditions of employment and/or which parts of their (national
and/or regional) legislation and collective agreements have to be applied
to employees posted to their territory. Providing information on appli-
cable collective agreements, however, seems to be one of the main
problems.17 Here, Member States should, where possible, provide links
13 See section 5.3.2 above.
14 Commission, ‘Amended proposal for a Council Directive concerning the posting of
workers in the framework of the provision of Services’ COM(93) 225 final, 2, refers
to “easily available” information for service providers.
15 In a 2010 study on information provided on the posting of workers, a distinction is
drawn between information provided before the posting of workers actually takes
place, and information provided in the period during which workers are posted.
Muller (2010) 37-54.
16 Commission Recommendation of 31 March 2008 on enhanced administrative
cooperation in the context of the posting of workers in the framework of the
provision of services (2008/C 85/01).
17 Muller (2010) 31.
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to existing internet sites and contact points, in particular the relevant social
partners. Information should be made available not only in the Member
State’s own language, but also in other languages, possibly in leaflets
summarising the applicable employment terms and conditions.
As a result of transposing the PWD, the three Member States
studied here have introduced and gradually improved the information
available on applicable terms and conditions of employment. So far, only
Sweden has explicitly implemented Art 4(3) PWD (Section 9 Posting of
Workers Act (1999:678)). Nevertheless, although not implemented, Ger-
many and the Netherlands make information available on applicable
employment rights and obligations. In Germany, access to information
is dealt with at central and Bundesland level, whereby it the responsibility
of each Bundesland or the social partners in case they have established
counselling offices or comparable institutions.18 In the Netherlands, much
information is made available on the English-language website of the
ISZW and the Ministry SZW. The German BMAS publishes a brochure on
its website, dealing with the employment and posting of Union citizens
after the full opening of the German labour market to the EU-8 Member
States as of 1 May 2011.19 Information can be found on the website of the
Customs Authority20 as well as – more extensively – the websites of the
social partners.21
In Sweden, the responsibility for providing or making available
information on the statutory protection offered to posted workers lies with
the WEA (Section 9 Posting of Workers Act (1999:678)), which is moreover
responsible for forwarding the information on the conditions in collective
agreements that the trade unions may enforce with the support of
industrial action – in accordance with Section 5a Posting of Workers Act
(1999:678) – and which they are supposed to submit to the WEA (Section
9a Posting of Workers Act (1999:678)22). So far, the WEA has received one
English version of the IF Metall collective agreements; the Union for
Service and Communications Employees and the Swedish Municipal
Workers´ Union submitted their agreements in Swedish. The WEA is
18 In BT-Drs. 17/5132, 7, the answer of the Bundesregierung on the question whether
projects at federal level will financially be subsidised was that this would be the
responsibility of each federal state or the social partners themselves.
19 Soziales (2011).
20 See for a general overview of relevant information in German: <http://www.zoll.
de/DE/Unternehmen/Arbeit/Arbeitgeber-mit-Sitz-ausserhalb-Deutschlands/
arbeitgeber-mit-sitz-ausserhalb-deutschlands_node.htm> accessed 28 October 2014.
Less detailed information is also available in English and French.
21 BT-Drs. 17/5132, 6-7.
22 See section 6.3.2 above.
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not responsible for interpreting the applicable legislation and/or collective
agreements, which is reserved for the parties to the collective agreements,
and the Labour Court.
In 2010, the Swedish WEA published a comprehensive compilation
in English, containing the basic information on posting workers to
Sweden.23 In its annex, it provides an English translation of the main
acts, or at least excerpts, that apply: inter alia, the Posting of Workers Act
(1999:678), Working Time Act (1982:673), Annual Leave Act (1977:480),
Act on the Hiring Out of Workers (1993:440) which now has been replaced
by the Act on Temporary Agency Work (2012:854), Co-determination Act
(1976:580), and Judicial Procedure in Labour Disputes Act (1974:371).
The website of the Swedish National Mediation Office (Medlingsin-
stitutet) also provides an overview of the applicable collective agree-
ments.24 Nonetheless, to gain an insight into these agreements, requests
must be lodged with the social partners themselves. Most collective
agreements, if available and locatable on the trade unions’ websites, are
provided only in Swedish.
For information on applicable collective agreements in the Nether-
lands, in the 2007 framework agreement concluded between the Ministry
SZW and the social partners, it was agreed to place on the Ministry’s
English website25 the minimum labour law provisions that apply, and to
publish on the same website an overview of the existing sectors to which a
generally applicable collective agreement applies, and to allow the social
partners to publish information on collective agreements, English transla-
tions thereof and a list of other websites that are of interest.26 Notwith-
standing this commitment, so far only four collective agreements have
been translated in English (on temporary agency work, the insurance
industry, the metal sector, and the construction industry).
To improve the provision of information, the Posted Workers
Enforcement Directive determines that information should be made
available more readily to service providers (Art 5). It reiterates the 2008
23 See <http://av.se/dokument/inenglish/books/h448.pdf> accessed 28 October
2014. In the legislative bill implementing the PWD, it was said that the WEA
should not be obliged to translate the information into foreign languages. Prop.
1998/99:90, Utstationering av arbetstagare, 4 March 1999, 31-1.
24 See for the database <www.mi.se/sok-avtal> accessed 28 October 2014.
25 See <http://www.government.nl/ministries/szw> accessed 28 October 2014.
26 Stichting van de Arbeid, Convenant: Kader voor handhaving bij grensoverschrij-
dende arbeid (2007) 8 and Kamerstukken II 2006/07, 29 407, nr. 75, 6. For posted
workers a general overview can be found at <http://cao.szw.nl/index.cfm?
rubriek_id=392840&hoofdmenu_item_id=16507&menu_item_id=16538&link_
id=101179> accessed 28 October 2014.
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Commission Recommendation by stating that Member States have to
indicate clearly which (parts of the) legislation must be observed by
foreign service providers. Furthermore, Member States should make the
applicable collective agreements generally available on the internet,
thereby, where possible, providing links to existing internet sites and
other contact points, in particular those of the relevant social partners.
Information should be provided free of charge via a single official national
website, or by other suitable means.27
Moreover, the Posted Workers Enforcement Directive states that
information should be made available in languages other than the national
language(s) of the country in which the services are provided, and if
possible in summarised leaflet form indicating the main employment
conditions applicable. Moreover, in the event Member States already
have websites, they should improve the accessibility and the clarity of
the information. The contact person at the liaison office in charge of
dealing with requests for information should also be announced, if
available. The information should be kept up to date.
As to the applicable statutory legislation, it appears that the three
states have fulfilled their duties. However, in relation to the availability
of collective agreements, the Member States should induce the social
partners to submit their collective agreements to the ministries or liaison
offices so that they can be made generally available. Even though Sweden
has Section 9a Posting of Workers Act (1999:678), it seems that the trade
unions do not submit their collective agreements to the WEA.
D. Information on the possibilities of enforcing rights
Even though the Member States under concern have administrative
enforcement methods in place, to a certain extent, it nevertheless follows
from Chapter 5 that – apart from the practical difficulties that may arise –
employees also bear responsibilities in the enforcement system. Taking
this into account, it seems to be crucial that a state should provide
employees with information on their rights, as well as with information
on how to enforce them.
Studying the national authorities’ websites, it becomes clear that
gaining an overview of the existing enforcement methods in the three
countries is hardly possible. Websites refer to the administrative enforce-
27 Council of the European Union, ‘Posting of workers directive’, Presse 120, 7299/14,
Brussels, 5 March 2014.
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ment method, whereby state authorities are involved.28 In the Nether-
lands, the ISZW website mentions that (anonymous) complaints can be
lodged to inform the Inspectorate about situations of non-compliance with
labour law.29 So far, the digital complaint form is available in English30 ,
Bulgarian, Romanian, Czech, Slovak, Portuguese and Polish.31 In Sweden,
no mention is made of how labour rights are monitored and enforced.
It follows from the Union Workers Enforcement Directive that
Union citizens “do not know where to turn to when faced with problems
concerning their rights”.32 Often they are “unaware of national proce-
dures and systems”. One central aim of the Directive is to empower Union
workers to ensure their rights are protected.33 According to Art 7, Member
States shall ensure that Union workers are not only informed about
their rights, but also about the ways to gain access to protection if their
employers have failed to comply with EU law. Accordingly, Member
States also need to provide information thereon. This is different in
the Posted Workers Enforcement Directive, where it is mentioned that
Member States shall make available a ‘description of the procedures to
lodge complaints’ (Art 5(c)).
7.2.3 Administrative cooperation
A. Introduction
Administrative cooperation, whether intra-state or transnational, is a
valuable tool to exchange information as well as experience and best
practice. This instrument operates as a means to facilitate the monitoring
and enforcement of the statutory minimum wage, the statutory holiday
pay and the minimum holiday allowance, especially as regards migrant
workers.
28 See for Germany: <www.zoll.de/EN/Businesses/Work/Foreign-domiciled-
employers-posting/Minimum-conditions-of-employment/Consequences-of-
non-compliance/consequences-of-non-compliance_node.html> accessed 28 October
2014.
29 See <www.inspectieszw.nl/english/investigating_complaints> accessed 28 Octo-
ber 2014.
30 See <https://fd8.formdesk.com/arbeidsinspectie/klachtenformulier_English>
accessed 28 October 2014.
31 To proceed in other languages, see: <http://www.inspectieszw.nl/other_lan-
guages/index.aspx> accessed 28 October 2014.
32 COM(2013) 236 final, 5.
33 COM(2013) 236 final, 6.
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B. Intra-state cooperation
Between national authorities
Cooperation between national authorities is essential, as different autho-
rities deal with the monitoring and enforcement of different laws. As this
is not regulated at EU level, Member States themselves are responsible for
establishing adequate cooperation between competent authorities. Inform-
ing each other seems inevitable to ensure that rights are complied with.
Therefore, provisions in the Netherlands, Germany and Sweden state that
the authorities need to cooperate. If the minimum wage is not paid, the
infringement also means that incorrect social security contributions and
income taxes are paid. This involves not only the authorities entrusted
with the monitoring and enforcement of minimum wages, but also the tax
and/or social security authorities (in the Netherlands, Germany, and
Sweden). In the Netherlands, as of 2007 the Tax Authority and the
ISZW are cooperating more closely than before in combating illegal
work and undeclared employment, as well as in cases where migrant
workers are in bogus self-employment.34
As of 1 January 2012, the Labour Inspectorate became part of the
Inspectorate Social Affairs and Employment (Inspectie Sociale Zaken en
Werkgelegenheid, ‘ISZW’), a merger between the Labour Inspectorate, the
Inspection of Work and Income (Inspectie Werk en Inkomen), and the Social
Intelligence and Investigation Service (Sociale Inlichtingen- en Opsporings-
dienst). The main aim – it was said – of this merger was to enhance the
monitoring and enforcement of labour legislation so as to make it more
effective and efficient.35 More extensive cooperation takes place within
one (bundled) organisation. While the Inspection of Work and Income
monitored the administration of the Uitvoeringsinstituut Werknemersverze-
keringen (UWV) (Employee Insurance Agency), the Sociale Verzekeringsbank
(SVB) (Social Insurance Bank), and the Gemeentelijke Sociale Diensten (GSD)
(Municipal Social Services) and Inlichtingenbureau (IB) (Benefits Intelli-
gence Agency), the Social Intelligence and Investigation Service was
responsible for fighting crime in the social security area.36
A detailed list mentions the authorities with which the German
Finanzkontrolle Schwarzarbeit (‘FKS’) (Financial Control of Undeclared
34 Van Hoek & Houwerzijl (2011b) 160-1.
35 Ministerie Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid, Jaarplan 2012 Inspectie Sociale
Zaken en Werkgelegenheid (2011). See also Kullmann-Klocke (2011).
36 See for an overview of inspectorates in the Netherlands: Kullmann-Klocke (2011).
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Employment) has to cooperate under the AEntG and the AÜG. Coopera-
tion takes place, inter alia, with: tax authorities (Finanzbehörden); Federal
Employment Office (Bundesagentur für Arbeit); collectors of the social
security insurances (Einzugsstellen); agencies competent under the Asylum
Seekers Benefits Act (Asylbewerberleistungsgesetz zuständigen Behörden);
agencies mentioned in the Residence Act (Aufenthaltsgesetzes); Federal
Office for Goods Transport (Bundesamt für Güterverkehr); competent re-
gional authorities for occupational health and safety (zuständigen Landes-
behörden für den Arbeitsschutz); police enforcement authorities of the Länder
on request in individual cases (Polizeivollzugsbehörden der Länder auf
Ersuchen im Einzelfall); and authorities competent under the law of the
Länder to prosecute administrative offences according to the SchwarzArbG
(nach Landesrecht für die Verfolgung und Ahndung von Ordnungswidrigkeiten
nach diesem Gesetz zuständigen Behörden).37 Moreover, cooperation takes
place between the customs authorities and the central business register, in
case a fine exceeding 200 EUR has been imposed (§ 20(3) AEntG). Public
contractors may consult entries in the central business register to check
whether or not an undertaking should be excluded from the public
procurement process.38 Courts and public prosecutors also communicate
information to the authorities within the meaning of the AEntG and the
AÜG, if relevant for enforcing administrative offences within the meaning
of § 23(1) and (2) AEntG and § 16(1) Nos. 1 and 2 AÜG.39
Cooperation between national authorities and social partners
In principle, in Germany,40 apart from the role of ULAK on holiday pay
and allowances, and in Sweden, there is no systematic co-operation
between the state authorities and the social partners. Swedish trade
unions, however, inform the authorities when they suspect undeclared
work or abuse of the rules on posting.41 Cooperation between the WEA
and the social partners might be established as a result of the notification
obligation introduced in July 2013 (see section 7.3.3 below). Although this
obligation is first and foremost directed to the WEA, this authority is not
competent to enforce the law and collective agreements. To make the
notification obligation more effective, there has to be some cooperation
between the WEA and the trade unions. If trade unions are informed
37 § 18 AEntG, §§ 17b and 18 AÜG, and § 2 SchwarzArbG.
38 Thüsing (Ed.) (2010) (Reufels) § 20 AEntG, para 3.
39 § 20(4) AEntG and § 18(4) AÜG.
40 Van Hoek & Houwerzijl (2011b) 97.
41 Van Hoek & Houwerzijl (2011b) 161.
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about the presence of a service provider, they may contact him and
possibly negotiate a collective agreement, based on which they can start
to monitor and enforce its provisions.
A more extensive cooperation has been established between the
Dutch authorities, in particular the ISZW, and the social partners. The
ISZW notifies trade unions about cases of WML violation, thus enabling
trade unions to better enforce observance of (generally applicable provi-
sions of) collective agreements. The trade unions have not been satisfied
with the cooperation as it worked in practice, so ad hoc intervention teams
have been established to cooperate more closely in sectors where abuse is
rife, such as the temporary agency work sector and the construction
sector.42 It is assumed that the press releases have a deterrent effect.43
Moreover, since 2007 the Dutch SZW and the social partners
cooperate in the enforcement of employment conditions in the context
of transnational employment.44 Based on a Covenant concluded between
the Ministry and the Labour Foundation, periodic meetings are held to
exchange information. However, according to the FNV, the exchange
of information between the Labour Inspectorate and the trade unions is
rarely used.45 Extensive opportunities for cooperation have been intro-
duced in the area of temporary agency work, including recognised
certifying institutions (see section 6.4.3 above). The establishment of
such cooperation was raised during the Parliamentary debate about the
introduction of mandatory registration for temporary-work agencies. As a
result, authorities voluntarily provide information to other authorities if
that is necessary to ensure the monitoring and enforcement of the Waadi;
they are obliged to provide information upon request (Art 14a Waadi).
Information will not be provided if this violates an individual’s private life
disproportionately.
In addition, the Tax Authority concluded an agreement with the
Stichting Normering Arbeid (Labour Standards Foundation) to exchange
information on certified temporary-work agencies. Regular consultations
are held between the Labour Standards Foundation, the SNCU, the
Ministry of Finance, and the Ministry of SZW. As regards monitoring
the certificates of temporary-work agencies, the Tax Authority and the
42 An example is the intervention team against malafide temporary-work agencies.
Ministerie Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid, Jaarplan 2014 Inspectie Sociale
Zaken en Werkgelegenheid (2013) 19.
43 Van Hoek & Houwerzijl (2011b) 160-1.
44 See on this cooperation Stichting van de Arbeid, Convenant: Kader voor handha-
ving bij grensoverschrijdende arbeid (2007).
45 FNV (2011) 24.
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ISZW are obliged to pass on information to the Labour Standards
Foundation in case an administrative fine has been imposed for not
paying the minimum wage and the holiday allowance, and for not being
able to provide certain documents from which the payment of the
minimum wage and holiday allowance can be derived (Art 14b Waadi).
C. Transnational cooperation: information exchange
EU legal basis46
Transnational administrative cooperation between national authorities
and stakeholders to facilitate and encourage the enforcement of EU law
is acknowledged in the Treaties. Administrative cooperation may consist
of the exchange of information, which includes the transmission of
information, the establishment and use of (electronic) databases, and alert
systems, as well as administrative assistance, meaning mutual assistance,
setting up joint administrative teams, and conducting joint operations.47
Information exchange simply facilitates the activity of the administration
of another Member State or European institution, while administrative
assistance refers to the distinct administrative tasks of the inter-dependent
public administrations.48 Transnational cooperation follows from Art 4(3)
TEU which determines that
“[…] [t]he Member States shall take any appropriate measure, general or
particular, to ensure fulfilment of the obligations arising out of the Treaties or
resulting from the acts of the institutions of the Union. The Member States shall
facilitate the achievement of the Union’s tasks and refrain from any measure
which could jeopardise the attainment of the Union’s objectives”.
This provision refers to vertical cooperation (ie between the Commission
and the Member States) and horizontal cooperation (ie between Member
States themselves). This provision also serves as a basis for the principles
of equivalence and effectiveness (see section 2.2.2 above). Moreover, the
Treaty contains several other provisions on cooperation. Regarding the
enforcement of the rights of foreign employees, Art 114 TFEU provides for
the possibility to regulate administrative cooperation. Based on this
provision the EU may adopt measures to approximate the provisions
laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States,
46 This paragraph is largely based on: Kullmann & Houwerzijl (2013).
47 Lafarge (2010) 611-5.
48 Lottini (2010) 132-3.
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which have as their object the establishment and functioning of the
internal market.
A provision of interest in the context of EU social policy is Art 153
TFEU, which states that the European Parliament and the Council may
adopt measures designed to encourage cooperation between Member
States. Cooperation can be aimed at improving knowledge, developing
the exchange of information and best practices, promoting innovative
approaches, and evaluating the experience gained. EU social policy
measures under this provision have been adopted, inter alia, on the
protection of workers’ health and safety in their working environment,
working conditions, social security, and the social protection of workers.
At EU level, several platforms exist for the exchange of information
between Member States. For example, in the context of occupational
health and safety, there are the Senior Labour Inspectorates Committee
(‘SLIC’), the European Agency for Health and Safety at Work (‘EU-
OSHA’), and a pilot project called CIBELES. This list is fragmentary,
however, referring as it does solely to health and safety in the workplace,
and not to labour law in general, or the core conditions mentioned in the
PWD in particular.
Cooperation in the context of the free movement of workers
As regards transnational cooperation in the context of the free movement
of workers, it should be noted that cooperation takes place between social
security authorities.49 There is no other transnational cooperation, and in
regard to labour law it is unnecessary. Union workers become part of the
host Member State labour market under Art 45 TFEU, and are treated on
an equal footing with domestic workers.
Cooperation in the context of the posting of workers
The situation is different in the context of the posting of workers. Here, the
PWD has formulated an obligation for Member States to cooperate with
the authorities of the country whence the worker has been posted (Art 4).
Cooperation shall consist, inter alia, in replying to well-founded requests
from those authorities for information on the transnational hiring-out of
49 Regulated under Regulation (EC) 987/2009 of 16 September 2009 laying down the
procedure for implementing Regulation (EC) 883/2004 on the coordination of
social security systems [2009] OJ L284/1.
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workers, including manifest abuses or possible cases of unlawful transna-
tional activities.
Article 4 PWD has not been explicitly implemented in the Nether-
lands. Nevertheless, it follows from the Parliamentary Documents that the
ISZW is the liaison office (verbindingsbureau).50 Explicit provision has been
made for the liaison office in Germany (§ 18(6) AÜG and § 20(2) AEntG)
and Sweden (Section 9 Posting of Workers Act (1999:678)).
In 1999 a Resolution was agreed on a Code of Conduct for improved
cooperation between authorities of the Member States concerning the
combat of transnational social security benefit and contribution fraud
and undeclared work, and concerning the transnational hiring-out of
workers (ie controlling whether the conditions for temporary agency
work are fulfilled). According to this Resolution, the Member States’
authorities should provide information and mutual assistance.51
Besides the general cooperation and the obligation to exchange
information obligation laid down in Art 4 PWD, at Member State level
bilateral agreements have been concluded to foster the cross-border
exchange of information between authorities of different countries.
On 20 June 2013, the Dutch Minister SZW and the Bulgarian
Minister of Labour and Social Policy signed a Joint Statement on coopera-
tion and the exchange of information in the fight against fraud and abuse
in the Bulgarian and Dutch labour markets. It has been agreed that the
Netherlands ISZW provides Bulgaria, and vice versa, with information on
companies that were fined or under investigation for infringing the rules
on minimum wages, health and safety, and working time. In the context of
combating malafide temporary-work agencies, the Netherlands committed
itself to setting up a list. This list contains certified agencies and agencies
that have lost their certificate. The Dutch and the Bulgarian Ministers
agreed that information on the private certification system would be
provided as well as information on how the Bulgarian Labour Inspecto-
rate can directly access the information to gain a clear indication of the
quality of Dutch agencies. Information is sent twice a year through the
liaison office. In addition, information on applicable labour law will be
50 Houwerzijl (2005) 314-5, with reference to Kamerstukken II 1998/99, 26 524, nr. 6, 5.
51 Resolution of the Council and the Representatives of the Governments of the
Member States, Meeting within the Council of 22 April 1999 on a Code of Conduct
for improved cooperation between authorities of the Member States concerning the
combating of transnational social security benefit and contribution fraud and
undeclared work, and concerning the transnational hiring-out of workers (1999/
C 125/01).
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communicated and exchanged. Such a Joint Statement has also been
signed with Romania.
On 18 December 2013, the Dutch SZW announced that the ISZW
has signed a cooperative agreement with the Polish Labour Inspectorate. It
relates in part to cooperation on “sham employment arrangements, rogue
employment agencies and companies that violate labour laws”.52 Further-
more, agreements were been concluded with the Czech Republic, France,
Portugal, Slovakia, and the UK.53
For monitoring and enforcement of the German AEntG and the
AÜG, there are obligations to cooperate in transnational situations (§ 18(1)
to (5) AÜG and § 20 AEntG). Cooperation may take place with authorities
of other Member States of the EU/EEA, which pursue similar monitoring
and enforcement tasks as the FKS, which are responsible for combating
illegal employment, or which can provide information on a particular
employer’s compliance with employment conditions (§ 8 AEntG and § 10(5)
AÜG).54 The main focus is on information requests from foreign authorities
as well as providing foreign authorities with information.55
With regard to temporary agencywork, theGermanFederalMinistry of
Finance has concluded cooperation agreements with other Member States to
combat illicit transnational work and illegal employment.56 Agreements have
already been concluded with Austria,57 Bulgaria,58 the Czech Republic,59
52 See <www.government.nl/ministries/szw/news/2013/12/18/polish-and-dutch-
labour-inspectorates-sign-agreement-on-cooperation.html> accessed 28 October
2014.
53 Van Hoek & Houwerzijl (2011b) 166-7.
54 Koberski (2011), § 17 AEntG, para 37.
55 Thüsing (Ed.) (2010) (Reufels) § 20 AEntG, para 6.
56 These Agreements have been concluded in the context of Resolution 1999/C 125/
01, and can be downloaded from: <www.zoll.de/DE/Fachthemen/Arbeit/
Bekaempfung-der-Schwarzarbeit-und-illegalen-Beschaeftigung/Zusammenarbeit/
Internationale-Zusammenarbeit/internationale-zusammenarbeit.html> accessed
28 October 2014.
57 Verordnung zu dem Vertrag zwischen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und der
Republik Österreich über die Zusammenarbeit bei der Bekämpfung grenzüber-
schreitender Schwarzarbeit und illegaler grenzüberschreitender Leiharbeit v. 11.
Juni 2012, BGBl. II 2013, 104.
58 Vertrag zwischen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und der Republik Bulgarien
über die Zusammenarbeit bei der Bekämpfung des grenzüberschreitenden Miss-
brauchs bei Leistungen und Beiträgen zur sozialen Sicherheit durch Erwerbstä-
tigkeit und von nicht angemeldeter Erwerbstätigkeit sowie bei illegaler
grenzüberschreitender Leiharbeit v. 10. Juli 2010, BGBl. II 2010, 771.
59 Vereinbarung zwischen dem Bundesministerium der Finanzen der Bundesrepu-
blik Deutschland und dem Ministerium für Arbeit und soziale Angelegenheiten
der Tschechischen Republik über die Zusammenarbeit bei der Bekämpfung
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France,60 and the Netherlands.61 These agreements, however, concern trans-
national cooperation in relation to illegal temporary agency work and illicit
work (ie if social security contributions are not paid).62 Both agreements
emanate from EU legal obligations on Member States under Regulation (EC)
1408/7163 and the PWD.64
The role of the Swedish WEA as a liaison office (förbindelsekontor) is
restricted to forwarding information on applicable collective agreements
and providing general information on core rights applicable under the
Posting of Workers Act (1999:678). The WEA cooperates with other liaison
offices across the EU and Switzerland (Section 9 Posting of Workers Act
(1999:678)). In Sweden, there is a regular exchange of experience with
colleagues in the Nordic countries on all kinds of issues, including the
posting of workers.65 The legislative bill66 on the implementation of the
PWD states that information exchange may also cover illegal employment
and other cases of abuse.67 In the context of the introduction of the
notification obligation, the Inquiry that was charged with making propo-
sals to make the Foreign Branch Offices Act (1992:160) more consistent
with EU law, advised making more use of the systems for administrative
cooperation between authorities in the Member States, set up in the
illegaler Beschäftigung, nicht angemeldeter Erwerbstätigkeit und illegaler grenzü-
berschreitender Leiharbeit sowie damit in Zusammenhang stehendem grenzübers-
chreitenden Missbrauch von Sozialleistungen und der Nichtabführung von
Sozialversicherungsbeiträgen v. 6. Juli 2010, BGBl. II 2010, 154.
60 Verwaltungsvereinbarung zwischen dem Bundesministerium für Arbeit und So-
zialordnung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und dem Ministerium für Beschäf-
tigung und Solidarität der Französischen Republik über die Zusammenarbeit bei
der Bekämpfung von nicht angemeldeter Erwerbstätigkeit und des grenzüber-
schreitenden Missbrauchs bei mit einer Erwerbstätigkeit verbundenen Sozialleis-
tungen sowie auf dem Gebiet der grenzüberschreitenden Leiharbeit v. 2. Juli 2001,
BGBl. II 2001, 721.
61 Gesetz zu dem Vertrag vom 12. Januar 2012 zwischen der Bundesrepublik
Deutschland und dem Königreich der Niederlande über die Zusammenarbeit bei
der Bekämpfung des grenzüberschreitenden Missbrauchs bei Sozialversicherungs-
leistungen und -beiträgen durch Erwerbstätigkeit und bei Leistungen der Grund-
sicherung für Arbeitsuchende sowie von nicht angemeldeter Erwerbstätigkeit und
illegaler grenzüberschreitender Leiharbeit (Deutsch-Niederländischer Vertrag zur
Bekämpfung grenzüberschreitender Schwarzarbeit) v. 16.04.2013, BGBl. II 2013,
378.
62 See also Koberski (2011) § 17 AEntG, para 38.
63 This Regulation has been repealed by Regulation (EC) 883/2004 of 29 April 2004
on the coordination of social security systems [2004] OJ L166/1.
64 See the agreements’ preambles.
65 Van Hoek & Houwerzijl (2011b) 167.
66 Prop. 1998/99:90, Utstationering av arbetstagare, 4 March 1999.
67 Prop. 1998/99:90, 31.
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framework of the PWD.68 It was suggested that more use should be made
of the IMI-system.69
In relation to reasoned requests, Art 6(6) Posted Workers Enforce-
ment Directive sets time limits within which requests must be answered. It
is said that in urgent situations a request must receive a response within
two days, while a period of 25 days is allowed for other requests. The
Commission will assess whether financial support is necessary to enhance
transnational cooperation and to ensure mutual trust (Art 8 Posted
Workers Enforcement Directive). This includes promoting exchanges of
officials and training, as well as developing, facilitating and promoting
best practice initiatives, including those of social partners at EU level. The
last point refers to developing and updating databases or joint websites
containing general or sector-specific information concerning terms and
conditions of employment to be respected.
The Posted Workers Enforcement Directive emphasises that Mem-
ber States should use the Internal Market Information System (‘IMI’) (Art
21).70 IMI applies to Directive 2005/36/EC on the recognition of profes-
sional qualifications71 and Directive 2006/123/EC on services in the
internal market,72 and assists local, regional and national authorities to
cooperate electronically with their colleagues abroad. It helps Member
States find the right authority to contact in another EU Member State and
to communicate with them using pre-translated sets of standard questions
and answers.73 The use of IMI is obligatory when Member State autho-
rities cooperate transnationally (Arts 6 and 7), for information requests in
relation to inspections (Art 10(3)), and in the cross-border enforcement of
financial administrative penalties and/or fines (Arts 14 to 18). Houwerzijl
provides some critical remarks on the mandatory use of IMI as laid down
in the original proposal for the Directive. Member States should also be
able to use other communication channels. It should be reiterated that IMI
is meant to assist the Member States, not that the Member States have to
assist IMI to work properly. Requiring Member States to use only the IMI
68 The information is taken from the English summary included in the Inquiry SOU
2010:46, Utländsk näringsverksamhet i Sverige: En översyn av lagstiftningen om
utländska filialer i ett EU-perrspectiv, 14 February 2013, 20-1.
69 Prop. 2012/13:71, Anmälningsskyldighet vid utstationering, 20.
70 Art 12. IMI is regulated by Regulation (EU) 1024/2012 of 25 October 2012 on
administrative cooperation through the Internal Market Information System and
repealing Commission Decision 2008/49/EC (‘IMI Regulation’) OJ [2012] L 316/1.
71 [2005] OJ L255/22.
72 [2006] OJ L376/36.
73 This information has been taken from <http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/
imi-net/about_en.html> accessed 28 October 2014.
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would make the system overly rigid. It would enable service providers to
use argue that IMI had not been correctly used. This would undermine the
monitoring and enforcement of the rights of posted workers.74 Never-
theless, Member States may (still) conclude bilateral agreements and
arrangements concerning administrative cooperation and mutual assis-
tance between their competent authorities.
7.3 Measures to monitor compliance
7.3.1 Introduction
Monitoring and enforcement by public authorities can be severely ham-
pered if foreign employees and their employers are unknown to the
authorities. Therefore, in order to make the monitoring and enforcement
tasks of the inspection authorities easier, registration and notification
obligations have been introduced for employers and foreign employees.
The following starts by describing the mandatory registration that applies
to (employed) Union citizens (section 7.3.2). Secondly, the existing prior
notification obligations in the context of the posting of workers are
assessed (section 7.3.3). Thirdly, the registration obligation for tempor-
ary-work agencies as applicable in Germany and the Netherlands is
examined (section 7.3.4).
7.3.2 Registration obligation for economically active Union citizens
Multiple authorities deal with the registration of Union citizens, at both
centralised (eg registers especially for foreign citizens and registers for
social security contributions and income tax) or decentralised levels (eg
registers at municipality level). Registration is of practical value as the
enforcement authorities are aware of the employees’ presence. Unregis-
tered employees are unknown to the public authorities, which aggravates
the authorities’ monitoring and enforcement tasks. Therefore, it is crucial
that Union citizens and services providing employers or user under-
takings make themselves known to the public authorities.
If they know where foreign employees provide work, state autho-
rities and the social partners could further raise awareness of applicable
rights and obligations (see section 7.2 above).
74 Houwerzijl (2013c).
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A. Mandatory registration of Union citizens in their place of residence
and with the host state migration authorities
Economically active Union citizens, who aim to stay for more than three or
four months in one of the three countries studied here, are required not
only to register in their place of residence, but also with migration
authorities. Member States may require Union citizens, regardless of the
capacity in which they move to another Member State, to register in their
place of residence (Art 8(1) Directive 2004/38/EC75).76 This Directive is
addressed to Union citizens, which includes all individuals who have the
nationality of one of the EU Member States and who move to another
Member State. This includes Union workers and posted workers alike.
Union citizens have to register if they stay for longer than three (Germany
and Sweden) or four months (the Netherlands, within a period of six
consecutive months).77 Not registering can be fined in the Netherlands by
325 EUR and up to 1000 EUR in Germany78 . A fine may also be imposed
in Sweden.79
The Dutch Basic Registration of Persons Act (Wet Basisregistratie
Personen), which entered into force on 6 January 2014, allows state
authorities to use the information contained in the register, as far as the
information is necessary for the fulfilment of their tasks (Art 1.3 Basic
Registration of Persons Act). One of the most important changes made is
that the existing municipal database and the register of non-residents
75 Directive 2004/38/EC of 29 April 2004 on the right of citizens of the Union and
their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member
States amending Regulation (EEC) 1612/68 and repealing Directives 64/221/EEC,
68/360/EEC, 72/194/EEC, 73/148/EEC, 75/34/EEC, 75/35/EEC, 90/364/EEC,
90/365/EEC and 93/96/EEC [2004] OJ L158/77.
76 See on this also Houwerzijl (2005) 184.
77 A registration requirement exists in all countries considered here. The Netherlands:
Arts 8.11 and 8.12 Vreemdelingenbesluit 2000 (Aliens Decree 2000), Art 2.38 Wet
Basisregistratie Personen (Basic Registration of Persons Act) (Wet van 3 juli 2013
houdende nieuwe regels voor een basisregistratie personen (Wet basisregistratie
personen), Stb. 2013, 315); Germany: § 2(5) Gesetz über die allgemeine Freizügig-
keit von Unionsbürgern vom 30 Juli 2004, BGBl. I, 1950, last amended by Artikel 2
und Artikel 8 G zur Anpassung von Rechtsvorschriften des Bundes infolge des
Beitritts der Republik Kroatien zur EU vom 17. Juni 2013, BGBl. I, 1555 iVm Bek. v.
21. Juni 2013, BGBl. II, 680. Kluth, Hund &Maaßen (2008), § 6 FreizügG/EU, para 26;
Mävers (2010); Sweden: Section 10(1) Utlänningslag (2005:716), last amended by Lag
(2014:792) (Aliens Act).
78 For instance, in North-Rhine Westphalia: Meldegesetz für das Land Nordrhein-
Westfalen (Meldegesetz NRW - MG NRW) in der Fassung der Bekanntmachung
vom 16. September 1997 (Residence Registration Act).
79 Chapter 20, Section 6 Aliens Act (2005:716), refers to a monetary fine or imprison-
ment of at most six months.
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(those who need not register, eg, frontier workers) were merged, creating a
centralised register at national level. Although the registration of mobile
workers was not explicitly part of the amendments, in the context of the
discussions in Parliament held on the free movement of workers, it was
established that a large group of Union workers is not registered with the
municipalities. In order to improve registration, it was suggested that
employers should be contacted, who should then ensure that migrant
employees register.80 However, employers can only be contacted if they
are known to the state authorities, which is more difficult as regards the
posting employers, as no general notification obligation applies in the
Netherlands. Moreover, employers may have reasons not to inform their
employees about the registration obligation in the Netherlands, allowing
them to act largely outside the legal boundaries.
A centralised registration system is also found in Sweden. Union
citizens moving to Sweden to work there have to register with the Swedish
Tax Agency (Skatteverket) which is responsible for the population regis-
ter.81 Individuals who work in Sweden have a right of residence. When
registering with the Tax Agency, individuals have to bring proof of their
right of residence (which they receive from the Migration Office). Someone
who has a (a proof of their) right of residence does not need a residence
permit. When a person is in possession of a right of residence, it is possible
to have an entry in the population register, which is a central register
which many state authorities can access. If changes are made as to the
place of residence or a change of name, this will be automatically
communicated to the authorities, such as the Swedish Migration Board.82
Registration in Germany is decentralised. Procedural details in
Germany concerning the obligation can be found in the laws of each
Land.83 Registration takes place with the Civil Registration Office (Ein-
wohnermeldeamt) of the municipality in which the Union citizen lives.
Moreover, foreign employees may be required to register with the
migration authorities. According to Section 10(1) Swedish Foreign Na-
tionals Act (2005:716),84 Union citizens who have a right to reside in
80 Kamerstukken II 2010/11, 29 407, nr. 132, 7.
81 Sections 1, 2 and 4 Folkbokföringslag (1991:481) (Population Registration Act).
82 See <http://work.sweden.se> accessed 28 October 2014.
83 Meldegesetz für das Land Nordrhein-Westfalen (Meldegesetz NRW - MGNRW) in
der Fassung der Bekanntmachung vom 16. September 1997. See also the Melder-
echtsrahmengesetz in der Fassung der Bekanntmachung vom 19. April 2002 (BGBl.
I S. 1342), das durch Artikel 2 des Gesetzes vom 28. August 2013 (BGBl. I S. 3458)
geändert worden ist, obliging the Länder to register the individuals in their area of
responsibility.
84 Aliens Act (2005:716).
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Sweden and who wish to stay for longer than three months, must register
with the Migration Board. An exception applies to citizens from Denmark,
Finland, Iceland and Norway, based on agreements concluded between
these countries, as they are permitted to enter and reside in one of the
Nordic countries, whichever they choose, without need of a residence
permit or a work permit.
The website of the Swedish Migration Board provides information
not only on how Union workers have to register, but also offers the
possibility to register their right of residence, either via the website or by
downloading a form,85 which can be signed and sent to the Migration
Board. A right of residence is a proof of registration, issued if the person
works in Sweden. When registering as an economically active Union
citizen, the following information must be provided: a passport or identity
card showing personal data and mentioning the period of validity, and a
proof of employment, not older than three months (if the proof is older,
the most recent monthly wage statement must also be included). The proof
of employment must show: the employer’s name, address and telephone
number; the employer’s corporate identity number; the employee’s salary;
the period of employment (permanent or temporary); the weekly working
hours; if the job pays per hour or when the employer needs extra help, in
which case, the last three monthly wage statements must be enclosed).86
Currently, there is a certain amount of control on the applicable employ-
ment conditions.
Union citizens in Germany must register with the Federal Office for
Migration and Refugees (Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge) in the
Central Register of Foreigners (Ausländerzentralregister).87 In contrast to
registration with the municipalities, this register applies nationwide.
However, Union citizens who register with the municipality do not
need additionally to register separately with the Central Register of
85 The form is available in English and Swedish. See <www.migrationsverket.se/
info/147_en.html> accessed 28 October 2014.
86 Therefore, the form Proof of Employment for Citizens of an EU/EEA Country and
People with Long-term Residence Status in Another EU Country, No. 227021, must
be used, which must be signed by the employer.
87 Gesetz über das Ausländerzentralregister (AZR-Gesetz) vom 2. September 1994,
BGBl. I, 2265, amended by Artikel 2 des Gesetzes vom 29. August 2013, BGBl. I,
3484. See for information on the Central Register, see: <www.bamf.de/EN/
DasBAMF/Aufgaben/FuehrungAZR/fuehrungazr-node.html> accessed 28 Octo-
ber 2014, also available in German, Turkish and Russian.
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Foreigners (§ 5(2) Freizügigkeitsgesetz/EU).88 The municipality informs
the responsible authority. How far the facts of the Central Register of
Foreigners Act (Ausländerzentralregistergesetz) can be used for statistical
reasons was discussed in the ECJ’s Huber case.89 At the time of the case,
the Central Register of Foreigners Act (Ausländerzentralregistergesetz)
aimed not only at providing authorities entrusted with decisions on the
right of residence of foreigners access to personal information of Union
citizens, it was also used for (non-anonymised) statistical reasons and to
combat crime. The question that arose in this case was whether Germany
was allowed to register personal information of foreign Union citizens in a
special register, while there is no similar central register for German
citizens, in the light of the principle of non-discrimination. The main
role of the Central Register of Foreigners is to enable authorities entrusted
with taking decisions in relation foreigners to access relevant information.
The ECJ ruled that such a central register does not violate the principle of
non-discrimination, provided
“it contains only the data which are necessary for the application by those
authorities of that legislation, and its centralised nature enables that legislation to
be more effectively applied as regards the right of residence of Union citizens
who are not nationals of that Member State”.90
In this context, the ECJ referred to Art 7(e) Directive 95/46/EC, which
states that “Member States shall provide that personal data may be
processed only if […] processing is necessary for the performance of a
task carried out in the public interest or in the exercise of official authority
vested in the controller or in a third party to whom the data are disclosed
[…]”.91 Hailbronner, commenting on the Huber ruling, has pointed out
that the efficiency of a central register cannot be questioned, given that
there are approximately 7,700 registration offices.92
Nevertheless, the Act had to be amended so that it is only applied if
personal information of Union citizens is necessary in the context of the
88 Bundesministerium für Arbeit und Soziales, Beschäftigung und Entsendung von
Unionsbürgerinnen und -bürgern 50 Fragen und Antworten zum 1. Mai 2011
(2011) 18. Kluth, Hund & Maaßen (2008) § 6 Aufenthaltsrecht der Unionsbürger,
para 26.
89 Case C-524/06 Heinz Huber ECLI:EU:C:2008:724.
90 Case C-524/06 Heinz Huber ECLI:EU:C:2008:724, para 66.
91 Directive 95/46/EC of 24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals with
regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data
[1995] OJ L281/31.
92 Hailbronner (2009) 181.
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right of residence and that statistical information is anonymised. Accord-
ing to the Advocate General in this case, “[…] the existence of two separate
data processing systems casts an unpleasant shadow over Union citizens,
whom the German Government monitors much more strictly and system-
atically than German citizens”.
This case did not necessarily question this issue of data processing
of mobile workers as such. In line with theWatson and Belman case, the ECJ
ruled that EU law does not exclude Member States measures enabling the
national authorities to have knowledge of population movements affect-
ing their territory.93 Under Regulation (EC) No 862/2007, the Member
States are explicitly required to supply the Commission, and in particular
Eurostat, statistics on the number of immigrants moving to the territory of
the Member State (Art 3(1)(a)).94 The need for EU level data processing on
migration is related to the EU enlargements and the extra geographical
and political dimension to the scale of the phenomena associated with
migration. This calls for accurate, timely and harmonised statistical
information. Moreover, statistics are necessary on the migrants’ profes-
sion, education, qualifications and type of activity.95
B. Registration in relation to social security and income tax
Union workers who are employed with an employer established in the
Netherlands, Germany or Sweden also need to register with the autho-
rities dealing with social security and income tax.96 Someone who is
economically active in the Netherlands will receive a citizen service
number (Burger Servicenummer). Similarly in Sweden, persons who register
with the Tax Authority receive a personal number (personnummer), which
is also relevant for social security and taxation.97 Germany has introduced
a tax identification number (Steueridentifikationsnummer) to abolish red
93 Case C-524/06 Heinz Huber ECLI:EU:C:2008:724, with reference to Case 118/75
Watson and Belmann ECLI:EU:C:1976:106, para 17.
94 Member States shall provide the information, disaggregated as follows: groups of
citizenship by age and sex; groups of country of birth by age and sex; and groups
of country of previous usual residence by age and sex. Information shall be based,
inter alia, on registers of the population of persons or of a particular subgroup of
that population (Art 9(1)(c) Regulation (EC) 862/2007). Regulation (EC) 862/2007
of 11 July 2007 on Community statistics on migration and international protection
and repealing Council Regulation (EEC) No 311/76 on the compilation of statistics
on foreign workers [2007] OJ L199/23.
95 Regulation (EC) 862/2007, recital 5.
96 Special provisions apply in relation to frontier workers.
97 See <www.skatteverket.se/privat/blanketterbroschyrer/broschyrer/info/717b.4.
39f16f103821c58f680008017.html> accessed 28 October 2014.
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tape and to simplify collecting taxes.98 Every citizen who is registered
with the population register receives such a number, which is used, inter
alia, for the payment of income taxes. This number is also relevant for
health and pension insurances.99
C. Reasons why foreign employees do not or cannot register
A problem is that Union citizens do not always register, either because
they do not intend to reside for more than three months in the host
Member State, in which case registration is not required, or they just do
not register. In 2013, the Netherlands College voor de Rechten van de Mens
(Netherlands Institute for Human Rights) conducted a study of the human
rights of Polish migrant workers in the Netherlands. In this study, one of
the things the Institute paid attention to was the way the right to decent
employment and working conditions was observed. Seven main problems
were identified, which may also be helpful in understanding the reasons
for not registering in general, not just in the Netherlands.
In the first place, it is often practically impossible for migrant
workers to receive information on their rights, due to the long hours
they have to work. Opening hours during which workers can register
often do not fit the employees’working schedule. Secondly, there seems to
be little confidence in the state authorities and their (complaint) proce-
dures, which can partly be explained by the poor feedback provided by
the enforcing authorities when an employee has lodged a claim. Employ-
ees seem not to know what actually happens to their complaint, which can
be explained by the fact that Polish workers, on whom the report focused,
have had experience of a socialist system. A third problem is the
acceptance of their situation. They experience poor employment opportu-
nities and low pay in their home country. Higher wages seem to be
attractive, as is the mere fact of having work. Thus, employees hardly ever
(officially) complain about their situation. In the fourth place, Polish
employees seem to be largely dependent on their employer, who organises
their housing and transport. Losing their job means losing the housing and
the transport. Another difficulty is the postponement of wage payment
and any fines to be paid if the relationship is ended. Fifthly, there are
hardly any other work alternatives for these employees. Finding new
98 § 139b Abgabenordnung in der Fassung der Bekanntmachung vom 1. Oktober
2002 (BGBl. I S. 3866; 2003 I S. 61), die zuletzt durch Artikel 13 des Gesetzes vom
18. Dezember 2013 (BGBl. I S. 4318) geändert worden ist (Fiscal Code).
99 See for general information: <http://www.bzst.de/DE/Steuern_National/Steuer-
liche_Identifikationsnummer/steuerid_node.html> accessed 28 October 2014.
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employment is difficult in practice due to the long working days, and a
poor knowledge of the language. The sixth problem is shame for com-
plaining about the situation, in particular towards the worker’s family in
his home state. The final problem concerns the shortcomings of the
enforcement mechanisms. The ISZW and the social partners should
monitor and enforce more frequently.100
7.3.3 Prior notification, appointing contact persons and keeping documents in
the context of the posting of workers
A. Notification of the posting of workers in Germany and Sweden
Prior notification of the posting is different from a work permit in that it
does not require any approval from the authorities to gain access to
another Member State’s labour market. There is no requirement for a work
permit in the case of the posting of workers, unless it involves the posting
of temporary agency workers having a third country nationality.101 While
in Germany and Sweden, a general notification obligation for the posting
of workers does exist, in the Netherlands, a notification requirement exists
for the service provider posting workers with a third country national-
ity.102 Although it has been requested by the FNV, so far the Netherlands
is not willing to introduce a general notification obligation.103 This must
be seen as an instrument that replaces the work permit, an instrument
used in migration law, which is not further dealt with here. In principle,
the ECJ has recognised prior notifications as valuable tools for the
monitoring and enforcement of labour law.104
Germany requires the posting of (temporary agency) workers to be
notified (§ 18 AEntG and § 17b AÜG). As for agency work, it should be
noted that it is not the employer who must notify, but the user under-
taking in case the temporary-work agency is established abroad, but only
100 College voor de Rechten van de Mens, Poolse arbeidsmigranten in mensenrech-
tenperspectief (2013) 39-41.
101 Case C-113/89 Rush Portuguesa ECLI:EU:C:1990:142 and Joined Cases C-307/09 to
C-309/09 Vicoplus ECLI:EU:C:2011:64.
102 Art 1e Besluit uitvoering Wet arbeid vreemdelingen (Implementation Decree (Foreign
Nationals (Employment) Act). This obligations applies as of 1 December 2005.
103 FNV (2011) 38. The FNV in 2011 tabled proposals to improve the enforcement of
employment conditions. Similar to the Belgian LIMOSA system, it, inter alia,
proposed an online notification system, the introduction of an obligation on
employers to notify their name, address and place of residence, registration with
the Chamber of Commerce, period in which the work is provided, subcontractors,
required licences, employees who are employed.
104 Case C-515/08 Santos Palhota ECLI:EU:C:2010:589, para 52.
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insofar as a minimum wage regulation applies (§ 17b(1) AÜG).105 A
notification, either in German, English, or French, must be issued to the
Customs Authority before the start of each period of employment or
service performance and it must contain substantial information, includ-
ing the employees’ names, dates of birth, the start and duration of the
posting/assignment, place where the work/service is to be performed,
and the place where documents within the meaning of § 19 AEntG (in case
of construction work the construction site) or § 17c AÜG are stored, the
name, date of birth, and address of the representative or agent, and the
sector in which the employees are to be posted.
With effect from 1 July 2013, as a result of the amendments made
due to the Laval case, Sweden has introduced a notification obligation for
service providers posting their workers to Sweden. Until then, national
control measures existed only in the form of a work permit and only for
third country nationals.106 Apart from that, Sweden has been labelled as
particularly generous in treating foreign service providers. The main
problem was that the Swedish system was prone to serious lacunae in
the monitoring and enforcement of the rights conveyed in the PWD.107
Notifications in Sweden must be made to the WEA (Section 13 Posting of
Workers Act (1999:678)). Exempted are postings taking less than five days
(Section 10). If, however, the posting takes longer than five days, then
notification must be issued at the latest on the sixth day (Section 11 Posting
of Workers Act (1999:678)). An employer must also notify any changes
within three days after the changes have occurred. The Parliamentary
documents do not show whether the WEA will automatically inform the
social partners when they have received notifications. If this were to
happen, there would be structural cooperation between the WEA and
the social partners on the exchange of information.108
The introduction of mandatory notification in Sweden must be seen
in the context of the Foreign Branch Offices Act (1992:160).109 Under this
105 Department Western Federal Revenue Office (Bundesfinanzdirektion West). For the
AEntG, see Verordnung zur Bestimmung der zuständigen Behörde nach § 18
Absatz 6 des Arbeitnehmer-Entsendegesetzes (AEntGMeldstellV), 31.08.2009,
BGBl. I, 3000. For the AÜG, see BT-Drs. 17/5761.
106 A work permit will be issued in case individuals have a job in Sweden, based on a
genuine employment contract with employment conditions that are normal for
Sweden. The Migration Board (Migrationsverket) issues work permits. Adlercreutz
& Nyström (2009) para 101.
107 Van Hoek & Houwerzijl (2011b) 113.
108 See section 7.2.3 above.
109 Lag om utländska filialer (1992:160), as last amended by Lag (2014:842) (Foreign
Branch Offices Act). Unless otherwise provided, the information is taken from the
English summary of the Inquiry included in the SOU 2010:46, Utländsk närings-
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act, managers of businesses run by foreign citizens in Sweden must be
resident in Sweden.110 The act’s provisions were alleged to violate the free
movement rights under EU law, in particular the freedom to provide services.
The problem was that it contained provisions framed in such general terms
that it seemed to apply to foreign undertakings that intended to undertake
only temporary business in Sweden, which would be protected under the
freedom to provide services. A problem that was identified is that it is not
always clear whether business activities are temporary or of a more perma-
nent nature. The Inquiry highlighted that services may last several years,
which does not necessarily mean that the undertaking aims to establish a
business in Sweden. Thus, the Act needed clarification in that respect.
Although the Inquiry clearly emphasised that services within the
meaning of EU law should not fall under the act’s scope, it nevertheless
stressed that if services were to be exempted, this could lead to “irregula-
rities”, in the sense that less serious undertakings could circumvent the
act’s application. Therefore, one of the two proposals made111 concerned
the introduction of a notification obligation for service providers conduct-
ing business within the meaning of the PWD, as this would contribute to
the correct application of the Directive.112
It is consistent with the strong Swedish tradition of self-regulation of
the labour market that monitoring and enforcement of labour law and
collective agreements is – still – largely dependent on private monitoring
and enforcement, conducted by the social partners.113 Nevertheless, the
introduction of the notification obligation as of 1 July 2013 has enhanced
verksamhet i Sverige: En översyn av lagstiftningen om utländska filialer i ett EU-
perspectiv, 14 February 2013, 17-22. See in this respect also Prop. 2012/13:71,
Anmälningsskyldighet vid utstationering, 14 February 2013, 23-4; Ahlberg (2010)
22-3.
110 Ahlberg (2010) 22.
111 The Inquiry also proposed that guidelines should be drawn up, with the aim of
clarifying what can be considered as services or establishment. This will increase
the legal certainty for foreign undertakings on what they are required to do when
conducting business in Sweden and it also serves predictability in the application
of the Act. Thereby, it is emphasised that these guidelines may in no way be
detrimental to EU (case) law. The responsible authority for setting up these
guidelines should be the Swedish Companies Registration Office, which is in
charge of applying the Act. The Companies Registration Officecould introduce a
presumption that a business operation not lasting one year shall be regarded as
temporary, or vice versa. However, the Office should be able to assess that case by
case.
112 Unlike the notification obligation described above, the Inquiry suggested the
Swedish Companies Registration Office (Bolagsverket) should be responsible for
the notifications.
113 Ahlberg (2011) 1.
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the WEA’s role in the context of the posting of workers’ rights, albeit only
to a minor extent. Nonetheless, the WEA’s main task is to monitor and
enforce health and safety matters.114 Thus, as Ahlberg clearly points out,
the WEA has “a comparably narrow jurisdiction”.115
As regards temporary agency work performed in Germany, infor-
mation must also be provided on the name and surname as well as the
address in Germany of the agency’s representative, the sector to which the
temporary agency worker is assigned, and the name and surname or trade
name of the undertaking, and the address of the agency. In addition, the
user must also provide further information, namely the name or business
of the agency. Any changes must be communicated directly by the agency
to the authority. In addition, the user undertaking must stand guarantor of
the agency, that the latter will comply with the obligation to pay the
sectoral minimum wage (§ 17b(2) AÜG). The same obligation applies in
relation to the cross-border posting of temporary agency workers within
the meaning of the AEntG (§ 18(3)).
In Sweden, broadly similar information must be provided: the
employer’s name, address and place or residence; name, social security
number or, failing this, date of birth, address, phone number, and e-mail
address of the employer’s representative; type of service(s) that will be
performed in Sweden; duration of the provision of the service(s) in Sweden;
the place(s) in Sweden where the service(s) are performed; and the name
and social security number or, failing this, the date of birth of the employees
that are posted to Sweden.116 Notifications can be made in six languages,
namely Swedish, German, Romanian, English, Polish and French.117
Whether a notification obligation is actually permitted under EU
law, depends on how the system works. Based on the ECJ’s case law it
seems that the German and Swedish notification systems are in accor-
dance with EU law. According to the Council’s press release on the Posted
Workers Enforcement Directive, “the text [of Article 9] strikes a balance
between the necessity of guaranteeing legal certainty and transparency for
service providers, while acknowledging member states’ competence.”118
114 See generally, Adlercreutz & Nyström (2009) para 102. See on the role of the Work
Environment Authority in relation to health and safety: Ahlberg (2011).
115 Ahlberg (2011) 1.
116 Section 4 Swedish Regulation on the notification on the posting of workers 23 May
2013 (Förordning om anmälningsskyldighet vid utstationering av arbetstagare)
(2013:352).
117 See for a choice of six languages: <http://www.av.se/inenglish/working/this_is>
accessed 28 October 2014.
118 Council of the European Union, ‘Posting of workers directive’, Presse 120, 7299/14,
Brussels, 5 March 2014.
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Based on that, it seems that the legal position of the posted worker and
the role of the host Member States to ensure that these workers’ rights are
actually complied with are still subordinated to the freedom to provide
services.
One major problem that makes enforcement difficult in practice
is that posting employers seem to forget to notify.119 To overcome this
lacuna, it could be useful to consider making the service recipient in the
host state liable for his subcontractor who has not notified the posting
and the workers who are to be posted. One could even think of a similar
measure to that in the German temporary agency work sector, where
the user undertaking is made responsible for the notification. Unlike the
service provider, the service recipient is in a better position to know
the legal situation in the host state, including the responsible state
authorities and the corresponding procedures. The burden should not
only fall on the service providing employer, but also on the service
recipient, the latter being the contractual party that probably requires
the service to be provided at a (very) low price.
Article 9 Posted Workers Enforcement Directive, codifying case law,
contains a provision determining that Member States may require a
foreign service provider established in another Member State to make a
simple declaration to the responsible competent Member State authorities,
at the latest at the beginning of the service provision. A notification should
facilitate factual controls. This simple declaration may contain the follow-
ing information: the identity of the service provider, the anticipated
number of clearly identifiable posted workers, the anticipated duration
and location of their presence, and the services justifying the posting, the
person who has been designated to liaise with the competent host state
authorities, and the designated contact person whom the social partners
may seek to induce the service provider to enter into collective bargaining
within the host state. It should be noted that this notification obligation
is part of an exhaustive list of measures that are permitted at Member
State level. Other instruments are only permitted if existing measures are
insufficient, provided they are justified and proportionate (Art 9(1a)
Posted Workers Enforcement Directive).
In order to allow service providers to comply easily with such a
notification obligation, host states should enable undertakings to notify
the posting at a distance and by electronic means, as far as possible. The
Commission has been allocated a specific role in monitoring the applica-
tion of, inter alia, the notification obligation and evaluating its compliance
119 Van Hoek & Houwerzijl (2011b) 114.
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with EU law. Where EU law has not been complied with because the
measures adopted at Member State level are not justifiable and/or
proportionate, the Commission may take the necessary measures, in
accordance with its competences under the Treaty.
B. Appointing a contact person in Germany and Sweden
In line with the Posted Workers Enforcement Directive, Germany and
Sweden require a contact person to be appointed. The German AEntG
contains no explicit statement that the service provider must appoint a
contact person. However, the service provider must notify, inter alia, the
name and surname, the date of birth, and the address in Germany of the
responsible agent (ie someone authorised by the employer to give instruc-
tions), and of the person who is authorised to receive documents from the
authorities, insofar as the latter differs from the responsible agent.120 The
responsible agent then will be the person who has to provide the enforcing
authorities with information. From the perspective of the enforcing
authorities, this enhances the efficient enforcement of the Act.121 If the
responsible agent is not an authorised agent, who is allowed to receive
official documents, the service providing employer also has to provide the
authority with the names and address of an authorised agent in
Germany.122
As of July 2013, the Swedish legislation obliges service providers to
appoint a contact person (Section 11 Posting of Workers Act (1999:678)).123
This contact person must be able to prove that the employer does comply
with the provisions laid down in the Posting of Workers Act (1999:678).
LO and TCO requested that in order to facilitate concluding and applying
collective agreements with foreign service providers, the contact person
should be authorised to negotiate and conclude collective agreements on
120 § 18(1) Nos. 5 and 7 AEntG. The latter must be seen in relation to § 22 AEntG,
determining that for the application of the aforesaid Act, the place where the work
or service is provided as well as the deployed vehicle will be considered as
business rooms within the meaning of the Act Governing the Delivery of Admin-
istrative Matters (Verwaltungszustellungsgesetz) and the Civil Procedural Code. See
also § 18a AÜG, according to which it is necessary to emphasise that the actual
place where the temporary agency workers work (which is mostly the user
undertaking’s premises) is considered as the premises in which the business of
the undertaking is carried out.
121 Koberski (2011) § 8 AEntG, para 5.
122 A comparable provision could already be found in the 1997 AEntG. See Koberski,
Sahl & Hold (1997) § 4 AEntG, paras 7-8.
123 Ds 2011:22, Anmälningsskyldighet vid utstationering samt förtydligande avseende
missbruk av visstidsanställningar enligt anställningsskyddslagen, 7 July 2011, 8.
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behalf of their employer (service provider). They argued that this would
be necessary to meet the requirements laid down in ILO Conventions No.
98 (on the right to organise and collective bargaining) and 154 (on the
promotion of collective bargaining).
This request was rejected. According to the Government, referring
to COM(2006) 159 final, a contact person functioning as an intermediary
between the responsible monitoring authority and the service provider
would suffice. The trade unions’ request, the Government argued, would
probably not be in accordance with EU law. As a result, the Swedish
Government agreed to the obligation to appoint a contact person who can
make notifications and inform the WEA of changes.124 Following the
legislative proposal, the contact person could be a posted worker or any
other person.125 The following details of the contact person appointed to
the WEA must be issued: name; social security number, or failing this,
date of birth; address in Sweden; telephone number; and e-mail
address.126
The 2012 draft Posted Workers Enforcement Directive included a
provision stating that Member States may impose
“[…] an obligation to designate a contact person to negotiate, if necessary, on behalf
of the employer with the relevant social partners in the Member States to which the
posting takes place, in accordance with national legislation and practice, during
the period in which the services are provided” (emphasis added).127
However, this proposal was not included in the Posted Workers Enforce-
ment Directive. Article 9(1)(f) now determines that Member States may
impose
“an obligation to designate a contact person, if necessary, acting as a representa-
tive through whom the relevant social partners may seek to engage the service
provider to enter into collective bargaining within the host Member State, in
accordance with national law and/or practice, during the period in which the
services are provided. That person may be different from the person referred to
under point (e) and does not have to be present in the host Member State, but has
to be available on a reasonable and justified request” (emphasis added).
124 Prop. 2012/13:71, Anmälningsskyldighet vid utstationering, 14 February 2013,
35-6.
125 Prop. 2012/13:71, 56-7.
126 Section 5 Swedish Regulation on the notification on the posting of workers
(2013:352).
127 COM(2012) 131 final, Art 9(1)(d).
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This amended proposal makes it – at least in Sweden – difficult for the
trade unions to negotiate on the possible conclusion of collective agree-
ments. Negotiation is necessary as the unions have the competence to
control compliance with the collective agreements only if the employer is
bound. From that perspective, one may doubt whether this amendment
provides a useful alternative, as the service provider may not always be
present in person at the construction site.
Article 9(1)(e) furthermore determines that Member States may also
oblige the appointment of a person with whom the responsible authorities
in the host state may liaise. This person should be able to dispatch and
receive documents and/or notices.
C. Keeping documents
In order to facilitate the monitoring and enforcement of the laws on the
posting of workers, Germany and Sweden require documents to be made
available for the authorities to enable them to check whether the obliga-
tions are complied with. For employers and user undertakings in Ger-
many, they must provide the FKS with the documents in which the
beginning, end and duration of the daily working time of the workers
are identified and these documents must be retained for two years in
Germany (§ 19(1) AEntG and § 17c AÜG). If the employer is already
obliged to compose such documents under the legislation of the home
state, they may also be used if they are adequate for the protection of the
workers, which therefore depends on whether the documents are suffi-
cient to establish the minimum wage.128 The provision in Sweden is more
broadly defined, stating that all kinds of documents that allow an
assessment of whether the obligations arising out of the Posting of
Workers Act (1999:678) are complied with, are to be produced to the
WEA (Art 11(3) Posting of Workers Act (1999:678)). This provision is also a
result of Lex Laval.
Keeping documents, as well as translating certain documents,129 is
in line with the Posted Workers Enforcement Directive. Article 9 codifies
some of the ECJ’s judgements in this area. The Directive determines that
service providers may be obliged to keep the documents on paper or in
electronic form. It refers to documents such as the employment contract or
128 Müller-Glöge, Preis & Schmidt (Eds.) (2014) (Schlachter) § 17 AEntG, para 3; and
Thüsing (Ed.) (2010) (Reufels) § 17 AEntG, para 8.
129 Case C-490/04 Commission v Germany (2007) ECLI:EU:C:2007:430. See section 2.3.3
above.
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an equivalent document within the meaning of Directive 91/533/EEC,
including information as mentioned in Art 4 of that directive, payslips,
time-sheets (indicating the beginning, end and duration of the daily
working time), and proof of payment of wages or copies of equivalent
documents. This applies to the availability of the information during the
period of posting. Information must be made accessible and available at a
clearly identified place in the host state’s territory, eg, the workplace or the
building site. Such documents may even be requested after the period of
posting and must be delivered within a reasonable time (Art 9(1)(c)).
Moreover, the documents mentioned must even be provided in a language
required by the host state. This means that documents will probably have
to be translated (Art 9(1)(d)).
7.3.4 Registration and licensing obligations for temporary-work agencies
In order to combat fraudulent practice in the temporary agency work
sector, registration or licensing obligations were also introduced for
temporary-work agencies, for domestic and foreign temporary-work
agencies alike. The reason why Germany and the Netherlands have a
registration or licensing obligation for temporary-work agencies is differ-
ent, however. The general starting point in Germany is that temporary
agency work is prohibited in principle, unless it is explicitly permitted. In
the Netherlands, temporary agency work is generally allowed, since no
prior approval is needed. Nevertheless, in order to be aware of the
presence of temporary-work agencies and to improve the monitoring
and enforcement in the agency work sector, the Netherlands has introduced
a registration system. Nevertheless, both aim similarly at compliance with
the rules of the game. This seems to be in accordance with Art 4(4) TAWD,
which states that licensing and registration obligations for agencies are
exempted from the review which Member States were required to under-
take in relation to measures that could limit the use of temporary agency
work.
A. The German licensing system: prior permission
A temporary-work agency, whether established in Germany or abroad,
needs the permission of the Federal Employment Office130 to conduct its
130 Depending on the place where the activity is performed, requests have to be made
with the regional departments of the Federal Employment Office. Müller-Glöge,
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business legally in Germany.131 No licence is required if the only domestic
connection (Inlandsbezug) is that the work is performed in Germany at a
German subsidiary of the user, while involving a foreign agency, a foreign
user undertaking and a foreign employee.132 On 30 June 2011, 17,938
licences had been issued133 , and 18,024 in 2012.134
Requests must be issued in writing and must be renewed annually,
unless they have been issued for an unlimited period, which is possible
after three successive years (§ 2(1), (4) and (5) AÜG). A licence will be
issued against a maximum charge of 2,500 EUR.135 A temporary licence
costs 750 EUR, while a permanent licence costs 2,000 EUR.136 Following
the Webb case, the host state authorities responsible for issuing permis-
sions, “must take into account the evidence and guarantees already
furnished by the provider of the services for the pursuit of his activities
in the Member State of his establishment”.137
The Federal Employment Office has several instruments at its disposal
to withhold the issue of a licence in certain defined situations. First, to protect
temporary agency workers against unreliable and malafide employers, the
Federal Employment Office may refuse to issue a licence (§ 3 AÜG). Refusal
can be for several reasons, for example relating to non-compliance with
obligations under employment and social security law or not guaranteeing
the basic working and employment conditions, including wages, to a
temporary agency worker on an equal basis to a comparable employee in
the user undertaking (equal pay/equal treatment principle). Here, it is
necessary to emphasise that under German law, if someone wants to set
up business activities, he must comply with the condition of commercial
reliability (gewerbliche Zuverlässigkeit).138 Commercial reliability is to be
determined per trade or industry.139 A temporary-work agency is unreliable,
Preis & Schmidt (Eds.) (2014) (Wank) § 2 AÜG, para 46. See for an overview of the
departments: <www.arbeitsagentur.de/zentraler-Content/A08-Ordnung-Recht/
A083-AUEG/Publikation/pdf/Informationen-zur-Arbeitnehmerueberlassung.
pdf> accessed 28 October 2014.
131 § 1(1) in conjunction with §§ 2 and 17 AÜG. Däubler (1993) 373; Müller-Glöge,
Preis & Schmidt (Eds.) (2014) (Wank) Einl. AÜG, para 46; Thüsing (Ed.) (2012)
(Thüsing) Einl. AÜG, para 45.
132 Thüsing (Ed.) (2012) (Thüsing) Einl. AÜG, para 47.
133 BT-Drs. 17/7167, 4.
134 BT-Drs. 18/673, 25. These agencies employ 822,379 employees in total, 143,469 of
whom do not have German nationality.
135 § 2a AÜG.
136 BT-Drs. 17/464, 4.
137 Case 279/80 Webb ECLI:EU:C:1981:314, para 20.
138 § 35(1) Gewerbeordnung (Trade, Commerce and Industry Regulation Act).
139 Thüsing (Ed.) (2012) (Pelzner/Kock) § 3 AÜG, para 12.
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if there is any doubt that the agency assigns employees in conformity with
the existing legal requirements.140 Whether an agency is commercially
reliable is to be based on a forecast, which may be based in part on historical
information on the agency’s behaviour. In case the information is based on
earlier facts, they must be carefully weighed and assessed.141 Moreover, the
Federal Employment Office may withdraw an illegally issued permit within
one year after becoming aware of that fact (§ 4 AÜG).142 And thirdly, a
permit can be revoked in exhaustively listed situations.143
Should the employer replace, close or establish a (part of the)
business or plant, he must inform the Federal Employment Office as far
as the activity of temporary agency work is concerned (§ 7 AÜG). The
Federal Employment Office may request any information it needs related
to the ongoing change(s). The agency must ensure that the information is
correct, complete, provided within the time limit, and free of charge. In
addition, the Federal Employment Office may require the employer to
provide the necessary business records from which the requested informa-
tion can be derived. Business records must be retained for three years. If
necessary, in well-founded individual cases, the property and the offices
of the employer may be entered to pursue checks.
Moreover, licensed temporary-work agencies144 are required to
provide the Federal Employment Office with statistical information bian-
nually (§ 8 AÜG). The information must contain: the number of employees
assigned, divided according to gender, nationality, occupational group
and the reasons for the employment contract with the agency; the number
of assignments arranged classified by economic groups; the number of
user undertakings to which employees have been assigned; and the
140 Schüren & Brors (Eds.) (2010) § 3 AÜG, para 61.
141 Schüren & Brors (Eds.) (2010) § 3 AÜG, paras 62-4.
142 Any financial loss caused by the illegal issuance of the permission can be
compensated based on legitimate expectations, unless the applicant received the
permission as a result of deceit, threat or a criminal act, by providing information
that was incorrect or incomplete, or did know that issuing the permission was
unlawful or due to being grossly negligent did not know. Claiming financial loss is
possible within one year after the Federal Employment Office did refer to the
unlawfulness of the permission.
143 These reasons are: (1) if revocation has been reserved at the time of issuing the
permission; (2) if the temporary-work agency does not comply with the conditions
under § 2 AÜG within the prescribed period; (3) if the Federal Employment Office
was allowed to withdraw the permission as a result of later occurred facts; and (4)
or the Federal Employment Office was allowed, due to a changed legal position, to
withdraw the permission. Revocation is possible within one year after the Federal
Employment Office did become aware of the said facts (§ 5 AÜG).
144 Thüsing (Ed.) (2012) (Thüsing) § 8 AÜG, para 3.
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number of days employed of each employee assigned. Special forms have
been established for such notifications.145 The Federal Employment Office
needs this information for its quadrennial experience report (Erfahrungs-
bericht) to the Bundestag.146 The advantage of such a licensing obligation is
that it improves the awareness of agencies that are active in the German
labour market.
B. The Netherlands registration obligation
The registration obligation in the Netherlands is rather different. As of
1 July 2012 there is a registration obligation for agencies, whether
established in the Netherlands or abroad, that want to assign employees
on the Netherlands market.147 This obligation facilitates the sector’s own
quality hallmark, which takes the form of a certificate that can be issued to
reliable temporary-work agencies.148 As regards agencies that are estab-
lished abroad, the physical location of the undertaking abroad will be
registered, or, in case the undertaking has no physical address, the address
where the entrepreneur is registered and can be contacted.149 In July 2012,
about 19,000 agencies were registered with the Chamber of Commerce.150
Three aims have been ascribed to the registration obligation, namely
increasing: (1) the transparency at the market; (2) the self-policing capacity
of the sector; and (3) monitoring and enforcement by the authorities. These
aims are a reflection of the fact that regulation, monitoring, and enforce-
ment in the agency sector consist of a public/private mix. Registration is
aimed at combating bad practices and applies to Dutch and foreign
temporary-work agencies alike.151
145 See the website of the Bundesagentur für Arbeit, containing particular forms to be
used for notifications: <www.arbeitsagentur.de/web/content/DE/Unterneh-
men/Rechtsgrundlagen/Arbeitnehmerueberlassung/index.htm> accessed 28
October 2014.
146 Thüsing (Ed.) (2012) (Thüsing) § 8 AÜG, para 1.
147 The registration duty is one of the spearheads of the Labour Inspectorate for 2012,
see Szw (2011) 8. See for the entry into force of the amendments Wet van 7 juni
2012 tot wijziging van de Wet allocatie arbeidskrachten door intermediairs in
verband met de invoering van een registratieplicht voor intermediairs die arbeid-
skrachten ter beschikking stellen, alsmede in verband met het verstrekken door de
rijksbelastingdienst en de Arbeidsinspectie van gegevens over de naleving van
bepaalde wetten aan certificerende instellingen (Wet registratieplicht intermediairs
die arbeidskrachten ter beschikking stellen), Stb. 2012, 260.
148 Kamerstukken II 2010/11, 32 872, nr. 3, 2-3.
149 Kamerstukken II 2010/11, 32 872, nr. 3, 4.
150 Kamerstukken II 2011/12, 17 050, nr. 419, bijlage 1.
151 Kamerstukken II 2011/12, 17 050, nr. 419, 5.
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This registration obligation replaces the licence, which applied until
1998. Abolition of the licensing obligation, the Government argued, was
because licensing was no longer needed due to the changed roles of the
state and the agency work sector. Regulating agencies should no longer be
the state’s role. Secondly, the regulation of the agency sector imposed
undesirable restrictions on the free market. To stimulate the free market,
access criteria and rigidity should be removed. Regulation had an adverse
impact on the labour market and labour participation. The third, argu-
ment was that, after all, the state did not enforce compliance due to the
high costs involved. Moreover, it was said that no licensing system is
watertight.152
In 2012, when the registration obligation was discussed in Parlia-
ment, it was established that, without the licensing obligation and without
any public enforcement, high costs for the state would still be involved. It
seems that non-enforcement would cause the state to miss out on
approximately 300 million EUR in non-paid premiums and taxes. There
are great concerns that the sector’s own monitoring and enforcement
system does not work in practice. It was mentioned, for instance, that
there seems to be hardly any difference between certified and non-certified
agencies which have – deliberately or not – failed to comply with the rules.
Of the certified agencies, 21 per cent were found to be in violation of the
rules, while 23 per cent of non-certified agencies were similarly in
breach.153 Given the problems that the sector faces, it can be doubted
whether the existing public/private mix is an appropriate way to ensure
compliance with the law and collective agreements. From a European
perspective, a registration obligation is less obstructive of the freedom to
provide services than a licensing obligation, as exists in Germany.
Nevertheless, it seems that the licensing system will not be reintro-
duced. The Minister SZW seems confident that the best results can be
achieved with a system in which there is cooperation between the state
and the social partners.154 However, a remark, which has been rightly
made, is that, regardless of the choice of system, in the end it stands or falls
with compliance with the law.155 It is clear, however, that expenditure
cuts also play a significant role in how enforcement duties are divided
between public and private institutions.156
152 Handelingen II 2011/12, 58, item 6, 28.
153 This paragraph is based on Handelingen II 2011/12, 58, item 6, 24.
154 Brief Ministerie Van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid, Maatregelen arbeidsmi-
gratie uit Midden- en Oost-Europa (2011) 10.
155 Handelingen II 2011/12, 58, item 6, 26.
156 See Handelingen II 2011/12, 58, item 6, 26.
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Registration differs greatly from a licence. The registration obliga-
tion introduced in 2012 obliges undertakings merely to register with, ie to
make themselves known to, the Chamber of Commerce. The following
information is recorded: the undertaking’s trade name (legal person) or
name (natural person), date of commencement, continuation or termina-
tion, the name, address, date of birth and date of decease of the one to
whom the undertaking belongs (Art 2 Handelsregisterwet (Trade Register
Act)). The Chamber of Commerce does not check whether the agency, for
instance, pays its employees the applicable wage laid down in a collective
agreement. Under the former licensing system, which lasted for 28 years,
the temporary-work agency was required to pay its employees the same
wages, grant the same employment conditions and reimbursement of
expenses as was granted to similar employees employed with the user
undertaking. Failure to comply with these conditions was sanctioned
under criminal law.157
In order to learn whether a temporary-work agency has been
registered, the user undertaking has to consult the (electronic) register of
the Chamber of Commerce. Foreign undertakings established abroad that
aim to register with the Chamber of Commerce have to convince the
Chamber that they are actually an undertaking that is run in the Nether-
lands. If the undertaking belongs to a foreign legal person, the Chamber of
Commerce needs certain documents from that legal person,158 including:
the memorandum of association of the foreign legal person, the statutes of
that legal person, and a proof of registration in the foreign register, no
older than one month. The Chamber of Commerce will then check with
the foreign register whether the legal person concerned is actually regis-
tered. The entrepreneur has to prove that he is registered in the Nether-
lands, by for instance providing a copy of a record in the land registry or a
leasing agreement.
Agency registration is possible in the absence of a certificate (see
section 6.4.3 above). During the Parliamentary discussions on the intro-
duction of a registration obligation, the question was raised whether it
would not be useful to make the certificate mandatory for registration
with the Chamber of Commerce. This obligation was not introduced in the
Waadi, because the certificate is a norm based on already existing legal
obligations, such as the payment of premiums and taxes, statutory
157 Schram & Sol (2007) section 2. See also Mundlak, Schram & Sol (2012).
158 Arts 24 to 26 Handelsregisterbesluit 2008 (Trade Register Decree 2008). Besluit van
18 juni 2008, houdende de vaststelling van een nieuw Handelsregisterbesluit 2008,
Stb. 2008, 240, as amended per 30 November 2012, Stb. 2012, 612.
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minimum wage, and compliance with the WAV. This is a private norm
without legal status, and thus it is not possible to make certification
mandatory before an agency can be registered. The argument that it is a
private norm seems plausible. However, a critical note can be sounded.
We have seen in Chapter 5 in the context of the joint and several liability of
user undertakings, that they are exempted from liability if they conduct
businesses with certified agencies (see Art 7:692(2) BW). It is striking that
certification has a kind of mandatory effect, if the user undertaking wishes
to be exempted from any liability for the payment of the statutory
minimum wage and statutory holiday allowance.
It can be said that the mix of public and private measures intro-
duced to ensure compliance with the rules on temporary agency work
may cause ambiguity for agencies as well as user undertakings. So far, it
consists of a mix of a public registration obligation enforced and sanc-
tioned by public law, and a voluntary sectoral private quality mark
enforced and sanctioned by the agency sector itself. Moreover, it is also
unclear whether collective agreements may determine that user under-
takings may only conduct business with a certified agency.159 It seems
that requiring a license, as is the case in Germany, without any private
certificate that the agency knows that it is either allowed to assign workers
to the German labour market, or not. The consequence of such a public
measure, however, is that it then falls on the state to monitor and enforce,
requiring an increase of public expenditure to make more inspection
capacity available.
7.4 Inspection and enforcement
7.4.1 Introduction
This section deals with the inspection role of the authorities to ensure
compliance with statutory and/or collective labour rights. It addresses the
authorities’ competences when investigating alleged violations of labour
rights by foreign and domestic employers employing foreign workers.
Enforcement concerns not only ensuring compliance with labour law
provisions and collective agreements, but also compliance with adminis-
trative obligations for employers.
159 See, for instance, Art 6(8) CAO Bouwnijverheid (see section 6.4.3).
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7.4.2 The responsible state authorities
A. Introduction
So far, it seems that the Member States’ institutional autonomy is un-
touched by EU law (see section 2.2.2 above).160 Nevertheless, Member
State authorities must be able to fulfil the principles of equivalence and
effectiveness. Prioritising the enforcement of certain sectors gives unen-
forced sectors a sort of carte blanche not to conduct business in accordance
with the applicable rules. The following introduces the responsible in-
stitutions that deal with monitoring and enforcement of the statutory and/
or collectively agreement provisions on minimum wages, holiday pay and
holiday allowances in the Netherlands, Germany, and Sweden.
B. The Netherlands: the ISZW
As of 1 January 2012, the Labour Inspectorate became part of the
Inspectorate Social Affairs and Employment (Inspectie Sociale Zaken en
Werkgelegenheid), a merger between the Labour Inspectorate, the Inspec-
tion of Work and Income (Inspectie Werk en Inkomen), and the Social
Intelligence and Investigation Service (Sociale Inlichtingen- en Opsporings-
dienst). The main aim of this merger was to make the monitoring and
enforcement of labour legislation more effective and efficient,161 but
actually this merger was accompanied by a reduction in the inspectorate’s
staff.
As of 2007, the ISZW has been responsible for ensuring compliance
with the WML. The introduction of the free movement of workers of the
new EU Member States was a reason to shift the accent of enforcement of
the WML from pure private law (judicial) enforcement to administrative
enforcement.162 This change of perspective was introduced with the
abolition of the temporary restrictions on the new EU Member States, in
the context of the flanking measures that were taken in the monitoring and
enforcement of the statutory minimum wage and the minimum holiday
allowance.163 The resources the ISZW used for monitoring and enforcing
160 Accetto & Zleptnig (2005) 394-5. See also Case C-8/88 Germany v Commission ECLI:
EU:C:1990:241, para 13.
161 Ministerie Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid, Jaarplan 2012 Inspectie Sociale
Zaken en Werkgelegenheid (2011). See also Kullmann-Klocke (2011).
162 Kamerstukken II 2005/06, 30 678, nr. 3, 1.
163 Van Hoek & Houwerzijl (2011b) 51.
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work permits could then be used for monitoring and enforcing the
WML.164
The priorities and main activities of the ISZW are set out in its
annual strategy. Selecting and prioritising sectors is done according to a
risk inventory, meaning that sectors and branches are selected based on
the level of risk they may represent, especially regarding the safety of
employees and/or where the rules are not (correctly) complied with.165
The ISZW prioritised four sectors for 2014: construction, cleaning,
transport, and agriculture and horticulture. Within these sectors, an
integral approach is applied, paying particular attention to illegal employ-
ment, circumvention of the statutory minimum wage, health and safety,
and labour exploitation. More concretely, the ISZW focuses on monitoring
and enforcement in certain areas,166 first of all, combating bogus employ-
ment schemes. Secondly, the ISZW assists the social partners to monitor
collective agreements. The general idea has always been that social
partners are themselves responsible for monitoring and enforcing their
collective agreements. In 2014, this is further developed based on advice
from the Labour Foundation (Stichting van de Arbeid) and experience
gained from a pilot project conducted at the large construction site in
the Eemshaven. In terms of the inspectors’ workload, they expect to
receive more requests to commence investigations on non-compliance
with collective agreements, based on Art 10 Wet AVV.167 In the context
of assisting the social partners, there is more information exchange with
paritarian supervisory authorities like the Foundation for Compliance
with the Agency Collective Agreement.168 Moreover, the ISZW aims to
combat malafide temporary-work agencies, for which an intervention team
164 Kamerstukken II 2005/06, 30 678, nr. 3, 7 and nr. 7, 2. The ISZW was already
competent in the field of health and safety, and migration.
165 Stichting van de Arbeid, Convenant: Kader voor handhaving bij grensoverschrij-
dende arbeid (2007) 7-8.
166 See more extensively Ministerie Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid, Jaarplan 2014
Inspectie Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid (2013).
167 In Vz. Rb. Rotterdam (Team Bestuursrecht) 27 maart 2014, ECLI:NL:
RBROT:2014:2324, the court ruled that a trade union is free to request the Minister
SZW to enforce compliance with the Aliens Employment Act which prohibits
illegal employment as well as WML. A difficulty in this case was that the Minister
decided not to impose administrative fines. The trade union appealed. However,
according to the court, under administrative law, the union could not be con-
sidered an interested party. Reasons for this conclusion were, inter alia, that the
union had no members aboard the vessel and it had no direct interest (potential
worker representation did not count).
168 See section 6.4.3 above.
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has been set up. Thus, with regard to monitoring and enforcement, the
ISZW has quite a broad role, covering all statutory labour law.
According to the 2012 Annual Report, the ISZW employed inspec-
tors and support staff amounting to 1114 fte (full time equivalents), 664 fte
of whom were inspectors.169 Nevertheless, for a couple of years now, there
have been rumours of a shortage of manpower; one thing that can be
established is that the number of officials appointed by the ISZW has been
cut.170 The 2012 ISZW Annual Report mentions that improved risk
analyses and efficiency have allowed the number of fte’s available to be
reduced by a further 160 fte, as of 1 January 2015.171 Whether this will
ensure adequate enforcement of labour law can be questioned, as fewer
staff members can undertake fewer inspections of workplaces. In fact,
economic arguments cannot justify less monitoring and enforcement by a
reduced inspection team.172
The total costs for the ISZW were 97.3 million EUR in 2012,
including staff costs and expenditure on material.173 Violations of the
WML led to the ISZW imposing sanctions of 2.3 million EUR in 2011 and
1.5 million EUR in 2012, while: by way of comparison, fines of 33.4 million
EUR were imposed in 2012 for illegally employing migrant workers.174
The number of fines imposed in 2012 was 114 for violations of the WML
(107 in 2011) and 1,904 for violations of the WAV (1,997 in 2011). In total,
in all areas where the ISZW has a monitoring and enforcing role, fines of
42.5 million EUR were imposed in 2012 (34.4 million EUR in 2011). The
number of construction undertakings inspected in 2012 was 3,872, of
the 139,930 construction undertakings that operate in the Netherlands
169 Ministerie Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid, Jaarverslag 2012 Inspectie Sociale
Zaken en Werkgelegenheid (2013) 9.
170 See for an overview: Kullmann-Klocke (2011). See also, inter alia, Jacobs (2006) 127;
Van Hoek & Houwerzijl (2011b) 154; Popma (2011); Staal (2014).
171 Ministerie Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid, Jaarverslag 2012 Inspectie Sociale
Zaken en Werkgelegenheid (2013) 71.
172 Cf. Case C-398/98 Commission v Greece ECLI:EU:C:2001:565, para 30. In this case,
Greece attempted to justify an obstacle to the free movement of goods due to the
security of supply of petroleum products. Greece stated that the refineries’
fundamental right to economic freedom would be excessively restricted if they
were required to store minimum stocks of petroleum products, and thus assume an
obligation of the marketing companies, if they were not required in return to
purchase their supplies from those refineries.
173 Ministerie Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid, Jaarverslag 2012 Inspectie Sociale
Zaken en Werkgelegenheid (2013) 74.
174 Ministerie Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid, Jaarverslag 2012 Inspectie Sociale
Zaken en Werkgelegenheid (2013). The fines increased and were thus higher than
in 2011 (24.1 million EUR).
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(based on 2013 figures). In 2010, a total of 863,840 undertakings were
registered.175
C. Germany: the Finanzkontrolle Schwarzarbeit
Germany has no general Labour Inspectorate. Part of the enforcement of
labour law is entrusted to the FKS, which forms part of the Customs
Authority and comes under the supervision of the Federal Ministry of
Finance (Bundesministerium der Finanzen). Its task is to monitor and enforce
employees’ rights in the context of the posting of workers, temporary
agency work, illicit (‘black’) labour, and illegal employment. Before that,
the Federal Employment Office (Bundesagentur für Arbeit) was competent
to enforce the employment conditions within the meaning of the
AEntG.176 In the context of temporary agency work, it is the Federal
Employment Office that monitors and enforces the licensing requirements.
The FKS, which was established in 2004,177 has quite a narrow
jurisdiction. It is responsible for ensuring compliance with the employ-
ment conditions laid down in accordance with the AEntG, the minimum
wage established according to the AÜG, and the Schwarzarbeitsbekämp-
fungsgesetz (‘SchwarzArbG’) (Act on Combating Illicit Employment).178
The FKS monitors and enforces minimum wages and holiday pay, but
only insofar as they are in accordance with the AEntG, and only in the
sectors covered by that act. Moreover, the FKS has to investigate illegal
agency work, AEntG, and illicit labour.
It follows from § 17 AEntG that it is not only the FKS that is
responsible for monitoring and enforcing the act.179 Authorities that play
a supplementary role are, inter alia, the tax authorities (Finanzbehörden), the
Federal Employment Office, the premium collecting organisations (Bei-
tragseinzugsstellen), and the statutory pension and accident insurers (Träger
der Renten- und Unfallversicherung) (§ 2(2) SchwarzArbG).
The customs authorities enjoy the same competence as the police
enforcement authorities (§ 14(1) SchwarzArbG).180 As such, the staff may
be considered investigators for the public prosecutor, meaning that they
175 The numbers can be found at <http://statline.cbs.nl/> accessed 28 October 2014.
176 § 2(1) AEntG as was applicable in 1996, BGBl. I, 227, 26.02.1996.
177 Koberski (2011) § 16 AEntG, para 3.
178 § 2 SchwarzArbG. Schwarzarbeitsbekämpfungsgesetz vom 23.07.2004, BGBl. I,
1842, last amended by Art 7 Gesetz vom 21.07.2012, BGBl. I, 1566.
179 Joussen (2009) 364.
180 According to the Code of Criminal Procedure (Strafprozessordnung), the customs
authorities may use the following provisions: confiscation (§ 98); search (§ 105);
inspection (§ 111); confiscation (§ 111c); and observation (§ 163ff.).
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have to follow the orders of the public prosecutor of their district.181
Moreover, the customs authorities are administrative authorities within
the meaning of the Ordnungswidrigkeitengesetz (‘OWiG’) (Administrative
Offences Act)182 (§ 36 OWiG in conjunction with § 2(1) SchwarzArbG).
From a practical point of view this has the advantage that administrative
offences such as not paying the minimum wage, which often go along
with criminal offences, like not paying social security contributions, can be
enforced by a single authority.183
In 2011, the FKS employed 6,318 civil servants.184 This number
increased from 6,002 (2009) to 6,283 (2010). For 2013, 6,769 positions were
foreseen, but in June 2012 it was clear that 495 posts would not be filled.185
It appears that an insufficient number of qualified applicants had ap-
plied.186 In 2012, the cost of inspections and investigations conducted by
the FKS was 44.3 million EUR,187 whereas the cost of personnel and
material was around 347 million EUR.188 In 2011, 24,483 construction
undertakings were inspected. The number of inspections in that sector
increased from 14,094 (2009) to 20,030 (2010). In total, the FKS controlled
51,600 employers in 2009 and 62,756 in 2010, mostly in the sectors covered
by the AEntG, particular the construction sector.189 As to the sanctions
imposed in the construction sector for not paying the sectoral minimum
wage within the meaning of the AEntG, in 2011 the FKS imposed
administrative sanctions of almost 11 million EUR.190 In September
2012, approximately 527,000 employees were employed in the construc-
tion sector, and there were 391,273 registered construction companies in
181 § 152 Gerichtsverfassungsgesetz (Code on Court Constitution).
182 Gesetz über Ordnungswidrigkeiten in der Fassung der Bekanntmachung vom 19.
Februar 1987 (BGBl. I S. 602), das durch Artikel 18 des Gesetzes vom 10. Oktober
2013 (BGBl. I S. 3786) geändert worden ist.
183 Koberski (2011) § 16 AEntG, paras 7 and 34.
184 BT-Drs. 17/6219, 3. Of the 6,318 civil servants, 5,591 were employed full time, with
727 part-time.
185 BT-Drs. 17/12834, 9.
186 BT-Drs. 17/6219, 3.
187 BT-Drs. 17/12834, 9.
188 BT-Drs. 17/6219, 4.
189 BT-Drs. 17/6219, 6.
190 The fines amounted to 25,107,760.65 EUR in 2009 and 13,929,789.84 EUR in 2010.
This discrepancy is explained by the fact that, based on actual and legal develop-
ments as to the procedures, the establishment, legal force and payment in different
years, reduction of the fine or payment by instalments, enforcement was only
partially succesful or not at all, in some cases. See BT-Drs. 17/6219, 12.
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2011.191 Approximately 3.65 million business undertakings are registered
in Germany.192
D. Sweden: the Work Environment Authority
In the context of monitoring and enforcing the terms and conditions of
employment, the WEA only plays a role in relation to health and safety at
work.193 In Sweden, the primary responsibility for regulating and thus
enforcing labour law lies with the social partners. As of 1 July 2013, the
WEA has been allocated a new task: it is now entrusted with administer-
ing, monitoring and enforcing the notification obligation under the Post-
ing of Workers Act (1999:678).194 In the context of this study, dealing with
the notification obligation is the only relevant task of the WEA. According
to its website, the WEA has 440 inspectors available for its work, which
is predominantly the enforcement of organisational health and safety.195
A second authority that should be mentioned is the Equality Ombudsman
(Diskrimineringsombudsmannen), dealing, as the name indicates, with cases
of (alleged) discrimination.196 In Sweden, almost 1.14 million business
undertakings were registered in 2012.197
E. EU requirements
So far, as was stated earlier, EU law does not prescribe howMember States
should organise their institutions entrusted with monitoring and enforcing
the rights individuals derive from EU law.198 Regardless of the institutions
involved and how they are organised, when they are entrusted to monitor
and enforce EU rights, they must comply with the principles of equiva-
lence and effectiveness.
191 For the number of construction companies see <https://www.destatis.de/DE/
ZahlenFakten/GesamtwirtschaftUmwelt/UnternehmenHandwerk/Unterneh-
mensregister/Tabellen/UnternehmenBeschaeftigteUmsatzWZ08.html> accessed
28 October 2014.
192 See <https://www.destatis.de/DE/ZahlenFakten/GesamtwirtschaftUmwelt/
UnternehmenHandwerk/Unternehmensregister/Tabellen/UnternehmenBeschaef-
tigteUmsatzWZ08.html> accessed 28 October 2014.
193 Engblom (2009) 26.
194 See <http://av.se/inenglish/Report_posting> accessed 28 October 2014.
195 See <http://www.av.se/inenglish/inspections> accessed 28 October 2014.
196 Monitoring and enforcing compliance with equal treatment laws falls outside the
scope of this study. More information can be found on the Equality Ombudsman’s
website <www.do.se/en> accessed 28 October 2014.
197 See <www.scb.se/foretagsregistret-en> accessed 28 October 2014.
198 See section 2.2.2 above.
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According to the European Commission, Member States are respon-
sible for monitoring and enforcing the rights posted workers derive from
the PWD. The Commission further states that these workers as well as
their representatives, and competing undertakings, should be able to
lodge complaints against non-compliant employers. This, the Commission
rightly points out, means that the inspecting authorities must have the
power and the necessary resources to respond to such complaints.199 If the
authorities work inefficiently, or are understaffed, no effective enforce-
ment is possible. In relation to this, the authorities need sufficient staff
with the skills and qualifications needed to carry out their duties (recital
29).
Under the Posted Workers Enforcement Directive, Member States
are required to ensure “that appropriate checks and monitoring mechan-
isms provided for by national legislation and practice are put in place and
that the authorities designated by national legislation carry out effective
and adequate inspections on their territory in order to control and monitor
compliance with the provisions laid down in Directive 96/71/EC and thus
guarantee its proper application and enforcement […]” (Art 10(1) first
sentence). Furthermore, inspections may not be discriminatory and/or
disproportionate. With the Posted Workers Enforcement Directive, EU law
determines that inspections relating to the enforcement of the rights of
posted workers are based primarily on a risk assessment by the competent
authorities (Art 10(1) sentence 2).
It has been emphasised in the Posted Workers Enforcement Direc-
tive that the home state authorities shall continue monitoring and enfor-
cing in relation to posted workers, within the boundaries set by their
legislation (Art 7). Assistance must be provided by the home state to the
enforcement authorities of the host state. Consequently, “[w]here there are
facts indicating possible irregularities, the Member State of establishment
of the service provider shall, on its own initiative, communicate to the
Member State to which the posting takes place any relevant information”.
This is a new provision which emphasises the role of the home state.
However, the home state authority shall not be obliged to carry out actual
investigations in the host state.
199 Commission, ‘Guidance on the posting of workers in the framework of the
provision of services’ (Communication) COM(2006) 159 final, 10.
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7.4.3 The competences of the authorities
A. General considerations
The national authorities involved in monitoring and enforcing minimum
wages, holiday pay and holiday allowance, have competences that relate
to ensuring compliance with the applicable employment conditions, as
well as ensuring compliance with the law on obligations of an adminis-
trative nature, such as notification obligations or registration and licensing
obligations for temporary-work agencies.
Investigations by the Dutch and the German authorities commence
based on either a well-founded complaint issued by an employee200 or the
social partners (reactive enforcement). Moreover, the authorities can
investigate within the framework of their annual programmes, in which
particular spearheads actions are formulated, where, for instance, a
particular sector will be monitored in a certain year. Such spearheads
are based on a risk analysis. Inspections in the Netherlands and Germany
may also be organised together with one or more of the other enforcement
authorities. In Germany, this inspection cooperation has a legal basis,
namely § 14(2) SchwarzArbG. In the Netherlands, the necessity for
cooperation is determined in practice at operational level.201 Investiga-
tions in Germany often take place unannounced and may even take
place without initial suspicion, but this is rare.202 A possible explanation
for this could be that the FKS receives references from private persons
or cooperating authorities.203 Investigations may also start because of
irregularities in notifying the posting of workers.204
Generally, investigations take place at the employer’s or, in case of
temporary agency work, at the user undertaking’s premises. As regards
minimum wages, holiday pay and holiday allowances, the Dutch and
German authorities’ competences are confined to check only whether the
minimum conditions are complied with. No other competence are fore-
seen. In the Netherlands the period during which the ISZW may monitor
and enforce the WML ends after five years, which runs parallel to the
200 The 2012 Annual Report of the Dutch ISZW mentions that the Inspectorate
received 343 complaints, 300 of which were lodged in Polish. See Ministerie Sociale
Zaken en Werkgelegenheid, Jaarverslag 2012 Inspectie Sociale Zaken en Werkge-
legenheid (2013) 18.
201 The Netherlands: Szw (2013) 13; Germany: Koberski (2011) § 17 AEntG, para 11-4.
202 Thüsing (Ed.) (2010) (Reufels) § 17 AEntG, para 8; Koberski (2011) § 17 AEntG,
para 9.
203 BT-Drs. 17/6219, 5.
204 Koberski (2011) § 17 AEntG, para 9.
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employer’s obligation to retain his administrative records,205 as well as the
period during which judicial proceedings may be instituted (section 5.3.1
above). The period in Germany is shorter, namely two years in case of
an administrative fine of more than 2,500 EUR or three years in the event
of an administrative fine of more than 15,000 EUR.206
B. Verifying the identity of employees
An identification obligation has been established for employees for several
sectors in Germany. If the persons involved come from another country,
they have to show the members of the FKS their passports or other
identification documents. Sectors covered are: construction, hotel and
catering, passenger transport, freight forwarding, transport and related
logistic industry, fairground amusement, undertakings in the wood
and forestry industry, commercial cleaning industry, undertakings that
participate in building and breaking down of funfairs, and the meat
sector (§ 2a(1) SchwarzArbG).207 This obligation has been introduced to
accelerate investigations.208 No such obligation has been included in the
Dutch and Swedish legislation. However, in the previous chapter we saw
that in Sweden, and probably also in the Netherlands, a sectoral identity
badge must be worn to facilitate checks (section 6.4.2 above).
C. Entering business premises
In order to gain access to documents needed to carry out controls on
compliance with labour law, inspection authorities are permitted to enter
business premises. Both the ISZW209 and the FKS are permitted to enter
business premises. During working hours, members of the German FKS
may enter the business premises and the estate of the employer, the user
undertaking, or the self-employed individual’s contractor (§ 3(1) Schwarz-
ArbG, also § 7(3) AÜG). The employer’s residence may not be entered,
without the owner’s consent (Art 13 GG). This is also the case even if the
residence is partly used for business.210 In the context of the enforcement
of the Waadi, the Dutch ISZW may even enter residences (Art 14).
205 Kamerstukken II 2005/06, 30 678, nr. 3, 3.
206 § 31(2) Nos. 1 und 2 OWiG. Koberski (2011) § 23 AEntG, para 27.
207 This obligation was introduced by the Zweites SGB IV-Änderungsgesetz,
21.12.2008, BGBl. I, 2933.
208 Koberski (2011) § 17 AEntG, para 28.
209 Art 5:15 General Administrative Law Act.
210 Koberski (2011) § 17 AEntG, para 19.
Administrative enforcement method
275
D. Access to documents and confiscation of the employer’s
administrative records
In Germany and the Netherlands, there is an obligation to keep and make
available certain documents that could assist the authorities to assess
a violation. Moreover, in the Netherlands, the ISZW can, under certain
circumstance, confiscate an employer’s entire administration. In order to
establish whether, and if so, how far, labour law regulations on minimum
wages, holiday pay and holiday allowances are not complied with, the
authorities need to have access to certain documents, such as employment
contracts, payslips, and the employer’s accounting records. From a
practical point of view, too, access to documents, probably within a short
time, is necessary to prevent that retrospective changes will be made to
them. Both the Netherlands and the German authorities are authorised
to inspect documents from which they can derive the wage, holiday pay
or holiday allowance paid by the employer, and the number of hours
worked.211 This option was also introduced in the Netherlands to facilitate
enforcement.212
In Germany, if information related to the employment conditions
laid down in § 8 AEntG is saved on a data processing machine,
the employer must ensure that the investigating authority will receive
the information requested. Costs incurred in that respect must be paid
by the authority (§ 5(3) SchwarzArbG). The FKS may request access to
employment contracts and documents within the meaning of § 2 Act
on Notification of Conditions Governing an Employment Relationship
(Nachweisgesetz), provided they are suspected to contain information on
whether employment conditions are complied with (§ 17 AEntG and § 17a
AÜG). During investigations, employers, employees, contractors and third
parties are required to tolerate and cooperate with the FKS. Primarily, they
are required to provide the FKS with the information they request (§ 5(1)
SchwarzArbG).
In Germany, the AEntG (§ 19(1)) and the AÜG (§ 17c in conjunction
with § 19(1) No. 2 AEntG) explicitly require employers and user under-
takings to establish and retain documents concerning the employees’
beginning, end, and duration of the daily working time. All documents
necessary for controlling whether the employment conditions are com-
plied with must at least be retained for the duration of the provision of the
211 See for Germany: § 4(1) and (2) SchwarzArbG. Investigation may only take place
during the undertaking’s office hours. Koberski (2011) § 17 AEntG, para 24.
212 Kamerstukken II 2007/08, 30 678, nr. 8.
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service and at most two years. If, under the legislation of the home state,
the employer is already obliged to compile such documents, they may also
be used if they are sufficient to establish the minimum wage (etc.).213 The
FKS officials may also interview the employees concerned, to verify the
actual implementation of the employment contract.214
In 2007/08 the Netherlands introduced the possibility for the Dutch
ISZW to access documents, but this caused difficulties. Prior to the
amendment in 2011/12, Art 18b(2) WML determined that failure in whole
or in part to provide the enforcement authority with written documents
from which the employment relationship, the wage or the holiday
allowance paid, or the hours worked could be derived for individuals
encountered in the enterprise, business, or institution, shall be considered
an administrative offence. The provision was framed so that documents
could only be requested for persons actually (ie physically) found working
at the employer’s enterprise, business, or institution. As a result, the
enforcement authority could not fully enforce the WML and could not
establish whether an employer had complied with the act.215 The
amended provision now determines that an employer can also be some-
one for whose enterprise, business, or institution work is or has been
provided, or for whom, based on the facts and the circumstances of the
case, it may reasonably be assumed that work is or has been provided. The
person found will thus be considered an employee (Art 18b(3) WML).
As of February 2011, the Netherlands ISZW was also given the
competence to confiscate an employer’s administration (Art 18a(4)
WML).216 This possibility had been introduced earlier in the WAV, in
2004 (Art 17a).217 Confiscation of the employer’s administrative records,
concerns both digital documents and documents on paper, such as
employment contracts, the account books, bank statements, the wages
administration, and the working time registration. All information neces-
sary to establish whether the law has been violated available on personal
213 Müller-Glöge, Preis & Schmidt (Eds.) (2014) (Schlachter) § 17 AEntG, para 3; and
Thüsing (Ed.) (2010) (Reufels) § 17 AEntG, para 8.
214 Koberski (2011) § 17 AEntG, para 10.
215 Kamerstukken II 2011/12, 32 896, nr. 3, 2.
216 Wet van 27 januari 2011 tot wijziging van de Wet minimumloon en minimumva-
kantiebijslag in verband met het opnemen van de bevoegdheid tot inbeslagneming
van daarvoor vatbare voorwerpen alsmede enige technische wijzigingen, Stb. 2011,
27.
217 Wet van 2 december 2004 tot wijziging van de Wet arbeid vreemdelingen in
verband met invoering van bestuursrechtelijke handhaving, Stb. 2004, 705. See also
Kamerstukken II 2003/04, 29 523, nr. 3.
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computers may also be confiscated.218 One of the reasons for introducing
the possibility to confiscate the employer’s administration is that in
practice, it may occur that employers are unwilling to cooperate. They
may decline to give the inspectorate certain administrative facts, based on
which the necessary checks may be carried out.219 The new competence is
seen as an ultimate remedy, to be used only if there are no other means to
force the employer to hand over the accounts.220 Moreover, it may only be
used if it is reasonable for the fulfilment of the ISZW’s task.221 The idea is
that the possibility that the administration can be confiscated may have a
deterrent effect on employers, based on experiences with this instrument
under the WAV.222 Underpaid employees are those who are entrapped in
case the level of underpayment cannot be established and as a conse-
quence the employer cannot be ordered to pay later.223
In this context, it should be noted that when assessing an employ-
ee’s minimum wage, his normal working time serves as a benchmark. This
must be assessed on a case-by-case basis, taking the working time in a
particular (user) undertaking or sector as a reference.224 As this is
cumbersome, the ISZW’s internal guidelines determine that the inspecto-
rate will only investigate whether the wage is consistent with a 40 hour
working week, regardless of the (collectively) agreed working time.225
This will be less time-consuming for the ISZW. According to the Ministry,
218 Kamerstukken II 2010/11, 32 486, nr. 5, 2.
219 Kamerstukken II 2009/10, 32 486, nr. 3, 1.
220 Kamerstukken II 2009/10, 32 486, nr. 3, 3-4.
221 Kamerstukken II 2009/10, 32 486, nr. 3, 2.
222 Kamerstukken II 2009/10, 32 486, nr. 3, 2.
223 Kamerstukken II 2009/10, 32 486, nr. 3, 1.
224 See Ktr. ‘s-Gravenhage 23 June 1998, JAR 1998/176, where the judge ruled that in
order to establish the normal working time, not only the individual employment
contract, but also the working time in similar employment relationships has to be
taken into account. In this case the employer attempted to convince the court that
the normal working time consisted of 45 hours a week. The court, however,
rejected this point of view, ruling that the normal working week in other, similar
employment relationships consisted of 40 hours a week; this should also be the
reference point in the underlying case.
225 Persbericht Ministerie van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid, ‘Handhaving Wet
minimumloon en minimumvakantiebijslag effectiever en efficiënter’, 25 augustus
2011 (gecorrigeerde versie 29 augustus 2011) <http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/doc-
umenten-en-publicaties/persberichten/2011/08/25/handhaving-wet-minimum-
loon-en-minimumvakantiebijslag-effectiever-en-efficienter.html> and Brief
Minister van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid, ‘Handhaving Wet minimumloon
en minimumvakantietoeslag’, 6 oktober 2011 <http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/doc-
umenten-en-publicaties/kamerstukken/2011/10/07/kamerbrief-handhaving-
wet-minimumloon-en-minimumvakantietoeslag.html> both accessed 28 October
2014.
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this leads to substantial benefits as to the efficiency and effectiveness of
enforcement. As a result, the Labour Inspectorate can inspect between 700
and 800 more undertakings. Moreover, de facto, it will be able to enforce
the more severe forms of underpayment and unfair competition as regards
employment conditions.226 It is open to doubt whether this will actually
increase the inspection capacity, as the ISZW still has to look into
collective agreements, payslips, and individual employment contracts to
discover the wage to be paid to employees, to assess whether the wage
and/or holiday allowance paid is in accordance with the statutory
minimum wage.
As a result, minor underpayments will no longer be enforced,
meaning that it is left to the individual worker to initiate a civil claim
before the civil court in order to claim back pay.227 Not enforcing such
minor underpayments may be in conflict with EU law, more specifically
with the principles of equivalence and effectiveness. Criticism of the
proposed change in enforcement practice came from the FNV, which
proposed that both the Inspectorate and the social partners should find a
joint solution to cope with this issue and to create a clearer notion of
normal working time.228
7.5 Sanctions
7.5.1 Introduction
Violations of statutory labour rights and administrative requirements by
employers are sanctioned by administrative fines, which are due to be
paid to the state. Moreover, depending on the type of violation, other,
alternative sanctions may be applied. Detailed provisions exist at Member
The website of the Labour Inspectorate also states that the inspectors check only
whether the payments correspond to a 40 hour working week. See <www.
inspectieszw.nl/onderwerpen/arbeidsverhoudingen/ontduiken_minimumloon>
accessed 28 October 2014.
226 Kamerstukken II 2011/12, 32 896, nr. 7, 5, nr. 8, 3.
227 Underpayment refers to situations in which: the 8 per cent holiday allowance has
not been paid; in case the net wage has been agreed instead of the gross wage; the
working time is incorrect; or there are mistakes as to the rounding up of wages and
other errors.
Ministerie Van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid, Handhaving Wet minimum-
loon en minimumvakantiebijslag effectiever en efficiënter (gecorrigeerde versie
29 augustus 2011); Brief Minister van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid, Hand-
having Wet minimumloon en minimumvakantietoeslag, 6 oktober 2011.
228 FNV (2011) 22-3.
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State level in relation to the imposition of administrative fines or sanctions.
Sanctions imposed for violations of EU law must, following from the Von
Colson and Kamann case, be effective, proportionate, and have a deterrent
effect.229 What follows sets out the administrative fines (section 7.5.2) and
other sanctions at Member State level (section 7.5.3 below).
7.5.2 Administrative fines
A. Procedural issues
In the Netherlands, according to the ISZW’s policy, prior to the imposition
of a fine, the employee will be informed about the situation that the
Inspectorate has detected, that the employee is being/has been under-
paid.230 This allows the employee to initiate judicial proceedings to claim
back-payment.231 It is also possible that the Dutch ISZW will pass the
name of the undertaking that has failed to comply with the WML to the
social partners (Art 18p(5) WML).232 This enables the social partners
to check whether that the employer falls under a collective agreement
and, if so, whether he is in compliance with the agreement. Moreover, the
ISZW will inform certifying institutions of the agency sector of certified
temporary-work agencies that have violated the registration obligation,
have not paid the statutory minimum wage and/or holiday allowance, or
have employed third country nationals without a work permit (Art 14b
Waadi). This enables the branch to improve its self-regulatory enforce-
ment mechanism.233
Before a fine is imposed, the Dutch ISZW may give an official
warning depending on the gravity of the offence. No administrative
sanction will be imposed in case of: an obvious mistake (kennelijke
vergissing); a mistake in a written record; or in case the extent of non-
compliance with the obligation to pay the statutory minimum wage is less
than 5 per cent per administrative offence (ie if a minor underpayment is
229 Case 14/83 Von Colson and Kamann ECLI:EU:C:1984:153, para 23. See also Case 68/
88 Commission v Greece (Greek Maize) ECLI:EU:C:1989:339.
230 Stichting van de Arbeid, Tweede evaluatie van het Samenwerkingskader (2011) 3.
231 See also Van Hoek (2002) 38, referring to Kamerstukken II 1986/87, 19 286, nr. 13.
Initially, this obligation was not foreseen for inclusion in the law. The major reason
behind this inclusion is to allow the worker to institute civil proceedings before the
Canton Court, as he is the only one who is legally empowered to do so.
232 Recently amended in that it now specifies to whom the information may be passed.
Kamerstukken II 2012/13, 33 579, nr. 8, 3.
233 Kamerstukken II 2010/11, 29 407, nr. 118, 10-1.
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concerned).234 A penalty order, ie the imposition of an administrative fine,
must be based on a so-called penalty report (boeterapport) and should
contain at least the name of the person/undertaking who committed the
offence, the sort of offence, with reference to the legal provision that has
been breached, and the persons concerned with the offence. This list is not
exhaustive.235 An administrative fine is qualified as a criminal charge
within the meaning of Art 6 ECHR.236 The Minister of Employment and
Social Affairs is assessing whether it is possible to introduce an adminis-
trative chain liability.237 This would enable the ISZW also to impose fines
on those who are not the employers.
In Germany, the administrative offence procedure starts with a
suspicion. It is for the enforcing authority to prove that the employer
has committed the administrative offence in question.238 The adminis-
trative offence procedure ends with the closure of proceedings,239 a
warning,240 or the imposition of a fine.241 Fines are paid to the enforcing
authority (§ 16(5) AÜG and § 23(5) AEntG).
B. Fines
Varying fine levels exist in the different countries. The levels depend on
the type of violation. Below, the different level of fines that apply for
violating the core employment conditions dealt with here, the formal
obligations to notify posted workers, and the licensing and registration
obligations of temporary-work agencies are provided.
234 Art 2 Regeling van de Minister van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid van 4
december 2012, AV/AR/2012/173362012-0000048827, tot vaststelling van de
beleidsregel in het kader van de bestuursrechtelijke handhaving van de Wet
minimumloon en minimumvakantiebijslag (Beleidsregel Wet minimumloon en
minimumvakantiebijslag 2013). Kamerstukken II 2005/06, 30 678, nr. 3, 3.
235 Kamerstukken II 2005/06, 30 678, nr. 3, 9.
236 This means that the person to whom the penalty order is addressed has the right
not to incriminate himself.
237 Brief Ministerie van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid, Voortgangsrapportage
aanpak schijnconstructies, 26 november 2013.
238 Thüsing (Ed.) (2012) (Kudlich) § 16 AÜG, para 71.
239 § 47(1) sentence 2 and (2) sentence 3 OWiG.
240 § 56 OWiG.
241 § 65ff. OWiG. Thüsing (Ed.) (2012), para 73.
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Level of fines Substantive
rights
Notification
obligations
Licence/registration
obligations
Documents
on substan-
tive rights
Germany 500,000 EUR 30,000 EUR 30,000 EUR 30,000 EUR
The
Netherlands
81,000 EUR n/a 76,000 EUR 12,000 EUR
Sweden n/a 2.275 EUR n/a
Minimum wages, holiday pay and holiday allowances
The level of fines for not paying the correct minimum wage as prescribed
in the Netherlands and Germany diverges greatly. While the maximum
administrative fine that may be imposed in the Netherlands on an
employer that does not comply with the WML on minimum wages and
minimum holiday allowances is 81,000 EUR242 , the maximum fine in
Germany is 500,000 EUR. In the Netherlands, Policy Guidelines contain
more detailed rules on the fines to be paid.243 The Guidelines specify the
administrative fines according to the duration of underpayment (from less
than one month to more than six months) and the percentage of under-
payment (from less than five per cent to more than 50 per cent). From 2007
until the present, the level of the administrative fine has increased
dramatically from 6,700 EUR to 81,000 EUR, or almost twelve times as
much.244 The Dutch Government wanted to substantially increase the
administrative fine and double fines in case of repeated offences, or
impose a preventive periodic penalty payment and announced the in-
crease in April 2011.245 In case of a repeat offence within two years after
the first administrative fine has been imposed, when the employer still
fails to comply with the WML, the administrative fine that imposed will be
increased by 50 per cent. A similar structure (based on the duration and
percentage of underpayment) is applied in relation to non-payment or
incorrect payment of the minimum holiday allowance of 8 per cent. The
fine is at most 12,000 EUR (was 6,700 EUR). The fines were increased as
242 The level of the fine is determined by Art 23(4) Wetboek van Strafrecht (Penal Code).
243 Beleidsregel Wet minimumloon en minimumvakantiebijslag 2013.
244 The fine was increased by Wet van 4 oktober 2012 tot wijziging van de wetgeving
op het beleidsterrein van het ministerie van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid in
het kader van de harmonisatie en aanscherping van de sanctiemogelijkheden ter
versterking van de naleving en handhaving en bestrijding van misbruik en fraude
(Wet aanscherping handhaving en sanctiebeleid SZW-wetgeving), Stb. 2012, 462.
245 Kamerstukken II 2010/11, 29 407, nr. 118, 8.
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part of a broader initiative to increase the fines under labour law and
social security legislation. One of the main aims of these increases is the
strict enforcement of labour legislation. Labour law protects the employee
from bad working conditions, underpayment, and illegality and labour
displacement.246
In Germany, it is seen as a very grave violation of the law if
employers do not pay their workers at least the statutory minimum
wage (§ 16(1) No. 7b AÜG) or contribute to the holiday pay fund (under
both § 23(1) No. 1 AEntG). As regards the posting of (temporary agency)
workers within the meaning of the AEntG, this also counts for engaging
(sub-) contractors that do not comply with the two minimum employment
conditions (§ 23(2) AEntG). The highest fine that may be imposed is
500,000 EUR per violation. As for temporary agency work, it has been said
that the administrative offence of failure to pay the statutory minimum
wage will probably be the only effective and noticeable sanction, since
enforcement of entitlements by temporary agency workers is not likely to
occur in practice.247
Criminal sanctions in both countries are only possible in case, eg,
the social security contributions have not been paid or if employees are
illegally employed or assigned by an agency, but not for failure to pay the
statutory minimum wage.
Notification of the posting of workers
In Germany, a fine can be imposed of up to 30,000 EUR for failure to notify
at all or not in good time (§ 23(1) No. 5 AEntG)248 , while in Sweden the
fine is 2275 EUR. Failure to notify a posting in Sweden can be sanctioned
with a penalty, and this is the only sanction that exists under the
administrative enforcement method in Sweden. A fine may be imposed
within five years of the violation having occurred (Section 14 Posting of
Workers Act (1999:678)). The fine for not notifying the posting is 20,000
SEK (approximately 2275 EUR).249 The service provider may correct this
situation, provided: he failed to notify the posting; he does not satisfy the
246 Beleidsregel Wet minimumloon en minimumvakantiebijslag 2013.
247 Thüsing (Ed.) (2012) (Mengel) § 10 AÜG, para 77.
248 Koberski (2011) § 23 AEntG, para 11.
249 More concrete rules on the notification obligation and the penalty can be found in
the Regulation on the notification of the posting of workers (2013:352).
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conditions laid down in Section 11(3); or the notification is false or
incomplete (Section 19 Posting of Workers Act (1999:678)).250
Licensing and registration obligations for temporary-work agencies
The allocation of agency workers by a non-registered temporary-work
agency in the Netherlands will be fined by at most 76,000 EUR. Policy
guidelines contain the concrete fines. Repeat offences are punished by a 10
per cent increase of the fine, if the same violation occurs within five years.
In case of multiple repeated offences, the fine is increased by 200 per cent.
A problem that has been mentioned in the context of repeat offences is that
a user undertaking could possibly start a new undertaking under a new
name in order to circumvent any fine.251 User undertakings, in case they
transact businesses with a non-registered agency, will also be subject to
an administrative fine.252
In Germany, several violations are fined with a maximum of 30,000
EUR, including not having a license as a temporary-work agency and
hiring agency workers from an agency that has no such license.253 The
administrative fine in Germany is at most 1,000 EUR in cases where:
the agency does not provide, or incorrectly or does not fully provide, the
Federal Employment Office with the necessary information for monitoring
enforcing the law254 ; the agency does not cooperate with the Federal
Employment Office in the sense that it prevents access to the business
rooms or premises255 ; the domestic agency does not provide the necessary
statistical information256 ; and/or the agency does not provide its workers
with the basic employment conditions applicable to the temporary agency
work employment contract (foreign agencies are obliged to do so under
their home state’s law) or a leaflet containing the basic information laid
down in the AÜG, in the language spoken by the temporary agency
worker(s).257
250 The penalty can be qualified as having a criminal character within the meaning of
Art 6 ECHR. Prop. 2012/13:71, Anmälningsskyldighet vid utstationering, 14
February 2013, 45.
251 Handelingen II 2011/12, 58, item 6, 28.
252 Kamerstukken II 2010/11, 32 872, nr. 3, 2.
253 § 16(1) No. 1a AÜG.
254 § 16(1) No. 5 in conjunction with § 7(2) sentence 1 AÜG.
255 § 16(1) No. 6a AÜG in conjunction with § 7(3) sentence 2 AÜG.
256 § 16(1) No. 7 in conjunction with § 8(1) AÜG.
257 § 16(1) No. 8 in conjunction with § 11(1) and (2) AÜG.
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Documents proving the wage, holiday pay and holiday allowance paid
Not making these documents available can be fined in Germany and
the Netherlands. In the Netherlands, failure to provide the ISZW with the
documents from which the wage and the holiday allowance paid, or
the hours worked by the employees may be deduced, results in a fine
on the employer of at most 12,000 EUR (Art 18b(2) WML). The fine is
reduced if the employment relationship has lasted less than six months.258
In Germany, the fine is 30,000 EUR at most.259
C. Cross-border enforcement of administrative sanctions
It is unclear whether or not administrative fines could be enforced via
Council Framework Decision 2005/214/JHA260 on the application of the
principle of mutual recognition to financial penalties.261 One of the main
questions is whether an administrative fine could be included under the
term ‘financial penalty’ within the meaning of the scope of the Framework
Decision. For the Netherlands it can be said that, so far, it has only been
possible to enforce a limited number of administrative fines imposed
on service providers.262 It follows from Art 5 that this Framework
Decision allows the recognition of financial penalties in case of offences
that, according to the laws of the countries studied here, fall within the
sphere of criminal law. This does not apply to the enforcement of
administrative fines imposed for failure, eg, to pay the minimum wage
or to make the notification. According to the Posted Workers Enforcement
Directive, the existing disparities between the Member States’ systems for
enforcing administrative fines in cross-border situations are said to be
prejudicial to the proper functioning of the internal market and risk,
making it difficult, if not impossible, to ensure that posted workers
enjoy an equivalent level of protection throughout the Union (recital 39).
The Posted Workers Enforcement Directive determines that:
“Without prejudice to the means which are or may be provided for in other
Union legislation, the principles of mutual assistance and mutual recognition as
well as the measures and procedures provided for in this Chapter shall apply to
258 Beleidsregel Wet minimumloon en minimumvakantiebijslag 2013.
259 § 16(1) No. 17 and 18 in conjunction with § 17c(1) and (2) AÜG and § 23(1) Nos. 8
and 9 AEntG.
260 [2005] OJ L76/16.
261 Van Hoek & Houwerzijl (2011b) 168-9.
262 Brief Ministerie Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid, Betekenis bereikte akkoord
over de handhavingsrichtlijn, 30 January 2014.
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the cross-border enforcement of financial administrative penalties and/or fines
imposed on a service provider established in a Member State, for failure to
comply with the applicable rules on posting of workers in another Member State”
(Art 13).
It further explains that financial administrative penalties are those penal-
ties imposed for non-compliance with the PWD as well as the Posted
Workers Enforcement Directive. Furthermore, the provision does not
apply in case a penalty falls under the Council Framework Decision
2005/214/JHA, Brussels I Regulation or Council Decision 2006/325/EC.
A provision that has been included in the Posted Workers Enforce-
ment Directive is that the host state authority which seeks to recover a
fine, or notifies a decision imposing such a fine, cannot make such a
request as long as the decision to impose a fine is being contested or
challenged in the host state (Art 15). Moreover, the request for recovery is
suspended pending the decision of the appropriate national authority in
the requesting Member State (Art 18). The imposition of an administrative
fine should have a deterrent effect on non-complying employers. This
effect will be nugatory if the service provider does not need to be afraid
that the fine will be imposed and will have to be paid.263 The Dutch
Ministry SZW judges the new provisions positively and is of the opinion
that it will enhance the enforcement of administrative fines. Moreover, it
assumes that this will have a positive effect on malafide undertakings, as
they could no longer easily escape the non-payment of the fine.264
7.5.3 Other sanctions
A. Penalty payments
Besides imposing an administrative fine, the Dutch ISZW can also impose
an order for periodic penalty payment (last onder dwangsom).265 This order
by the ISZW gives the employer the opportunity to finally comply with
the WML and to pay the minimum wage and the minimum holiday
allowance to his employees. The result will be that violation will be
rectified and recurrence will be prevented – at least, this is what the
measure is formally intended to do. This instrument has one important
advantage for employees: they do not have to initiate judicial proceed-
263 Houwerzijl (2013c) 5.
264 Brief Ministerie Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid, Betekenis bereikte akkoord
over de handhavingsrichtlijn, 30 January 2014.
265 Other translations may be possible.
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ings.266 The inspectorate will set a deadline within which the employer
has the opportunity to pay the wage in arrears to the employees. Only if
the employer does not comply with the order will the inspectorate impose
an order for periodic penalty payment(s) (a certain amount per offence).
Only if the term set by the ISZW expires will the penalty payment(s) fall
due. If an employer does not comply with the periodic penalty order,
while the employee still fails to receive the wage to which he is entitled,
the periodic penalty payment will be forfeit, meaning that the employee
has to initiate judicial proceedings.
B. Suspending the employer’s activities and exclusion from public
procurement
In the Netherlands, as of 1 January 2013, an official warning may be issued
stating that if the employer continues not to pay the minimum wage and
minimum holiday allowance, the employer’s activities will have to cease
(Art 18i(1) WML).267 The employer’s activities may be suspended for at
most three months. In Germany, undertakings can be excluded from
public procurement if they have been fined within the meaning of § 21
AEntG. The fine imposed must be at least 2,500 EUR. This means that
employers who do not comply with the wage and holiday provisions that
apply under the AEntG and who have been fined can be excluded from
public procurement.
7.6 Comparative notes and conclusions
Chapter 7 examined the administrative enforcement method, where a
principal role for the monitoring and enforcement has been allocated to
the public authorities. Four subjects have been dealt with: information and
(cross-border) administrative cooperation between public authorities;
measures to monitor compliance; inspection and enforcement; and
sanctioning.
266 Kamerstukken II 2005/06, 30 678, nr. 3, 5.
267 This option was introduced in the Wet van 4 oktober 2012 tot wijziging van de
wetgeving op het beleidsterrein van het ministerie van Sociale Zaken en Werkge-
legenheid in het kader van de harmonisatie en aanscherping van de sanctiemoge-
lijkheden ter versterking van de naleving en handhaving en bestrijding van
misbruik en fraude (Wet aanscherping handhaving en sanctiebeleid SZW-wetgev-
ing), Stb. 2012, 462.
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It has been shown that the EU legally influenced the Member States’
measures for monitoring and enforcing the rights individuals derive from
EU law. Influences from the EU are most visible in the administrative
enforcement method, compared to the judicial and industrial relations
enforcement methods. This is only natural, as Member States are the
primary addressees when case law shows that their legislation violates EU
law and when directives have to be implemented. The EU has influenced
the Member State monitoring and enforcement instruments insofar as they
concern information provision and transnational cooperation between
enforcement authorities and/or liaison offices. Moreover, EU law has
influenced the registration of Union citizens and the notification obligation
in the context of the posting of workers. Largely left to the Member States
are the inspection and enforcement conducted by the enforcement autho-
rities, as well as the sanctions that can be imposed, as long as they take the
principles of equivalence and effectiveness and the freedom to provide
services into account.
The influence was especially apparent in the context of the posting
of workers. Here, the PWD and now also the Posted Workers Enforcement
Directive, in conjunction with the ECJ’s case law, determine that Member
States must provide information on the core rights and obligations to
service providers and posted workers. In relation to Union workers, it is
the Union Workers Enforcement Directive in particular that states that
Member States must provide information to Union workers and their
employers (Art 6). Moreover, both enforcement Directives determine that
information must be made available in more than one of the official
languages of the EU. While in the context of the posting of workers, the
Netherlands, Germany and Sweden have provided information on core
rights and obligations in various languages, this is not yet the case in
relation to Union workers. This does not mean that Union workers do not
need information on their rights. In order to comply with the Directive,
Member States should also address in particular the needs of Union
workers and provide them with adequate information on their rights.
Moreover, the EU has influenced transnational cooperation between
monitoring and enforcement authorities. Here, too, in the context of law
enforcement, the posting of workers has been addressed in particular.
Member State authorities have to cooperate with each other in order to
exchange information. To conform to this requirement, the countries
studied have concluded bilateral agreements with competent authorities
in other Member States. Besides, IMI provides an EU-platform for in-
formation exchange.
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To know who stays and works in a Member State, the three
countries studied require Union citizens to register. This is possible under
EU law if Union citizens stay longer than three months. All three countries
apply such a requirement, regardless of whether it applies to a Union
worker or a posted worker. The notification obligation for the posting of
workers, as applied in Germany and Sweden, has been largely shaped by
the ECJ’s case law. As long as Member States do not make the posting
dependent on the service provider having received a receipt of notifica-
tion, notification is permitted. Moreover, case law has clarified that
keeping and making available certain translated documents is also in
line with EU law, if required for monitoring and enforcing rights derived
from EU law. With the 2014 Posted Workers Enforcement Directive, the
ECJ’s case law is codified. Notification can be seen as a substitute for the
work permit, which, as a result of the ECJ’s case law, Member States were
not permitted to demand in the context of posting of workers.
The two enforcement Directives emphasise that adequate and uni-
form application and enforcement are key elements in protecting the
rights of Union workers and posted workers; poor enforcement would
undermine the effectiveness of EU law. The Posted Workers Enforcement
Directive determines that Member States must ensure that sufficient staff
is available and that the staff have the skills and qualifications needed to
carry out inspections effectively and to enable information requests: no
specific requirements can be found, however. What is not addressed at EU
level is registration or licensing obligations on temporary-work agencies.
This leaves room for Member States to apply such obligations, provided
they respect the free movement rules. EU case law in relation to sanctions,
which are not tightly regulated at EU level, requires Member States to
adopt sanctions that are adequate, effective and persuasive.
From a comparative perspective, Germany and the Netherlands
have similar administrative enforcement methods, except that they have
developed at a different pace. While the German method was developed
even before the PWD had to be implemented, the Dutch administrative
enforcement method came about in relation to monitoring and enforcing
statutory minimum wages as late as 2007. The EU enlargements in 2004/
07 induced a shift in the enforcement methods, from purely judicial
enforcement, left to the individual worker, towards a combination of
judicial and administrative enforcement. The Swedish development in the
administrative enforcement area is different. Although it is principally the
social partners that are entrusted with monitoring and enforcing labour
law, the WEA has been allocated a new task, namely to administer and
enforce the notification obligation applicable to service providers. This
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obligation was introduced with effect from July 2013 as a result of the
Laval case. Nevertheless, it is for the social partners to monitor and enforce
collective agreements. It seems that this measure has been introduced to
gain at least some insight into who is active in the Swedish labour market,
even if the WEA can only monitor and enforce issues surrounding
occupational health and safety.
The three countries differ as to the organisations they have en-
trusted with monitoring and enforcing (certain parts of) labour law. While
the Dutch ISZW operates in all labour law areas, the German FKS was
initially only responsible in the context of “black” (illicit) labour and
gradually became competent to ensure compliance with the key condi-
tions laid down in accordance with the AEntG, which implements the
PWD. The Swedish WEA has the narrowest competence, since its opera-
tions are limited to occupational health and safety and the administration
of notification obligations in the context of the posting of workers.
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CHAPTER 8
CONCLUSIONS
8.1 Introduction
Monitoring and enforcement of labour law (in cross-border situations)
embraces three enforcement methods: judicial enforcement, which leaves
room for the interpretation and application of labour law by judges;
industrial relations enforcement, where supervision and enforcement of
collective agreements is entrusted to the social partners; and adminis-
trative enforcement, where supervision and enforcement of the statutory
rules is a task for public authorities such as labour inspectorates, or other
public bodies. These three enforcement methods, which can be found in all
Member States, face three main challenges: 1) increased labour mobility
due to the 2004/07 EU enlargements; 2) different forms of worker
mobility: the free movement of workers and the posting of workers,
each with its own rights and obligations on the parties involved; and 3)
the fact that the EU is a formidable law-making institution, but not a law-
enforcing one, meaning that enforcing EU rights is left to the Member
States. Against this background, this study was designed to answer the
following research question:
In which ways, and to what extent, do EU rules and case law exert influence on
Member States’ methods to monitor and enforce labour law in transnational
situations?
The first subquestion concerns the ways EU rules and case law exert
influence on Member State enforcement methods, which are adopted to
enforce labour law in transnational situations (section 8.2). In the second
place, this thesis addressed the extent to which EU influences, and perhaps
will influence, the Dutch, German and Swedish ways of monitoring and
enforcing labour law as applicable to Union workers and posted workers
(section 8.3). This is followed by an overall conclusion based on the
findings presented previously (section 8.4). Finally, this chapter is con-
cluded with some final thoughts on the EU’s influences on Member State
enforcement systems, referring to law as a system and the theory of
reflexive harmonisation (section 8.5). Such a reference might help to
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understand why the EU is more or less successful in influencing Member
States’ laws and behaviour as regards enforcement of EU labour law.
8.2 The ways in which EU rules and case law exert influence
In chapter 2 described the ways in which EU rules and case law exert
influence on Member State systems to enforce labour law (in cross-border
situations) are described. The ways in which the EU exerts influence can
be decomposed into jurisprudential requirements, set by the ECJ’s case
law, and legislative requirements, which are laid down in EU (secondary)
law. Within the jurisprudential requirements, there are two limits that
Member State enforcement methods must respect: firstly, the principles of
equivalence and effectiveness, serving as a floor, and, secondly, the ECJ’s
case law on the posting of workers in the context of the freedom to provide
services, providing a ceiling on enforcement methods at Member State
level. As to the legislative requirements, EU (secondary) law contains
particular provisions on howMember States must monitor and enforce EU
law as applied to transnational mobile workers.
From a chronological point of view, it was EU case law that first
provided guidance to the Member States. Monitoring and enforcement is
decentralised, which means that every Member State has adopted mea-
sures to ensure EU law. These measures, however, differ between the EU
Member States, as they are adopted in line with their own legal system.
Initially there were no regulations or directives on how Member States
should monitor and enforce EU law. Thus, the ECJ had to ensure that the
Member State monitoring and enforcement methods provide at least some
degree of uniformity as to the application of EU rights. The principles of
equivalence and effectiveness provide minimum standards that domestic
enforcement methods must meet when monitoring and enforcing the
rights that individuals derive from EU law. First developed within the
judicial enforcement method, the principles of equivalence and effective-
ness provide a minimum framework for creating some uniformity in the
application of EU law. A great deal of case law has been ruled by the ECJ,
providing case-by-case guidelines to Member States on how they should
ensure the proper enforcement of EU law. The principles of equivalence
and effectiveness play a crucial role in all stages of the enforcement
process. An important feature that follows from the ECJ’s case law is
that the Member States’ institutional autonomy how to set up enforcement
authorities is not directly affected by the case law. This means that
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Member States are free to decide on the (internal) organisation of their
enforcement authorities.
Besides the principles of equivalence and effectiveness, the ECJ’s
case law on the posting of workers, which poses a ceiling on Member State
enforcement methods, is also important. The right of a posted worker to
move is derived from the right of the service provider to move to another
Member State to provide a service there. Accordingly, all national instru-
ments that are used to enforce labour law can be qualified as imposing
additional (administrative) burdens and have frequently been contested
by foreign service providers and the European Commission, alleging that
some Member State enforcement instruments impinge on the freedom to
provide services. National instruments that make (exercising) that free-
dom less attractive cannot (or should not be able to) be justified. The case
law shows that in many cases, Member States had to adapt their enforce-
ment methods or instruments in favour of an increased right of freedom to
provide services. As a result, enforcement at Member State level becomes
more difficult. The aim of this case law is to guarantee that service
providers are ensured of their EU right to provide cross-border services.
In addition to the jurisprudential requirements, legislative require-
ments have also gradually come to influence enforcement methods, at
Member State level to ensure compliance with rights of Union workers
and posted workers. So far, this has happened only to a limited extent, as
EU law primarily contains substantive rights that workers may invoke.
Moreover, the general idea is that EU law is enforced at Member State
level. Basic monitoring and enforcement provisions can be found in the
PWD. Under the PWD it is the host Member States who must ensure that
the rights and obligations are complied with, and if not, that they are
appropriately enforced. Particular attention is paid to information and
cooperation as well as judicial enforcement by workers and/or their
representatives. Moreover, the Directive creates a possibility for posted
workers to initiate judicial proceedings in the temporary host state. The
consequence thereof is that enforcement has become more difficult.
The EU’s legislative influence will increase with the two Directives
adopted in April/May 2014, aimed at increasing compliance with EU law
by harmonising certain areas concerned with the monitoring and enforce-
ment of the rights of Union workers and posted workers. Both Directives
focus on facilitating the uniform application and enforcement of rights
applicable to Union workers and posted workers (Art 1 in both Direc-
tives). The Posted Workers Enforcement Directive moreover refers to the
aim of uniform implementation of the PWD. These enforcement Directives
do not pescribe all-encompassing enforcement methods through which
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Member States have to monitor and enforce the rights of Union workers
and posted workers. Based on the provisions of the Directives, the primary
focus is on the role of the Member States and how their administrative
enforcement method is or should be constructed. In that regard, detailed
requirements are provided with which Member States have to comply.
Besides, also the judicial enforcement method received attention in the two
enforcement Directives. Within that method, social partners are given an
explicit role in the enforcement of workers’ rights at EU level. Member
States must ensure that workers and their representatives have access to
judicial protection in the (temporary) host state. Even though the role of
the social partners has become more prominent at EU level, it still seems
that the EU, at least in the context of the posting of workers, is much more
in favour of public institutions entrusted with labour law enforcement. It
can be noticed that – as it seems – more efforts as to make enforcement
more uniform are being made in relation to enforcement in the context of
cross-border posting of workers, as this is where most problems arise in
relation to the freedom to provide services. Enforcement instruments
impose extra (administrative) burdens on the service provider which
can limit or make less attractive the exercise of the freedom to provide
services. Any such burden must therefore be justified. As a result, EU
(case) law is putting Member State enforcement of labour law, in this
particular context, under Generalverdacht.
8.3 The extent to which EU rules and case law exert influence
8.3.1 Substantive employment conditions
This study has addressed the EU’s influences on Member State methods to
enforce minimum wages, holiday pay and holiday allowances, as regu-
lated by statute law and/or collective agreements. In order to assess the
EU’s influences, Chapters 3 and 4 addressed the ways in which the
Netherlands, Germany and Sweden regulate minimum wages, holiday
pay and holiday allowances. Insight into the differences in regulating
employment conditions is necessary to understand how the three coun-
tries monitor and enforce them and how they have been influenced, which
will be dealt with thereafter.
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A. Statutory minimum wages, holiday pay and holiday allowances
The statutory ways to regulate minimum wages, holiday pay and holiday
allowances have been dealt with in Chapter 3. If statutory employment
conditions are to be applicable, individuals must be considered as employ-
ees or workers. Two worker concepts are used within an EU legal context:
an autonomous Union worker concept in the context of the free movement
workers, and a Member State employee concept, which applies in the
context of the cross-border posting of workers. When enforcing statutory
labour rights, it is essential that these two worker concepts are clearly
separated, as each classification entails different ranges of protection. An
individual who is not considered an employee but as self-employed may
not benefit from labour law. An exception applies if the individual has
been wrongly qualified and actually is an employee.
As to the regulation of statutory minimum wages, the three coun-
tries differ greatly from each other. First, there is a statutory monthly
minimum wage in the Netherlands to which all employees covered by the
definition of a contract of employment are entitled. In Germany, there are
sectoral, and as of 1 January 2015 statutory, hourly minimum wages.
Sweden differs from the other two countries in that wages are solely
determined via collective bargaining and by collective agreements. Thus,
regarding Germany and the Netherlands, we see a certain convergence as
to the regulation of national statutory minimum wages. The statutory
minimum wage in Germany has been adopted, although initially seen
quite negatively, to cope with the decrease in collective agreement cover-
age and to allow all workers to receive a basic minimum wage. The EU
lacks competence to regulate pay. Based on Art 3(1) PWD Member States
may apply their own wage definitions. Nevertheless, the ECJ’s case law
plays an important role in defining pay boundaries. The Laval case made
clear that Member States must exercise that competence consistently with
EU law.
As a result of the Working Time Directive, all employees are entitled
to receive holiday pay, defined as the normal pay the employee receives
when on annual leave. In Sweden, the employer and his posted employee
are explicitly permitted under on the Posting of Workers Act (1999:678) to
agree that the latter receives a payment in lieu instead of holiday pay.
Whether this is in line with the Working Time Directive may be ques-
tioned, as it permits a payment in lieu only if the employment contract or
relationship is terminated for whatever reason. Related to paid annual
leave is the length of annual leave. Here, the most favourable rules apply
in Sweden, where employees are entitled to 25 days of leave. In the
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Netherlands, the annual leave is set at 20 days, while it is 24 days in
Germany. Collective agreements may, of course, provide more favourable
annual leave.
A right for employees to receive a statutory holiday allowance,
which is not regulated at EU level, exists only in the Netherlands. Here,
employees are entitled to receive a holiday allowance of 8 per cent of the
employee’s annual wage. Sweden allows holiday supplements for em-
ployees whose employer has decided to pay them. No such statutory
entitlement exists in Germany. Nevertheless, collective agreements may
provide holiday allowances or additional holiday supplements.
Comparing the three countries, it seems that the Dutch system is the
only one that grants all employees, regardless of whether they are foreign
or domestic, a statutory monthly minimum wage, holiday pay, and
holiday allowance. This is the result of the statutory regulation of a
minimum wage, holiday pay and a holiday allowance. This minimum
wage serves as the starting point for calculating the holiday pay and
holiday allowance. Coverage is much more limited in Germany, where
only employees who are employed in one of the AEntG sectors are entitled
to a sectoral minimum wage. Although Germany is going to introduce a
nationwide statutory minimum as of 1 January 2015, the sectoral approach
remains applicable for the construction sector. The situation in Sweden
differs greatly from the Netherlands and Germany, as the labour market is
regulated by collective agreements rather than statutes. As a result,
employees must be covered by a collective agreement before being entitled
to collectively agreed employment conditions.
B. Sectoral minimum wages, holiday pay, and holiday allowances in
the construction and temporary agency work sectors
Chapter 4 dealt with the sectoral regulation of minimum wages, holiday
pay, and holiday allowances. Coverage by a collective agreement and
depends on whether or not the employer and/or employee is a party to
and covered by a collective agreement. In the Netherlands and Germany,
collective agreements can be declared generally binding, covering all those
who fall within their scope. A generally binding collective agreement can
have a similar effect to statute law, but at sectoral level. As there is no
possibility to declare a collective agreement generally binding in Sweden,
the social partners must ensure that employers sign collective agreements.
Otherwise, employers and their employees may decide on their own what
wage will be paid. Precisely this Swedish model of industrial relations was
at stake in the Laval case. The Laval judgement reveals the limits of the
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Swedish industrial relations model in the context of the posting of
workers.
As a result of that judgement, Sweden has assessed ways to amend
its system, and adopted an amended Posting of Workers Act (1999:678) in
April 2010, known as the Lex Laval. While the option to provide for the
possibility to declare collective agreements generally binding was rejected,
the new provision limiting the exercise of the right to take collective action
was passed by the Swedish Parliament. Based on this amendment, the
social partners may take collective action only if several conditions are
met. It must, inter alia, be assess whether the collective action corresponds
to conditions contained in a national sectoral collective agreement applied
throughout Sweden. Moreover, no collective action may be held if foreign
employers are able to show that his workers are afforded at least condi-
tions that are at least as favourable as conditions of the national sectoral
collective agreement. It should be observed that Laval has had a huge
impact on the way Sweden regulates and enforces employment rights.
Although the Swedish industrial relations model works within an ‘inter-
nal’ situation, this is not the case (anymore) due to the (case law in the
context of the) PWD. It has shown the limits of the Swedish industrial
relations model, which is not recognised as such under the PWD. There-
fore, the Swedish Government launched an Inquiry on Lex Laval in 2012,
due to be published by the end of December 2014.
A look into the sectoral regulation of minimum wages, holiday pay
and holiday allowances in the construction and temporary agency work
sector has provided a mixed picture. In the Netherlands, employees are
protected by the generally binding collective agreements applicable in
both sectors. The agreements apply to foreign and domestic employers
and employees. The social partners in the Netherlands identified particu-
lar provisions that apply to Union workers and posted workers. As a
consequence of the general binding nature of the collective agreements
applicable in the two sectors, all employees falling under the scope of one
of these agreements are entitled to a sectoral minimum wage, holiday pay,
and holiday allowance. The latter corresponds to the statutory holiday
allowance of 8 per cent. In Germany, on the other hand, generally binding
collective agreements exist only in the construction sector, not for the
temporary agency work sector. This means that in relation to construction
work, all employees are entitled to receive a sectoral minimum hourly
wage and an amount comprising holiday pay and holiday allowance. The
rights for temporary agency workers are not mandatory, with the excep-
tion of a sectoral minimum wage. The entitlement to holiday pay and
holiday allowance thus depends on being bound to a collective agreement
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or if such has been individually agreed in the employment contract. In
Sweden, as has been said above, no collective agreement is generally
binding, meaning that, if the employer and the employee are covered by
one of the agreements due to membership of one of the signature parties
or in case the employer has signed the agreement directly, the employees
will receive a wage, holiday pay, and probably also a holiday allowance in
accordance with the provisions of relevant collective agreements. And if
employers are not bound, their employees will not be entitled to the
aforementioned labour conditions.
From an EU perspective, the Dutch and German legal systems seem
to fit EU law, and in particular the PWD, best. The employment conditions
are regulated by the collective agreements that are published, allowing
workers and employers to know beforehand what they are entitled to or
obliged to do. This, to a certain extent, is not true of the Swedish system. It
may be observed that EU law in the context of the posting of workers
seems to prefer national legislation or collective agreements that are
declared generally binding.
As the free movement of workers is based on the principle of equal
treatment, no difficulties can be seen in the way employment conditions
are regulated. Even though the EU explicitly states that it respects the
“diversity of national industrial relations systems” (recital 14 Posted
Workers Enforcement Directive), studying the Swedish industrial relations
model has shown that it cannot protect the (minimum) wage of posted
workers. The PWD allows Sweden to regulate wages in a way that is not
explicitly laid down as prescribed by the Directive. This, coupled with the
case law, does, however, not allow Swedish trade unions to compel non-
bound employers (ie service providers) to sign a collective agreement by
means of collective action. It seems that Sweden will not change its way of
regulating labour law, at least not in the near future.
8.3.2 Judicial enforcement method
Chapter 5 addressed the judicial enforcement method at Member State
level. Judicial enforcement refers to the role of civil and labour courts in
Member States, applying EU law correctly and in the end ensuring that the
law is complied with. The chapter pinpointed where EU (case) law has
had influence, and probably will exert an influence in the future, on the
implementation of the two enforcement Directives. The following subjects
have been presented: access to a court, aspects of judicial procedures (eg
time limits and evidential rules), liability schemes for the payment of
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minimum wages, and civil sanctions and remedies (recovery of rights and
compensation).
This chapter revealed that the EU has regulated certain features of
the judicial enforcement method applied or implemented at Member State
level. In the context of access to a court, some legislative influences could
be identified: Directive 91/533/EEC on information to be provided by the
employer as to essential aspects of the employment relationship (1991),
Art 6 PWD concerning access of posted workers to the host state courts
(1996), Brussels I Regulation on jurisdiction in civil and commercial
matters, including employment matters (2001), and the Legal Aid Direc-
tive (2003). With the implementation of the Posted Workers Enforcement
Directive, a limited joint and several liability will also be regulated at EU
level.
Although EU law recognises a role for social partners in the context
of judicial enforcement (see Art 6 PWD, Art 11 Posted Workers Enforce-
ment Directive, and Art 3 Union Workers Enforcement Directive), their
role in the enforcement of labour law has not been extensively regulated at
EU level. Consequently, it is for the Member States to determine whether,
and if so how far social partners have a role in enforcing workers’ rights.
This may also include their own interests in seeking compliance with their
own collective agreements. At Member State level, social partners have
far-reaching possibilities to initiate judicial proceedings on behalf of their
own or the worker’s interests (the Netherlands and Sweden). Proceedings
can be started, claiming not only statutory labour rights, but also collective
labour rights as laid down in (generally binding) collective agreements.
The role of the social partners in Germany is, in general, limited to a
certain extent. Here, only ULAK, the joint institution of the social partners
in the construction sector, has a powerful role in enforcing holiday pay
and holiday allowances. Their role, however, is limited to just that.
Individual workers in Sweden who are member of a trade union
are, in principle, not themselves allowed to initiate proceedings in the
Labour Court in case their wage under a collective agreement has not been
paid. This is reserved for the Swedish trade unions. This is only different
in case the trade union decides not to take action. That individual workers
themselves may not initiate proceedings may be problematic as Art 47
EUCFR is clear when it states that everyone whose rights and freedoms
guaranteed by EU law are violated has the right to an effective remedy
before a tribunal. On the other hand, the Swedish model is based on
industrial relations, where labour rights are regulated and enforced by the
social partners. In that sense, it may be argued that workers who are
members of a trade union are far better protected through their trade
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union representatives than when they have to enforce their rights on their
own. An additional benefit is that a trade union will always first try to
settle the dispute out of court, before commencing judicial proceedings.
In the Netherlands and Sweden, the trade unions may bring an
action, even if the worker concerned does not want to. This mostly
happens in a situation in which an employer who is bound by a collective
agreement fails to abide by that agreement. It is in the trade union’s
general interest as well as that of the employers’ association to ensure
compliance with their agreements. Social partners in the Netherlands may
even initiate a group action, which is not regulated at EU level. In relation
to minimum wages, the German social partners have weaker rights than
their colleagues in the Netherlands and Sweden; they may not initiate
judicial proceedings demanding compliance with a (generally binding)
collective agreement. There is no EU influence here.
The two enforcement Directives will not require any changes at
Member State level in this regard. Nevertheless, both Directives emphasise
the need for access to judicial protection for workers and/or their
representatives. What both Directives require is that trade unions who
are willing to initiate proceedings on behalf of or in support of workers,
must receive the workers’ prior approval before doing so (Art 11(4)(b)
Posted Workers Enforcement Directive and Art 3(3) Union Workers
Enforcement Directive). The question is what kind of impact this has on
the situations of the three countries analysed: Germany where ULAK has a
strong role in relation to holiday pay and holiday allowance; the Nether-
lands as regards group actions and actions based on collective labour law;
and Sweden where trade unions may initiate proceedings even in the
absence of their employee-member’s consent. It seems that the Directives’
provisions are addressed to initiating proceedings on behalf of or in
support of Union workers and posted workers. Consequently, bringing
the employer before a court due to a violation of the collective agreement
seems still possible without the worker’s approval as long as it concerns
the contractual relationship between the trade union and the employers or
their representatives. IAs has been said earlier, foreign workers do often
not initiate a judicial proceeding against their employer. Therefore, the
requirement to request the worker’s consent may delay the procedure or
may lead to the situation in which no procedure will be initiated at all.
A new aspect is the introduction of a limited joint and several
liability in the context of the posting of workers. At the time of writing,
liability schemes can be found in the Netherlands (user liability, intro-
duced in 2010 as a result of the EU enlargements) and Germany (sub-
contractors’ chain liability, introduced in 1999 to combat wage dumping
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and illegal employment in the construction sector). The Dutch and Ger-
man schemes differ: while the Dutch is a user undertaking liability,
allowing the temporary agency worker to claim the payment of the net
minimum wage from the user undertaking, the German is a subcontrac-
tors’ liability that allows the worker to claim his minimum wage from all
parties in the chain. Sweden, although it does not have such a scheme, has
a “functional equivalent”. Trade unions have the right to negotiate and
possibly object to the engagement of a certain subcontractor by an
employer. To use this instrument, both the subcontractor and the em-
ployer must be bound by a collective agreement for the work in question.
The German chain liability was disputed in the Wolff and Müller
case, in which the ECJ made it clear that EU law, in particular the PWD, is
not against a liability system as such, provided the boundaries set by EU
(case) law are respected. According to the ECJ, if minimum rates of pay
constitute a feature of worker protection, then procedural arrangements
ensuring compliance with that right must likewise be regarded as being
such as to ensure that protection. Workers are given a second party from
whom they can claim the payment of the net wages unpaid, which
increases their chances of success.
With the adoption of the Posted Workers Enforcement Directive in
2014, the EU now regulates a limited liability. One of the reasons for
establishing a limited liability is that employers seem to disappear or may
even never have existed (Art 12). The liability applies in relation to a
worker’s rights acquired under the contractual relationship between the
contractor and his or her subcontractor. Member States, like Germany, that
have a more stringent liability system, may, in conformity with EU law,
continue to apply that system, if it is applied in a non-discriminatory and
proportionate manner. Member States are required to introduce such a
liability for activities mentioned in the Annex of the PWD.
Member States that have no subcontracting liability scheme for
wages, like the Netherlands and Sweden, may for activities that are not
listed in the Annex of the PWD take other appropriate enforcement
measures, in accordance with EU and Member State law and/or practice,
which permit effective and proportionate sanctions against the contractor.
Although introducing a subcontractor’s liability is optional, this develop-
ment may induce Member States that have no such liability scheme to
introduce one, or at least to assess the existing enforcement measures, and
improve them if they are found to be insufficient. While the Netherlands in
the context of the Posted Workers Enforcement Directive has contem-
plated the introduction of subcontractor liability, it may be assumed that
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Sweden will not do so. Sweden is perhaps also not required to introduce
liability as it has not regulated wages within the meaning of the PWD.
Besides these legislative influences, the ECJ’s case law provides
guidance on how Member State courts have to apply national time limits
and sanctions and remedies for breaches of the rights workers derive from
EU law. Time limits are currently not regulated at EU level, nor are there
any intentions to do so. Nevertheless, as time limits vary across the
Member States, they have to respect the jurisprudential principles of
equivalence and effectiveness as developed in the ECJ. As to remedies,
ever since the ECJ’s ruling in the Von Colson and Kamann case it is known
that if Member States sanction a violation of EU law, this sanction must
guarantee real and effective judicial protection. Sanctions must also have a
genuine deterrent effect on the employer and be adequate in relation to the
damage sustained. Symbolic pecuniary compensation is insufficient.
Moreover, following Art 47 EUCFR, everyone whose rights under EU
law have been violated has the right to an “effective remedy”.
The 2014 Posted Workers Enforcement Directive, in line with Von
Colson and Kamann, obliges Member States to “lay down rules on penalties
applicable in the event of infringements of national provisions adopted
pursuant to this Directive […]. The penalties provided for shall be
effective, proportionate and dissuasive” (Art 20). No such provision can
be found in the Union Workers Enforcement Directive. However, recital 29
states that, referring to fundamental rights, the Directive respects the right
to an effective remedy and a fair trial. In addition, it determines that
Member States must introduce measures that are necessary to protect
Union workers from any adverse treatment or adverse consequence in
reaction to a complaint or proceedings aimed at enforcing free movement
of worker rights (Art 3(6)). This provision may induce Member States to
reconsider their existing sanctions and remedies in the context of cross-
border worker mobility.
Thus, we can see that within the judicial enforcement method, the
EU has increasingly guided Member State enforcement, with the aim of
making judicial enforcement in the context of cross-border worker mobi-
lity easier, not only for Union workers, but also, if not particularly so, for
posted workers. The principles of equivalence and effectiveness remain
applicable, as a floor, to those instruments that have only partly been
harmonised.
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8.3.3 Industrial relations enforcement method
Chapter 6 addressed the industrial relations enforcement method found at
Member State level. It provided an overview of measures adopted by the
social partners to increase compliance with collectively agreed labour
rights. The existing instruments of the social partners at Member State
level are largely untouched by EU influences. EU legislation creates an
obligation on Member States to ensure that social partners do what they
are required to do within their competences.
Directives, as Art 288 TFEU clearly determines, are addressed to the
Member States; the latter are responsible for the correct and timely
implementation, application and enforcement of the rights individuals
derive therefrom. Nevertheless, at Member State level, workers often
derive their labour rights from (generally binding) collective agreements.
Collective agreements are private contracts, concluded between employ-
ees’ and employers’ associations. That EU law can also be laid down in
collective agreements is recognised at EU level (Art 154 TFEU). Based on
this provision, collective agreements agreed upon by the social partners at
EU level can become binding either via Council Decision (which has the
force of a directive), or via autonomous agreements to be implemented at
Member State level, in a way that is appropriate to that state’s labour law
and industrial relations system. Moreover, social partners have become
more visible in the two enforcement Directives, even though these instru-
ments seem to recognise a role for social partners within the legally
regulated methods of monitoring and enforcing labour rights. There is
therefore hardly any direct legislative EU influence on the Member States’
industrial relations enforcement method.
Nevertheless, indirect EU influences can be found. First, in the
context of providing information to foreign employees and foreign service
providers, EU law, in particular the two enforcement Directives, obliges
Member States to provide the relevant (translations of) (generally binding)
collective agreements. The reason for this is that, as has been shown
earlier, foreign workers and service providers are often unaware of their
rights. Information thereon is crucial as it allows proper monitoring and
enforcement. As a result, Member States must ensure that the social
partners make the necessary efforts and make information on at least
the core employment conditions available in as many languages as
possible. From a legal perspective, Sweden provides a good example:
Section 9a Posting of Workers Act (1999:678) obliges the social partners to
submit their collective agreements to the WEA, which acts as a liaison
office in the context of the PWD. However, it seems that this provision is
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not enforced in practice, as only one translated and two collective agree-
ments in Swedish are published on the WEA’s website. In the Netherlands
and Germany, where no such provision has been adopted, more (trans-
lated) collective agreements are published online, to be consulted by
foreign workers and their employers. Summaries of the agreements are
sometimes also provided.
The EU’s indirect impact is also visible in the context of temporary
agency work. In the Netherlands especially, the 2004/07 EU enlargements
have induced the agency work sector to reconsider their monitoring and
enforcement role. Consequently, in 2004, the social partners jointly set up a
foundation, which has been ascribed a monitoring and enforcement role.
Its main function is to ensure compliance with the generally binding
collective agreement in that sector. Although the foundation’s functioning
can certainly be improved, in common with many organisations or
institutions entrusted with monitoring and enforcement, it shows that
the social partners in that sector take their role seriously. To date, the
foundation has initiated many judicial proceedings against temporary-
work agencies that have failed to apply the collective agreement.
Another example is the Swedish ID06 identity requirement, adopted
by the social partners in the construction sector. In order to allow social
partners to fulfil their monitoring and enforcing role, this identity badge
helps them identify available workers at a construction site, and who their
employer is. Not having such a badge means not gaining access to the
construction site. The Netherlands has also considered introducing such
an identification badge, inspired by the Swedish model. The outcomes of a
pilot scheme have not been published at the time of writing.
As to the exercise of the right to take collective action, which is by
definition the right of social partners to protect the interests of their
members, it has been argued that, strictly speaking, collective action is
not an enforcement instrument. It covers conflicts of interests, not rights
conflicts, which are for the courts to resolve. However, in relation to
Sweden the right to take collective action is important, as it can, as an
ultimate remedy, be used to compel an employer (if necessary by sym-
pathy actions) to sign a collective agreement or an accession agreement.
Laval obviously has shaken up the Swedish model of industrial relations.
In fact, the case has revealed, from an EU perspective, the problems that
may arise if the system is not designed in a way which the PWD
apparently addresses. EU law does not seem to accept the Swedish model
in the context of the posting of workers. In order to steer the Swedish
model in the direction of greater compliance with the main conclusions
derived from Laval, the Swedish legislator added a restricted right to
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collective action into the Posting of Workers Act (1999:678). Here, the
Swedish legislator went quite far, lacking insight in the real problem,
which is the way collective agreements are binding, a way that is not
explicitly recognised at EU level, in particular in the PWD. Thus, it is not
the collective action as such that is problematic, rather it is the combina-
tion of the way collective agreements become binding, and forcing a non-
bound employer to sign a collective agreement. In this context, in relation
to Sweden, it is also necessary to emphasise the lack of transparency to
‘outsiders’ of applicable rights and obligations under existing collective
agreements, ie to those employers and employees who are not member of
one of the signatory parties. This relates to what has been established
earlier, namely that there exists an information deficit as to publish (the
content of) collective agreements in Sweden. So, even if the model
functions perfectly in an internal setting, it does not in a cross-border
posting situation. This is the result of the predominance of the freedom to
provide services and the unequal treatment between Union workers and
posted workers.
We can thus see that social partners in the Netherlands and Sweden,
where ensuring compliance with collective agreements is left to the social
partners, frequently seek new solutions to cope with their tasks.
8.3.4 Administrative enforcement method
Chapter 7 examined the administrative enforcement method, where a
principal role for the monitoring and enforcement has been allocated to
the public authorities. Four subjects have been dealt with: information and
(cross-border) administrative cooperation between public authorities;
measures to monitor compliance; inspection and enforcement; and
sanctioning.
It has been shown that the EU legally influenced the Member States’
measures for monitoring and enforcing the rights individuals derive from
EU law. Influences from the EU are most visible in the administrative
enforcement method, compared to the judicial and industrial relations
enforcement methods. This is only natural, as Member States are the
primary addressees when case law shows that their legislation violates EU
law and when directives have to be implemented. The EU has influenced
the Member State monitoring and enforcement instruments insofar as they
concern information provision and transnational cooperation between
enforcement authorities and/or liaison offices. Moreover, EU law has
influenced the registration of Union citizens and the notification obligation
in the context of the posting of workers. Largely left to the Member States
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are the inspection and enforcement conducted by the enforcement autho-
rities, as well as the sanctions that can be imposed, as long as they take the
principles of equivalence and effectiveness and the freedom to provide
services into account.
The influence was especially apparent in the context of the posting
of workers. Here, the PWD and now also the Posted Workers Enforcement
Directive, in conjunction with the ECJ’s case law, determine that Member
States must provide information on the core rights and obligations to
service providers and posted workers. In relation to Union workers, it is
the Union Workers Enforcement Directive in particular that states that
Member States must provide information to Union workers and their
employers (Art 6). Moreover, both enforcement Directives determine that
information must be made available in more than one of the official
languages of the EU. While in the context of the posting of workers, the
Netherlands, Germany and Sweden have provided information on core
rights and obligations in various languages, this is not yet the case in
relation to Union workers. This does not mean that Union workers do not
need information on their rights. In order to comply with the Directive,
Member States should also address in particular the needs of Union
workers and provide them with adequate information on their rights.
Moreover, the EU has influenced transnational cooperation between
monitoring and enforcement authorities. Here, too, in the context of law
enforcement, the posting of workers has been addressed in particular.
Member State authorities have to cooperate with each other in order to
exchange information. To conform to this requirement, the countries
studied have concluded bilateral agreements with competent authorities
in other Member States. Besides, IMI provides an EU-platform for in-
formation exchange.
To know who stays and works in a Member State, the three
countries studied require Union citizens to register. This is possible under
EU law if Union citizens stay longer than three months. All three countries
apply such a requirement, regardless of whether it applies to a Union
worker or a posted worker. The notification obligation for the posting of
workers, as applied in Germany and Sweden, has been largely shaped by
the ECJ’s case law. As long as Member States do not make the posting
dependent on the service provider having received a receipt of notifica-
tion, notification is permitted. Moreover, case law has clarified that
keeping and making available certain translated documents is also in
line with EU law, if required for monitoring and enforcing rights derived
from EU law. With the 2014 Posted Workers Enforcement Directive, the
ECJ’s case law is codified. Notification can be seen as a substitute for the
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work permit, which, as a result of the ECJ’s case law, Member States were
not permitted to demand in the context of posting of workers.
The two enforcement Directives emphasise that adequate and uni-
form application and enforcement are key elements in protecting the
rights of Union workers and posted workers; poor enforcement would
undermine the effectiveness of EU law. The Posted Workers Enforcement
Directive determines that Member States must ensure that sufficient staff
is available and that the staff have the skills and qualifications needed to
carry out inspections effectively and to enable information requests: no
specific requirements can be found, however. What is not addressed at EU
level is registration or licensing obligations on temporary-work agencies.
This leaves room for Member States to apply such obligations, provided
they respect the free movement rules. EU case law in relation to sanctions,
which are not tightly regulated at EU level, requires Member States to
adopt sanctions that are adequate, effective and persuasive.
From a comparative perspective, Germany and the Netherlands
have similar administrative enforcement methods, except that they have
developed at a different pace. While the German method was developed
even before the PWD had to be implemented, the Dutch administrative
enforcement method came about in relation to monitoring and enforcing
statutory minimum wages as late as 2007. The EU enlargements in 2004/
07 induced a shift in the enforcement methods, from purely judicial
enforcement, left to the individual worker, towards a combination of
judicial and administrative enforcement. The Swedish development in the
administrative enforcement area is different. Although it is principally the
social partners that are entrusted with monitoring and enforcing labour
law, the WEA has been allocated a new task, namely to administer and
enforce the notification obligation applicable to service providers. This
obligation was introduced with effect from July 2013 as a result of the
Laval case. Nevertheless, it is for the social partners to monitor and enforce
collective agreements. It seems that this measure has been introduced to
gain at least some insight into who is active in the Swedish labour market,
even if the WEA can only monitor and enforce issues surrounding
occupational health and safety.
The three countries differ as to the organisations they have en-
trusted with monitoring and enforcing (certain parts of) labour law. While
the Dutch ISZW operates in all labour law areas, the German FKS was
initially only responsible in the context of “black” (illicit) labour and
gradually became competent to ensure compliance with the key condi-
tions laid down in accordance with the AEntG, which implements the
PWD. The Swedish WEA has the narrowest competence, since its opera-
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tions are limited to occupational health and safety and the administration
of notification obligations in the context of the posting of workers.
8.4 Final conclusions
Based on the findings set out before, it becomes clear that EU law and case
law provides obligations and often also limitations on how Member States
should enforce the labour conditions for foreign workers. The EU’s
influences, and perhaps it is better to speak of limitations, are more visible
in relation to the freedom to provide services than in relation to the free
movement of workers. It is precisely the freedom to provide services that,
from a (old) Member State perspective, impinges on Member State
enforcement systems, in favour of a smooth exercise of the freedom
without too much host state interference. What follows are some closing
remarks.
The assessment of the ways in which and the extent to which the EU
has exerted influence on Member State enforcement methods shows that
the enforcement methods, at least in the Netherlands and Germany (ie the
continental models), have increasingly converged. In particular, there is a
gradual evolution towards “legal harmonisation” which aims at minimis-
ing legal differences across the Member States’ enforcement systems, in
support of the free movement of workers and – even more – the freedom
to provide services. Despite the increased legal harmonisation, there still
exists a kind of patchwork of EU enforcement instruments to be applied at
Member State level. This patchwork does not fully resemble a coherent
approach in line with the three enforcement methods available at Member
State level. This stands in contrast to the Member State perspective which
is to retain the coherence of their enforcement system without too much
EU intervention. Such coherence is, as follows from the study, created by
the system’s own structure, supporting the one or the other method where
there are (potential) gaps in the possibilities to enforce labour rights. The
EU’s limited ability to legally harmonise (the enforcement of) labour law
at Member State level is due to the narrow competences it has under the
Treaties in the area of labour law. The EU’s efforts to harmonise labour
law enforcement at Member State level nevertheless affect to a certain
extent the coherence of the Member State enforcement systems. It is the
freedom to provide services, an example par excellence, which creates the
most difficulties for labour law.
The general starting point in labour law is the equal treatment of
workers performing similar or comparable work. This is also the basic
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tenet of Art 45 TFEU on the free movement of workers. However, if
workers are posted based on their employer’s right to invoke the freedom
to provide services, these workers will not be treated equally. This, in
combination with the restraints caused by the ECJ’s case law pertaining
Member State enforcement instruments and the Posted Workers Enforce-
ment Directive, may have the effect that monitoring and enforcement at
Member State level will become arduous. Because of the various implica-
tions, the EU may (have) discourage(d) the host Member States to
guarantee the rights posted workers derive from EU law.
From a comparative perspective, it may be observed that the
Netherlands has amended the way it enforces labour rights the most.
This is not the result of implementing EU law, however. Rather, the EU
enlargements 2004/07 were taken as a reason to shift from a purely
judicial enforcement system in relation to statutory minimum wages to
a combined administrative and judicial enforcement system. The social
partners in the Netherlands remain responsible for the collective agree-
ments they have concluded. Germany already had a robust system even
before the PWD was adopted; in fact, German law anticipated this
development. The Swedish labour law and industrial relations model
differs from the Dutch and German one, in that it cannot easily fit within
the EU’s ideas about how labour rights should be regulated in the context
of the posting of workers. The PWD permits regulations that are applied
nationwide at Member State level, such as a national statutory minimum
wage, as well as generally binding collective agreements that (explicitly)
apply to all workers of a certain sector. Moreover, it allows for other ways
to regulate collective agreements; however, it then fails to recognise that if
a collective agreement is not generally binding, it needs the employer’s
signature for the agreement to become binding. Otherwise, the employer
cannot be obliged to abide by the collective agreement. Introducing a
nationwide statutory minimum wage or a system to declare a collective
agreement generally binding in Sweden would cause severe disruption to
the Swedish model of industrial relations. Moreover, these instruments
would be viewed as “foreign elements”, which do not fit within the
Swedish model. This also holds true for the notification obligation
introduced in July 2013. So far, the Swedish system has shown itself
largely resistant to EU implications.
It is certainly easier for countries such as Germany and the Nether-
lands to adapt their continental enforcement systems to EU standards than
it is for Sweden.1 Therefore, greater convergence can be seen in the Dutch
1 See on this also: Rönnmar (2010b) 190.
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and German enforcement systems. Nevertheless, the different forms of
worker mobility, each with its own rights and obligations, make matters
difficult for actors entrusted with the monitoring and enforcement of
workers’ rights.
At EU level the focus is largely on administrative enforcement. For
administrative enforcement to be actually effective, it would require a
huge army of labour inspectors to ensure almost complete compliance
with labour rights.2 Against the austerity programmes issued in the
Member States, the costs for establishing an army of inspectors will be
beyond what is budgeted for. Moreover, it must be emphasised, as the
underlying study has shown, labour law is not only publicly monitored
and enforced. Much reliance at EU level seems to be on judicial enforce-
ment as well. However, also this enforcement method faces certain short-
comings as workers often are not aware of their rights and the possibilities
on how to enforce their rights. Also important in this regard is the fact that
complaining and enforcing labour rights may lead to the dismissal of
migrant workers, discouraging the workers to complain. An increased
awareness at EU level of how Member States enforce labour law would
certainly positively contribute to the ways in and the extent to which EU
law tries to steer Member State behaviour. This does, of course, not mean
that at Member State level enforcement is perfect. Also here certainly
improvements can be made, first and foremost in improving the informa-
tion on applicable rights and obligations to be communicated, if it is done
at all. Here, communication between state authorities and social partners
is inevitable.
8.5 Some final thoughts: on law as a system and the theory of
reflexive harmonisation
The EU increasingly tries to guide the way Member States should, or
should not, guarantee the rights workers derive from EU law when they
cross the border. The EU is a complex system: not only does the EU have a
sui generis legal system, but there are also 28 separate Member State legal
systems, which the EU aims to regulate. Every rule adopted at EU level
may induce responses in Member State laws and practice. However, in an
EU with 28 Member State, it is hardly possible to predict what kind of
impact a rule has, even if the general aim of the rule is clearly stated. There
2 Collins (2010) 29-30.
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simply is no one-size-fits-all enforcement method that could be applied in
all Member States. Sterman made it perfectly clear that:
“[…] most of the changes we now struggle to comprehend arise as consequences,
intended and unintended, of humanity itself. All too often, well intentioned
efforts to solve pressing problems lead to policy resistance, where our policies are
delayed, diluted, or defeated by the unforeseen reactions of other people or of
nature. Many times our best efforts to solve a problem actually make it worse”.3
How to explain why the EU sometimes can or cannot influence Member
States in their way to monitor and enforce labour law and why in some
cases Member States seem to be policy-resistant? A possible response
thereto can be found in systems theory. Based on that theory, each legal
system consists of an autonomous functional system, located within
society, placed on the same level as the economy, society itself, or the
political system.4 As such, the legal system is guided by the need to
protect its own autopoiesis, ie its self-referentiality and self-reproduction.5
The self-referential nature of the law allows it to reinterpret itself, in the
light of external needs and demands.6 This shows not only the limits of
law as a mechanism for social change, but also the possibilities of law.7
Viewing law from an autopoietic perspective, it is “operationally
closed”, but “cognitively open”. Operational closure refers to the fact that
the legal system reproduces itself entirely by reference to its own internal
structures and modes of operation. This means that only law can produce
law. Cognitive openness means that the system evolves over time by
referring to an external context, consisting of other systems.8 It should be
noted that operational closure “[…] renders the domestic legal systems
highly resistant to any intervention by the Community authorities which
seeks to prescribe supranational legislative norms understood and applied
identically in every Member State”.9 As a result, if legal changes are made,
they reflect an internal dynamic that is affected by external stimuli, in turn
influencing the external environment.10
In line with this, the theory of reflexive harmonisation was estab-
lished. This theory has evolved “[…] from two separate strands of
3 Sterman (2000) 3.
4 Rogowski & Deakin (2012) 230.
5 Rogowski & Deakin (2012) 230.
6 Teubner (1983) 249.
7 Rogowski & Deakin (2012) 230.
8 Rogowski & Deakin (2012) 231.
9 Dougan (2003) 124.
10 Teubner (1983) 249.
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academic thinking about how best to regulate the Single Market: the first
on competition between legal orders and social dumping within Europe;
the second concerning a systems analysis of the relationship between
Community law and the domestic jurisdictions of the Member States”.11
Reflexive harmonisation has one major advantage: it can preserve the
existing legal diversity we have in the EU and, to a certain extent, national
autonomy in decision making, rather than leading to convergence or
approximation, thereby taking into account the rules of the internal
market.12
The idea of reflexive harmonisation is borrowed from the theory of
reflexive law, and offers an analytical framework for studying the opera-
tion and effects of EU law and for evaluating EU (social) policy.13
Reflexive law is able to acknowledge “that regulatory interventions are
most likely to be successful when they seek to achieve their ends not by direct
prescription, but by inducing ‘second-order effects’ on the part of social
actors” (emphasis added).14 Reflexive law therefore has implications for
the design of regulations.15 It aims at setting conditions for self-regulation,
which means a shift from substantive to procedural law. It should be
noted that a distinction must be drawn between the legal forms and their
regulatory functions. Legal forms say nothing about how parties receive
the information and act on it in another systemic context.16 For regulatory
design, reflexive law aims to provide and structure mechanisms for self-
regulation, for example negotiation, decentralisation, planning and orga-
nised conflict.
A reflexive approach is said to provide possibilities for law to bring
about social changes.17 As stated by Hepple, “[o]ne should not expect law
to change behaviour by simple ‘command and control’”.18 Adopting a
reflexive approach therefore allows each legal system to reconstruct and
incorporate the information provided at EU level “according to its own
internal reality such that it becomes absorbed into, but also stimulates the
ongoing evolution of, the self-referential unit”.19 Based on this approach,
EU law should limit its regulatory activity to setting basic standards as a
floor, allowing Member State laws to adopt these standards according to
11 Dougan (2003) 113, with reference to Barnard, Deakin & Hobbs (2001).
12 Barnard & Deakin (2000), 332.
13 Rogowski & Deakin (2012) 229.
14 Barnard & Deakin (2000) 341.
15 Teubner (1983) 251.
16 Rogowski & Deakin (2012) 232.
17 Rogowski & Deakin (2012) 230.
18 Hepple (2011) 320.
19 Dougan (2003) 125.
Chapter 8
312
their own autonomy and diversity. As a result, domestic law can evolve in
light of the general principles of EU law. By inducing “second-order
effects”, the EU would be more likely to achieve its policy objectives.20
Even though EU (case) law provides minimum and maximum
conditions in the context of enforcing labour conditions, the three Member
States considered in this thesis have adapted their rules and practice only
if this suited their legal system. As a result, although there are some
similarities in the enforcement of labour conditions, the Member States’
legal systems differ. This seems to be in line with the idea of reflexive
harmonisation. That idea, however, is under pressure and in particular
after the Viking and Laval cases. Following these two cases it seems that,
according to the ECJ, legal diversity which still exists in the three countries
studied and which underpins the idea of reflexive harmonisation is a
threat to the internal market.21 However, for the EU to be successful in
steering Member State behaviour in line with the theory of reflexive
harmonisation, diversity is exactly what the EU should accept. To success-
fully “influence” Member State legislation and behaviour in line with the
theory of reflexive harmonisation, the EU must actually accept legal
diversity. As said, there is in an EU with 28 Member States no one-size-
fits-all method.
20 Deakin (2001) 211.
21 Rogowski & Deakin (2012) 247.
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BEVINDINGEN
1. Inleiding
De nakoming van arbeidsrechtelijke regels en de naleving van arbeids-
voorwaardelijke afspraken in EU-grensoverschrijdende situaties kan men
via verschillende wegen handhaven. Dit proefschrift onderscheidt drie
methoden van handhaving. Ten eerste de privaatrechtelijke handhaving
(judicial enforcement), waarbij een werknemer en een vakbond de interpre-
tatie en toepassing van het arbeidsrecht aan een rechter voorleggen. Ten
tweede de handhavingmethode waarbij men gebruik maakt van het door
de arbeidsverhoudingen gegeven krachtenveld (industrial relations enforce-
ment). Toezicht en handhaving van collectieve arbeidsovereenkomsten is
binnen deze handhavingsmethode toevertrouwd aan de sociale partners.
De derde handhavingsmethode is de bestuursrechtelijke handhaving
(administrative enforcement). Hier is het toezicht op en de handhaving
van de wettelijke regels neergelegd bij overheidsinstanties, zoals arbeids-
inspecties of andere publieke instellingen. Alle lidstaten hanteren deze
drie handhavingsmethoden, zij het dat zij verschillend zijn geregeld en
worden toegepast. De genoemde handhavingsmethoden staan onder druk
door: 1) de toegenomen arbeidsmobiliteit als gevolg van de EU uitbrei-
dingen in 2004/07; 2) de verschillende vormen van werknemersmobiliteit
bestaande uit het vrij verkeer van werknemers en de detachering van
werknemers, ieder met eigen rechten en verplichtingen voor de betrokken
partijen; en 3) het feit dat de EU een uitstekende wetgever is, maar in de
onderhavige context niet zelf handhavend optreedt. Handhaving van EU-
rechten is overgelaten aan de lidstaten. Tegen deze achtergrond is de
volgende onderzoeksvraag geformuleerd:
Op welke wijze en in hoeverre hebben EU-regels en EU-rechtspraak
invloed op de methoden van lidstaten om het arbeidsrecht in grensover-
schrijdende situaties te controleren en te handhaven?
De eerste vraag betreft de wijze waarop EU-recht(spraak) invloed
uitoefent op de handhavingsmethoden die de lidstaten toepassen om de
naleving van het arbeidsrecht in grensoverschrijdende situaties te verze-
keren (paragraaf 2). De tweede vraag betreft de mate waarin de EU
invloed uitoefent op de Nederlandse, Duitse en Zweedse methoden van
toezicht op en handhaving van het arbeidsrecht, zoals dit van toepassing
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is op Uniewerknemers en gedetacheerde werknemers (paragraaf 3).
Hierna volgt een algemene conclusie gebaseerd op de bevindingen die
hiervoor zijn beschreven (paragraaf 4). Het hoofdstuk wordt afgesloten
met een aantal afsluitende gedachtes over de EU invloeden op de hand-
havingssystemen van de lidstaten, daarbij kijkend naar het recht als een
systeem en de theorie van reflexive harmonisation (paragraaf 5). Dit kan
eventueel verklaren waarom de EU soms wel en soms met succes de
wetgeving en het gedrag van lidstaten ten aanzien van de handhaving van
het EU-arbeidsrecht beïnvloedt.
2. De wijzen waarop EU-recht(spraak) invloed uitoefent
In hoofdstuk 2 wordt de wijze waarop EU recht(spraak) invloed uitoefent
op de handhavingssystemen in de lidstaten om naleving van het arbeids-
recht (in grensoverschrijdende situaties) te verzekeren beschreven. De
handhaving moet voldoen aan jurisprudentiële vereisten zoals vastgesteld
door de rechtspraak van het Hof van Justitie en wettelijke vereisten
neergelegd in (secundair) EU-recht. Deze jurisprudentiële vereisten stellen
twee grenzen aan de handhavingsmethoden van de lidstaten: het begin-
selen van gelijkwaardigheid en effectiviteit als minimumvereiste en de
rechtspraak van het Hof van Justitie in het kader van het vrij verkeer van
diensten als maximumvereiste. Daarnaast bepalen wettelijke vereisten,
neergelegd in het (secundaire) EU-recht, hoe lidstaten het recht dat van
toepassing is op grensoverschrijdende mobiele werknemer moeten
handhaven.
De EU-rechtspraak geeft richting aan hoe lidstaten het EU-recht
zouden moeten controleren en handhaven. Er zijn in beginsel geen
verordeningen en richtlijnen geweest die aan hebben gegeven hoe lid-
staten het EU-recht moeten controleren en handhaven. Het toezicht op en
de handhaving van het EU-recht zijn gedecentraliseerd. Dit houdt in dat
iedere lidstaat zelf maatregelen moet nemen om de naleving van het EU-
recht te verzekeren. Lidstaten nemen evenwel maatregelen die passen
binnen hun eigen rechtssysteem, met als gevolg dat de maatregelen per
lidstaat fors van elkaar kunnen verschillen. Precies om die reden heeft het
Hof van Justitie jurisprudentiële vereisten ontwikkeld die door overheids-
instellingen van de lidstaten in achtmoetenworden genomen bij de handha-
ving. Uit deze rechtspraak vloeien de beginselen van gelijkwaardigheid en
effectiviteit voort. Zij stellen minimumvoorwaarden waaraan nationale
handhaving moet voldoen. Deze minimumvoorwaarden hebben tot doel
een zekere uniformiteit te creëren in de toepassing van het EU-recht. Het
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Hof van Justitie heeft veel rechtspraak gewezenwaarin richtsnoeren voor de
lidstaten worden gegeven over hoe zij het EU-recht kunnen handhaven. De
beginselen van gelijkwaardigheid en effectiviteit spelen in alle stadia van het
handhavingsproces een belangrijke rol. Minder belangrijk is het beginsel ten
aanzien van de inrichting van de organen die met handhaving zijn belast.
Uit de rechtspraak blijkt dat de zogeheten institutionele autonomie niet
wordt aangetast. Op de achtergrond, als minimumvoorwaarde, moeten
niettemin de vereisten van gelijkwaardigheid en effectiviteit in acht worden
genomen.
Bij het gebruik van handhavingsmethoden moeten daarnaast ook de
rechtspraak van het Hof van Justitie in het kader van de detachering van
werknemers in acht nemen. Het recht van een gedetacheerde werknemer
om de grens over te gaan is afgeleid van het recht van de dienstverlener
om naar een andere lidstaat te gaan om daar een dienst te verlenen. Op
grond daarvan kunnen alle nationale instrumenten die worden ingezet om
de naleving van het arbeidsrecht te verzekeren worden gekwalificeerd als
extra (administratieve) lasten die worden opgelegd. Regelmatig zijn
nationale instrumenten door buitenlandse dienstverleners en de Europese
Commissie aangevochten. Dergelijke instrumenten zouden inbreuk ma-
ken op (de uitoefening van) het vrij verkeer van diensten en kunnen niet
worden gerechtvaardigd. De rechtspraak laat zien dat in veel gevallen de
lidstaten hun handhavingsinstrumenten moesten aanpassen ten gunste
van het recht op vrij verkeer van diensten. Het doel van de rechtspraak is
te verzekeren dat dienstverleners ongehinderd hun recht op het vrij
verlenen van diensten kunnen uitoefenen. Als gevolg daarvan is de
handhaving op lidstatenniveau echter moeilijker geworden.
Naast de hiervoor genoemde jurisprudentiële vereisten, moeten
lidstaten voldoen aan wettelijke vereisten. Ook zij hebben de handha-
vingsmethoden die de naleving van de EU-rechten van Uniewerknemers
en gedetacheerde werknemers verzekeren beïnvloed. Het EU-recht creëert
hoofdzakelijk materiële rechten die door werknemers kunnen worden
ingeroepen. EU-recht wordt op het niveau van de lidstaat gehandhaafd.
Een voorbeeld van algemene toezichts- en handhavingsbepalingen is te
vinden in de Detacheringsrichtlijn. In deze richtlijn staat het aspect van
informatieverspreiding centraal. Ook bepaalt de Detacheringsrichtlijn dat
ontvangende lidstaten moeten garanderen dat de rechten en verplichtin-
gen voortvloeiend uit de rechtspraak worden nagekomen. Als dat niet het
geval is, moeten zij worden gehandhaafd. Bovendien creëert de Detache-
ringsrichtlijn een mogelijkheid voor gedetacheerde werknemers om in
het tijdelijke ontvangstland een gerechtelijke procedure te starten. De
aandacht gaat in het bijzonder uit naar informatie en coöperatie als
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ook de privaatrechtelijke handhaving door werknemers en/of hun
vertegenwoordigers.
De invloed van de EU op de handhavingsmethoden in de lidstaten
zal toenemen met de twee handhavingsrichtlijnen die in april/mei 2014
zijn aangenomen. Deze richtlijnen beogen het toezicht op en de handha-
ving van de rechten van Uniewerknemers en gedetacheerde werknemers
te harmoniseren. Beide richtlijnen concentreren zich op het vergemakke-
lijken van een uniforme toepassing en handhaving van de rechten van
Uniewerknemers en gedetacheerde werknemers (Art 1, beide richtlijnen).
Daarnaast verwijst de Handhavingsrichtlijn voor gedetacheerde werkne-
mers naar het doel van een uniforme implementatie van de Detacherings-
richtlijn. De twee handhavingsrichtlijnen hebben voornamelijk betrekking
op de bestuursrechtelijke handhavingsmethode. De bepalingen geven
gedetailleerd aan waaraan lidstaten moeten voldoen. Daarnaast krijgt
ook de privaatrechtelijke handhaving aandacht in de twee handhavings-
richtlijnen. Binnen de privaatrechtelijke handhavingsmethode hebben
sociale partners de mogelijkheid om rechten van werknemers te hand-
haven. Lidstaten moeten verzekeren dat werknemers en hun vertegen-
woordigers toegang hebben tot gerechtelijke bescherming in het (tijdelijke)
ontvangstland. Geconcludeerd kan worden dat vooral met de nieuwe
handhavingsrichtlijnen de sociale partners een steeds belangrijker positie
innemen op EU-niveau.
Vastgesteld kan worden dat de invloed van het EU-recht duidelijk
zichtbaar is in het kader van grensoverschrijdend detacheren van werk-
nemers, en minder in het kader van het vrij verkeer van werknemers. De
reden daarvoor is dat ten aanzien van het vrij verkeer van diensten zich
hier de meeste praktische problemen voordoen. Handhavingsinstrumen-
ten leggen aan de dienstverrichter veelal extra (administratieve) lasten op,
die de uitoefening van het recht op vrij verkeer van diensten (kunnen)
beperken en die dus gerechtvaardigd moeten worden. De handhaving van
de lidstaten komt daardoor onder Generalverdacht te staan.
3. De mate waarin EU-recht(spraak) invloed uitoefent
3.1 Materiële arbeidsvoorwaarden
In dit onderzoek is de invloed van het EU-recht op de methoden van de
lidstaten om wettelijke en collectief overeengekomen minimumlonen,
vakantiegeld en vakantietoeslagen te handhaven onderzocht. De hoofd-
stukken 3 en 4 gaan in op de wijzen waarop Nederland, Duitsland en
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Zweden deze voorwaarden regelen. Inzicht in de verschillen in de wijze
waarop arbeidsvoorwaarden worden geregeld is noodzakelijk voor een
beter begrip van de verschillende handhavingsmethoden en de invloeden
daarop.
A. Wettelijke minimumlonen, vakantiegeld en vakantietoeslagen
In hoofdstuk 3 wordt de wettelijke regulering van minimumlonen, vakan-
tiegeld en vakantietoeslagen behandeld. Cruciaal voor de toepasselijkheid
van het arbeidsrecht is dat individuen als werknemers moeten worden
gekwalificeerd. Het EU-recht kent twee werknemersbegrippen. In de
eerste plaats een autonoom Uniewerknemersbegrip in het kader van het
vrij verkeer van werknemers. In de tweede plaats verwijst het EU-recht
vaak naar het nationale werknemersbegrip. Dit is onder meer het geval bij
de Detacheringsrichtlijn. Voor de handhaving van de in regelgeving
neergelegde arbeidsvoorwaarden en -omstandigheden moeten deze twee
begrippen goed uit elkaar worden gehouden. Ieder begrip kent namelijk
een eigen beschermingsbereik. Iemand die niet als werknemer kan worden
gekwalificeerd is veelal als zelfstandige werkzaam en valt dus niet onder
het arbeidsrecht. Hierop bestaat een uitzondering, namelijk in geval het
individu verkeerd is gekwalificeerd als zelfstandige, terwijl hij eigenlijk als
werknemer moet worden beschouwd.
Grote verschillen ten aanzien van de regulering van het wettelijke
minimumloon verschilt bestaan in de drie landen die zijn onderzocht.
Nederland kent een maandelijks wettelijk minimumloon. Alle werkne-
mers die onder de definitie van een arbeidsovereenkomst vallen hebben
daar recht op. In Duitsland bestaat er een sectoraal, en vanaf januari 2015
ook een wettelijk, minimum uurloon. Anders is de situatie in Zweden.
Hier worden lonen enkel door middel van onderhandelingen en collec-
tieve arbeidsovereenkomsten overeengekomen. Wat betreft Duitsland en
Nederland bestaat er een zekere convergentie met betrekking tot de
regulering van nationale wettelijke minimumlonen. Ondanks eerdere
tegenstand om een nationaal minimumloon in te voeren, is het er
uiteindelijk toch gekomen in Duitsland. Daar zijn twee redenen voor.
Ten eerste om een afname van de dekkingsgraad van arbeidsvoorwaarde-
lijke afspraken tegen te gaan. Ten tweede beoogt het werknemers het recht
te geven op een basis minimumuurloon. De EU is niet bevoegd om lonen
te reguleren. Uit art. 3 lid 1 Detacheringsrichtlijn en art. 3 lid 2 Uitzend-
richtlijn volgt dat lidstaten hun eigen loondefinities kunnen toepassen.
Daarnaast speelt de rechtspraak van het Hof van Justitie een belangrijke
rol bij het afbakenen van het begrip loon, zeker in het kader van
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grensoverschrijdende detachering. De Laval-zaak heeft duidelijk gemaakt
dat lidstaten hun bevoegdheid om lonen te regelen in overeenstemming
met het EU-recht moeten uitoefenen.
Op grond van de Werktijdenrichtlijn hebben alle werknemers recht
op vakantiegeld. Dat betekent dat de werknemer gedurende zijn vakantie
zijn gewone loon ontvangt. In Zweden zijn de werkgever en de ge-
detacheerde werknemer op grond van de Detacheringswet (1999:678)
bevoegd om af te spreken dat de werknemer zijn vakantiegeld uitbetaald
krijgt. Twijfels bestaan of dit in overeenstemming is met de Werktijden-
richtlijn. Volgens die richtlijn is uitbetaling alleen toegestaan als de
arbeidsovereenkomst of de arbeidsverhouding, om welke reden dan
ook, wordt beëindigd. Wat betreft vakantiedagen, zo bestaat de meest
gunstige regeling in Zweden. Hier hebben werknemers recht op 25
vakantiedagen. Werknemers in Nederland hebben 20 vakantiedagen,
terwijl Duitsland 24 vakantiedagen toekent aan werknemers. Op grond
van collectieve arbeidsovereenkomsten kan het aantal vakantiedagen
echter worden verhoogd.
Recht op een vakantietoeslag is niet geregeld in het EU-recht, wat
betekent dat niet alle lidstaten een dergelijke toeslag wettelijke toekennen.
Alleen werknemers in Nederland hebben daar recht op. De vakantietoe-
slag omvat acht procent van het jaarsalaris. In Zweden ontvangen
werknemers alleen een vakantietoeslag als werkgevers besluiten om de
toeslag uit te keren. Geen vakantietoeslag bestaat in Duitsland. Wel
kunnen collectieve arbeidsovereenkomsten vakantietoeslagen of extra
vakantiesuppleties toekennen.
Geconcludeerd kan worden dat alleen het Nederlandse systeem alle
werknemers recht geeft op een wettelijk minimummaandloon, vakantie-
geld en vakantietoeslag. Het minimumloon dient als basis voor het
berekenen van het vakantiegeld en de vakantietoeslag. In Duitsland
hebben werknemers recht op een sectoraal minimumloon, mits zij werken
in een van de sectoren waarop het AEntG van toepassing is. Hoewel
Duitsland per 1 januari 2015 een nationaal wettelijk minimumuurloon
gaat invoeren, blijft het sectoraal geregelde loon van toepassing op de
bouwsector. Zweden verschilt van Nederland en Duitsland in die zin dat
de arbeidsmarkt voornamelijk door collectieve arbeidsovereenkomsten
wordt gereguleerd. Dat betekent dat werknemers onder een collectieve
arbeidsovereenkomst moeten vallen willen zij daaraan rechten kunnen
ontlenen.
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B. Sectorale minimumlonen, vakantiegeld en vakantietoeslagen in de
bouw- en uitzendsector
De sectorale regulering van minimumlonen, vakantiegeld en vakantietoe-
slagen staat centraal in hoofdstuk 4. In eerste instantie is gekeken naar het
toepassingsbereik van collectieve arbeidsovereenkomsten. Dit hangt af
van de vraag of een werkgever en/of een werknemer partij is bij en
gebonden is aan een collectieve arbeidsovereenkomst. In Nederland en
Duitsland kunnen collectieve arbeidsovereenkomsten algemeen verbin-
dend worden verklaard. Zij zijn dan van toepassing op iedereen die onder
het toepassingsbereik van de overeenkomst valt. Een algemeen verbin-
dende collectieve arbeidsovereenkomst krijgt hierdoor een vergelijkbaar
effect als een wet, zij het dat de overeenkomst enkel op sectoraal niveau
van toepassing is. Zweden daarentegen kent geen systeem om collectieve
arbeidsovereenkomst algemeen verbindend te verklaren. Wil men dat
werkgevers de collectieve arbeidsovereenkomst naleven, dan moet de
vakbond ervoor zorgen dat zij of hun vertegenwoordigers de overeen-
komst ondertekenen. Zijn werkgevers en hun werknemers namelijk niet
gebonden aan een collectieve arbeidsovereenkomst, dan kunnen zij zelf
afspraken maken over de beloning. Precies over dit Zweedse model van
arbeidsverhoudingen ging de door het Hof van Justitie gewezen zaak
Laval. Deze uitspraak heeft duidelijk de beperkingen van het Zweedse
arbeidsverhoudingenmodel in het kader van de detachering van werkne-
mers laten zien.
Als gevolg van de Laval-uitspraak heeft Zweden onderzocht hoe het
haar systeem kan aanpassen. In april 2010 is in Zweden de gewijzigde
Detacheringswet (1999:678) aangenomen, de zogeheten Lex Laval. De
wetgever heeft verschillende mogelijkheden besproken. De mogelijkheid
om een collectieve arbeidsovereenkomst algemeen verbindend te verkla-
ren werd echter verworpen. Wel heeft het parlement ermee ingestemd de
uitoefening van het recht op collectieve actie te beperken. Sindsdien
mogen sociale partners enkel een collectieve actie voeren indien aan een
aantal voorwaarden is voldaan. Onder meer moet gekeken worden of de
collectieve actie verband houdt met voorwaarden die zijn neergelegd in
een op nationaal niveau geldende collectieve arbeidsovereenkomst. Daar-
naast mag geen collectieve actie worden gevoerd indien de buitenlandse
werkgever in staat is om aan te tonen dat zijn werknemers recht hebben
op ten minste dezelfde voorwaarden als neergelegd in de op nationaal
niveau geldende sectorale collectieve arbeidsovereenkomst.
Zo te zien heeft Laval een grote invloed gehad op de wijze waarop
Zweden zijn arbeidsrechten reguleert en handhaaft. Het Zweedse arbeids-
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verhoudingenmodel lijkt prima te werken binnen een ‘interne’ situatie. Dit
is echter niet (meer) het geval bij een grensoverschrijdende situatie op
grond van de (rechtspraak omtrent de) Detacheringsrichtlijn. Daarom
heeft de Zweedse regering in 2012 een onderzoek gestart waarin Lex
Laval wordt onderzocht. Het onderzoek wordt eind december 2014
gepubliceerd.
De sectorale regulering van minimumlonen, vakantiegeld en vakan-
tietoeslagen in de bouw- en uitzendsector laat een gevarieerd beeld zien. In
Nederland zijn werknemers in beide sectoren beschermd door algemeen
verbindend verklaarde collectieve arbeidsovereenkomsten. Deze overeen-
komsten zijn van toepassing op binnenlandse en buitenlandse werkgevers
en werknemers die in Nederland al dan niet tijdelijk werkzaamheden
uitvoeren. De sociale partners in Nederland hebben specifieke bepalingen
geïdentificeerd die van toepassing zijn op Uniewerknemers en gedeta-
cheerde werknemers. Als gevolg van de algemeen verbindverklaring van
de collectieve arbeidsovereenkomsten hebben alle werknemers die onder
het bereik van één van deze overeenkomsten vallen recht op een sectoraal
minimumloon, vakantiegeld en vakantietoeslag. Dit laatste houdt verband
met de wettelijke vakantietoeslag van 8 procent. Anders is de situatie in
Duitsland. Hier zijn algemeen verbindend verklaarde collectieve arbeids-
overeenkomsten enkel van toepassing in de bouwsector, maar niet in de
uitzendsector. Dit betekent dat wat betreft bouwwerkzaamheden alle
werknemers een dwingend sectoraal minimumuurloon ontvangen en een
bedrag bestaande uit vakantiegeld en vakantietoeslag. Daarentegen zijn de
rechten van uitzendwerknemers niet dwingend, met uitzondering van een
minimumuurloon dat per verordening is vastgelegd. Of een werknemer
recht heeft op vakantiegeld en een vakantietoeslag hangt af van het ge-
bonden zijn van de werkgever aan een collectieve arbeidsovereenkomst,
dan wel of dit individueel is overeengekomen in de arbeidsovereenkomst.
Zoals eerder gezegd bestaan er in Zweden geen algemeen verbindend
verklaarde collectieve arbeidsovereenkomsten. Gebondenheid aan een col-
lectieve arbeidsovereenkomst bestaat enkel door lidmaatschap van één van
de partijen die de overeenkomst heeft getekend of indien een werkgever zelf
de overeenkomst heeft getekend. Alleen in die situatie ontvangen werkne-
mers loon, vakantiegeld en wellicht een vakantietoeslag in overeenstem-
ming met de bepalingen van de toepasselijke collectieve arbeidsovereen-
komst. Als werkgevers niet gebonden zijn, hebben hun werknemers geen
recht op de hiervoor genoemde arbeidsvoorwaarden.
Vanuit een EU-perspectief lijken de Nederlandse en Duitse rechts-
systemen het meest in overeenstemming te zijn met het EU-recht en in het
bijzonder de Detacheringsrichtlijn. De arbeidsvoorwaarden worden ge-
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reguleerd door collectieve arbeidsovereenkomsten die ook gepubliceerd
zijn. Deze stellen werknemers en werkgevers van te voren in staat om hun
rechten en verplichtingen te kennen. Dit geldt tot op zekere hoogte niet
voor het Zweedse systeem. Het EU-recht blijkt in het kader van detache-
ring van werknemers de voorkeur te geven aan nationale wetgeving en
collectieve arbeidsovereenkomsten die algemeen verbindend zijn.
Omdat het vrij verkeer van werknemers gebaseerd is op het
beginsel van gelijke behandeling, bestaan er geen moeilijkheden ten
aanzien van de wijze waarop arbeidsvoorwaarden zijn geregeld. Ondanks
het feit dat de EU expliciet aangeeft dat het ‘de verschillen tussen de
nationale stelsels van arbeidsverhoudingen’ eerbiedigt (overweging 14
Handhavingsrichtlijn voor gedetacheerde werknemers), laat onderzoek
naar het Zweedse model van arbeidsverhoudingen zien dat gedetacheerde
werknemers moeilijk beschermd kunnen worden door een (minimum)cao-
loon. De Detacheringsrichtlijn bepaalt dat lonen kunnen worden geregeld
op een wijze die niet is voorgeschreven in de richtlijn. Volgens de
rechtspraak betekent dit echter niet dat de Zweedse vakbonden door
middel van een collectieve actie niet-gebonden werkgevers (dat wil
zeggen buitenlandse dienstverleners) ertoe kunnen dwingen om een collec-
tieve arbeidsovereenkomst te ondertekenen. Niet blijkt dat Zweden –
althans niet op korte termijn – haar wijze waarop zij het arbeidsrecht
reguleert zal aanpassen.
3.2 Privaatrechtelijke handhavingsmethode
Hoofdstuk 5 heeft betrekking op de privaatrechtelijke handhavingsme-
thode op lidstatenniveau. Privaatrechtelijke handhaving verwijst naar de
rol van de civiele en arbeidsrechter in de lidstaten. Deze gerechten
behoren het EU-recht correct toe te passen en te garanderen dat het EU-
recht wordt nageleefd. Het hoofdstuk geeft aan waar EU-recht(spraak)
invloed heeft gehad en waar het wellicht in de toekomst als gevolg van de
implementatie van de twee handhavingsrichtlijnen nog invloed op zal
hebben. De volgende onderwerpen zijn behandeld: toegang tot de rechter,
aspecten van gerechtelijke procedures (bijvoorbeeld verjarings- en ver-
valtermijnen en bewijsrechtelijke regels), aansprakelijkheid voor het be-
talen van minimumlonen en civiele sancties en remedies (verhaal en
compensatie).
De EU heeft bepaalde elementen van de privaatrechtelijke handhavings-
methode die op lidstatenniveau van toepassing en geïmplementeerd zijn
gereguleerd. In het kader van de toegang tot de rechter kunnen enkele
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invloeden vanuit EU-wetgeving worden vastgesteld: Richtlijn 91/533/
EEG betreffende de verplichting van de werkgever de werknemer te
informeren over de voorwaarden die op zijn arbeidsverhouding van
toepassing zijn (1991), art. 6 Detacheringsrichtlijn betreffende de toegang
van gedetacheerde werknemers tot de rechtbank van het ontvangstland
(1996), Brussel I Verordening over de bevoegdheid in civiele en handels-
zaken inclusief arbeidsaangelegenheden (2001) en de Rechtshulprichtlijn
(2003). Met de implementatie van de Handhavingsrichtlijn voor gedeta-
cheerde werknemers zal ook een beperkte gezamenlijke en hoofdelijke
aansprakelijkheid op EU-niveau worden gereguleerd.
Ofschoon het EU-recht de rol voor sociale partners binnen de
context van de privaatrechtelijke handhaving erkent (zie art. 6 Detache-
ringsrichtlijn, art. 11 Handhavingsrichtlijn voor gedetacheerde werkne-
mers en art. 3 Handhavingsrichtlijn voor Uniewerknemers), is hun rol wat
betreft handhaving niet uitvoerig geregeld op EU-niveau. Het is aan de
lidstaten overgelaten om te bepalen of en in hoeverre sociale partners een
rol hebben bij de handhaving van werknemersrechten. Dit geldt ook voor
de handhaving van door sociale partners overeengekomen collectieve
arbeidsovereenkomsten. Op lidstatenniveau hebben sociale partners ver-
gaande mogelijkheden om namens henzelf of in het belang van werkne-
mers privaatrechtelijke procedures te starten (Nederland en Zweden).
Procedures kunnen worden gestart voor zowel het vorderen van wette-
lijke als ook collectieve arbeidsvoorwaarden en -omstandigheden zoals
neergelegd in (algemeen verbindende) collectieve arbeidsovereenkomsten.
In Duitsland is de rol van sociale partners over het algemeen begrensd.
Alleen ULAK, een door de sociale partners in de bouwsector ingestelde
instantie, heeft een sterke positie ten aanzien van de naleving van het recht
op vakantiegeld en vakantietoeslagen.
In Zweden zijn individuele werknemers die lid zijn van een vak-
bond in beginsel zelf niet bevoegd om een procedure bij de arbeidsrecht-
bank te starten ingeval hun loon niet conform een collectieve arbeids-
overeenkomst is betaald. Dit recht is voorbehouden aan de Zweedse
vakbonden. Dit is enkel anders wanneer de vakbond besluit geen actie
te ondernemen. Dat individuele werknemers niet zelf een procedure
mogen starten, kan problematisch zijn in relatie tot art. 47 EU-handvest.
Dit artikel bepaalt dat iedereen wiens recht ontleend aan het EU-recht is
geschonden toegang tot een doeltreffende voorziening in rechte moet
hebben. Het Zweedse model is gebaseerd op arbeidsverhoudingen waar-
door arbeidsvoorwaarden in principe geregeld en gehandhaafd worden
door de sociale partners. Vanuit dit perspectief kanworden beargumenteerd
dat leden van vakbonden beter beschermd worden door vertegenwoordi-
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gers van de vakbonden dan wanneer zij zelf hun rechten zouden moeten
handhaven. Een bijkomstig voordeel is dat vakbonden altijd eerst proberen
het geschil buitengerechtelijk op te lossen alvorens zij een gerechtelijke
procedure beginnen.
Vakbonden in Nederland en Zweden kunnen ook een vordering
instellen indien de werknemer dit niet wil. Dit komt meestal voor in een
situatie waarin een werkgever aan een collectieve arbeidsovereenkomst
is gebonden maar deze overeenkomst niet naleeft. Sociale partners in
Nederland kunnen ook een groepsactie, die niet op EU-niveau is geregeld,
instellen. Wat betreft minimumlonen hebben de Duitse sociale partners
minder rechten dan hun collega’s in Nederland en Zweden. Zij mogen
geen gerechtelijke procedure starten om nakoming van (algemeen ver-
bindende) collectieve arbeidsovereenkomsten te vorderen. Dit wordt
verder niet door de EU beïnvloed.
In dat opzicht zullen de twee handhavingsrichtlijnen ook geen
veranderingen op lidstatenniveau met zich meebrengen. Niettemin bena-
drukken beide richtlijnen de noodzaak voor toegang tot gerechtelijke
bescherming voor werknemers en/of hun vertegenwoordigers. Beide
richtlijnen vereisen dat vakbonden, die bereid zijn om een procedure
namens of ter ondersteuning van werknemers te starten, eerst toestemming
hiervoor krijgen van de werknemer (art. 11 lid 4 onder b Handhavings-
richtlijn voor gedetacheerde werknemers en art. 3 lid 3 Handhavingsrichtlijn
voor Uniewerknemers). Dit heeft gevolgen voor de sterke positie van ULAK
in Duitsland wat betreft vakantiegeld en vakantietoeslag, voor groepsacties
en acties binnen het collectieve arbeidsrecht in Nederland, en voor Zweden
waar vakbonden procedures mogen initiëren ook zonder toestemming van
hun werknemersleden. Het lijkt erop dat de bepalingen van de richtlijnen
doelen op het initiëren van gerechtelijke procedures namens of ter onder-
steuning van Uniewerknemers en gedetacheerde werknemers. Het blijft
dus kennelijk wel mogelijk om zonder toestemming van de werknemer een
procedure tegen eenwerkgever aan te spannenwegens niet-naleving van de
collectieve arbeidsovereenkomst. Dit dient dan wel uit hoofde van een
vordering tot nakoming van de collectieve arbeidsovereenkomst te geschie-
den. In dit onderzoek is vastgesteld dat buitenlandse werknemers veelal
geen rechtszaak tegen hun werkgever aanspannen. Door een extra eis te
stellen wordt het instellen van een procedure ook niet bevorderd.
Een nieuw aspect is de invoering van een gezamenlijke en hoofdelijke
aansprakelijkheid in het kader van detachering van werknemers. Tot dusver
bestaan er aansprakelijkheidsstelsels in Nederland (inlenersaansprakelijkheid,
ingevoerd in 2010 onder invloed van de EU-uitbreidingen) en in Duitsland
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(ketenaansprakelijkheid voor onderaannemers, geïntroduceerd in 1999 om
loondumping en illegale arbeid in de bouwsector tegen te gaan). Het
Nederlandse en Duitse stelsel verschillen van elkaar. Het Nederlandse stelsel
betreft een inlenersaansprakelijkheid op basis waarvan de uitzendwerknemer
de betaling van het netto minimumloon van de inlener kan vorderen. Het
Duitse stelsel is een ketenaansprakelijkheid voor onderaannemers en stelt de
werknemer in staat om zijn netto minimumuurloon van alle partijen in de
keten terug te vorderen. Ook al kent men geen inlenersaansprakelijkheid in
Zweden, er bestaat wel een functioneel equivalent. Op grond daarvan hebben
vakbonden het recht om te onderhandelen. Daarnaast mogen zij bezwaar
aantekenen tegen het inschakelen van een bepaalde onderaannemer door een
werkgever. Om dit instrument te kunnen gebruiken moeten zowel de
onderaannemer als de werkgever gebonden zijn aan een collectieve arbeids-
overeenkomst voor de betreffende werkzaamheden.
De Duitse ketenaansprakelijkheid werd aangevochten in de Wolff en
Müller-zaak. Het Hof van Justitie heeft in deze zaak duidelijk gemaakt dat
het EU-recht, en in het bijzonder de Detacheringsrichtlijn, een aansprake-
lijkheidssysteem, zoals aan de orde in Wolff en Müller, niet in de weg staat.
Een dergelijk systeem moet wel de grenzen die door het EU-recht en de
EU-rechtspraak worden gesteld respecteren. Volgens het Hof van Justitie
is het zo dat indien het recht op minimumloon een bestanddeel van
de bescherming van de werknemers vormt, de procedureregels waarmee
de eerbiediging van dit recht kan worden afgedwongen ook moeten
worden geacht een dergelijke bescherming te kunnen bieden.
Met de in 2014 aangenomen Handhavingsrichtlijn voor gedeta-
cheerde werknemers is er op EU-niveau een beperkte aansprakelijkheid
ingevoerd. Een van de redenen daarvoor, is dat blijkt dat werkgevers veelal
verdwijnen of nooit hebben bestaan (art. 12). Deze aansprakelijkheid is van
toepassing op werknemersrechten die zijn opgebouwd tijdens de contrac-
tuele relatie tussen de hoofdaannemer en diens onderaannemer. Lidstaten
zoals Duitsland mogen hun bestaande strengere aansprakelijkheidssysteem
blijven toepassen. Zij moeten er wel op letten dat het in overeenstemming is
met het EU-recht en niet-discriminatoir en proportioneel. Lidstaten zijn
verplicht om een aansprakelijkheidssysteem in te voeren voor de activiteiten
opgesomd in de Bijlage van de Detacheringsrichtlijn.
Voor activiteiten die niet in voornoemde Bijlage zijn opgenomen
kunnen lidstaten die geen onderaannemersaansprakelijkheid voor lonen
hebben, zoals Nederland en Zweden, andere maatregelen inzetten met
effectieve en proportionele sancties, mits in overeenstemming met het EU-
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recht en lidstatenrecht en/of praktijk. Het invoeren van een onderaan-
nemersaansprakelijkheid is optioneel. Niettemin kan deze ontwikkeling
lidstaten die geen aansprakelijkheidsstelsel kennen ertoe aanzetten om een
dergelijk stelsel in te voeren dan wel om bestaande handhavingsmaat-
regelen te onderzoeken en indien nodig te verbeteren mochten deze ontoe-
reikend zijn. Terwijl Nederland in de context van de Handhavingsrichtlijn
voor gedetacheerde werknemers overweegt om een onderaannemersaan-
sprakelijkheid in te voeren; hetzelfde blijkt niet ten aanzien van Zweden.
Zweden is misschien ook niet verplicht om een aansprakelijkheidsstelsel in
te voeren aangezien de lonen, zoals eerder aangegeven, niet op een wijze
zijn geregeld als voorgeschreven door de Detacheringsrichtlijn.
Ook geeft de rechtspraak van het Hof van Justitie richting aan de
wijze waarop de gerechten van de lidstaten nationale verjarings- en
vervaltermijnen moeten toepassen. Dit geldt ook ten aanzien van sancties
en remedies voor inbreuken op rechten die werknemers aan het EU-recht
ontlenen. Verjarings- en vervaltermijnen worden niet door het EU-recht
geregeld. Een dergelijke intentie bestaat ook niet. Niettemin moeten de
verschillende nationale verjarings- en vervaltermijnen voldoen aan de
beginselen van gelijkwaardigheid en effectiviteit zoals ontwikkeld door
het Hof van Justitie. Sinds de Von Colson en Kamann-zaak is bekend dat de
sancties die lidstaten opleggen vanwege een schending van het EU-recht
een daadwerkelijke en effectieve rechtsbescherming moeten bieden. Sanc-
ties moeten daarnaast een afschrikwekkend effect hebben op de werkge-
ver en in verhouding geschikt zijn ten aanzien van de schade die is
geleden. Dit leidt er toe dat een zuiver symbolische vergoeding ongeschikt
is. Daarnaast geldt onder art. 47 EU-handvest dat iedereen wiens rechten
die hij aan het EU-recht ontleent zijn geschonden het recht heeft op een
“doeltreffende voorziening in rechte”.
De Handhavingsrichtlijn voor gedetacheerde werknemers verplicht
lidstaten, in lijn met Von Colson en Kamann, “om inbreuken op de nationale
bepalingen uit hoofde van deze richtlijn te bestraffen […]. De vastgestelde
sancties moeten doeltreffend, evenredig en afschrikkend zijn” (art. 20).
Een dergelijke bepaling is niet te vinden in de Handhavingsrichtlijn voor
Uniewerknemers. Niettemin geeft overweging 29 aan dat, onder verwij-
zing naar de grondrechten, de richtlijn het recht op een doeltreffende
voorziening in rechte en een eerlijk proces eerbiedigt. Daarnaast bepaalt
de richtlijn dat lidstaten maatregelen moeten nemen die noodzakelijk zijn
om Uniewerknemers te beschermen voor tegenmaatregelen of ongunstige
gevolgen naar aanleiding van een klacht of procedure (art. 3 lid 6). Deze
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bepaling zou lidstaten ertoe kunnen aanzetten om bestaande sancties en
remedies in het kader van grensoverschrijdende mobiliteit te herzien.
Vastgesteld kan worden dat de EU wel degelijk invloed heeft op
onderdelen van de privaatrechtelijke handhavingsmethoden van de lid-
staten. De privaatrechtelijke handhaving in de context van grensover-
schrijdende werknemersmobiliteit is vereenvoudigd wat betreft de
toegang tot rechtsbescherming, niet alleen voor Uniewerknemers maar
ook, en wellicht in het bijzonder, voor gedetacheerde werknemers. De
beginselen van gelijkwaardigheid en effectiviteit zal van toepassing blij-
ven op de instrumenten die tot op een bepaalde hoogte gedeeltelijk zijn
geharmoniseerd.
3.3 Handhavingsmethode inzake de arbeidsverhoudingen
In hoofdstuk 6 wordt ingegaan op de handhavingsmethode binnen de
arbeidsverhouding op lidstatenniveau. Het geeft een overzicht van maat-
regelen die zijn aangenomen door de sociale partners om naleving van
collectief overeengekomen arbeidsrechten te verzekeren. De bestaande
instrumenten van de sociale partners op lidstatenniveau zijn voor een
groot deel onaangetast gebleven door de EU. EU-wetgeving creëert wel
een verplichting voor lidstaten, inhoudende dat zij moeten garanderen
dat sociale partners, binnen hun bevoegdheden, zich houden aan de
verplichtingen.
Richtlijnen zijn, zoals art. 288 VWEU aangeeft, verbindend voor de
lidstaten. Lidstaten zijn verantwoordelijk voor de goede en tijdige imple-
mentatie, toepassing en handhaving van EU-rechten van individuen. Op
lidstatenniveau ontlenen werknemers niettemin hun rechten vaak aan
(algemeen verbindende) collectieve arbeidsovereenkomsten. Collectieve
arbeidsovereenkomsten zijn overeenkomsten overeengekomen tussen
werkgevers- en werknemersorganisaties. Dat EU-rechten ook in collectie-
ve arbeidsovereenkomsten worden neergelegd is ook erkend op EU-
niveau in art. 154 VWEU. Volgens deze bepaling kunnen collectieve
arbeidsovereenkomsten door sociale partners op EU-niveau worden over-
eengekomen. Zij kunnen werking krijgen via een Raadsbesluit (die de
werking heeft van een richtlijn) of via autonome overeenkomsten die op
lidstatenniveau moeten worden geïmplementeerd, op een wijze die past
bij het arbeidsrecht en het arbeidsverhoudingensysteem van de betreffen-
de lidstaat. De rol van sociale partners is wel beter zichtbaar geworden
door de twee handhavingsrichtlijnen. Niettemin blijft de rol van de sociale
partners beperkt tot een rol voor sociale partners binnen de wettelijk
geregelde methoden voor toezicht en handhaving van arbeidsvoorwaarden
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en -omstandigheden. Maar een directe EU-invloed ten aanzien van de
handhavingsmethode inzake de arbeidsverhoudingen is niet te vinden.
Niettemin zijn indirecte invloeden zichtbaar. In de eerste plaats
verplicht het EU-recht, en in het bijzonder de twee handhavingsrichtlijnen,
ten aanzien van het geven van informatie aan buitenlandse werknemers
en buitenlandse dienstverleners lidstaten om de relevante (vertalingen
van) (algemeen verbindende) collectieve arbeidsovereenkomsten te geven.
De reden hiervoor is dat buitenlandse werknemers en dienstverleners
vaak niet op de hoogte zijn van hun rechten. Informatie daarover is
cruciaal omdat het de controle en handhaving ten goede komt. Dit heeft
tot gevolg dat lidstaten moeten verzekeren dat de sociale partners de
noodzakelijke inspanningen plegen ten aanzien van het beschikbaar
stellen van op zijn minst de kernarbeidsvoorwaarden in zo veel mogelijk
talen. Vanuit juridisch oogpunt is Zweden een goed voorbeeld. Afdeling
9a Detacheringswet (1999:678) verplicht sociale partners om hun collec-
tieve arbeidsovereenkomsten aan de WEA, het verbindingsbureau in het
kader van de Detacheringsrichtlijn, te verstrekken. Niettemin blijkt in de
praktijk dat deze bepaling niet wordt gehandhaafd. Er is enkel één
vertaalde en twee Zweedse collectieve arbeidsovereenkomsten op de
website van de WEA gepubliceerd. In Nederland en Duitsland zijn meer
(vertaalde) collectieve arbeidsovereenkomsten online ter beschikking ge-
steld, die buitenlandse werknemers en hun werkgevers kunnen raad-
plegen. Dit ondanks afwezigheid van een vergelijkbare bepaling. Ook
worden soms samenvattingen gepubliceerd.
Een indirecte EU-invloed speelt bij uitzendwerk, in het bijzonder in
Nederland. Hier hebben de 2004/07 EU-uitbreidingen tot gevolg gehad
dat de uitzendsector haar toezichts- en handhavingsrol heeft herzien. Dit
heeft de sociale partners ertoe aangezet om in 2004 een gezamenlijke
stichting met een controlerende en handhavende taak op te richten. De
hoofdfunctie van deze stichting is het verzekeren dat de in deze sector
algemeen verbindende collectieve arbeidsovereenkomst wordt nageleefd.
Zoals dit ook het geval is bij andere organisaties of instituties die met het
toezicht en handhaving zijn belast, kan het functioneren van de stichting
worden verbeterd. Tot dusver heeft de stichting veel gerechtelijke proce-
dures tegen uitzendbureaus gestart die de collectieve arbeidsovereen-
komst niet of niet volledig hebben nageleefd.
Een ander voorbeeld is de Zweedse ID06 identiteitsvoorwaarde.
Deze voorwaarde is ingevoerd door de sociale partners in de bouwsector.
Een identiteitsbadge ondersteunt de sociale partners bij het toezicht op en
de handhaving van de collectieve overeenkomsten. De identiteit van de
aanwezige werknemers en hun werkgevers kan met de badge relatief
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eenvoudig worden vastgesteld. Zonder identiteitsbadge krijgt men geen
toegang tot de bouwplaats. Ook Nederland overweegt, geïnspireerd door
het Zweedse model, een dergelijke identiteitsbadge in te voeren. De
uitkomsten van een pilootproject zijn echter op het moment van schrijven
nog niet gepubliceerd.
De uitoefening van het recht om collectieve actie te voeren is per
definitie een recht van sociale partners om hun eigen belangen en die van
hun leden te beschermen. In dit onderzoek is gesuggereerd dat een
collectieve actie strikt genomen niet als handhavingsinstrument kan worden
gekwalificeerd. Enkel belangenconflicten worden door dit recht bestreken.
Daar vallen rechtsconflicten die door de rechtbanken kunnen worden
beslecht niet onder. Ten aanzien van Zweden moet worden opgemerkt
dat het recht op collectieve actie belangrijk is. Het kan – zij het als ultimum
remedium – ingezet worden om een werkgever (indien nodig met solidari-
teitsacties) ertoe te dwingen een collectieve arbeidsovereenkomst of een
aanvullende overeenkomst te tekenen. Echter heeft Laval heeft duidelijk
sporen achter gelaten in het Zweedse arbeidsverhoudingenmodel. Wat deze
zaak heeft laten zien is dat, vanuit EU-perspectief, problemen kunnen
ontstaan indien een systeem afwijkt van de Detacheringsrichtlijn. Het EU-
recht schijnt het Zweedse model in het kader van de detachering van
werknemers niet te accepteren. Om het Zweedse model beter in overeen-
stemming te brengen heeft de Zweedse wetgever een beperkt recht op
collectieve actie in de Detacheringswet (1999:678) opgenomen. De Zweedse
wetgever is daarmee vrij ver gegaan. Daarnaast wordt het eigenlijke
probleem niet erkend, namelijk de wijze waarop een collectieve arbeids-
overeenkomst bindend kan zijn. De wijze waarop collectieve arbeidsover-
eenkomsten bindend kunnen zijn in Zweden, wordt niet expliciet op EU-
niveau, en in het bijzonder in de Detacheringsrichtlijn, erkend. Problema-
tisch is daarom niet het recht op collectieve actie als zodanig, maar een
combinatie van de wijze waarop collectieve arbeidsovereenkomsten bin-
dend zijn en hoe een niet gebonden werkgever gedwongen kan worden om
een collectieve arbeidsovereenkomst te tekenen. Ten aanzien van Zweden
moet ook worden opgemerkt dat het voor “buitenstaanders” (dat zijn
werkgevers en werknemers die niet lid zijn van een van de partijen die
hebben ondertekend) niet transparant is welke rechten en verplichtingen zij
onder bestaande collectieve arbeidsovereenkomsten hebben. Dit houdt
verband met wat eerder is gezegd, namelijk dat er in Zweden een gebrek
aan informatie bestaat ten aanzien van het publiceren van (de inhoud van)
collectieve arbeidsovereenkomsten. Dat betekent dat het model in principe
perfect werkt binnen een interne situatie, maar niet in een grensoverschrij-
dende detacheringssituatie. Dit is het gevolg van het overwicht van het vrij
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verkeer van diensten en de ongelijke behandeling tussen Uniewerknemers
en gedetacheerde werknemers.
Vastgesteld kan worden dat sociale partners in Nederland en
Zweden regelmatig op zoek zijn naar nieuwe oplossingen om hun
verantwoordelijkheid na te komen.
3.4 Bestuursrechtelijke handhavingsmethode
De bestuursrechtelijke handhavingsmethode is behandeld in hoofdstuk 7.
Binnen deze methode is er een belangrijke rol voor toezicht en handhaving
weggelegd voor overheidsinstanties. Vier onderwerpen zijn behandeld:
informatie en (grensoverschrijdende) bestuursrechtelijke samenwerking
tussen overheidsinstanties; maatregelen om naleving te controleren;
inspectie en handhaving; en sanctionering.
De EU heeft invloed gehad op de maatregelen die lidstaten hebben
genomen voor wat betreft het toezicht op en de handhaving van de naleving
van de EU-rechten van individuen. De invloed van de EU is vooral zichtbaar
binnen de bestuursrechtelijke handhavingsmethode. Dat is logisch. Lid-
staten zijn immers de voornaamste geadresseerden bij de toepassing, de
naleving en handhaving van EU-recht. Duidelijk is de Europese invloed ten
aanzien van het geven van informatie door overheidsinstellingen en grens-
overschrijdende samenwerking tussen handhavingsautoriteiten en/of ver-
bindingsbureaus. Daarnaast heeft het EU-recht invloed op de registratie van
Unieburgers en de notificatieverplichting voor het detacheren van werkne-
mers. Opgemerkt kan worden dat inspectie en handhaving uitgeoefend
door handhavingsinstanties voor een groot deel niet door het EU-recht
beïnvloed. Dit geldt ook voor sancties die kunnen worden opgelegd. De
beginselen van gelijkwaardigheid en effectiviteit en het vrij verkeer van
diensten spelen ook hier een rol.
Sterk beïnvloed door het EU-recht is het nationale recht omtrent het
detacheren van werknemers. De Detacheringsrichtlijn en nu ook de Hand-
havingsrichtlijn voor gedetacheerde werknemers, in combinatie met de
rechtspraak van het Hof van Justitie, bepalen dat lidstaten informatie
moeten geven aan dienstverleners. Deze informatie moet de kern van
rechten en verplichtingen voor dienstverleners en gedetacheerde werkne-
mers betreffen. Met betrekking tot Uniewerknemers bepaalt de Handha-
vingsrichtlijn voor Uniewerknemers dat lidstaten informatie moeten
geven aan Uniewerknemers en hun werkgevers (art. 6). Daarnaast geven
beide handhavingsrichtlijnen aan dat informatie ook beschikbaar moet
worden gesteld in meer dan een van de officiële talen van de EU.
Nederland, Duitsland en Zweden moeten op basis van het EU-recht
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werknemers (in verschillende talen) van informatie voorzien ten aanzien
van de kern van rechten en verplichtingen. Een dergelijke verplichting
bestaat niet ten aanzien van Uniewerknemers. Dat betekent echter niet dat
Uniewerknemers niet de behoefte hebben om te worden voorzien van
passende informatie over hun rechten. In het verlengde van deze informa-
tieverplichting, wordt ook aandacht besteedt aan de grensoverschrijdende
samenwerking tussen controlerende en handhavende instanties. Over-
heidsinstanties moeten met elkaar samenwerken om informatie uit te
wisselen. Om hieraan te voldoen hebben de onderzochte lidstaten bilate-
rale overeenkomsten met bevoegde instanties in andere lidstaten gesloten.
Daarnaast biedt IMI een EU-platform voor informatie-uitwisseling.
EU-recht staat toe dat lidstaten Unieburgers ertoe verplichten zich te
registeren in het land waarnaar deze burgers zijn verhuisd. Deze voor-
waarde geldt wanneer zij langer dan drie maanden in dat land verblijven.
Alle drie landen passen deze voorwaarde toe, onafhankelijk van het feit of
het gaat om een Uniewerknemer of een gedetacheerde werknemer. Voor
gedetacheerde werknemers geldt daarnaast een notificatieverplichting.
Een dergelijke verplichting bestaat in Duitsland en in Zweden en is voor
een groot deel vormgegeven door het Hof van Justitie en diens recht-
spraak. Notificatie is toegestaan, maar wat niet is toegestaan is dat
lidstaten de detachering afhankelijk maken van het gegeven dat de
dienstverlener een bevestiging heeft ontvangen. De rechtspraak heeft
ook vastgesteld dat het behouden en ter beschikking stellen van bepaalde
(vertaalde) documenten in overeenstemming is met het EU-recht. De
documenten moeten dan wel noodzakelijk zijn voor het controleren en
handhaven van de rechten die aan het EU-recht worden ontleend. De
Handhavingsrichtlijn voor gedetacheerde werknemers voorziet in codifi-
catie van deze rechtspraak van het Hof van Justitie. Notificatie kan
worden gezien als vervanging van de tewerkstellingsvergunning. Een
dergelijke vergunning mocht als gevolg van de rechtspraak van het Hof
van Justitie niet meer worden toegepast door lidstaten in het kader van
grensoverschrijdende detachering van werknemers.
De twee handhavingsrichtlijnen benadrukken dat passende en
uniforme toepassing en handhaving essentiële onderdelen zijn om de
rechten van Uniewerknemers en gedetacheerde werknemers te kunnen
garanderen. Een slechte handhaving zou de effectiviteit van het EU-recht
ondergraven. De Handhavingsrichtlijn voor gedetacheerde werknemers
bepaalt dat lidstaten voor voldoende personeel moeten zorgen die hand-
haaft. Het personeel moet de nodige bevoegdheden en kwalificaties hebben
om inspecties effectief uit te kunnen voeren en om informatieaanvragen
te bevorderen. Niet geregeld op EU-niveau zijn de registratie- of vergun-
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ningverplichtingen voor uitzendbureaus. Dat betekent dat lidstaten vrij zijn
om dergelijke voorwaarden te stellen, mits in overeenstemming met de vrij
verkeer bepalingen. In het kader van sancties bepaalt EU-rechtspraak
dat lidstaten maatregelen moeten nemen die passend, effectief en afschrik-
wekkend zijn.
Vanuit rechtsvergelijkend perspectief kan worden vastgesteld dat
Duitsland en Nederland vergelijkbare bestuursrechtelijke handhavings-
methoden hebben. Het verschil bestaat er enkel in dat deze methoden zich
in een ander tempo hebben ontwikkeld. De Duitse methode is ontwikkeld
voorafgaand aan de implementatie van de Detacheringsrichtlijn. De
Nederlandse bestuursrechtelijke handhavingsmethode is in het kader
van toezicht op en handhaving van het wettelijk minimumloon in 2007
ingevoerd. De EU-uitbreidingen 2004/07 hebben in Nederland ten aan-
zien van de handhavingsmethoden een verschuiving doen plaatsvinden.
Van een puur privaatrechtelijke handhaving is Nederland overgegaan
naar een combinatie bestaande uit privaatrechtelijke en bestuursrechtelijke
handhaving. De Zweedse ontwikkeling wat betreft bestuursrechtelijke
handhaving verschilt van het Nederlandse en Duitse systeem. In principe
zijn het de sociale partners die zijn toegerust met het toezicht op en
de handhaving van het arbeidsrecht. Niettemin heeft de WEA een nieuwe
opdracht gekregen, namelijk het beheer van de notificatieverplichting die
op dienstverleners van toepassing is. Deze verplichting is per juli 2013
ingevoerd naar aanleiding van de Laval-zaak. Sociale partners blijven
verantwoordelijk voor de naleving en handhaving van collectieve arbeids-
overeenkomsten. Deze maatregel is ingevoerd om meer inzicht te krijgen
in de vraag wie actief is op de Zweedse arbeidsmarkt. De WEA kan enkel
de naleving van arbeidsomstandigheden controleren en handhaven.
De drie landen verschillen wat betreft de organisaties die belast zijn
met toezicht op en handhaving van (bepaalde delen van) het arbeidsrecht.
De Nederlandse ISZW is bevoegd binnen alle arbeidsrechtgebieden. De
Duitse FKS was in eerste instantie enkel verantwoordelijk voor zwartwerk
en is pas later bevoegd gemaakt om naleving van de kernarbeidsvoor-
waarden in overeenstemming met de AEntG (deze implementeert de
Detacheringsrichtlijn), te verzekeren. De Zweedse WEA heeft de minste
bevoegdheden. Het is enkel bevoegd in het kader van arbeidsomstandig-
heden. Daarnaast beheert het de notificatieverplichting in de context van
de detachering van werknemers.
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4. Slotconclusies
Op basis van bovengenoemde bevindingen wordt duidelijk dat het EU-
recht en de rechtspraak voorwaarden stellen en vaak ook beperkingen
opleggen aan lidstaten over hoe zij arbeidsvoorwaarden van buitenlandse
werknemers moeten handhaven. De invloeden, oftewel beperkingen, zijn
doen zich meer voor in het kader van het vrij verkeer van diensten dan in
het kader van het vrij verkeer van werknemers. Juist het vrij verkeer van
diensten heeft, bezien vanuit het perspectief van de (oude) lidstaten,
invloed op de handhavingssystemen van de lidstaten. Dit met oog op
het probleemloos toepassen van het vrij verkeer van diensten zonder al te
veel invloed door het ontvangstland. Nu volgen een aantal afsluitende
opmerkingen.
Kijkend naar de wijze waarop en de mate waarin de EU invloed
heeft uitgeoefend op de handhavingsmethoden van de lidstaten, kan het
volgende worden geconcludeerd. De handhavingsmethoden in Nederland
en Duitsland (dat zijn de continentale modellen) zijn gaandeweg gecon-
vergeerd. In het bijzonder kunnen we een geleidelijke ontwikkeling naar
“juridische harmonisatie” zien als het doel de juridische verschillen die
bestaan tussen de lidstaten ten aanzien van het vrij verkeer van werkne-
mers en van diensten te verkleinen. Beide vrij verkeersrechten zijn erop
gericht individuen zoveel mogelijk vrijheid te geven. Ondanks harmoni-
satie heeft de EU een lappendeken aan handhavingsinstrumenten ge-
creëerd. De lappendeken vertoont geen coherentie, zoals die ten aanzien
van de drie handhavingsmethoden wel bestaat op lidstatenniveau. Lid-
staten geven de voorkeur aan een coherent handhavingssysteem zonder te
veel EU-inmenging. Een dergelijke coherentie, zoals volgt uit onderhavige
studie, wordt gecreëerd door de eigen structuur van het handhavings-
systeem. Daarbij ondersteunt de ene handhavingsmethode de andere
waar (mogelijke) leemtes bestaan ten aanzien van de handhaving van
het EU-recht. De beperkte mogelijkheid van de EU om (de handhaving
van) het arbeidsrecht te harmoniseren vloeit voort uit de beperkte com-
petenties op het gebied van het arbeidsrecht die de EU op grond van de
verdragen heeft. Niettemin blijkt de EU – tot op zekere hoogte – invloed te
hebben op de coherentie van de handhavingssystemen van de lidstaten.
Het is voornamelijk het vrij verkeer van diensten dat de meeste moeilijk-
heden creëert voor het arbeidsrecht.
Het algemene uitgangspunt binnen het arbeidsrecht is gelijke behan-
deling van werknemers die vergelijkbaar werk verrichten. Dit ligt ook ten
grondslag aan art. 45 VWEU betreffende het vrij verkeer van werknemers.
Dit beginsel geldt echter niet indien werknemers worden gedetacheerd op
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basis van het recht op vrij verkeer van diensten van hun werkgever. Dit, in
combinatie met de beperkingen opgelegd door de rechtspraak van het
Hof van Justitie ten aanzien van lidstatelijke handhavingsinstrumenten en
de Handhavingsrichtlijn inzake gedetacheerde werknemers, kan tot gevolg
hebben dat toezicht en handhaving op lidstatenniveau wordt bemoeilijkt.
De verschillende gevolgen kunnen de ontvangende lidstaten ontmoedigen
(of hebben de lidstaten ontmoedigd) de rechten die gedetacheerde werkne-
mers aan het EU-recht ontlenen te verzekeren.
Vanuit rechtsvergelijkend perspectief kan worden opgemerkt dat de
verschillende methodes waarop het arbeidsrecht wordt gehandhaafd het
meest zijn aangepast in Nederland. Dit is echter niet het resultaat van de
implementatie van EU-recht. De voornaamste reden voor de verschuiving
van een puur gerechtelijk handhavingssysteem naar een gecombineerd
systeem bestaande uit bestuursrechtelijke en privaatrechtelijke handha-
ving is gelegen in de EU-uitbreidingen 2004/07. De Nederlandse sociale
partners blijven verantwoordelijk voor de collectieve arbeidsovereenkom-
sten die zij overeen zijn gekomen. Duitsland had al een robuust systeem
voordat de Detacheringsrichtlijn werd aangenomen. In feite heeft Duits-
land op deze ontwikkeling geanticipeerd. Het Zweedse arbeidsrecht- en
arbeidsverhoudingenmodel verschilt van de Nederlandse en Duitse
modellen. Het Zweedse systeem past niet binnen de ideeën van de EU
over hoe arbeidsrechten geregeld zouden moeten worden in het kader van
detachering van werknemers. De Detacheringsrichtlijn staat nationale
reguleringen toe, zoals een nationaal wettelijk minimumloon en algemeen
verbindend verklaarde collectieve arbeidsovereenkomsten die (expliciet)
van toepassing zijn op werknemers binnen een bepaalde sector. Daarnaast
staat de Detacheringsrichtlijn andere wijzen toe om collectieve arbeids-
overeenkomsten te reguleren. De richtlijn erkent echter niet dat een
handtekening van de werkgever is vereist teneinde de werkgever te
verplichten om een collectieve arbeidsovereenkomst na te leven. Het
invoeren van een nationaal wettelijk minimumloon of een systeem waar-
mee een collectieve arbeidsovereenkomst algemeen verbindend kan wor-
den verklaard zou het Zweedse model van arbeidsverhoudingen ernstig
verstoren. Daarnaast zouden deze instrumenten als ‘vreemde substanties’
worden gezien die niet in het Zweedse model passen. Hetzelfde kan
worden gezegd met betrekking tot de notificatieverplichting die in juli
2013 is ingevoerd. Tot dusver is het Zweedse model, voor een groot deel,
immuun tegen EU-inmengingen.
Het is zeker eenvoudiger voor landen zoals Duitsland en Nederland
om hun continentale handhavingssystemen aan EU-standaarden aan
Bevindingen
335
te passen dan voor Zweden.1 Er bestaat daarom een grotere convergentie
tussen de Nederlandse en Duitse handhavingssystemen. De verschillende
vormen van werknemersmobiliteit maken het moeilijk voor met toezicht
en handhaving belaste betrokkenen.
Op EU-niveau wordt voornamelijk gefocust op de bestuursrechte-
lijke handhaving. Daarvoor zou men a huge army of labour inspectors
moeten hebben om zo de algemene naleving van arbeidsrechten te kunnen
verzekeren.2 Op grond van bezuinigingen in de lidstaten overstijgen de
kosten voor een dergelijke army het overheidsbudget. Daarnaast moet
worden benadrukt dat arbeidsrecht niet alleen publiekrechtelijk wordt
gecontroleerd en gehandhaafd. Nadruk blijkt ook te worden gelegd op de
privaatrechtelijke handhavingsmethode. Ook deze handhavingsmethode
kent een aantal tekortkomingen. Werknemers zijn zich vaak niet bewust
van hun rechten en de mogelijkheden deze rechten te handhaven. Belang-
rijk is daarnaast dat het aantekenen van bezwaar of het handhaven van
arbeidsrechten kan leiden tot ontslag van de migrerende werknemers. Dit
ontmoedigt werknemers om bezwaar te maken. Een beter bewustzijn op
EU-niveau over hoe lidstaten arbeidsrecht handhaven kan zeker positief
bijdragen aan de wijze waarop en de mate waarin EU-recht probeert het
gedrag van de lidstaten in een bepaalde richting te duwen. Dat sluit niet
uit dat handhaving op lidstatenniveau alles behalve ideaal werkt. Ook
hier kunnen zeker verbeteringen worden aangebracht. Daarbij valt voor-
namelijk te denken aan het verbeteren van de informatieverspreiding, mits
dit dan wel werkelijk gebeurt. Communicatie tussen overheidsorganen en
sociale partners is onvermijdelijk.
5. Een paar afsluitende gedachten: het recht als systeem en de theorie
van reflexieve harmonisatie
De EU probeert steeds meer invloed uit te oefenen op de wijze waarop en
de mate waarin lidstaten EU-rechten van werknemers in grensoverschrij-
dende situaties moeten handhaven. De EU is een complex systeem: het
heeft niet alleen een sui generis rechtssysteem, maar het tracht ook de 28
verschillende rechtssystemen van de lidstaten te reguleren. Iedere regel
die op EU-niveau wordt aangenomen, kan reacties in het recht en de
praktijk van de lidstaten oproepen. Echter in een EU met 28 lidstaten kan
men nauwelijks voorspellen welke invloed een regel heeft, ook al is het
1 See on this also: Rönnmar (2010b) 190.
2 Collins (2010) 29-30.
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doel van deze regel duidelijk. Een one-size-fits-all handhavingsmodel dat
in alle lidstaten zou kunnen worden toegepast bestaat niet. Sterman geeft
aan dat:
“[…] most of the changes we now struggle to comprehend arise as consequences,
intended and unintended, of humanity itself. All too often, well intentioned
efforts to solve pressing problems lead to policy resistance, where our policies are
delayed, diluted, or defeated by the unforeseen reactions of other people or of
nature. Many times our best efforts to solve a problem actually make it worse”.3
Hoe valt te verklaren waarom de EU soms wel en soms niet lidstaten kan
beïnvloeden ten aanzien van de wijze waarop zij het arbeidsrecht con-
troleren en handhaven en waarom lidstaten soms weerstand bieden ten
aanzien van overheidsbeleid? Een mogelijke verklaring daarvoor kan
worden gevonden in de systeemtheorie. Op grond van deze theorie
bestaat ieder rechtssysteem uit een autonoom functioneel systeem, geïn-
tegreerd in de maatschappij, de economie, de maatschappij en het poli-
tieke systeem.4 Het rechtssysteem wordt als zodanig gestuurd door de
behoefte om zijn eigen autopoiese (dat wil zeggen zelfreferentialiteit en
zelfreproductie) te beschermen.5 De zelfreferentiële eenheid van het recht
staat toe dat het recht zichzelf opnieuw interpreteert tegen de achtergrond
van externe behoeften en vragen.6 Dit laat niet alleen de beperkingen,
maar ook de mogelijkheden, van het recht als een mechanisme voor
sociale verandering zien.7
Het recht vanuit een autopoietisch perspectief bezien is “opera-
tioneel gesloten”, maar “cognitief open”. Operationele geslotenheid bete-
kent dat het rechtssysteem zichzelf reproduceert door naar zijn interne
structuren en wijzen waarop het werkt te verwijzen. Dat betekent dat
alleen het recht recht kan produceren. Cognitieve openheid betekent dat
het systeem in de loop der tijd evolueert doordat het naar een externe
context verwijst, bestaande uit andere systemen.8 Operationele gesloten-
heid “[…] renders the domestic legal systems highly resistant to any
intervention by the Community authorities which seeks to prescribe
supranational legislative norms understood and applied identically in
3 Sterman (2000) 3.
4 Rogowski & Deakin (2012) 230.
5 Rogowski & Deakin (2012).
6 Teubner (1983) 249.
7 Rogowski & Deakin (2012) 230.
8 Rogowski & Deakin (2012) 231.
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every Member State”.9 Indien juridische verandering wordt aangebracht,
reflecteert deze verandering een interne dynamiek die de externe om-
geving beïnvloedt.10
In lijn hiermee is de theorie van reflexieve harmonisatie tot stand
gekomen. Deze theorie is geëvolueerd “[…] from two separate strands of
academic thinking about how best to regulate the Single Market: the first
on competition between legal orders and social dumping within Europe;
the second concerning a systems analysis of the relationship between
Community law and the domestic jurisdictions of the Member States”.11
Reflexieve harmonisatie heeft een groot voordeel. Het kan de bestaande
juridische diversiteit binnen de EU in stand houden en, tot op zekere
hoogte, de nationale autonomie ten aanzien van het besluitvormings-
proces. Het leidt niet tot convergentie of onderlinge aanpassing. Daarbij
worden de regels in het kader van de verwezenlijking van de interne
markt in acht genomen.12
Het idee van reflexieve harmonisatie is ontleend aan de theorie van
reflexief recht. Het geeft een analytisch raamwerk om de werking en
gevolgen van EU-recht te bestuderen en om EU (sociale) politiek te
evalueren.13 Reflexief recht is in staat om te erkennen “that regulatory
interventions are most likely to be successful when they seek to achieve
their ends not by direct prescription, but by inducing ‘second-order effects’ on
the part of social actors” (cursivering MK).14 Reflexief recht heeft daarom
invloed op de vormgeving van regelingen.15 Het doelt op het geven van
voorwaarden voor zelfregulering. Dit betekent een verschuiving van
materieel naar procedureel recht. Een onderscheid moet worden gemaakt
tussen de vormen van het recht en hun regulerende functie. De vormen
van het recht zeggen niets over de vraag hoe partijen de informatie
ontvangen en hoe zij daarop reageren binnen een andere systemische
context.16 Wat betreft regelgevende vormen doelt reflexief recht op het
geven en structureren van mechanismen voor zelfregulering (bijvoorbeeld
onderhandeling, decentralisatie, plannen en georganiseerde conflicten).
Een reflexieve benadering geeft mogelijkheden voor het recht om
sociale veranderingen tot stand te brengen.17 Zoals door Hepple aange-
9 Dougan (2003) 124.
10 Teubner (1983) 249.
11 Dougan (2003) 113, with reference to Barnard, Deakin & Hobbs (2001).
12 Barnard & Deakin (2000) 332.
13 Rogowski & Deakin (2012) 229.
14 Barnard & Deakin (2000) 341.
15 Teubner (1983) 251.
16 Rogowski & Deakin (2012) 232.
17 Rogowski & Deakin (2012) 230.
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geven, “[o]ne should not expect law to change behaviour by simple
‘command and control’”.18 Door van een reflexieve benadering uit te
gaan is het mogelijk om ieder rechtssysteem te reconstrueren en de
informatie die op EU-niveau wordt gegeven te incorporeren “according
to its own internal reality such that it becomes absorbed into, but also
stimulates the ongoing evolution of, the self-referential unit”.19 Op basis
hiervan zou het EU-recht zich moeten beperken tot het stellen van
minimumvoorwaarden. De wetgeving van de lidstaten kan dan voor-
waarden stellen in lijn met de eigen autonomie en diversiteit. Het
nationale recht kan dan evolueren in het licht van de algemene beginselen
van het EU-recht. Door “second-order effects” kan de EU beter haar
beleidsdoelstellingen bereiken.20
Het EU-recht en de EU-rechtspraak geven minimale en maximale
voorwaarden ten aanzien van grensoverschrijdende handhaving van
arbeidsvoorwaarden. De drie onderzochte landen hebben hun regels en
praktijk enkel aangepast voor zover dit ook past binnen hun rechts-
systeem. Ofschoon er diverse overeenkomsten bestaan ten aanzien van
de handhaving van arbeidsvoorwaarden, verschillen de rechtssystemen
van de lidstaten van elkaar. Dit lijkt in lijn te zijn met de idee van
reflexieve harmonisatie. Dit idee staat echter onder druk, in het bijzonder
door de zaken Viking en Laval. Als gevolg van deze twee zaken lijkt het dat
volgens het Hof van Justitie, de juridische diversiteit die nog steeds bestaat
in alle drie de bestudeerde landen en die ten grondslag ligt aan het idee
van reflexieve harmonisatie wordt gezien als een bedreiging van de
interne markt.21 Om het gedrag van de lidstaten in lijn met de theorie
van reflexieve harmonisatie succesvol te beïnvloeden, moet de EU diver-
siteit juist accepteren. Zoals gezegd, er bestaat in een EU met 28 lidstaten
geen one-size-fits-all model.
18 Hepple (2011) 320.
19 Dougan (2003) 125.
20 Deakin (2001) 211.
21 Rogowski & Deakin (2012) 247.
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1612/68 and repealing Directives
64/221/EEC, 68/360/EEC, 72/
194/EEC, 73/148/EEC, 75/34/
EEC, 75/35/EEC, 90/364/EEC,
90/365/EEC and 93/96/EEC
[2004] OJ L158/77 (‘Citizens’
Rights Directive’)
Directive 2005/36/EC on the re-
cognition of professional qualifica-
tions [2005] OJ L255/22
Directive 2006/123/EC on services
in the internal market [2006] OJ
L376/36
Directive 2008/104/EC of 19 No-
vember 2008 on temporary agency
work [2008] OJ L327/9 (‘Tempor-
ary Agency Work Directive’)
Directive 2009/52/EC of 18 June
2009 providing for minimum stan-
dards on sanctions and measures
against employers of illegally stay-
ing third-country nationals [2009]
OJ L168/24
Directive 2014/54/EU of 16 April
2014 on measures facilitating the
exercise of rights conferred on
workers in the context of freedom
of movement for workers [2014] OJ
L128/8 (‘Union Workers Enforce-
ment Directive’)
Directive 2014/67/EU of 15 May
2014 on the enforcement of Direc-
tive 96/71/EC concerning the post-
ing of workers in the framework of
the provision of services and
amending Regulation (EU) No
1024/2012 on administrative coop-
eration through the Internal Market
Information System (‘the IMI Reg-
ulation’) [2014] OJ L159/11
(‘Posted Workers Enforcement
Directive’)
EU policy documents
Commission, ‘Amended proposal
for a Council Directive concerning
the posting of workers in the frame-
work of the provision of Services’
COM(93) 225 final
Commission, ‘Guidance on the
posting of workers in the frame-
work of the provision of services’
(Communication) COM(2006) 159
final
Commission, ‘Green Paper on
Modernising labour law to meet
the challenges of the 21st century’
COM(2006) 708
Commission, ‘Reaffirming the free
movement of workers: rights and
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major developments’ (Communica-
tion) COM(2010) 373 final
Commission, ‘Minimizing regula-
tory burden for SMEs: Adapting
EU regulation to the needs of mi-
cro-enterprises’ (Report) COM
(2011) 803 final
Commission, ‘Proposal for a Coun-
cil Regulation on the exercise of the
right to take collective action
within the context of the freedom
of establishment and the freedom
to provide services’ COM(2012) 130
final
Commission, ‘Proposal for a Direc-
tive of the European Parliament
and of the Council on the enforce-
ment of Directive 96/71/EC con-
cerning the posting of workers in
the framework of the provision of
services’ COM(2012) 131 final
Commission, ‘Proposal for a Direc-
tive of the European Parliament of
the Council on measures facilitat-
ing the exercise of rights conferred
on workers in the context of free-
dom of movement for workers’
COM(2013) 236 final
Commission, ‘Towards a European
Horizontal Framework for Collec-
tive Redress’ (Communication)
COM(2013) 401/2
Commission Recommendation of
31 March 2008 on enhanced admin-
istrative cooperation in the context
of the posting of workers in the
framework of the provision of ser-
vices (2008/C 85/01)
Council, ‘Enforcement of Directive
96/71/EC concerning the posting
of workers in the framework of the
provision of services – General ap-
proach’, 4 December 2013, doc.
17075/13
Resolution of the Council and the
Representatives of the Govern-
ments of the Member States, Meet-
ing within the Council of 22 April
1999 on a Code of Conduct for
improved cooperation between
authorities of the Member States
concerning the combating of trans-
national social security benefit and
contribution fraud and undeclared
work, and concerning the transna-
tional hiring-out of workers (1999/
C 125/01)
Dutch legislation
Beleidsregels bestuurlijke handha-
ving Wet minimumloon en Mini-
mumvakantiebijslag 2013, 4
december 2012, Stcrt. 2012, 25532
Besluit van 2 september 1996, hou-
dende aanwijzing van een aantal
arbeidsverhoudingen die als
dienstbetrekking als bedoeld in ar-
tikel 2 van de Wet minimumloon
en minimumvakantiebijslag wor-
den beschouwd, last amended by
Act of 13 October 2012, Stb. 2012,
484
Besluit van 10 november 2005 tot
wijziging van het Besluit uitvoering
Wet arbeid vreemdelingen en van
het Vreemdelingenbesluit 2000, Stb.
2005, 577
Besluit wettelijke rente, last
amended by Act of 25 June 2012,
Stb. 2012, 285
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Buitengewoon Besluit Arbeidsver-
houdingen 1945, last amended by
Act of 17 July 2013, Stb. 2013, 332
Handelsregisterbesluit 2008, Stb.
2008, 240, last amended by Decree
of 18 December 2013, Stb. 2013, 581
Handelsregisterwet 2007, last
amended by Act of 18 December
2013, Stb. 2014, 14
Invorderingswet 1990, last
amended by Act of 18 December
2013, Stb. 2013, 567
Regeling van de Minister van So-
ciale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid
van 13 mei 2014, 2014-0000059768,
tot aanpassing van het wettelijk
minimumloon per 1 juli 2014
Toetsingskader Algemeen Verbin-
dend Verklaring CAO-bepalingen
(AVV), last amended by Regulation
of 28 November 2013, Stcrt. 2013,
34009
Wet aanscherping handhaving en
sanctiebeleid SZW-wetgeving, 4
October 2012, Stb. 2012, 462
Wet allocatie arbeidskrachten door
intermediairs, last amended by Act
of 9 October 2013, Stb. 2013, 405
(Waadi)
Wet arbeidsvoorwaarden grens-
overschrijdende arbeid 1999, 2 De-
cember 1999, Stb. 1999, 554
(WAGA)
Wet arbeid vreemdelingen, last
amended by Act of 11 December
2013, Stb. 2014, 138 (WAV)
Wet basisregistratie personen, last
amended by Act of 10 July 2013,
Stb. 2013, 316
Wet minimumloon en minimumva-
kantiebijslag 1968, last amended by
Act of 13 May 2014, Stcrt. 2014,
13936 (WML)
Wet op het algemeen verbindend
en het onverbindend verklaren van
bepalingen van collectieve arbeids-
overeenkomsten 1937, last
amended by Act of 9 October
2013, Stb. 2013, 405 (Wet AVV)
Wet op de collectieve arbeidsover-
eenkomst 1927, last amended by
Act of 7 December 2006, Stb. 2006,
706 (Wet CAO)
Wetboek van Burgerlijke Rechts-
vordering, last amended by Act of
28 November 2013, Scrt. 2013, 486
(Rv)
Wet op de loonvorming 1968, last
amended by Act of 28 January
1999, Stb. 1999, 30
Wet op de rechtsbijstand 1993, last
amended by Act of 10 July 2013,
Stb. 2013, 316
Wet van 19 februari 2005 tot aan-
passing van de Wet op de rechtsbij-
stand aan richtlijn 2003/8/EG van
de Raad van 27 januari 2003 tot
verbetering van de toegang tot de
rechter bij grensoverschrijdende
geschillen, door middel van ge-
meenschappelijke minimumvoor-
schriften betreffende rechtsbijstand
bij die geschillen, Stb. 2005, 90
Wet van 1 december 2005 tot wijzi-
ging van de Wet op het algemeen
verbindend en onverbindend ver-
klaren van bepalingen van collec-
tieve arbeidsovereenkomsten in
verband met de uitbreiding van
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de werkingssfeer van de wet ar-
beidsvoorwaarden grensoverschrij-
dende arbeid, Stb. 2005, 626
Wet van 23 december 2009 tot wij-
ziging van titel 7.10 (arbeidsover-
eenkomst) van het Burgerlijk
Wetboek in verband met de tot-
standbrenging van een inlenersaan-
sprakelijkheid met betrekking tot
de voldoening van het toepasselijke
minimumloon en de toepasselijke
minimumvakantiebijslag, Stb.
2009, 620
Wet van 23 maart 2012 tot wijzi-
ging van de Wet arbeid vreemde-
lingen in verband met de
implementatie van de Richtlijn
nr. 2009/52/EG van het Europees
Parlement en de Raad van 18 juni
2009 tot vaststelling van minimum-
normen inzake sancties en maatre-
gelen tegen werkgevers van illegaal
verblijvende onderdanen van
derde landen (PbEU 2009 L 168),
Stb. 2012, 143
Wijzigingswet Burgerlijk Wetboek,
het Buitengewoon Besluit Arbeids-
verhoudingen 1945 enz. (Flexibili-
teit en zekerheid), last amended by
Act of 20 December 2006, Stb. 2006,
647
Dutch policy documents
Kamerstukken II 1967/68, 9574, nr. 3
Kamerstukken II 1990/91, 26855, nr. 3
Kamerstukken II 1991/92, 22486, nr. 3
Kamerstukken II 1996/97, 25263, nr. 3
Kamerstukken II 1998/99, 26524, nr. 6
Kamerstukken II 1998/99, 26693, nr. 3
Kamerstukken II 1999/00, 26855, nr. 3
Kamerstukken II 2002/03, 28863, nr. 3
Kamerstukken II 2003/04, 29523, nr. 3
Kamerstukken II 2004/05, 29407, nrs.
24 and 30
Kamerstukken II 2004/05, 29983, nr. 3
Kamerstukken II 2005/06, 30678, nrs.
3 and 7
Kamerstukken II 2006/07, 29406, nrs.
73 and 75
Kamerstukken II 2007/08, 30678, nr. 8
Kamerstukken II 2008/09, 31833, nrs.
3 and 4
Kamerstukken II 2009/10, 32486, nr. 3
Kamerstukken II 2010/11, 29407, nrs.
118 and 132
Kamerstukken II 2010/11, 32486, nr. 5
Kamerstukken II 2010/11, 32872, nr. 6
Kamerstukken II 2010/11, 32895, nrs.
3 and 5
Kamerstukken II 2011/12, 17050, nr.
419, bijlage 1
Kamerstukken II 2011/12, 32896, nrs.
3, 7, and 8
Kamerstukken II 2012/13, 17050, nr.
428
Kamerstukken II 2012/13, 29407, nr.
173
Kamerstukken II 2012/13, 33579, nr. 8
Handelingen II 2011/12, 58, item 6
German legislation
Abgabenordnung in der Fassung
der Bekanntmachung vom 1. Okto-
ber 2002 (BGBl. I S. 3866; 2003 I S.
61), die zuletzt durch Artikel 13 des
Gesetzes vom 18. Dezember 2013
(BGBl. I S. 4318) geändert worden
ist
Arbeitnehmerüberlassungsgesetz in
der Fassung der Bekanntmachung
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vom 3. Februar 1995 (BGBl. I S. 158),
das zuletzt durch Artikel 4 Absatz
46 des Gesetzes vom 7. August 2013
(BGBl. I S. 3154) geändert worden ist
(BGBl. I S. 3154)
Arbeitsgerichtsgesetz in der Fas-
sung der Bekanntmachung vom 2.
Juli 1979 (BGBl. I S. 853, 1036), das
zuletzt durch Artikel 3 des Ge-
setzes vom 10. Oktober 2013
(BGBl. I S. 3786) geändert worden
ist
Bundesurlaubsgesetz in der im
Bundesgesetzblatt Teil III, Gliede-
rungsnummer 800-4, veröffentlich-
ten bereinigten Fassung, das
zuletzt durch Artikel 3 Absatz 3
des Gesetzes vom 20. April 2013
(BGBl. I S. 868) geändert worden ist
Erste Verordnung über eine Loh-
nuntergrenze in der Arbeitnehmer-
überlassung vom 21. Dezember
2011 (BAnz. 2011 Nr. 195 S. 4608)
Zweite Verordnung über eine Loh-
nuntergrenze in der Arbeitnehmer-
überlassung vom 26. März 2014
(BAnz AT 26.03.2014 V1)
Gesetz über das Ausländerzentral-
register (AZR-Gesetz) vom 2. Sep-
tember 1994, BGBl. I, 2265,
amended by Artikel 2 des Gesetzes
vom 29. August 2013, BGBl. I, 3484
Gesetz über die allgemeine Freizü-
gigkeit von Unionsbürgern vom 30
Juli 2004, BGBl. I, 1950, lastly
amended by Artikel 2 und Artikel
8 G zur Anpassung von Re-
chtsvorschriften des Bundes infolge
des Beitritts der Republik Kroatien
zur EU vom 17. Juni 2013,
BGBl. I, 1555 iVm Bek. v. 21. Juni
2013, BGBl. II, 680
Gesetz über Ordnungswidrigkeiten
in der Fassung der Bekanntma-
chung vom 19. Februar 1987
(BGBl. I S. 602), das durch Artikel
18 des Gesetzes vom 10. Oktober
2013 (BGBl. I S. 3786) geändert
worden ist
Gesetz über zwingende Arbeitsbe-
dingungen für grenzüberschreitend
entsandte und für regelmäßig im
Inland beschäftigte Arbeitnehmer
und Arbeitnehmerinnen (Arbeit-
nehmer-Entsendegesetz – AEntG)
vom 20. April 2009 (BGBl. I S.
799), das zuletzt durch Artikel 1
des Gesetzes vom 24. Mai 2014
(BGBl. I S. 538) geändert worden ist
Gesetz zu dem Vertrag vom 12.
Januar 2012 zwischen der Bundes-
republik Deutschland und dem Kö-
nigreich der Niederlande über die
Zusammenarbeit bei der Bekämp-
fung des grenzüberschreitenden
Missbrauchs bei Sozialversicher-
ungsleistungen und -beiträgen
durch Erwerbstätigkeit und bei
Leistungen der Grundsicherung
für Arbeitsuchende sowie von nicht
angemeldeter Erwerbstätigkeit und
illegaler grenzüberschreitender Lei-
harbeit (Deutsch-Niederländischer
Vertrag zur Bekämpfung grenzü-
berschreitender Schwarzarbeit)
v. 16.04.2013, BGBl. II 2013, 378
Gesetz zur Umsetzung gemein-
schaftsrechtlicher Vorschriften
über die grenzüberschreitende Pro-
zesskostenhilfe in Zivil- und Han-
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delssachen in den Mitgliedstaaten
(EG-Prozesskostenhilfegesetz), 20
December 2004, BGBl. 2004 I,
3392, as lastly amended by Gesetz
zur Änderung des Prozesskosten-
hilfe- und Beratungshilferechts, 31.
August 2013, BGBl. 2013 I, 3533
Gesetz zur Erleichterung der Be-
kämpfung von illegaler Beschäfti-
gung und Schwarzarbeit vom 23.
Juli 2002
Gesetz zu Korrekturen in der So-
zialversicherung und zur Siche-
rung der Arbeitnehmerrechte,
BGBl. I, 3843 vom 19. Dezember
1998
Meldegesetz fürdasLandNordrhein-
Westfalen (Meldegesetz NRW – MG
NRW) in der Fassung der Bekannt-
machung vom 16. September 1997
Melderechtsrahmengesetz in der
Fassung der Bekanntmachung
vom 19. April 2002 (BGBl. I S.
1342), das durch Artikel 2 des Ge-
setzes vom 28. August 2013 (BGBl.
I S. 3458) geändert worden ist
Mindestarbeitsbedingungengesetz
in der im Bundesgesetzblatt Teil III,
Gliederungsnummer 802-2, veröf-
fentlichten bereinigten Fassung,
das zuletzt durch Artikel 1 des
Gesetzes vom 22. April 2009
(BGBl. I S. 818) geändert worden ist
Schwarzarbeitsbekämpfungsgesetz
vom 23.07.2004, BGBl. I, 1842, lastly
amended by Art 7 Gesetz vom
21.07.2012, BGBl. I, 1566
Tarifvertragsgesetz in der Fassung
der Bekanntmachung vom 25. Au-
gust 1969 (BGBl. I S. 1323), das
zuletzt durch Artikel 88 des Ge-
setzes vom 8. Dezember 2010
(BGBl. I S. 1864) geändert worden
ist
Vereinbarung zwischen dem Bun-
desministerium der Finanzen der
Bundesrepublik Deutschland und
dem Ministerium für Arbeit und
soziale Angelegenheiten der Tsche-
chischen Republik über die Zusam-
menarbeit bei der Bekämpfung
illegaler Beschäftigung, nicht ange-
meldeter Erwerbstätigkeit und ille-
galer grenzüberschreitender
Leiharbeit sowie damit in Zusam-
menhang stehendem grenzüber-
schreitenden Missbrauch von
Sozialleistungen und der Nichtab-
führung von Sozialversicherungs-
beiträgen v. 6. Juli 2010, BGBl. II
2010, 154
Verordnung zu dem Vertrag
zwischen der Bundesrepublik
Deutschland und der Republik Ös-
terreich über die Zusammenarbeit
bei der Bekämpfung grenzüber-
schreitender Schwarzarbeit und il-
legaler grenzüberschreitender
Leiharbeit v. 11. Juni 2012, BGBl.
II 2013, 104
Vertrag zwischen der Bundesrepu-
blik Deutschland und der Republik
Bulgarien über die Zusammenar-
beit bei der Bekämpfung des grenz-
überschreitenden Missbrauchs bei
Leistungen und Beiträgen zur so-
zialen Sicherheit durch Erwerbstä-
tigkeit und von nicht angemeldeter
Erwerbstätigkeit sowie bei illegaler
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grenzüberschreitender Leiharbeit
v. 10. Juli 2010, BGBl. II 2010, 771
Verwaltungsvereinbarung
zwischen dem Bundesministerium
für Arbeit und Sozialordnung der
Bundesrepublik Deutschland und
dem Ministerium für Beschäftigung
und Solidarität der Französischen
Republik über die Zusammenarbeit
bei der Bekämpfung von nicht an-
gemeldeter Erwerbstätigkeit und
des grenzüberschreitenden Miss-
brauchs bei mit einer Erwerbstätig-
keit verbundenen Sozialleistungen
sowie auf dem Gebiet der grenz-
überschreitenden Leiharbeit v. 2.
Juli 2001, BGBl. II 2001, 721
Zivilprozessordnung in der Fas-
sung der Bekanntmachung vom 5.
Dezember 2005 (BGBl. I S. 3202;
2006 I S. 431; 2007 I S. 1781), die
durch Artikel 1 des Gesetzes vom
8. Juli 2014 (BGBl. I S. 890) geändert
worden ist
Zweites SGB IV-Änderungsgesetz,
21.12.2008, BGBl. I, 2933
German policy documents
BT-Drs. 6/2303, Entwurf eines Ge-
setzes zur Regelung der gewerbs-
mäßigen Arbeitnehmerüberlassung
(Gesetzentwurf der Bundesregie-
rung), 15.06.1971
BT-Drs. 13/8994, Beschlußempfeh-
lung und Bericht des Ausschusses
für Arbeit und Sozialordnung (11.
Ausschuß), Entwurf eines Ersten Ge-
setzes zur Änderung des Dritten
Buches Sozialgesetzbuch und an-
derer Gesetze (Erstes SGB III - Än-
derungsgesetz -1. SGB III – ÄndG),
12.11.1997
BT-Drs. 14/45, Gesetzentwurf der
Fraktionen SPD und Bündnis 90/
Die Grünen, Entwurf eines Ge-
setzes zu Korrekturen in der Sozial-
versicherung, 17.11.1998
BT-Drs. 17/464, Unterrichtung
durch die Bundesregierung, Elfter
Bericht der Bundesregierung über
Erfahrungen bei der Anwendung
des Arbeitnehmerüberlassungsge-
setzes (AÜG), 18.01.2010
BT-Drs. 17/2236, Kontrolle und
Umsetzung des Arbeitnehmerüber-
lassungsgesetzes, 18.06.2010
BT-Drs. 17/2510, Antwort der
Bundesregierung, auf die Kleine
Anfrage, 8.07.2010
BT-Drs. 17/4951, Kleine Anfrage,
Arbeitnehmerfreizügigkeit ab dem
1. Mai 2011 – Konsequenzen und
Handlungsnotwendigkeiten,
25.02.2011
BT-Drs. 17/5132, Antwort der Bun-
desregierung, Arbeitnehmerfreizü-
gigkeit ab dem 1. Mai 2011 –
Konsequenzen und Handlungsnot-
wendigkeiten, 18.03.2011
BT-Drs. 17/5177, Antrag, Arbeit-
nehmerfreizügigkeit sozial gestal-
ten, 22.03.2011
BT-Drs. 17/5761, Entwurf eines Ge-
setzes zur Änderung des Arbeit-
nehmerüberlassungsgesetzes und
des Schwarzarbeitsbekämpfungs-
gesetzes, 10.05.2011
BT-Drs. 17/6219, Ergebnisse der
Finanzkontrolle Schwarzarbeit,
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Antwort der Bundesregierung,
14.06.2011
BT-Drs. 17/7167, Antwort der Bun-
desregierung auf die Kleine An-
frage, Kontrollen in der Leiharbeit,
27.09.2011
BT-Drs. 17/12834, Mindestlöhne
durchsetzen, Qualität der Kontrol-
len verbessern, Antwort der Bun-
desregierung, 20.03.2013
BT-Drs. 18/223, Soziale Rechte
bulgarischer und rumänischer EU-
Bürgerinnen und –Bürger in
Deutschland, Antwort der Bundes-
regierung, 20.12.2013
BT-Drs. 18/673, Zwölfter Bericht
der Bundesregierung über Erfah-
rungen bei der Anwendung des
Arbeitnehmerüberlassungsgeset-
zes, Unterrichtung durch den Bun-
destag, 26.02.2014
BT-Drs. 18-1885, Entwurf eines Ge-
setzes zur Stärkung der Tarifauto-
nomie (Tarifautonomiestärkungs-
gesetz), 28.05.2014
BT-Ausschussdrucksache 17(11)/
446, Änderungsantrag der Fraktio-
nen der CDU/CSU und der FDP
zum Entwurf eines Ersten Gesetzes
zur Änderung des Arbeitnehmer-
überlassungsgesetzes - Verhinde-
rung von Missbrauch der Arbeit-
nehmerüberlassung (BT-Drs. 17/
4804), 15.03.2011
BT-Ausschussdrucksache 17(11)776
neu, Zusammenstellung der schrift-
lichen Stellungnahmen, 7.02.2012
BR-Drs. 622/07, Gesetzesantrag
des Landes Rheinland-Pfalz von
dem Entwurf eines Gesetzes über
die Festsetzung des Mindestlohns,
4.09.2007
BT-Plenarprotokoll 18/46,
3.07.0214
BR-Plenarprotokoll 924. Sitzung,
11.07.2014
Swedish regulations
Lag om privat arbetsförmedling
och uthyrning av arbetskraft
(1993:440), last amended by Lag
(2012:856)
Lag om utstationering av arbetsta-
gare (1999:678), last amended by
Lag (2013:351)
Semesterlagen (1977:480), last
amended by Lag (2014:424)
Lag om uthyrning av arbetstagare
(2012:854), last amended by Lag
(2014:961)
Lag om medbestämmande i arbets-
livet (1976:580), as last amended by
Lag (2013:615)
Lag om rättegången i arbetstvister
(1974:371), as lastly amended by
Lag (2010:1448)
Lag om grupprättegång (2002:599)
Rättshjälplag (1996:1619), lastly
amended by Lag (2014:329)
Utlänningslag (2005:716), lastly
amended by Lag (2014:792)
Lag om utländska filialer (1992:160),
as lastly amended by Lag (2014:842)
Förordning om anmälningsskyl-
dighet vid utstationering av arbet-
stagare (2013:352)
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Swedish policy documents
Dir. 2008:38, Konsekvenser och åt-
gärder med anledning av Laval-do-
men, 10 april 2008
Dir. 2012:92, Utstationering på
svensk arbetsmarknad, 27 septem-
ber 2012
Ds. 2011:22, Anmälningsskyldighet
vid utstationering samt förtydli-
gande avseende missbruk av vis-
stidsanställningar enligt anställn-
ingsskyddslagen, 7 juli 2011
Prop. 1990/91:162, Om vissa freds-
pliktregler, 27 mars 1991
Prop. 1998/99:90, Utstationering av
arbeitstagare, 4 mars 1999
Prop. 2009/10:48, Åtgärder med
anledning av Lavaldomen, 10 no-
vember 2009
Prop. 2011/12:178, Lag om uthyrn-
ing av arbetstagare, 18 september
2012
Prop. 2012/13:71, Anmälningsskyl-
dighet vid utstationering, 14 feb-
ruari 2013
SOU 2008:123, Förslag till åtgärder
med anledning av Lavaldomen, 12
december 2008
SOU 2010:46, Utländsk näringsverk-
samhet i Sverige: En översyn av
lagstiftningen om utländska filialer
i ett EU-perspectiv, 14 februari 2013
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industrial relations 1.1.1; 2.2.3; 6.4.2
judicial 1.1.1; 2.2.3; 5.2.3; 6.5.3
EU enlargements 1.1.2; 1.5; 5.4.2; 7.2.2; 7.3.2
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